James Edmondstoune

PALLAS ARMATA.

Military Essayes
Of the ANCIENT
GRECIAN,
ROMAN,
AND
MODERN
ART of WAR.

Written in the Years 1670 and 1671.

By Sir JAMES TURNER, Knight.

Scotch David Dalyell

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PRUDENTIA IN ADVERSIS
George Tollet Esqr.

TO HIS

Royal Highneſs

JAMES

Duke of ALBANY and YORK,

His MAJESTIES only Brother.

May it pleaſe your Royal Highneſs,

THE Dedication of Books hath been ſo old, and ſtill is ſo univerſal a cuſtome, that to diſallow it, would be perhaps look'd upon as affecting Singularity a little too much; yet I could never learn any convincing reaſon for that Practice. The greateſt Monarchs

that ever liv'd could not protect Books from Cenſure: and, I think, it were againſt reaſon they ſhould; for except in matters of Faith and State, (and not in them neither, where the Almighty and his Vicegerents have ſet no limits,) no reſtraint ſhould be laid on Men, to hinder their embracing and enjoying their own Opinions, and arguing againſt thoſe of others. Wherefore I ſhall not be guilty of ſo high a preſumption, as to beg from your Royal Highneſs the Patrociny of this Work of mine; in which, I have not the Vanity to doubt but that there may be many more Errors than I can well help. Nor ſhall I carry my Preſumption to ſo extravagant a pitch, as to deſire your Royal Highneſs to caſt your Princely Eye on any thing contain'd in this Treatiſe; You have given the World too publick demonſtrations, how great a Maſter you are in the Art of War, to go to thoſe Schools again, eſpecially to learn from ſuch as I am: And now in this happy calm under his Majeſties moſt merciful Government, You are giving ſignal proofs of your great deſire of Peace, notwithſtanding your abilities and skill in War. I could enlarge my ſelf much on this Head, without coming within the ſuſpicion of Flattery, a ſordid Vice in all Men, more eſpecially in thoſe who profeſs Arms. But my only deſign in this

this Humble Addreſs is, with moſt ſubmiſſive thankfulneſs, to acknowledge the Princely favours, you have ſo Nobly, but I am afraid undeſervedly, beſtowed upon me; and to declare how ready I am to venture what remains of a Life, now almoſt worn out, in making all thoſe dutiful returns that become,

May it pleaſe your Royal Highneſs,

Your moſt Humble, moſt Faithful,

and moſt Obedient Servant,

JAMES TURNER.

TO

TO THE

Generous Reader.

IF the Subjects of *Great Britain* and *Ireland* live in ſo profound a repoſe, that they ſcarce hear the woful crys of their Neighbours, haraſs'd and oppreſt by that dreadful Monſter *War*, that great Boar of the Foreſt, which makes deſolate Cities and Provinces, ſo that their Sleep is not broke by the unſeaſonable ſound of Trumpets, and the rattling of Drums, nor are they frighted out of their Houſes (I had almoſt ſaid, out of their Wits) by the ſudden Infalls and Attacks of a fierce Enemy; they have good reaſon to bleſs and praiſe the God of Peace for ſo great a happineſs, and with a thankful acknowledgement, pray for his Vicegerent, the King, underr whoſe auſpicious raign they enjoy theſe *Halcyon* days, and under whoſe Government, if they cannot ſit under their own Fig-trees and Vines, at leaſt they may eat the Fruit of the one, and drink the Juice of the other in Peace and Quiet. Yet let them remember, that War follows Peace, as naturally as Night does follow Day; and that after a ſweet calm, a dreadful ſtorm is to be looked for, againſt which the wary Pilot carefully provides. If you think I do hereby invite all Gallant Spirits in time of Peace, to provide themſelves for War, you are not at all deceiv'd: I do indeed deſire, that when War comes unexpectedly (as often it does) it may not find brave men ſurpriz'd, and to need inſtruction in thoſe neceſſary

Military

Military things, which they might have learn'd before at full leiſure.

If you be one of thoſe, who either already knows, or imagines you do know all the rules of the Ancient and Modern Art of War; Or if you be one of thoſe who deſire to know neither of them, I ſhall adviſe you, to ſave your ſelf the Money to buy, and the trouble to read this trifle of mine. It is with none of you that it ſeeks acquaintance, it walks in another Stage. It is to you, Young Lords and Gentlemen, it makes its humble addreſs; It is to you, Generous Souls, that it offers its ſervice: And it is from you (whoſe birth entitles you to Martial Exerciſes) that it expects a fair welcome and entertainment. Moſt, or many of you will not learn theſe Peaceable Arts and Sciences, without which no Principality or Republick can well or long ſubſiſt; and all of you cannot be admitted to the Stern of Government, or permitted to ſit at the Kings Council-board: It will be therefore for you to conſider, how you can ſerve your Prince and Countrey but by Arms. The ancienteſt of you all derive your Pedegree from thoſe who bore Arms, it is by Arms you had your Honour, and it is by Arms you are bound now to maintain it. I ſhall not bid you look to thoſe of your own rank and quality in *France*, who glory to learn the Military Art from them, and yet their example deſerves imitation; but I ſhall entreat you to follow the footſteps of your Martial Anceſtors, and account it more honour for you by Warlike Exploits to ſhew you are their Worthy Succeſſors, than to pretend to it only by a vain muſter of their old Charters, Patents, and Commiſſions. If this prevail not with you, then ſet before your eyes, but at a very great diſtance, the Moſt Illuſtrious Prince *James*, Duke of *Albany* and *York*; no mortal can boaſt of a higher Birth and Extraction, yet that did not hinder him in his younger years to learn the true Art to fight Battels both at Sea and Land, which hath made him now ſo famous all the World over. Nor do I deſire you to reſt ſatisfied when you know indifferently well to exerciſe Companies, Troops or Regiments of Horſe and Foot, though that be both good and neceſſary; let there be a *plus ultra* with you, and endeavour to know all that belongs to a compleat Souldier; for you are indeed the ſtock out of which

our

our Soveraign ſhould chuſe his Military Commanders, and then there will be the leſs need of ſuch perſons as I am, whom the World nick-names *Souldiers of Fortune*. Remember it is not your Native Courage and Valour (though that be an eſſential part) though every one of you were as ſtout as ever *Hector* was ſaid to be, that will ſerve your turn; it is knowledge in Martial affairs that you are to learn; and though the Art of War be a Practical one, yet the Theory is ſo needful, that without it you may be Common Souldiers good enough, but not good Commanders; you are to know more than you daily ſee; for it is a ſign of a very mean Officer, when he tells you he likes not ſuch a thing, becauſe he never ſaw it before. I wiſh with all my heart, that this following Treatiſe may afford you ſome help to ſo noble a Study: In it I give you few, or rather no rules of my own, I am not ſo vain; but I go very far back to ſearch for them in all the remains of Antiquity: And let it not offend you, that I illuſtrate Rules and Cuſtomes of War by ſeveral Inſtances; I do it purpoſely becauſethe Nature of Man is rather led by Example, than driven by Precept: *This* ſeems to impoſe, *that* only to invite to a Noble Emulation: Beſides, the right or wrong doing of an action, with all its circumſtances, is better clear'd by the firſt, than by the laſt. And if I ſeem to claſh with the old Maſters, or new Tacticks of the Ancient or Modern Art of War, I give my Reaſons for it, which you may either approve or diſapprove as you pleaſe, without doing me the leaſt injury. When I tell my own opinion of Military Cuſtomes, looking back as far as I could find any glimmering light of Hiſtory to direct me; I give alſo my Reaſons, which you may likewiſe reject if you pleaſe, for by ſo doing I ſhall neither be condemn'd for Hereſie nor Schiſm.

If any Gentlemans curioſity leads him to enquire, Why I Print this Book? I ſhall Anſwer him firſt, I can ſincerely aſſure him, Vanity to make my ſelf known in the World puſh'd me not to it, elſe I had not let it lye unprinted by me ten whole Years after firſt I wrote it. Next, very few could importune me to publiſh it, ſince very few did know I had writ it. Nor did I, indeed, make it publick to diſabuſe ſome gay men, by letting them ſee they knew no

more than their Neighbours; and yet the doing ſo had been Charity, if my offer had been receiv'd as kindly as I intended it. The conſideration that induced me to it was in ſhort this, When I had ended all I had reſolv'd to ſay of the *Grecian* and *Roman* Art of War, and durſt not hazzard on the vaſt Ocean of the Modern Art, I was encourag'd to proceed to that, and to bring all I intended, to as great perfection as I could, by a great Maſter, and good Judge in thoſe affairs: And when I had done ſo, that Noble Perſon, after my concealment of it ſome years, deſir'd to peruſe it; and as he had perſwaded me to finiſh, ſo he prevail'd with me to publiſh theſe Eſſays: But be pleas'd to know, he was ſuch a one as his Majeſty had made choice of in the year 1666. to command his *Scottiſh* Army, towards the end whereof he routed the Rebels at *Pentland*: The very ſame Perſon was again entruſted by his Majeſty, with the conduct of his Forces, in the year 1679. and continues ſtill in that Command, and is well enough known by the Name of General *Dalyell*. But I am afraid you may ask me, What mov'd me to begin to write theſe Diſcourſes? But for that, if I were put to the Rack till I give you my Reaſon, I could give no other than this, That being out of employment, and not accuſtom'd to an idle life, I knew not how to paſs away my ſolitary and retired hours with a more harmleſs divertiſement.

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PALLAS



PALLAS ARMATA.

Military Eſſays
ON THE
ANCIENT
AND
GRECIAN
ART of WAR.

CHAP. I.

Of the Ancient Militia in General.

PEACE is the choiceſt of all Earthly Bleſſings: One Peace is better than innumerable Triumphs: It is that Bleſſing which carries all other external ones in its Boſome; without it no man can ſay he either enjoys himſelf, or any thing he might call his own. The terrible Wars which our Paſſions raiſe within our Breaſts againſt our Reaſon, make us cry to Heaven for that inward Peace, whereof neither Man nor Devil can bereave us. Even ſo, thoſe people, among whom the ſeat of War is, ſend up their frequent Petitions to the God of Peace, to remove that dreadful Scourge from them; but the pity is, when their Prayers are heard, and that they have obtain'd the ſo much deſir'd and long'd for Peace, few or none of them ſtudy to preſerve ſo ineſtimable a Jewel. Peace a choice Bleſſing.

Many Nations have, and do this day enjoy a quiet Peace, but ſeldome or never had the whole habitable World a general Ceſſation of Arms, but when *Auguſtus* ſhut the Temple of *Janus*: And it was fit that it ſhould be ſo then, when the Prince of Peace was to deſcend from the Manſions of Peace, to enter the Womb of the Immaculate Virgin. But it is not my Work to deſcant of Peace, the Elogies whereof have been loudly enough proclaimed many Ages ago.

War a horrible Curſe.

If Peace be ſo great a Bleſſing, it will follow, that War muſt be a very heavy Curſe, and ſo, no doubt, it is. It carries all evils, and all plagues in the Belly of it; it extirpates Families, deſtroys Nations, and drains Provinces of both Men and Money; it breaks up and diſſolves Humane Societies, and it tramples on all Laws, both Divine and Humane, except that of the longeſt Sword; or it makes them run all after it like Lacqueys. I believe, if the Prophet *Gad* had ſpoke nothing of Peſtilence, but given *David* his choice of War or Famine, the *Pſalmiſt* had undoubtedly choſen the laſt, as the leſs Plague. For, though all the three be from God; (for there is no evil in the City which is not from the Lord) yet War is but mediately from God, and immediately from Man: And the King of *Iſrael* choſe rather to fall into Gods hands than Mans. Beſides, both Peſtilence and Famine have been, and undoubtedly will be, in the World without War; but it is almoſt impoſſible, that War can be of any continuance in a Land, but it will draw after it both Peſtilence and Famine, as its inſeparable concomitants. Yet this dreadful and devouring Plague of War is not only permitted, but commanded by the Almighty, to dwell among the Sons of Men. Gods own choſen people were by his own appointment afflicted by it, and did alſo by that ſame authority afflict others with it.

Companions of War.

Private War.

Enmity and feud had its beginning in the World ſoon after its Creation, not only between the ſeed of the Woman and the Serpent, but between Man and Man, yea, Brother and Brother, *Cain* and *Abel*; neither doth it matter much, with what Weapon the one kill'd the other, ſince experience teacheth us, that man can be ſent to his Grave a thouſand ways without the help of a Sword. This was a Private War, which ſtill continues, and will laſt till time be no more, between Man and Man, and ſometimes, Family and Family. A Publick War is twofold, a Foreign and a Civil War. The Foreign is of one or more Nations againſt one or more Nations; if undertaken to encreaſe Dominion, conquer or enſlave others, or yet to hinder the growth of a neighbour Potentate, it is unjuſt. Of the juſtifying cauſes of a Foreign War, Authors are to be conſulted, that write purpoſely on that ſubject, particularly *Hugo Grotius*, *De jure Belli & Pacis*: let it be enough to ſay in this place with *Auguſtin*, that there can be no cauſe of a juſt War, but an injury done, whether it be to Princes, Subjects or Embaſſadours, and that no ſatisfaction, after it is required, can be got. And indeed this War ſhould be formally denounc'd, otherwiſe it derogates from the Juſtice of the cauſe. This to me ſeems clear from the definition the Civilians give of an Enemy, *Hoſtes* (ſay they) *ſunt qui nobis, aut quibus nos bellum decernimus; cæteri latrones, aut prædones ſunt: Thoſe are enemies, who either have denounc'd the War againſt us, or we againſt them; others are Thieves or Robbers.* And *Cicero* in his Offices, *Nullum Bellum eſt juſtum, niſi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur, aut denunciatum ante ſit, & indictum; No War is juſt, but what is made for reſtitution, or denounced or indicted before.* Neither will the War that *Joſhua* made againſt the ſeven Nations of the *Canaanites*, impugn what I have ſaid of the juſt cauſe of a War; for though theſe Nations had, perhaps, done no wrong to the *Iſraelites*, yet *Joſhua* had a particular Warrant from God for what he did, which few or none but he can pretend to. It is true, neither he nor *Moſes* were commanded to fight with the *Amalekites*, yet the Lord approved of it afterward.

Publick War.

When juſt.

Indictio Belli.

Joſhua his Wars.

The *Grecians* denounc'd their War by a *Caduceus*: The *Romans* by their *Feciales*, whoſe cuſtome was to ſtand on the *Roman* Territory, and throw a Spear or Javelin againſt the Land of thoſe whom they declared Enemies. In theſe later times, beſides the denunciation of the War, a Declaration (ordinarily, called a *Manifeſto*) is emitted by the Aggreſſor, whereby he either doth make the Juſtice of his War appear to the world, or at leaſt endeavours

vours it. And though the persons of Embassadours were wronged and violated against the Law of Nations, yet the War should be denounc'd by a Letter, or some such way, saith *Grotius*; yet we read not that *David* used any such previous civility to *Hanun* King of *Ammon*, after he had affronted his Embassadours.

A Civil War may be likewise two-fold, the one sort is of the great men of a Free State, one against another, as that of *Sylla* against *Marius*, Father and Son, and *Cæsar* against *Pompey*, Father and Son among the *Romans*; or in a Monarchy of those who are competitors for the Crown, as the War was between the Houses of *York* and *Lancaster*. The other is of Subjects against their Soveraigns, which can never be lawful, let the pretext be never so specious, I mean on the Subjects part; for I make no doubt, but a Soveraign, whether Prince or State, not only may, but ought by the power of the Sword to reduce their Rebellious Subjects to their Duty, when by no other means they can prevail with them. Both these kinds of Intestine Wars are called *Civil*, because they are *inter Cives unius Reipublicæ*; *Among the Citizens of one Common-wealth*. It is the worst of all Wars, and that wherein there is not so much as the least shadow of *Civility*. This War arms Brother against Brother, for which we need not search History for Examples: In this War the Son thinks he doth a meritorious work if he betrays his own Father; and the Father conceives he super-erogates, if he sheaths his Sword in his Sons Bowels, because, saith he, he did not rise to fight *the Lords Battels*, even perhaps *against the Lords anoimed*; for this War extinguisheth all natural affection among the neareſt in Blood. This sort of War sends Coblers and other Mechanicks to the Pulpits, to torture their Audience with Non-sence. This converts Souldiers into Preachers, who by vertue of their double callings, belch out Blasphemies against the great God of Heaven, and rebellious and opprobrious Speeches against his Vice-gerents on Earth. And on the other hand, this War metamorphoseth Preachers into Souldiers, and tells them, that a Corslet becomes them better than a Canonical Coat, and a broad Sword better than a long Gown: It whispers them in the ear, that Christ would not have bid those of his Disciples who had two Coats, sell one of them, and buy a Sword, if he had not intended to leave War as a Legacy to his followers, as well as Peace. It tells them, they ought in their Sermons to summon Subjects under the pain of eternal damnation, to rise in Arms against the Soveraign Power, because they are bidden *Curse* Meroz, *who would not come out to help the Lord against the Mighty*: Yet very few of them can tell you, whether *Meroz* was a Prince, a City, or a Countrey. But I dwell too long here.

Civil War twofold.

It is the worst of Wars.

Not long after the Flood we find numerous Armies raised by *Nimrod* and his ambitious Successors, to subject others of *Noah*'s race to their lawless dominion: And indeed, if the Stories of these very ancient times be true (as they are very much to be doubted) we read not of so great Armies (except some in Holy Writ) as those, which *Ninus*, and the famous *Semiramis*, and the Kings of *India*, whom she invaded, brought together. It is pity we should not know how they were armed, and in what order they fought: I suppose there were Wars in the World, before there was any to record them. The *Egyptians* wrote in Hieroglyphicks, and therefore, I believe, next to *Moses*, we are obliged to the *Grecians*, for giving us a glimpse of Antiquity. And truly, even they wrote the occasions, the causes, the beginnings, the progress, and issues of Wars so confusedly, and fabulously, that we can build but little on their relations, till themselves became renown'd by the stout resistance they made against the *Persian* Monarchy; and yet even then, they give us but little light, how other Nations, besides themselves, manag'd the War, what Art or Order they used in their Battels, or how their Combatants were Armed.

Ancient Histories fabulous.

The Sacred Story mentions no Battel fought after the Flood, or before it, till that of *Chaderlaomer*, and other three Kings, against the five Kings of the Plain. But we may presume, there were many bloody bickerings before that, when *Nimrod*, *Belus*, *Ninus* and *Semiramis* (if *Ninus* was not *Amraphel* one of the four Kings, whereof I much doubt) impos'd the yoke of Slavery on so many Nations. In this Battel fought in the plain of *Sodom* and *Gomorrha*,

The Battel of *Sodom.*

the five Kings were beaten, but how either they or their Adversaries fought, with what Arms, or in what Order, the History tells us nothing. The Conquerours carry away a great booty, and many Prisoners, and among them *Lot*, and the endeavouring his rescue, made the War just on his Uncle *Abrahams* side: He follows, and overthrows the four Kings, and brings back all the Goods and Prisoners. *Abraham* had no particular Warrant for this War, but it was approved, for thereafter *Melchizedec*, the Priest of the most High God, blessed him; nor was it needful for the Father of the Faithful to denounce the War, because he look'd upon himself there, as an Ally, if not a Subject of some of the five Kings, particularly him of *Sodom*. The Text makes this action of *Abraham* a surprizal; for it is said, he smote them in the night. We find he Armed three hundred and eighteen of his own Servants, but with what kind of Arms, either for Offence or Defence, we know not; and yet it would seem, his Servants had learned to handle their Arms, for some of our Translations have it, He armed his train'd Servants. By this place of Scripture, it appears that these Kings had fought together before, (because it is said, the five Kings rebell'd against *Chaderlaomer*, whom they had serv'd twelve years; now it is more than probable, they had fought at least once with him, before they offer'd to do homage to him, but *Moses* mentions not that, as not being to his purpose, his design there being only to give us the Story of *Abraham*.

Egyptians good Warriours.

Pharaoh follow'd the *Israelites* with six hundred chosen Chariots, saith *Moses*; and with two hundred thousand Foot, and fifty thousand Horse, saith *Josephus*: but how these Chariots, these Horse, and these Foot were arm'd, what order they kept in their pursuit, or what discipline they had, neither the one nor the other tells us. But we may suppose well enough that the *Egyptians* were well armed, and knew the Art of War; and that *Joshua* and other Captains of the people of *Israel*, might have learned from them the contemplative part of their Military skill, which afterward they practis'd on those Nations they were ordain'd to root out. And if the Kings of *Egypt* had War with the *Ethiopians* while the *Israelites* were under them, I make no doubt, but many of them serv'd in these Wars. *Xenophon* commends very much both the valour and the skill of those *Egyptians* who were with *Cræsus*, at that Battel which he fought with *Cyrus*: And it is very like that the *Grecians* themselves got the rudiments of their Art of War in *Egypt*, as well as of other liberal Sciences; and it is like, *Lycurgus* taught the Rules of the Military Art to his *Spartans*, which he had learned from the *Egyptians*, as well as he did other civil constitutions. From the *Lacedæmonians* did the *Thebans* learn their discipline of War. The *Theban Epaminondas* and *Pelopidas* taught it to *Philip* of *Macedon*, and he to his Son, the Great *Alexander*, whose glorious acts obscured all the famous exploits of the rest of the *Grecians*. We need not doubt each of these added something of their own to what they had learned, for by such means all Arts come to perfection.

So were the *Spartans.*

Facile est inventis addere.

CHAP. II.

Of the Arms, and Order of War of the Ancients.

TO find out the Arms, or Art of War of these Ancient Nations, whether *Jews* or *Gentiles*, till the *Grecians* wrote their own actions, we have very little light. To begin with the *Israelites*. In the foregoing Chapter I observed, that their great Patriarch *Abraham*, fought with four Kings and routed them; he was, no doubt, the first, but not the last of the race of *Heber*, who fought a Battel. I told you also, it is not known how he armed his servants and followers. That all or some of them had Swords, is no more but a probable conjecture, for we do not read of that Weapon in Scripture or any other Book, till *Simeon* and *Levi* (who were *Abrahams* great Grand-children) covering

Swords.

vering their cruel revenge with the cloak of Religion, (of so old a date is that mischievous practice) destroy'd the *Sechemites* with Swords; for it is said, Each man took his Sword.

That the *Israelites* had Arms, wherewith they fought against *Sihon* and *Og*, and other people, is not at all to be doubted: In the Wilderness they could not get them; and therefore, I think, that they brought them out of *Egypt* with them, should be no question; but how they came by them, to me is a very great question. For I think it not at all probable, that those Kings or those *Pharaohs*, who so grievously oppress'd them, would suffer so many hundred thousands of them to be arm'd, no more, than afterwards the *Philistines*, when they had the upper hand, would suffer a Smith to dwell in *Israel*. For my part, I believe, at their coming out of *Egypt*, they borrow'd all manner of Arms from the *Egyptians*, as well as they did better movables, for they had alike right to all.

But what kind of Arms they used, when they fought with those Nations whom they extirpated, what Art or Order they used in their Marches and Battels, both before and after they came to the Land of Promise, we are yet to learn: yet we find mention'd, for the Offensive, Swords, Javelins, and Spears; and for the Defensive, Targets and Shields (I suppose Head pieces could not be wanting) are recorded to have been in the Magazines of their several Kings; nor did they want their great Artillery of Balists, and Catapults, as shall be declared in its proper place. Yet, if all the *Philistines*, according to their several Statures, were proportionably arm'd as their Champion *Goliah* was, and all the *Israelites* as well arm'd as their Neighbours the *Philistines*, we may safely conclude, they were as well arm'd every jot, as the *Grecians* or *Macedonians* were afterwards. We find likewise they had Chariots; but how many, or how arm'd or order'd, we know not. We may also probably conjecture, their Files were ten deep, when they marshall'd their Batallions, for I find they had Companies and Regiments much about the number of those of our latest modern Wars: for we read of Captains of thousands, who were such as our Colonels; Captains of hundreds, who were Centurions, and like our private Captains; Captains of fifties, such as our Lieutenants. It is pity, *Josephus* (who was a great Captain himself) did not transmit the Military Art of his Countrey-men to posterity, it had been worth his labour.

Arms of the *Israelites*.

Their Order.

As little, or indeed less light doth any Author afford us to know the Arms, Order, and Discipline of the *Assyrians*, to whom the first Monarchy is given, by the universal consent of History. But we find, that not only they, but the *Persians*, *Indians*, and other Nations used Elephants and Chariots.

Assyrians.

The Elephant of *India* is said to be a far more couragious Beast than that of *Africk*: They are yet made use of in the Wars of that Countrey. Of old they carried wooden Towers on their backs, wherein were lodged armed men, who threw Darts and Javelins among the bands of the enemies, through which these dreadful Creatures were furiously driven, who of themselves were sufficiently able to break the strongest and best compos'd Squadrons of armed men: But when they were gall'd and wounded, and turned head, then they did that mischief to their Masters, that was intended for the Enemy. The *Romans*, before their Wars in *Greece*, made no use of them; and though at first *Pyrrhus* terrified them with the sight of these, indeed, terrible Beasts; yet thereafter they found means to wound them, or by making lanes and streets for them, to render their fury so useless, that they got but little hurt by them. But for all this, I cannot have faith enough to believe what *Livy* reports, that an armed Souldier enter'd into combat with an Elephant, and that the Beast grapled him with his Trunk about the middle, and cast him up in the air, but that the Souldier falling with little or no hurt, wounded the Beast with his Sword. I should be of opinion, that such a hug as that might have crush'd both the Souldiers Corslet and his Bones, till the Marrow came out; for in his Trunk (which the *Latines* call *Proboscis*) there is such strength, that therewith, as some write, he is able to fell Trees; or I think, the Elephant might have toss'd his Duellist so high in the air, that the very fall should have dash'd him in pieces. But *Livy* did no more see this Romantick combat, than he saw showers of Blood

The Elephants.

and

and Stones, which he writes rain'd frequently among the Territories of the *Romans* and their Allies.

Chariots in ancient times had ſometimes Scythes on both ſides of them, ſometimes none. *Xenophon* writes that before *Cyrus* time, the *Trojans* and *Aſſyrians*, and thereafter the *Cyrenians* uſed Chariots drawn with four Horſes, in every one whereof was only one Combatant, and a Driver or Coachman. This faſhion ſeem'd to *Cyrus*, of no greater advantage than to skirmiſh a little, but did not at all help to beat an Enemy rang'd in Battel: Therefore he aboliſh'd it, and order'd his Chariots to be made with ſtrong and broad Axle-trees, to both ſides of which were faſten'd Braſs or Iron Scythes; next he put armed men within the Chariots, who in the charge diſcharg'd luſtily their miſſile Weapons, wherewith he took care that they ſhould be well ſtored: and with theſe he did not only ſometimes skirmiſh, but for moſt part charg'd furiouſly the Enemies ſtrongeſt and cloſeſt Bodies and Batallions.

Chariots.

Egyptian Arms.

The *Egyptians* Arms for the Offenſive, were great and maſſy Spears, ſaith *Xenophon*, but how long they were, he doth not tell; and for the Defenſive, they had Shields of Braſs, of ſuch a largeneſs, that therewith they cover'd both their Bodies and their Legs. They marſhall'd their men one hundred in File, and when this was told to *Cyrus*, he made himſelf merry with it, and ſaid, he wiſh'd all his Enemies would draw up a thouſand deep, for ſo they ſhould be the more eaſily ſurrounded, their flanks ſooner attack'd, and conſequently, ſaid he, I ſhould have the cheaper market of them. By what that ſame Author ſaith, it would ſeem, the *Egyptians* drew up conſtantly an hundred deep; for when *Cræſus* deſir'd them to change, they anſwered, They would not alter their Countrey faſhion. Yet I conjecture, the *Egyptian* cuſtome hath been to marſhal their Batallions by the ſquare root, for here I find their Body conſiſted of ten thouſand men, and they perhaps being deſirous to make a ſquare of men, (which is to have as many in File as Rank) have embatteli'd them, a hundred in each; for a hundred times a hundred produceth ten thouſand. Of the Square Root I ſhall ſpeak hereafter.

Their Order.

Arms of the ancient *Perſians.*

The *Perſians* that ſerv'd on Foot in *Cyrus*'s time carried for the Defenſive, a Head-piece, Corſlet, and a little Target; and for the Offenſive, a Sword and a Curtle-axe, beſides their Darts and Stones. His Cuiraſſiers and Light-horſe were arm'd as the *Grecians* were, whereof I ſhall ſpeak in the next Chapter. In his time, the *Sacans* and *Carduſians*, a people dwelling near *Perſia*, were excellent Bow-men on Horſe-back, whoſe off-ſpring, in all probability, were thoſe *Parthians*, who by their valour and skill in that manner of fight, routed the Army of the *Roman* Conſul *Craſſus*, and kill'd himſelf; and put *Mark Anthony* to ſo ſhameful a retreat, and ſo near a danger of evident ruine, that oftner than once he offer'd to rid himſelf of that impending diſgrace by Self-Murther, as *Plutarch* in his Life relates. *Cyrus*, who was the firſt *Perſian* Monarch, did not adhere to one conſtant number of Ranks; for ſometimes he drew up his Batallions ten in File; and it is like, he obſerv'd that moſt, for he had Myriarchs, who had the command of ten thouſand; Chiliarchs, who were Colonels of thouſands; and Centeniers, who were Captains of hundreds; all which may infer ten deep. Yet in *Xenophons* ſecond Book, we find *Cyrus* his *Perſians* to be twelve in File; and his Batallions, when he fought with *Cræſus*, were four and twenty deep; and indeed that was deep enough: Perhaps in the marſhalling his ſeveral Bodies, he hath ſometimes made uſe of the Square Root: But the King of *Lydia*, in that ſame Battel which he fought with *Cyrus*, made both his Horſe and Foot thirty deep, except the *Egyptians* I ſpoke of, who were an hundred in File, as I told you formerly. What more I have to ſay of any point of War uſed by any other ancient Nation, either before, or in the time of either the *Grecian* or the *Roman* greatneſs, ſhall be interwoven in the diſcourſes of the Militia of theſe two famous Nations.

Their Order.

Lydians.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of the Election, Levy, and Arms Offensive and Defensive, of the Grecians.

SInce we have found out but little of the true Militia of other Ancient Nations, let us take a survey of the *Grecian* Art of War, which hath been in many ages, and still is so much spoken of. And herein we must borrow all our help from *Ælian*, who, you will find, hath given it us very sparingly. For though we have the works of *Homer*, and that he is accounted the first Heathen Author, who wrote any thing of formed Battels; yet we are not to expect much light from so blind a Lanthorn. *Polybius*, though a *Grecian*, and a Captain, contributes nothing to our assistance, but what we are glad to glean from the scattered drops of his Pen. The rest of the *Grecian* Tacticks nam'd by *Ælian* in his Treatise, are lost, except some pieces of *Æneas*, translated into *Latine* seventy years ago by *Casaubon*, which Sir *Thomas Kellie* thought were likewise perish'd. But truly we need not much regret that loss, if that which *Ælian* (who perus'd them all) tells us, be true, that they wrote not, as if they intended to instruct those who were ignorant and desirous to learn; but as to those who were already Proficients, who understood the words and terms of Art, and who knew the practice of the *Grecian* War, as well as the Authors themselves.

Grecian Tacticks lost.

And no matter.

All Armies and Forces were rais'd by a Levy called ordinarily in ancient times, and still very properly, an Election. And truly, I am sorry I should so soon have occasion to expostulate with *Ælian*, who hath forgot to tell us that, of which he should have given us a particular information, and in the first place too; that is, how the levies of the *Grecian* Souldiers, either of Horse or Foot, were made, at what age they were enroll'd in the Militia, and how long they were obliged to serve. Of these particulars I shall tell my Reader, that *Lipsius* out of *Demosthemes*, saith, that none were elected till they were eighteen years old (this was a year later than the *Romans* chose theirs) and that they were bound to serve till the five and fortieth year of their age. But *Ulpian* saith, that the *Athenians* did indeed elect and enrol their Souldiers when they were eighteen years old, but made them only do Military duties within their own territories (which was, upon the matter, to train them) till they were twenty. After that, they were bound to serve in foreign expeditions till they were forty, and then they were dismiss'd. I think it strange, they would dismiss men in the very strength of their age; I should rather think, they then only left it to the Souldiers choice, to serve longer or not, as they pleas'd, but did not by any publick act or ordinance disable or incapacitate them to serve longer in the War. I find also in Authors, that the *Greeks* had an especial care (as all Nations should) to chuse persons, who as members apt for several functions, were fit to compose the great Body of their *Phalanx*: For many can serve on Foot, who would make but bad Horse-men; and many are able enough to carry a piece of light Armour, and Offensive Weapons, who cannot bear the burthen of Head-piece, Corslet, Greeves, Taslets, and Targets. And this is shortly all I can say of the *Grecians* Election of their Souldiers.

Ælians omission.

Grecian levy.

The Ancient *Greeks* compos'd their Armies of Horse-men, Foot-men, Chariots, and Elephants. Of the two last I have spoken. We are now to see how the other two were armed.

The Foot-men were divided into those who carried heavy Arms, and those who were light arm'd; and so were the Horse; and both the heavy arm'd Foot and Horse were called *Cataphracti*, and the light arm'd Foot had the denomination of *Velites*. The heavy arm'd Foot had for the Defensive, a Head-piece, a Corslet, Greeves, and a Target; this last was round and hollow in the middle, more than two Foot and a half in diameter; this the Souldier carried on his Back all the time of his march; but when he was to fight,

Defensive Arms for the heavy armed Foot.

fight, by a wry of his Body he made it fall on his left ſhoulder, and preſenting his Pike with his left foot formoſt, his whole Body, till below the knee, was covered with his Target: All theſe Arms were of Braſs, and ſo were their Boots, which defended their Legs; for *Homer* tells us often of his *bene ocreati Archivi*. I cannot tell whether both their Legs were Booted, it may be only the left, becauſe moſt ſubject to danger. Inſtead of Braſs Targets, the Great *Alexander* gave Silver ones to thoſe *Veteran Phalangites*, who had helped him well to obtain ſo many glorious Victories; and thoſe who carried them were called *Argyraſpides*, or Silver Shields. Every man who carried a Shield had ſome Device on it, according to his own fancy; and I have read that one cauſed to be painted on his Shield a Fly, of as little a proportion as a living Fly is, and ſo ſcarce diſtinguiſhable on ſo great a Shield, for which his fellows and companions mock'd him, and ſaid, He had done ſo, that his Device not being diſcernable, he might not be purſued by an Enemy: but he anſwer'd, That his intention was to advance ſo near an Enemy, that any of them might ſee and perceive it was the picture of a Fly.

Offenſive. The Offenſive Weapon for the heavy arm'd Foot, was a ſtrong Pike, ordinarily eighteen foot long, but the *Macedonian* was of one and twenty, and was called *Sariſſa*; theſe three foot of greater length gave a great advantage to thoſe who carried them, for aſſuredly, the longer the Pike is, it is the better, ſo it be manageable, as ſhall be ſaid hereafter: and therefore a Pike of four and twenty foot long, would have had the advantage of that of one and twenty. A good ſhearing Sword was alſo a Weapon for the *Cataphracts*, both Foot and Horſe, though

Omiſſion of *Ælian*. *Ælian*, in all the accounts he gives us of the *Grecian* Armies or Arms, ſpeaks not one word of a Sword. Perhaps he thought we were obliged to conceive, that all Souldiers were *Sword-men*.

Velites how armed. The *Grecian Velites*, or light arm'd Foot, for moſt part had no Defenſive Arms. Their Offenſive Weapons were Swords, Javelins, Darts, Arrows, and Stones, which they threw, both out of their Hands, and out of Slings: Some of them had alſo a ſhort Spear; and for Defence, a little Target, which the *Macedonians* called *Pelta*: But thoſe who carried them needed not make a third ſpecies of the Infantry, as *Ælian* ſeems to inſinuate; theſe

Peltati. *Peltati* being nothing but light armed Foot; for the beſt arm'd of them, were not ſo well arm'd Defenſively, as the worſt arm'd of the *Roman Velites*; who notwithſtanding were but reckon'd among the light arm'd Infantry. And indeed I wonder, why any of the *Grecians*, at leaſt of the *Macedonians*, ſhould have wanted theſe *Pelta*, or little Targets, with which they ought likewiſe to have had Head-pieces or Morrions, as moſt of the *Roman Velites* had.

The *Grecian* Cavalry was likewiſe divided into two ſorts; the heavy arm'd, and light arm'd. The heavy arm'd were called *Cataphracti*, a word which both the *Romans*, and all other Nations, have borrowed from the *Greeks*; and though it be common to both Horſe and Foot, yet they have appropriated it only to the heavy arm'd Horſe-men. And here my Reader may obſerve, that theſe words *Cataphracts*, *Gens d' Arms*, Men of Arms, heavy arm'd Horſe-

Cataphracti how armed. men, and Cuiraſſiers, ſignifie all one thing. The *Grecian Cataphracts* for Defence, had Head-pieces, Backs and Breaſts, Greeves, Taſſets, and Boots of Iron or Braſs; and if I underſtand right, Targets; Their Horſes were likewiſe arm'd. If theſe Riders ſo armed, were mounted on ſtrong and couragious Horſes, aſſuredly they were able, either to give or receive a very forcible and ſtrong charge and impreſſion. But being ſo heavy, were neither able to purſue an Enemy far, or run very ſpeedily from him. In this place *Ælian*

Ælian inexcuſable. is much to blame (as in many other places) and is here inexcuſable, for not telling us what Offenſive Arms his *Cataphracts* carried, for he keeps up this as a ſecret; but till he or ſome Body for him, inform me better, I ſhall believe their Weapons were Lances, Swords, and Maces, which I ſuppoſe, I could

Light Horſe how armed. make appear out of Hiſtory. The light armed Horſe-men were of two kinds, *Haſtati*, which I render *Lancieers*; ſome of theſe had no Defenſive Arms, and ſome had a Target. The ſecond kind of light armed Horſe-men *Ælian* calls *Ferentarii*, other Authors call them *Acrobaliſts*, and theſe were ſub-divided into two ſorts; ſome uſed Darts, and were called *Tarentines*; and ſome had Bows and Arrows, and were called *Scythæ*, becauſe the *Scythians* delighted much in the Bow.

If

If you will compare the Antient *Grecian*, and the Modern Armies used not half an age ago, in the point of Arms, you will not find any considerable difference. To the heavy arm'd *Grecian* Foot, answer our Pike-men, when they were, and still should be armed with Head-piece, Back and Breast, Greeves and Tasslets, except in this, that ours want Targets, and walk not in Brazen Boots. To the light armed or *Velites* of the *Greeks*, do answer our Bow-men or Harquebusiers, when we had them, and now our Musquetiers. To the *Grecian Cataphracti* on Horse-back, correspond our *Gens d' Arms*, or Cuirassiers, armed with Lances, when they were in fashion, and now with Pistols and Carabines. To the light armed Horse-men called *Sagittarii* or *Scythæ*, you may compare those whom the *French* call still Archers, armed formerly (even since Gun-powder was found out) with Bows and Arrows, and half Lances, and now with Pistols or Carabines. To the *Tarentines* answer generally our Light Horse-men, armed Offensively now with Hand-guns and Swords, and some of them Defensively, with Back, Breast and Head-piece, but most without any of them.

Grecian and Modern Arms compared.

CHAP. IV.

Of their great Engines, and Machines, of their Training, and Exercising.

THe Ancients had their Artillery as well as we have. These were their *Rams*, *Balists*, and *Catapults*. They had also their *Vineæ*, *Plutei*, *Moscoli*, and other Engines, whereby they made their approaches to the Walls of besieged Towns. I think it strange, that some attribute the invention of the moving or ambulatory Tower so much admired by Antiquity, to *Demetrius* the Son of *Antigonus*; for to me it is clear enough, that his Fathers Master the Great *Alexander* had one of them at the Siege of *Gaza*, which was rendred ineffectual by the deep Sand, through which it could not be brought so near the Walls, as was needful; for the Wheels, on which it was to move, sunk down. Neither do I think that *Alexander* himself was the inventor of it: Whether the *Trojan* Horse, whose Belly was stuffed with armed men, might be such a Machine as this, or whether it had only its existency in the Poets brain, is no great matter. But because the *Romans* used all these Warlike Engines at the expugnation and propugnation of Towns, I shall refer my Reader concerning them to the fourth Chapter of my Discourses of the *Roman* Militia, where I shall also show him the substance of what *Æneas*, an Ancient *Grecian* Tactick, saith on that subject. Here I shall only observe, that as the *Grecians* were very apt to usurp to themselves the invention of many Arts and Sciences, which they stole from others: So it will be found that many of these Machines were used in the World, before the *Grecians* were so much known, as afterwards they came to be. We read in the seventeenth Chapter of the second Book of the *Chronicles*, *That* Ozias *King of* Judah, *by the invention of skilful Masters made and planted on the Towers and corners of the Walls of* Jerusalem, *Engines which shot Arrows, Darts, and great Stones.* And these were no other than those Machines the *Greeks* called *Catapults* and *Balists*: And this was long before, the overthrows and defeats of the *Persian* Monarchs made *Greece* famous in the habitable World. Some think, *Moses* invented them, and I think, they may as well fansie he invented the moving Tower (of all which hereafter) whereof I spoke but just now. But the place alledged for this, which is the last verse of the twentieth Chapter of *Deuteronomy*, will not justifie that; for it is said there (as the *Italian* Translation hath it) Thou shalt cut down those Trees, which bear no Fruits, and make Bulwarks (*Bastioni*) of them, against those Cities thou art to besiege. And though *Lipsius* and *Terduzzi* think, that here are only meant Stakes and Pallisadoes for Ramparts and Sconces; yet I may without Heresie believe, that the *Vineæ* and *Plutei*, of which we read in *Latin* Histo-

The ambulatory Tower.

These Machines not invented by the *Grecians*.

ries, may be meant in the Text; and the Ram alſo, wherewith, I ſuppoſe, *Joſhua* may have battered the Walls of thoſe Cities, which he had no authority from the Almighty, to beat down with the ſound of Rams horns, as he did the ſtrong Walls of *Jericho*.

The *Grecians* were very exact in Training and drilling both their Horſe and Foot; and without queſtion, they taught their Souldiers very perfectly to handle and manage all the Arms they were appointed to carry, whether thoſe were Javelins, Darts, Stones, Slings, Swords, Pikes, Lances, Maces, or Bows and Arrows. And as careful they were to teach them thoſe motions and evolutions, whereby their Bodies, whether ſmall or great, changed their preſent poſture into another, either by Facings, Doublings, Countermarches, or Wheelings. And though the *European* Nations were forc'd to find out words of Command each in their own language, to teach the uſe and handling of the Piſtol, Carabine, Harquebuſs, Muſquet, or any other Fire-gun, in regard none of thoſe were known to any of the Antients; yet the handling of the Pike is the ſame in all its poſtures, that the *Grecians* had: And all our *European* words of Command for the motions and evolutions of Bodies, are borrowed from the *Greek*. By Example; That which they call'd *Declina in haſtam*, we call *To the Right hand*. That which with them was *Declina in Scutum*, with us is *To the Left hand*: Becauſe they carried their Pike on their right Shoulder, and their Target on the left. Their *Inflectio in haſtam aut Scutum*, was our *Right or Left about*. *Jugare* with them, is to my ſenſe, (though I know others think not ſo) to *Double Ranks*. Their *Intercalatio*, was our *Doubling of Files*. *Reddere in arrectum*, is *As you were*. It is needleſs to give you more, ſince moſt of our Modern words are the ſame with theirs, and are obvious in moſt languages. Yet here I ſhall take liberty to ſpeak a little of both their, and our Counter-marches, that hereafter I need not trouble either my ſelf or my Reader with that point of exerciſe, for which I have ſo ſmall an eſteem.

Grecian words of Exerciſe

All one with ours.

They called a Counter-march *Evolutio per verſum*, and they had three kinds of it, which are yet retained in our Modern Exerciſes; and theſe were the *Macedonian*, the *Lacedæmonian*, and the *Perſian*, which was alſo called the *Choræan*. The *Macedonian* is, when the Batallion is commanded to take up as much ground in the Van, as it poſſeſſed before, e're he who was Leader faced to the Rear. It is done thus: He who is in the Rear marcheth through or between two Files to the Van, and then without an alt ſo many foot beyond the File-leader, as the Body at their due diſtance poſſeſſeth; all the reſt that were in the File before him, following him in order as they ſtood, till he making alt, they all take up their ſeveral diſtances behind him, till he who is File-leader turn himſelf about on that ſame ground he ſtood on, and then all turn likewiſe, ſo that all the File faceth to the Rear in that ſame order, that before the Counter-march it fac'd to the Van; by this means the Body loſeth ground in the Rear: and therefore our Modern Drillers, when they command the *Macedonian* counter-march, they ſay, By the Right or Left hand Countermarch, and loſe ground in the Rear, or gain ground in the Van, which is all one thing.

Macedonian Counter-march.

The *Laconian* is, when the Batallion is commanded to take up as much ground in the Rear as it poſſeſs'd before, and is done thus. The File-leader turns juſt where he ſtands, and marcheth as many foot behind the Rear-man as the Body at its due diſtance ſhould poſſeſs, all who follow him turn not about, till their Leaders go by them, and ſo the Bringer up doth only turn himſelf without any further motion. The Modern word of Command for this is, Counter-march to the Right and Left hand, and gain ground in the Rear.

Lacedemonian.

The *Perſian* is, when the Batallion keeps the ſame ground it had, but with this difference, that the Leader ſtands where the Bringer up was, and the Rear-man where the Leader ſtood. It is done thus: The Leader advanceth three ſteps, and then turns and marcheth to the Rear, and all who follow him turn not, till they come to that place to which he advanced, and then they face about, and take up the ſame ground they formerly poſſeſt. The word of Command for this is, Counter-march to the Right or Left hand and keep your ground. It is alſo called the *Choræan* Counter-march, becauſe,

Perſian.

Or *Choræan.*

cause, as the *Chorus* useth to sing and dance all together, so here all the Ranks move at once, and keeping that same measure and distance in turning, resembles a Dance: But indeed, all these Counter-marches, as most of all evolutions, are better, and sooner illustrated, nay, demonstrated by a Body of Souldiers in the Field, than they can be either by words, or figures on Paper.

Philip King of *Macedon*, Father of the Great *Alexander*, put down the first of these Counter-marches, which was his own Countrey one, and with good reason; for it hath a show of flying, at least of retiring, being a Body of sixteen deep (as the *Macedonian Phalanx* was) by that Counter-march lost in the Rear (where the Enemy is suppos'd to be) one hundred and twelve foot of ground, one foot being allowed for every Rank to stand on, and six foot of distance between the Ranks, at least it loseth one hundred and six foot. And truly, I think the hazard were small, if all the three several Counter-marches were for ever banish'd out of all Armies, except those of our Enemies. It is true, I never saw any of them used in sight of an Enemy; for if they be practis'd then, I am confident, confusion would follow them, which is but too ready to appear in any Army, though never so well order'd, when it is unexpectedly attack'd by an Enemy in the Rear. All three of small use.

If the *Grecians* had been acquainted with our great Guns, nay, even with our Muskets, which kill at a greater distance by far, than Darts or Arrows, and against which their Defensive Arms would not have been proof; they would have found that an Enemy a good way from their Rear would have render'd their best Counter-marches both unfeasible and dangerous. All the good, I suppose, that is intended by a Counter-march, is to place the very same men and Ranks with their faces to the Rear in that very same order they were, with their faces to the Front. And truly, if Captains be careful to place their best men in the Front, their next best in the Rear, and make middle men of the third, and rank every man according to his worth and dignity, as they should do, (but too many of them are negligent in this) it will be needless to hazard a Counter-march, but with much ease, and with one word of Command, (and that is, By the Right or Left hand about) an Enemy may be fac'd in the Rear, without danger of any confusion or disorder.

I have seen some very punctual Officers and Drill-masters, who have taken much pains to teach new beginners all these three sorts of Counter-marches, and have made them practise their lessons very exactly; yet for all that, I could never in my own Judgement, have a better opinion of Counter-marches, than, they say, some Physicians have of Cucumbers, which they first order to be well corrected and prepar'd with Vinegar, Oyl, Pepper, and I know not what else, and then advise, to throw them out of doors, or over the Windows.

In exercising Bodies, the first care is to make Ranks and Files keep that distance, that is allowed by the Prince or General who commands the Army, for he may do in that according to his pleasure. The *Grecian* Foot had a three-fold distance, the first was of six foot, and this *Ælian* will have to be in exercisings and marches between File and File, as well as Rank and Rank; but assuredly there was not so good reason for the one as there was for the other, in regard all the heavy arm'd Foot carrying long Pikes, required six foot in their march between Rank and Rank for the conveniency of their Pikes; but there was no need of so much between File and File, as any man at first view, may easily comprehend. The second distance was of three foot between Rank and Rank, as also between File and File, and this was when they were drawn up, and stood in Battel with their Pikes order'd; and their posture at this distance was called *Densatio*. The third was of one foot and a half between both Files and Ranks, and that was, when they were either to give or receive a charge, and it was call'd *Constipatio*. In that posture having presented their Pikes with their left foot formost, their Targets touch'd one another, and so their *Phalange* look'd like a Brazen Wall, as *Lucius Æmilius*, the *Roman* Consul, spoke of that wherewith King *Perseus* fac'd him at the Battel of *Pidna*, where they fought for the Soveraignty of the Kingdom of *Macedon*. Distances of the Foot.

Of the Horſe.

The *Grecian* Horſe were marſhall'd in ſeveral figures, and of their diſtance I can ſay nothing, nor doth *Ælian* help me in it at all. Of theſe ſeveral figures of Horſe Troops, I ſhall ſpeak in the next Chapter but one. And then my Reader will perhaps believe with me, that the Square Battels probably kept that diſtance that Troops have done ſince; and that both the Rhombus and the Wedge required a greater diſtance, when they were commanded by a motion either to the Right or Left hand, to change the poſture or the place, wherein they ſtood; and I conceive, when either of them was to charge, the Horſe men were obliged to ſerr together, as cloſe as ever they could, otherwiſe they could not pierce ſo home, as was expected by thoſe who caſt them into thoſe moulds. But this will be better underſtood afterward.

Omiſſions of *Ælian*.

Whether all thoſe *Grecians*, who were fit to bear Arms, were Train'd or Exercis'd, or ſome only of them elected for that purpoſe; or whether thoſe who were pick'd out and Train'd, enter'd in pay before they were put in Companies or Troops, or what that pay was, or whether ſome were bred and Train'd in Military Schools and Seminaries, as *Alexander* did with thoſe 30000 *Perſians*, whom he caus'd to learn the *Macedonian* Art of War, and as the Grand Signior doth with his Janizaries, we know nothing. We ſhould have been much bound to *Ælian*, if he had vouchſafed to have given us any light in theſe particulars, but he is defective all along in many things, beſides theſe.

Exerciſing a neceſſary duty.

The *Grecians*, and more eſpecially the *Romans*, thought Training and Exerciſing ſo neceſſary a duty, that they never either neglected or omitted it, nay, not in the times of the calmeſt Peace. A Train'd and well Exercis'd Army hath the advantage of that which is not Train'd, though the firſt be compos'd of Novices and *Tyrones*, and the laſt of *Veterans*, whereof *Polybius*, a famous Hiſtorian, and a good Captain, gives us an obſervable example in his Fifth Book. *Antiochus* King of *Syria*, preſuming on the experience and approved valour of his Army, and deſpiſing the *Egyptians*, with their King *Ptolomy*, (an unactive Prince) whom he had beat before, neglected to exerciſe and keep his Souldiers in diſcipline; mean time *Siſibius*, *Ptolomy*'s great Miniſter of State, protracted time with feign'd Treaties with *Antiochus*, till he had levied great numbers both of Natives and Strangers, and had by *Grecian* Captains Train'd and Exercis'd them well in all Military duties; ſo that when the two Kings fought at *Raphia*, for the Kingdom of *Cæloſyria*, with Armies of near equal numbers, *Ptolomy* got the Victory.

CHAP. V.

Of the Grecian *Infantry.*

Foot ſixteen deep.

WE are told by *Ælian* that the *Grecian* Foot were ſometimes marſhall'd ſixteen deep, ſometimes twelve, and ſometimes eight. Obſerve here, that what he or other Authors call a Longitude we call a Rank, which the *Latines* called *Frons*, and *Jugum*; and what they call'd Altitude, we call a File, or the depth. The *Germans* after the *Latine*, call the deepneſs of a File the height of it. The *Macedonians*, as *Ælian* ſaith, marſhall'd all their heavy armed foot ſixteen deep; and this height or depth of a File, our Author eſteems to be abſolutely the beſt, becauſe, ſaith he, it makes not too long a Front, but what if it make too ſhort a one? But his reaſons for ſixteen deep, we ſhall hereafter examine.

Decurio.

Every one of thoſe Files had a leader who commanded it, and was called *Decurio*. Obſerve here by the way, that *Decurio* is not always he who commands ten men, as many of my profeſſion fanſie. The File had likewiſe its Tergiductor, who was our Bringer up: But in *Ælians* account this Rear-man had

had no command, but was subject to the Middle-man, who under the Leader commanded the last half of the File. There were besides in every File, as *Ælian* saith, four Enomotarchs, each whereof, saith he, had the command of three men. But here assuredly our Author mistakes himself, for four men, and each of them the command of three, make compleatly sixteen, and so both File-leader and Middle-man were excluded. But certainly the *Decuria* or Leader had the three men next him immediately under his command, and the fifth man was an Enomotarch, who had three under him, then the *Dimarite* or Middle-man, (who commanded the last half of the File) had the inspection of the three men immediately following; and lastly, the fifth man from the *Dimarite*, and thirteenth from the *Decurio*, had the three last men of the File recommended to his care. By this means, there are but four petty Commanders in every File, whereas *Ælian* unadvisedly and unattentively made six. *Lochos* with the *Grecians* was our File, two of these made a Dilochy, which consisted of thirty two men; its Commander was called *Dilochita*; We have no Officer to represent him but a Lance Spesate. Two Dilochies or four Files made a Tetrarchy, whose number was sixty four; its Officer was a Tetrarch, whom a Caporal in a Company of two hundred or three hundred men may resemble. Two Tetrarchies made a Taxiarchy, its Commander was called *Taxiarcha*, which *Ælian*'s Translator renders *Centurio*; His command was of eight Files, which made one hundred twenty eight men. And here, I pray you observe, that *Centurio* was not always strictly taken for a Captain of one hundred. And we shall find hereafter in the *Roman* Militia, his ordinary command was of sixty, sometimes but of thirty, as it is here of one hundred twenty eight. A Sergeant in an old *French* or *German* Company represents this *Grecian* Taxiarch. Two Taxiarchies, which were sixteen Files, made a Syntagmatarchy of two hundred fifty six men; its Commander *Syntagmatarcha* was our private Captain. This Company was a square of men, sixteen in Rank and sixteen in File, and whatever way you turn'd it, still sixteen. And if with *Ælian*, you allow six foot of distance between Files as well as Ranks, it will be a Body equilateral, and a square of ground, as well as a square of men. But of these manner of Battels I shall speak particularly hereafter.

A File.

Ennumeration of the several Bodies of the Foot.

Two Syntagmatarchies compos'd a Pentecosiarchy consisting of five hundred and twelve men; its Commander was called *Pentecosiarcha*, or, in *Latine*, *Tribunus minor*, we call him our Lieutenant Colonel. Two Pentecosiarchies made a Chiliarchy of one thousand twenty four men, its Commander was *Chiliarcha*, or *Tribunus major*, to whom answers directly our Modern Colonel of one thousand men. Of two Chiliarchies was made up a Myriarchy of two thousand forty eight, its Commander was *Myriarcha*. About eighty years ago no Colonel in *Germany* had so few in his Regiment, but now we shall say that he was as our Brigadeer; Two Myriarchies made a Phalangarchy or simple Phalange, consisting of four thousand ninety six men; its Commander was called *Phalangiarcha*, in *Latine*, *Prætor*; for whom suppose a modern Major General. Two Phalangarchies made a Diphalangarchy, compos'd of eight thousand one hundred ninety two men; its Commander was called a *Diphalangiarcha*, for whom we have none but a Lieutenant General. Two of these made a Phalange, over which commanded the General of the Infantry. By this account we find in every Phalange two Diphalangarchies, four Phalangarchies, eight Myriarchies, sixteen Chiliarchies, two and thirty Pentecosiarchies, sixty four Syntagmatarchies; in all one thousand twenty four Files, which consisted of sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four men, at sixteen in every File.

Compar'd with our Modern Bodies.

Here you are to observe, that every Syntagmatarchy or private Company, consisting of two hundred fifty six men, had beside the Captain and others already spoken of, five other Officers, whom *Ælian* calls supernumerary or extraordinary. These were the Ensign-bearer (for every Company or Syntagmatarchy had a Colours) a Servant or Assister, or if you please, you may call him an Adjutant, who carried the Captains Orders: The third was a *Præco*, or a Cryer, who proclaim'd the Captains directions, even in the time of Battel. Men of strong voices were chosen for that office. The *Romans* used them, as it appears by *Hannibal*'s causing them to be counterfeited when he

Extraordinary or supernumerary Officers.

he ſtorm'd and enter'd the *Roman* Camp at *Capua*. They are out of faſhion now, the loud noiſe of Gun-powder having render'd them uſeleſs. The fourth was a Trumpeter, whoſe office is known. And the laſt was a *Tergidux* or Lieutenant, whoſe office was to ſtay conſtantly in the Rear. Theſe five were ſuperordinary; the reſt were *Ordinarii*, and this word the Church hath borrowed from the Militia (and reaſon for it, ſince on earth ſhe is a Militant Body) in giving the name of Ordinaries to her reverend Biſhops.

But in this place *Ælian* is obſcure, for I know not how he diſpoſeth of the Serjeant, or of the Captain of the Company, nor how he diſpoſeth of the Tribunes leſſer or greater, Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels, Brigadiers and Major Generals, where he appoints them to march, or where to ſtand or officiate in time of action; or whether he reckons them in the number of the Phalange, which conſiſted of ſixteen thouſand three hundred eighty four men, or not. His Decurions, Dimarites, Enomotarchs, Dilochites, and Tetrarchs, are all of them, no doubt, of that number; neither can I allow them any other place to march or fight in, but Rank and File, for they were no other but File-leaders, Middle-men, Lance-ſpeſats, and Caporals, all of whom carry Arms. But that all who commanded above them were in Rank and File, is a thing I cannot fanſie. And if the Captain was conſtantly in the Van or Front of his Company, why was the Lieutenant, whoſe ſtation was conſtantly in the Rear of it, call'd a ſuperordinary Officer, more than the Captain? And being all theſe five were conſtantly Officers in the Syntagmatarchy or Company, why ſhould they not be call'd ordinary Officers as well as the Taxiarch or Serjeant, or as the Syntagmatarch or Captain?

A Queſtion not anſwer'd.

The light armed *Grecian* Foot, according to *Ælian*, were half the number of the heavy armed, and by this account they were eight thouſand one hundred ninety two. This he ſpeaks of the *Macedonian* Foot, for the other *Grecian* Phalanges were not ſo ſtrong. Theſe light armed Foot were drawn up, ſaith *Ælian*, eight deep. By this account they took up as much ground in Longitude, Rank, or Front, as the heavy armed Phalange did, and but half as much in File or depth.

Grecian Velites.

CHAP. VI.

Ælian's *marſhalling the* Grecian *Infantry examined.*

TO hazard all at one caſt hath ever been thought a piece of madneſs, except in very deſperate caſes, for in them neceſſity hath no Law. It is upon that ground that Leaders of Armies appoint Reſerves, ſome one, ſome two, to ſuſtain and ſecond the firſt Batallions, in caſe they be worſted. But this great Body or Phalange of *Ælian* admitted of no reſerve at all, and therefore the men that compos'd it, had need to have fought well; becauſe firſt, there were none to ſecond them, and next their heavy Armour render'd them uncapable to fly either faſt or far.

That the Phalange might have had Reſerves, is unqueſtionable, if thoſe who compos'd it, had not made it ſo deep, as ſixteen. But we ſhall the better know, whether it might not conveniently have been of a leſs altitude, when we examine the Reaſons that are given for ſo great a depth. For take it along with you, the more a Batallion is extended in length or Front, the more hands are brought to fight, and the leſs it is ſubject to be out-wing'd or ſurrounded; and therefore the deepneſs of this Phalange brings both thoſe inconveniencies with it. Let us now hear the advantages it hath.

Sixteen deep examin'd.

Firſt, *Ælian* ſaith, if it be needful that the Files be doubled, the Phalange may be made two and thirty deep; and if the Ranks muſt be doubled, then

the

the Files are made eight deep. I wonder to hear such language from so great a Master; for all this may be done in any Body of men of what depth soever, provided it be not of an odd number. If *Ælian* had made his Phalange but twelve deep, might he not, when he pleas'd, by doubling the Files, have made it twenty four deep, and by doubling the Ranks, have made it but six deep, and by the bargain he had made the Front of his Phalange a fourth part longer, that where at six foot distance between Files it took up in longitude but six thousand one hundred forty four foot, it would have taken up eight thousand one hundred ninety foot? But the mystery of the matter (if I understand *Ælian* right) is shortly this, Such an altitude or deepness of the File is most exact, whereby the Commander in chief may with few words bring his whole numbers by equal proportions to one man: As sixteen to eight, eight to four, four to two, and two to one. But this you cannot do with twelve; for twelve divided makes two sixes, six divided makes two threes; three men you cannot divide, unless you cut one man in two pieces. Now by sixteen deep, you may bring your whole Batallion of sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four men into one File, or into one Rank, and here, I suppose, lyes the knack of the business. These sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four men, at sixteen in File, make one thousand twenty four Files, which you can bring to one File, thus: Command your half Ranks to double their Files, and then you have but five hundred and twelve Files; the same word of Command being obeyed, you have but two hundred fifty six; give it once more, you have but one hundred twenty eight; let it be done over again, you shall see but sixty four Files; continue the same word of Command, your Files come to thirty two, next to sixteen, after that to eight, from that to four, then to two, and lastly to one. And so you have your whole Phalange in one File. If you will have your Phalange all in one Rank, command the Middle-men or half Files to double their Ranks, and then sixteen become eight; command the same thing, they shall be but four, then two, and lastly one. But is it not very strange, that *Ælian* would not know, that all this might have been done with a Body of men four deep, or eight deep, which last many of the *Grecians* did not exceed: And certainly, till we hear some more solid reason than this aiery one, eight deep is for many considerations to be preferr'd to sixteen. Nor should this pretended reason hinder either Prince or State to appoint the depth of their Batallions to be twelve, ten, eight, or six deep, as they think fit, though by some of them, the Bodies cannot be subdivided till they come to one File, or one Rank; for it was never seen, nor do I fansie it can be imagin'd, that ever such an emergency of War will fall our, that can move a General, (unless he be to File his Army along a very narrow Bridge, or a very narrow way) to marshal all his Foot either in one Rank, or one File. So I conceive the first reason is no reason at all.

First reason for 16 deep.

Answered.

A second Reason is, In time of Action an Enemy may charge the Rear, to rencounter whom, the *Dimaritæ* or Middle-men are commanded with the Half-Files that follow them, to face about (but without countermarch) and sustain the charge. By the way observe, that in such an occasion the Bringer up or Rear-man hath the command of the Half-File, and consequently of the Dimarite or Middle-man himself, to whom *Ælian* gave it before. But to the reason it self I give two answers. First, a Reserve, which *Ælians* Phalange admits not, would prevent that danger. Secondly, I say, if they were but twelve in File, nay, but ten in File, they might withstand the charge of an Enemy in both Van and Rear, as well as being sixteen deep, which I make appear out of *Ælian* himself, thus: The *Grecian* Pikes were all eighteen Foot long, except the *Macedonians* which were twenty one. We shall speak of the longest. Next, *Ælian* allows one foot and a half of distance between Ranks, when they fought, which distance he or his Interpreter calls *Constipatio*. Thirdly, the same Author allows three foot of the Pikes length for his hands who presents it. These grounds being laid, which are the Authors own, I say, that only four Ranks of the *Grecian* Pikes, and five of the *Macedonian* could do an Enemy any hurt; and but hardly so either, because between five Ranks, there are four distances, and for those you are to allow six foot, at *Ælians* account, of closest distance; next, you are by his rule likewise to allow fifteen foot of the Pikes of the fifth Rank

Second reason for 16 deep.

Answered.

to

to be abated from their length, which fifteen being added to ſix, make one and twenty; for three foot of the Pikes length of the firſt Rank being allowed for their hands who hold them, you muſt of neceſſity grant the like proportion for the reſt. And ſo the *Macedonian Sariſſa* did not much advance its point from the fifth Rank beyond the firſt Rank, and therefore the reſt behind theſe five Ranks ſeem uſeleſs. But an Enemy attacks the Rear, to oppoſe whom, let five Ranks face about, and preſent; for if five be ſufficient to reſiſt the ſhock in the Van, certainly five may do the ſame in the Rear. And if you will conſider it well, you will think the points of the Pikes of five Ranks ſufficient to give or receive a charge, if all the Files be ſerr'd together as the *Grecians* were, and as all ſhould be, that no interval be given an Enemy to enter between them. If then ten Ranks were enough to reſiſt an Enemy in Front and Rear, I preſume, the other ſix might have been diſpos'd of two ways; firſt, they might have been beſtow'd on the Front, and ſo have extended it to a far greater length, which would have brought more hands to fight, and not only ſav'd the Phalange from being out-wing'd, but have put it in a capacity to out-wing the Enemy: Secondly, theſe ſix Ranks might very advantagiouſly have compos'd a Body apart in the Rear, and that ſhould have been a Reſerve, and then no danger of an Enemy to have troubled the Battel behind.

But I am afraid you may think I am making up a *Grecian* Militia of my own, unknown to the famous Warriours of that renowned Nation. I ſhall tell you truly and ingenuouſly, my quarrel is only with *Ælian*, becauſe he hath not told us ſo much as he knew, and ſo much as he was oblig'd to tell us, which in this particular is that I am now to tell you, and it conſiſts in two things, one that Phalanges were not always ſixteen deep, and ſecondly, that they wanted not always Reſerves: To prove both, be pleaſed to take the following Inſtances. At *Delos*, when the *Athenians* fought with the *Thebans* and other *Bœotians*, the Phalanges were all of them eight deep, and all of them had Reſerves. At *Leuctra*, *Epaminondas* his Foot Batallions were all marſhall'd in eight Ranks. At *Siracuſa*, when the *Athenian* General *Nicias* was to fight, he plac'd his Auxiliaries in the two Wings, his *Athenians* he divided into two great Bodies; the half whereof he marſhall'd in the Battel between the two Wings, the other half he plac'd behind at a diſtance, with command, to ſuccour either the Wings or the Battel, as they ſaw them, or any of them ſtand in need of their help, and this was a perfect Reſerve: And obſerve, that his Wings, Battel and Reſerve, were all marſhall'd eight deep. Take *Thucydides*, a noble Hiſtorian, and a good Captain for my Author.

Phalanges eight deep.

And had Reſerves.

But you will ſay, theſe were not *Macedonian* Phalanges, true; but they were *Grecian* ones though, and the Commanders of them without all peradventure, did well enough foreſee, in what danger their Phalanges of eight deep might be by a ſudden charge of an Enemy in the Rear, which, no queſtion, they would have oppos'd, by making the laſt four Ranks face about, if their Reſerves ſerv'd not their turn, neither could the fourth Rank extend its Pikes (being three foot ſhorter than the *Macedonian* ones) much beyond the firſt Rank. But to take the Objection more fully, let us come nearer, and view the Great *Alexanders* Army at *Arbela*, and we ſhall ſee, he was not at all limited by *Ælians* rules of a *Macedonian* Phalange, though by it, they ſay, he conquer'd the *Perſian* Monarchy. Sir *Walter Raleigh* ſaith right, that in this place *Alexander* drew up his Forces, ſo that they fac'd to Van, Rear, and both Flanks; but this is not to be underſtood ſo, that he made his heavy armed Phalange front four ſeveral ways: for then it ſhould have been immovable, and only apt to reſiſt, but not to advance, which had been both againſt the intentions of that brave Prince, and his actions of that day; for he charg'd the *Perſian* Batallions both with his Horſe and Foot. But the meaning muſt be, that he order'd ſome Horſe and Foot at a diſtance from his main Battel to face to the Rear, for preventing any misfortune there, and the like he did on both his Flanks; but all theſe, when his main Battel mov'd, fac'd to the Van, and advanced with it, and when it ſtood, they took up their former diſtances, and fac'd as they were appointed: And all this was done, leſt his Army (ſmall in compariſon of that with *Darius*) ſhould be ſurrounded. If the Army

he was afraid to be out-wing'd, as aſſuredly he was, it will eaſily be granted that the more ground he took up in Front, the leſs ſubject he was to that danger. And this *Curtius* confirms, when he tells us, that the Commanders of the ſeveral Bodies had orders given them, to extend their Batallions as far in length, as without eminent danger they might, leſt, ſaith the ſame Author, they ſhould be environ'd. I conceive then, it cannot be doubted, but *Alexander* ſtudying how to make as large a Front as feaſibly he might, againſt ſo numerous an Enemy, he made his heavy arm'd Foot Phalange but eight deep, as that which ſuited beſt with his preſent affairs, and as he had ſeen other *Grecian* Captains do before him, for by that means he made himſelf maſter of twice as much ground, as he had when it was marſhall'd ſixteen in File. That he had Reſerves, is moſt clear both from *Curtius* and others, for *Nicanor* follow'd the Phalange with the *Argyraſpides*, or Silver Shields, and theſe were heavy armed, (obſerve it) and *Cenos* with a Band of men, which, ſaith *Curtius*, was appointed (note this) to be a Relief. Then *Horeſtes*, *Lincerta*, *Polycarpon*, and *Philagus*, all with ſeveral Bodies follow'd the Phalanx. And that all theſe were Reſerves, *Ælian* himſelf, nor any for him, will not be ſo impudent as to deny. But I ſhall ſpeak more of the marſhalling this Army in the Chapter following the next.

Alexander at *Arbela* but eight deep;

And had Reſerves.

I come now to the third Reaſon, which is pretended for ſixteen deep of the heavy armed Phalange. And it is this. Though the Pikes of all thoſe Ranks, that ſtand behind the fifth, or if you will, the ſixth, be uſeleſs; in regard they can reach but little or nothing beyond the File leader (and you will remember theſe Ranks are not fewer than ten, if not eleven) yet being at cloſe order, with their Pikes advanc'd, they bear forward with the weight and force of their Bodies thoſe five or ſix Ranks that are before them, and ſo make the Impreſſion the greater and ſtronger, they take all occaſion of flight from them, and impoſe a neceſſity on them to overcome or dye. I anſwer firſt, that this pretended advantage, if it was any at all, was very oft dear bought. Secondly, I ſay, five Ranks having their Pikes preſented to the Enemy, three Ranks behind them might have ſerv'd ſufficiently to bear forward the five before them; or if *Ælian* thought ſix Ranks might preſent all their Pikes with advantage, then let four Ranks be allowed behind them to bear them forward to the charge and hinder them to fly, and this will make in all but ten Ranks, and ſo ſtill ſix Ranks might have been diſpoſed of either to enlarge the Front, or make a Body in the Rear for a Reſerve. And thirdly, I ſay, when *Ælian*'s ſix formoſt Ranks were buſie in fight, the ten behind them, who were to bear thoſe ſix forward, were at their cloſeſt diſtance (which he calls conſtipation) and ſo not able to open very ſuddenly, and face about in ſo good order, and ſo ſoon as was requiſite to receive, or beat back the charge of an unexpected Enemy: For certainly they muſt firſt have open'd backward, and then fac'd about; both which muſt have been done by the command of ſome of their Officers, probably the Lieutenant, and it is well enough known, how confuſion and diſorder (which ſeldome fails to attend ſuch occaſions) ſtops the ears, and dulls the judgement of Souldiers, that they can neither hear nor underſtand the words of Command aright. I will fetch two inſtances from Hiſtory, and thoſe, I believe, will prove all I have ſaid, and clear this whole matter pretty well.

Third reaſon for 16 deep.

Anſwered.

At the Battel of *Cynotephalæ*, or Dogs heads, fought by *Philip* the laſt King of *Macedon*, except one, againſt *Titus Flaminius*, a *Roman* Conſul, the half of *Philips* heavy armed Phalange on the right hand, bore down all before it, and trod over the Legions, gaining ground ſo far, that the *Macedonian* thought the day his own. But *Flaminius* having obſerv'd that the left Wing of the Phalange could not draw up in any cloſe order, becauſe of the unevenneſs and knottineſs of the Mountain (whoſe little hillocks repreſented the heads of Dogs) ſent a Tribune with a Legion and ſome Elephants up the Hill, to charge that Left Wing, which he ſmartly doing, eaſily routed it, and immediately fell on the Rear of the victorious Right wing, and without oppoſition, cut it in pieces. Now, if the Left Wing of the Phalange, which had no convenient ground whereon to draw up, had plac'd it ſelf on the top of the

Battel of *Cinocephalæ*.

Hill at a distance behind the Right Wing, as a Reserve, the *Romans* durst never have hazarded to have come between them; or if the last ten Ranks of the Right Wing who serv'd for nothing but to bear forward the other six Ranks, had fac'd about (according to *Ælians* rule) they could not so easily have been broken. But the close posture or constipation of these last ten Ranks to bear forward the formost six Ranks, made them uncapable to do that quickly, which the present necessity required, or else the sudden charge of an unlook'd for Enemy did so appal them, that they knew not what they were doing, nor who commanded, or who obeyed, which, as I have said, frequently falls out in such cases. So this Phalanx cast in *Ælian's Macedonian* mould, cost King *Philip* very dear, but another modell'd after the same fashion, cost his Son *Perseus* much dearer.

Battel of *Pidna.*

At *Pidna*, a Town of *Macedon*, King *Perseus* fought with *Lucius Æmilius*, a *Roman* Consul, and the ground for his Phalange being as good as his own heart could wish, the *Roman* Legions were not able to resist its furious charge, but gave ground in several places, insomuch that the Consul seeing Fortune look with so grim a countenance upon him, began to despair of the Victory, and to tear his Coat of Arms, but being of a ready judgement, he quickly espied his advantage, for he saw the Phalange open its constipation, some small Bodies of it pursuing those who gave ground, and others fighting loosely with those of his *Romans* who made stouter opposition, and therefore order'd some of his Legionaries to fall into those void and empty places of the several Phalangarchies, and these getting entrance at those intervals, came upon the sides of the *Macedonian* Pike-men, and so without much trouble made most of them dye on the place. If but a third, nay, a fourth or fifth part of this Phalange had been standing at a convenient distance in Reserve, ready to have charg'd the weary and disorder'd Legions, will any man doubt, but that in all humane probability, *Perseus* had been Master of the Field? But the want of that lost him, in the twinkling of an eye, his Wife and Children, his Kingdom, his Riches (which he lov'd too well) his Honour, and at last his Life.

Defects of *Ælians* Phalange.

The Defect then of the *Macedonian* Phalange, as *Ælian* describes it, was two-fold; First, by the exorbitant deepness of its File, it took not up ground enough in the Front, and next it admitted not of a Reserve. Both which inconveniencies other *Grecians* shunn'd, and so did *Alexander* himself, the greatest *Macedonian* that ever was. But I am of opinion, that *Ælian* in his days, never saw any thing (except in figures) so like the other *Grecian* Phalangarchies, as we may see very frequently in our Modern Wars, for he wrote his Tacticks to the Emperour *Adrian*, who liv'd some Centuries after the *Grecian* Phalange was forc'd to do homage to the *Roman* Legion.

Velites.

Our Author tells us, that the *Velites*, or light armed foot were half the number of the heavy armed, but we shall see hereafter that this held but seldome. He will also have them to be eight deep, because the heavy arm'd were sixteen in File. By this rule, the other *Grecians*, who marshall'd their heavy arm'd eight in File, should have drawn up their Velites but four deep. *Ælian* doth also appoint them to be drawn up behind the Phalange, and indeed he might make them stand, perhaps march, where he pleas'd; but the manner of their Fight being *a la disbandad*, we may believe, they kept but little good order in fighting with an Enemy, less in pursuing him, and least of all in flying from him.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Grecian *Cavalry, with ſome Obſervations upon it.*

IT ſeems the *Greeks* did not tye themſelves to any preciſe or certain number of Horſe in their Armies, as *Ælian* hath tyed them to a determinate number of Foot, ſome of them uſing more, ſome fewer, as they conceiv'd needful for managing the preſent War they had in hand, augmenting, and diminiſhing the numbers of their Horſe Troops, as alſo the number of the men of each Troop, as they found their occaſions required. *Ælian* tells us, that every Troop of Horſe had a Captain, whoſe place was in the Van; a Lieutenant, whoſe ſtation was in the Rear; and a Cornet, who, he ſaith, ſtood with his Standard in the ſecond Rank next him who was on the Right hand of the Troop. All theſe we have. He ſaith, it had likewiſe two Flank Commanders, who, if they rode in Rank, are repreſented by our Corporals. He tells us nothing of a Quarter-maſter; perhaps one of theſe Flank-Officers was he, or officiated for him. But that wherein he is very forgetful, is, that he makes no mention of a Trumpeter; but aſſuredly, ſince every Foot Company, called a Syntagmatarchy that had Colours, was allow'd a Trumpeter, every Troop of Horſe having a Standard had likewiſe one, if not more. Nor ſpeaks he of Horn-winders, though theſe were uſed by the *Grecians*, as other Authors tell us. Other Nations uſed them alſo, The *Perſians* had them; for *Xenophon* in his firſt Book ſaith, that *Cyrus* had his *Cornicines*, or Horn-blowers, as well as *Tubicines*, Trumpeters. The *Romans* had them alſo, whereof we ſhall ſpeak hereafter.

Officers of a Horſe Troop.

Ælian in that Treatiſe of his *De inſtruendis Aciebus*, gives us many figures of Troops of Horſe, moſt of which do but repreſent the ſeveral poſtures of a Body of Horſe in doubling Files and Ranks, and Countermarching. Some of theſe figures it will be found difficult to imitate, and perhaps our Author (as ingenious as he was) would himſelf have found it hard to have marſhall'd them ſo in the Field, as he hath done in Paper, and they are indeed but thoſe *Schematiſmi*, whereof *Lipſius* on another occaſion ſpeaks. Particularly *Ælian* preſents us with an Oval Figure of a Troop, another of a Lunar, or Creſcent, and a third which he calls *Phalanx Incurva*, not unlike that form of Battel, after which the famous *Hannibal* is ſaid to have drawn up his Mercenaries at *Canne*, which Body could no ſooner move, but preſently it loſt its form, and therefore, I think it is probable, that he marſhall'd his Auxiliaries in that faſhion, to ſtand before his choice *Carthaginians*, to weary the *Romans*, that ſo his beſt Souldiers might have a cheaper Market of them, as the Great Turk is ſaid to blunt the Swords of his Enemies, with the Interpoſition of his Aſapi, between them and his Janizaries. If any of the *Grecian* Troops of Horſe were drawn up after any of theſe three forms that I have mention'd, I ſhall very boldly ſay, that they needed to have kept their ground very tenaciouſly, and to have receiv'd the Enemies charge very ſtedfaſtly and couragiouſly; for to my ſenſe, it was impoſſible for them either to march, or give the charge, without falling immediately into an irrecoverable diſorder; and this may be obvious to any man that will have the curioſity to look upon them, and conſider them right.

Three odd figures of Horſe Troops.

I find the *Grecians* uſed three kinds of Battels of Horſe ordinarily, not to ſpeak of extravagant ones. Theſe were the Rhombus, the Wedge, and the Square. The *Theſſalians*, who were thought to be the firſt and perfecteſt Horſe-men in *Europe*, uſed the Rhombus: The invention of the Wedge is given to *Philip* of *Macedon*, Father of *Alexander*; and the Square was uſed by them both, as alſo by all the other *Grecians*; who ſometimes made uſe likewiſe of the other two forms.

Three forms of Horſe Battalions.

The first is the Rhombus.

A Rhombus is a Geometrical Figure consisting of four acute Angles, and four sides equilateral, or if you imagine two equilateral Triangles joyn'd back to back, and their Angles equidistant (for when two Triangles are joyn'd, both of them have but four corners) you conceive the figure of a Rhombus right enough. To explain the Rhombus Horse Battel, let us imagine a Troop to consist of sixty four Riders, which number *Ælian* gives to a *Macedonian* Troop. These sixty four were thus marshall'd. Next the Captain stood one Horseman, behind him two, next them three, behind them four, then five, then six, then seven, then eight: That Rank of eight made two Angles, where the two Flank Commanders stood; for behind that Rank the number decreas'd, as thus: Behind the eight stood seven, then six, then five, then four, then three, then two, and lastly one. Add all these together, you will find the aggregate to be sixty four. Behind the last one, to my sense, stood the Lieutenant, though *Ælian* in some of his Figures, seems to make the Captain and Lieutenant to be two of the number; and if the two Flank Commanders were so too, then the Troop consisted only of sixty, besides Officers, and not of sixty four.

Simple Rhombus.

The greater Rhombus.

There is another kind of Rhombus, which in some sense may be called a double one, and it is marshall'd by increasing the number of every Rank after the first by two, till you come to the eighth Rank, and after that, your number is to decrease by two in every Rank till you come to one, and then your Rhombus shall consist of one hundred and thirteen Riders, as thus: First one, behind him three, behind them five, behind them seven, then nine, then eleven, then thirteen, and in the eighth Rank place fifteen; from that Rank your number decreaseth, for next to fifteen you are to place thirteen, behind them eleven, then nine, then seven, then five, then three, and lastly one. This is also a *Thessalian* Rhombus of Horse, a Figure whereof *Ælian* bestows upon us. This Troop, I conceive, being at open order (for it was very requisite it should be so) could upon an occasion front any way without wheeling, to the Right or Left hand, by a half turn of their Horses, and to the Rear by two half turns, and immediately thereafter serr together, either to give or receive the charge. This Figure of the Rhombus is call'd by some the Diamond; but if so, the Diamond which it resembles, must be a four-corner'd one. Observe here, that *Ælians* number of Horse represented in his Figure of the Simple Rhombus amounts but to forty nine; and this I attribute to his neglect, for he told us it should consist of sixty four.

The second is the Wedge.

The Wedge Battel, which the *Latines* called *Cuneus* or *Rostrum*, was a Body of men, either on Foot or Horse-back, drawn up with a sharp point, and encreasing in its bigness, till it came to that greatness, which the maker of it design'd for it, and so represented a Wedge, from which it hath its denomination; or it is like a Dagger, sharp at the point, growing broader till it come to the haft. I told you, that *Philip* of *Macedon* invented it, choosing a Wedge to be the fittest pattern whereby to model his *Macedonian* Troops, by placing his choicest Men and Horses, both for strength of body and courage of mind in the formost Ranks, the rest behind them serving to bear them forcibly forward. Take the description of it thus: First one, then three, then five, then seven, then nine, then eleven, then thirteen, and lastly fifteen: These added together make up *Ælian*'s *Macedonian* Troop of sixty four Horse-men. But in his description of it he oversees himself twice; first, in his words, for he saith the Wedge is just the half of the number of the great Rhombus, but that consists, as I just now told you, of one hundred and thirteen, and the Wedge is of sixty four, much more than the half of one hundred and thirteen. Next in his Figure, which presents us only with thirty six Horse-men, twenty eight fewer than King *Philips* Troop. But if you would take a Wedge out of the Rhombus, you may do it easily, by causing that Rank wherein are fifteen Horse-men, with all the Ranks that are before it, to stand, and all that are behind it, to remove, and then you have a perfect *Macedonian* Wedge Troop, consisting of sixty four Riders.

A twofold mistake.

But

But the manner of embatteling in form of a Wedge was not appropriated only to the Cavalry; The Infantry both of *Grecians* and *Romans*, and several other Nations used it in many occasions: *Epaminondas*, that famous *Theban*, at the Battel of *Mantinea*, seeing the *Lacedæmonians* stand stoutly to it, (after he had routed their Confederates the *Athenians*) chose out a parcel of his gallanteſt Foot, cast them in a Wedge, and broke so forcibly in upon their Batallion, that he pierc'd it, and after brave resistance, forc'd them to quit the Field; but this prov'd his last action, for in it he receiv'd so many mortal wounds, that he dyed of them before the next day. I shall speak more of this Wedge Battel in my discourses of the *Roman* Militia. Neither it nor the Rhombus have been heard of in the World in many ages since those antient times. It is probable, the Great *Alexander* permitted his *Thessalians* to make use of the Rhombus at *Arbela*, because almost half of their Great Rhombus might face to the Rear, and so prevent surrounding by *Darius* his numerous forces. It is also like, that his *Macedonian* Horse might have kept the form of a Wedge both at *Issus* and *Arbela*. And I find, that his great Captains (who after his death shar'd his vast Conquests among themselves) used it frequently. But I believe likewise, that both he and they, and other *Grecians* and *Asians* too, made use of the Square Battel. Wedge Battels of Foot.

The Square form of embattelling was most commonly used by the *Grecians* in marshalling their Infantry, and most of them us'd it in ordering their Cavalry. I speak not of an equilateral Square, but an oblong one, such as we use in our modern Wars. Yet I do not deny, but the Antients several times used equilateral Square forms of their Batallions, as when they made their Ranks and Files consist of equal numbers of men, and this we call a Battel Square of men, or sometimes Square of ground, when the Front was of no greater extent of ground than the Flank, but of these I shall speak hereafter, when I come to discourse of the Square Root. Not only many of the *Grecians*, but the *Persians* and *Sicilians* used the Square Horse Battel, and many great Captains preferr'd it to both the Rhombus and the Wedge; first, because by it the Troops could march with more celerity and convenience, and next, they could bring more hands to fight at one time. As for Example, in a Wedge Troop of sixty four, the first Rank consists but of one, the second of three, the third of five, and the fourth of seven: In these four Ranks there are but sixteen Riders. Oppose a Square Battell'd Troop of sixty, and marshal it in an oblong, fifteen in Rank and four in File, you may see that the sixteen Riders in the four first Ranks of the Wedge must fight with all the sixty of the Square Troop; this is a very great odds, and as much may be said of the Rhombus. But *Ælian* doth not at all tell us, how deep the *Grecian* Square Battels of Horse were. The third is the Square. Preferr'd to the other two.

This was a great neglect, for thereby we might have known how many of the Ranks could have reach'd an Enemy with their Lances, and whether the rest behind serv'd only to bear forward those before, as the ten last Ranks of Pikes did to the six formost. Yet as far as I can conjecture by some of his Figures, he seems to insinuate, that his Countrey-men order'd their Horse to be half as many in File, as they were in Rank. His Figure of that Phalanx, which he calls *Quadrata*, of fifty Horse, hath ten in Rank and five in File. This manner of Battel (whether it be of Horse or Foot) is called by the Square Root men a Doubled Batallion, of the fashion of which, and how it is done, I shall shew you in its proper place. But I dare not believe that all *Grecian* Troops were marshall'd so, neither indeed doth *Ælian* aver it. I know not then, why I may not imagine a *Grecian* Troop of Horse, consisting of sixty four, to be marshall'd three deep, as most of our Modern Troops now are, and so there should have been in it twenty one Files, for 21 multiplied by three produceth sixty three, and he who shall make the sixty fourth, shall be the Trumpeter, with whom we could not meet before in *Ælian*'s enumeration of the Officers of a Troop. *Ælian* speaks nothing of the deepness of Horse Files.

What

What distances were kept between Ranks or Files, between several Troops, or yet between greater Bodies of the Horse, *Elian* tells us not: Yet writing of the right ordering of Batallions, I think, he was obliged to speak of Distances, for who can marshal an Army, unless those be condescended on? I conceive, that assuredly the Rhombus was oblig'd to keep a great Distance both between its Ranks and its Files, otherwise it could not turn to either Right or Left hand, or to the Rear, without Wheeling; and this, if I mistake not, was one of the advantages the *Thessalians* proposed to themselves, by that form of Horse Battel. But when either it or the Wedge was to charge, they were oblig'd to serr together as close as they could, otherwise they could not pierce so home, as was expected by those who cast them in those moulds. It is probable, that the Square Bodies of the *Grecian* Horse were exercis'd, did march and fight at those distances used now in our Modern Militia.

Nor of Distances.

Our Author makes the number of the Cavalry in a *Macedonian* Army, to be half the number of their Velites, or light armed Foot. I told you, those were eight thousand one hundred ninety two, therefore the Horse must be four thousand ninety six. The smaller Bodies, of which he composeth this Cavalry, are shortly these: Sixty four Horse-men made a Troop, and were called an Elarchy, its Commander *Elarchas*, our Ritmaster. Two Troops made an Epilarchy of one hundred twenty eight Horse-men, its Commander *Epilarchas*, for whom we have no Officer, unless a Major; and I find no such man among the *Macedonians*. Four Troops made a Talentinarchy of two hundred fifty six Horse, its Commander *Talentinarcha* is represented by our Lieutenant Colonel. Two Talentinarchies made one Hipparchy, of five hundred and twelve Horse, he was called *Hipparcha*, our Colonel. Two Hipparchies made an Ephipparchy, its Commander *Ephipparcha* had under him one thousand twenty four Riders, our Brigadieer may resemble him. Two Ephipparchies made a Telos, which consisted of two thousand forty eight Horse, its Commander was called *Telarcha*, whom, if you please, our Major General of Horse shall represent. Two Telarchies made up an Epitagma, and this consisted of four thousand one hundred ninety six Horse-men, which compos'd the whole Phalange of the *Macedonian* Cavalry, its Commander was called *Epitagmarcha*, for him our Modern Militia furnisheth us with a Lieutenant General, or if you will, a General of the Horse. Now, though our Author hath given us the exact number of both the smaller and greater Bodies of the *Macedonian* Cavalry, yet he hath not at all told us, how many of them were heavy armed, and how many light armed, for which he is inexcusably to blame.

Denominations of the several Bodies of the Horse.

Inexcusable omission.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Great Macedonian *Phalanx, of its number, and how marshall'd; with some Observations on both.*

A Phalanx signifieth a number of men, great or small, Train'd and Instructed in Military Duties, and order'd in Ranks and Files. By this Definition any Foot Company, or Horse Troop is a Phalanx, as well as an Army; and a whole Army is a Phalanx, as well as a particular Company or Troop. It is true, in Authors, the word Phalanx is ordinarily taken for the great Body of sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four heavy armed Foot, which formerly I have out of *Ælian* described to you, of which I shall tell you thus much more, that he saith it had two Horns (for so the Translator renders the word *Keras*) and those were the Right and Left hand Horn, which we either simply call the Right or Left hand, or the Right and Left Wing. But indeed I wonder why *Ælian* divides the whole Phalange of Foot into two Horns, Right and Left; and why so many of our Commanders in the Modern Wars imitate him, in dividing a whole Body into the Right or Left Wing; never considering, that naturally and really there is a Body between two Wings: and the same error is committed, in dividing a whole Batallion of armed men into two Flanks, very ordinarily done by some Drill-masters. And here, no doubt, *Ælian* forgot himself; for the Phalange of the heavy armed Foot was divided, as I told you before, into four lesser Phalanges or Phalangarchies, two whereof made the two Wings, which he calls Horns; and the other two compos'd the Body. These four Phalangarchies made three Intervals, how great we know not, out of which, before the fight, issued the light armed; and if they prevail'd, they pursued their Victory, being followed by the Phalange; but if they were beaten, as for most part they were, they retired to the Rear the same way they came, and then the four Phalangarchies closed together, to give or receive the charge, according as they were ordered by their Superiours.

The signification of Phalanx.

Phalangarchies.

But now I am to speak of the whole *Macedonian* Army, which was called the Great Phalanx, consisting of heavy and light armed Foot and Horse, not reckoning their Chariots and Elephants. Their heavy armed Foot were sixteen thousand three hundred eighty four, the Velites were eight thousand one hundred ninety two, the Horse four thousand ninety six: Add all these together, you will find the *Macedonian* great Phalanx to consist of twenty eight thousand six hundred seventy two Combatants.

The great *Macedonian* Phalanx of both Horse and Foot.

A Story goes, that either the Great *Alexander*, or *Julius Cæsar*, or both, should have said, That they desired no more than thirty thousand men to conquer the whole World: Certainly, if either of them, or both said so, they meant, that that number should still be kept compleat and full, for though they should have been constantly Victorious, and never have lost one man in Battel or Skirmish, yet sickness and toyl would have made all that number to have moulder'd away, before they could have march'd over the tenth part of the then habitable World. But I do not at all believe that either of them said so, for true Histories (if there be any truth in Histories) assure us, that both of them had Armies which far exceeded that number. At *Arbela*, *Alexander* had more than double the number of a *Macedonian* Army; and yet at that same time, when he fear'd to be surrounded, I suppose, he wish'd his forces to be more numerous than they were. Neither do I believe, that his Father *Philip*, who was the framer of the Phalanx, did keep himself precisely within that number, for at *Cheronea*, where he routed the Confederated *Greeks*, he exceeded it far. His Son *Alexander*, when he cross'd the *Helle-*

Ælians numbers did not always hold

spont,

In the *Macedonian* Armies;

ſpont, to invade the *Perſian* Monarchy, had thirty two thouſand Foot, and five thouſand Horſe; above eight thouſand more men, than in *Ælian*'s *Macedonian* Phalange. At *Iſſus* he was ſtronger, and at *Arbela* he had forty thouſand Foot, and ſeven thouſand Horſe, all *Grecians*, beſides very many *Aſians* whom he had ſubdued. So we ſee that *Ælians* numbers of Horſe or Foot, did not hold even in the *Macedonian* Armies.

Much leſs will his rule hold in other *Grecian* Phalanges, who drew up their heavy armed Foot but eight deep, and ſo by our Authors method, their light armed but four deep; for if you allow their heavy armed Phalange to be one thouſand twenty four Files, theſe multiplied by eight, which is the number of the File, that Batallion conſiſted of eight thouſand one hundred ninety two men: Their Velites being half of that number, they were four thouſand ninety ſix: Give the half of that number to their Cavalry, they muſt have been two thouſand forty eight. And thus by *Ælians* rule, their whole Phalange of both heavy and light armed Foot and Horſe ſhould have amounted to neither more nor leſs than fourteen thouſand three hundred thirty ſix Combatants. But they neither obſerv'd that number, nor his rule in the diviſion of that number. At *Delos*, the *Thebans* and *Bœotians* had an Army conſiſting of ſeven thouſand heavy armed Foot, ten thouſand light armed, and one thouſand Horſe. If they had been rul'd by *Ælian*, they ſhould have had more than ten thouſand heavy armed, five thouſand and odd Velites, and all the reſt ſhould have been Horſe in this Phalange of theirs. When the *Athenians* ſent *Alcibiades* and *Nicias* to *Sicily*, they did not dream of any ſuch exact numbers. At *Mantinea*, *Epaminondas* his Army conſiſted of thirty thouſand Foot, and three thouſand Horſe; a number exceeding the great *Macedonian* Phalange by four thouſand three hundred twenty eight men. The Armies of the *Lacedæmonians* and *Athenians* that fought againſt him in that laſt Battel of his, were twenty two thouſand Foot and Horſe, and theſe were more by ſeven thouſand ſix hundred ſixty four, than a *Grecian* Phalange ſhould have been by *Ælians* method, at four deep the light, and eight deep the heavy armed, and yet came ſhort ſix thouſand ſix hundred ſeventy two of the number of the great *Macedonian* Phalange. By this we ſee our Authors numbers of Phalanges did not always hold; and it is a very great queſtion to me, if ever they did exactly hold at all.

Nor in the other *Grecian* Phalanges.

I have already told you, how he marſhals his Phalange of heavy armed Foot, without Reſerve, I have ſhown you that was not always done, and I have demonſtrated and inſtanc'd the inconveniencies of it, when it was done; Let us now ſee where he placeth his Cavalry in time of action: To this he ſaith, it was marſhall'd according to the Generals pleaſure, ſometimes on the Flanks of the heavy armed Foot, ſometimes before them, and ſometimes behind them. That they were drawn up according to the Generals pleaſure, he needed not tell us, that was not the queſtion, but it was where the Generals pleaſure was to place them. For marſhalling the Horſe on the Flanks of the Foot, there is reaſon enough for it; it was, and ſtill is a common practice. To marſhal them when they are to fight before the Foot, is not, in my opinion, adviſedly done; ſome to skirmiſh doth well, but if all the Horſe fight in the Van of the Foot, and be beaten, they may readily rout their own Infantry, without the Enemies help, for ſomething like that I have ſeen practis'd. And though the *Macedonian* Foot Phalange had, as I ſaid before, three Intervals, through which, the Horſe might perhaps (if worſted) have retir'd in good order, and drawn up in the Rear of the Foot, yet their Flight or Retreat would have infinitely diſcourag'd the Infantry, which was preſently to enter into action; nor do I think ſuch a manner of fight hath been oft practis'd. To draw up the Horſe behind the Foot would be, in my judgement, yet of leſs uſe; but *Ælian* in his Figure of the whole Phalanx, marſhals the heavy armed Foot formoſt, next them the Velites, and the Cavalry behind both. If he did not intend the Horſe ſhould fight in that place, why did he marſhal them there; and if he conceiv'd they might fight there, why did he not tell us, how they could do it. It is true, it may be imagin'd, the Velites might beſtow their Arrows and Stones caſt out of Slings upon an Enemy,

Where *Ælian* marſhall'd the Cavalry.

Enemy, over the heads of the heavy arm'd Phalange: but what hurt Horſemen, heavily armed, could do an Enemy over the heads of both heavy and light arm'd Foot, drawn up in two diſtinct Bodies one behind the other, is not ſo eaſie to fanſie. And with permiſſion of *Ælian*, I doubt, it can hardly be made appear, that any General before his time, whether *Macedonian*, *Grecian*, or *Barbarian*, ever drew up an Army in that faſhion, if they had ground to do it otherwiſe. *Cyrus* plac'd his Foot in the Battel, and his Horſe in the Wings, when he fought with the *Aſſyrians*, ſaith *Xenophon*. The *Grecians* at *Delos*, *Leuctra*, and *Syracuſa*, put their Horſe in the Wings mixed with light armed Foot, their heavy armed Phalange in the middle, and ſome of their Velites skirmiſhing before it, with Reſerves behind. *Alexander* uſed that ſame cuſtome in all his Battels, though at *Iſſus*, the Streights of the Mountains would not ſuffer him to put his Army in that order he had deſign'd, till he acquir'd a more ſpatious ground. At *Arbela*, where he totally overthrew *Darius*, he marſhall'd his Army nothing after *Ælians* pattern; but ſo, that you may almoſt ſay, that our Modern Generals draw up their Armies now in imitation of him, and according to the Copy he caſt them there: For his Right Wing conſiſted of Horſe mix'd with light armed Foot, the Right hand whereof was commanded by *Clitus*, and the Left by *Philotas*. His Left Wing was likewiſe Horſe mix'd with Velites, on the Right hand whereof ſtood *Meleager*, and on the Left, *Philip* with his *Theſſalian* Cavalry. Between theſe two Wings was ranged his Phalange of heavy arm'd Foot, ſome Velites skirmiſhing before it, and behind all theſe, both Phalanx and Wings, were thoſe Reſerves, under *Horeſtes*, *Lincerta*, *Polycarpon* and *Philagus*; whereof I formerly told you.

Ordinarily Horſe fought in the Wings.

The altering a Phalange from one form, poſture, or ſite to another, gave occaſion to the *Grecians* to give it ſome new denomination, though it was ſtill that ſame Phalange, it was before the motion or evolution made the alteration, which perhaps hath given a rice to *Ælian* to preſent us with ſo many ſeveral Figures in his Treatiſe; nor would they be hard to be underſtood, if they were illuſtrated by either ſmaller or greater Bodies in the Field, as they are by him in Paper. When the Phalanx preſented their Pikes by half Files to Front and Rear, the *Greeks* called it in that poſture *Amphiſtomus*: When the General commanded the Wings of the Phalange to advance, and the Body to make a Bow or Creſcent, and in that poſture to receive the charge of a Wedge Battel, then it was called *Antiſtomus*: And when by facing either by the Right or Left hand about, the Rear was made the Front, then the Phalange was called *Periſtomus*: And ſo of others needleſs to rehearſe. It may be I miſtake in the *Greek* names, as having indeed but very little knowledge in that Language.

Several forms of a Phalange gave it ſeveral denominations.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Grecian *March, Baggage, Encamping, Guards, and of their* Pæan.

ALL theſe belong to the Art of War of any Nation and none will doubt, but the *Grecians* had ſet rules and orders for them all, and every one of them, which they did not alter, but according to the circumſtances of things and emergency of affairs, on which depend moſt of Military actions. *Ælian* gives us little light, or indeed none at all, in any of theſe particulars, but leaves us to glean what we can out of Hiſtory, and thereon to build our own conjectures.

Moſt of them forgot by *Ælian.*

It had been convenient for us to have known the manner of their marching, where or how the Horſe, the heavy and light armed, and how far every day all of them were obliged to march, as alſo whether the Chiliarchies (which were Regiments of Foot) and the Hipparchies (which were Regiments of Horſe) changed day about, or if they march'd conſtantly in one place according to their Antiquity or Precedency. For there is no doubt but their Ephipparchies (which were Brigades of Horſe; and their Myriarchies (which were Brigades of Foot) might have chang'd Van and Rear every day by turns, as eaſily as our Brigades do. But ſince we are left by our leader *Ælian* in the dark, I ſhall be of the opinion, that being there were by *Ælians* account four Ephipparchies in the Cavalry, and four Phalangarchies in the Phalange of the heavy armed Foot, they chang'd day about, and each of them had the Van every fourth day; as alſo, I think, it was moſt conſentaneous to Reaſon, that there being four Chiliarchies in every Phalangarchy, and four Talentinarchies in every Ephipparchy, they likewiſe daily changed; ſo that every Talentinarchy had the Van in the Ephipparchy every fourth day, as every Chiliarchy had in the Phalangarchy. I ſhall likewiſe believe, that the Cavalry march'd either before, behind, or on the Flanks of the Foot Phalange, according to the Enemies motions, and ſo did the light armed Foot. By theſe conjectures I do not offer to impoſe on any mans belief, but leave him that liberty that I have taken, to gueſs as probably as he can. How far the heavy armed Phalange was bound to march in one day, as I can aſſert nothing, ſo I may only gueſs, that they could be bound to march but twenty or five and twenty miles, as the *Roman* Legionaries were, and therefore I can hardly believe *Polianus*, who ſaith, *Philip* made his Phalange march in one day three hundred *Stadia* or Furlongs, which make thirty ſeven *Italian* miles and a half, you will think this the more incredible, when you hear immediately what Baggage they carried.

March.

Concerning the Baggage of a *Grecian* Army, our Author gives us this account; firſt, that it was neceſſary to appoint a judicious and active perſon to have the conduct of it, he ſaith well: Next he tells us, that ſometimes the Baggage march'd in the Van of the Army, and ſo I think it ſhould if the Enemy were in the Rear. Sometimes, ſaith he, it march'd in the Rear, when the Army advanc'd towards an Enemy, and good reaſon it ſhould be ſo. Sometimes, ſaith he, it march'd in the middle of the Army, and there may be ſtrong enough Reaſons for that too. But ſometimes he ſaith, it was order'd to march in the Flanks of the Army, and ſo it might, provided it had good Guards on the Flanks of it. And laſtly, he avers, the *Grecians* ſent their Baggage ſometimes before their Army, when they were to enter iuto a declared Enemies Countrey. And here, I profeſs, I do not at all underſtand the myſtery of this Stratagem of War. But I wiſh *Ælian* had clear'd us in this, whether the Souldiers or Companies of Horſe or Foot, had

Baggage.

had Waggons, Carts, Beaſts of Carriage, Drudges and Slaves allow'd them to carry their Meat and Drink, and Fardles, or if they were obliged to carry all, themſelves; for in my next Eſſay of the *Roman* Militia, I ſhall let you ſee a Legionary carry three Magazines on his Head, Back, and Shoulders, the firſt of Arms, Stakes or Palliſadoes; the ſecond of Meat and Clothes; and the third of Utenſils for a Kitchin. If of all theſe three, the *Greek* was only obliged to carry his Arms, he had a great advantage of the *Roman* in all marches and expeditions. Yet, I ſuppoſe, my Reader may hazard with me to believe, that before *Philip* of *Macedons* time, the *Grecian* Souldiers carried no other burthens than their Arms, but had either Carriage-Beaſts or Drudges allow'd them, for carrying their Victuals and other neceſſaries; and this conjecture I ground upon what I have read in *Thucydides*, who tells us, that at *Syracuſa*, after the unfortunate *Athenians* had loſt their Navy, in which were all or moſt of their proviſions, and that they were to march away by Land from the Siege of that potent City to ſeek new fortunes, their Souldiers were neceſſitated to carry their meat themſelves; becauſe, ſaith the Hiſtorian, they had moſtly loſt their Slaves and Drudges who were accuſtom'd to carry it; and ſome few, whoſe Slaves had ſtay'd ſtill with them, durſt not truſt them with ſo precious a thing as meat then was, leſt in that ſad diſaſter they ſhould run away with it, and ſo ſtarve them. If then their Slaves ran away from them, then Slaves were allow'd them. And it ſeems King *Philip* abrogated this cuſtome, for he caus'd all his Foot Souldiers to carry their Meat and Baggage themſelves, allowing only one Soujat to carry a Hand-mill for the uſe of ten Souldiers, and a Drudge to every Horſe-man; this caus'd the other *Grecians* to call the *Philippians*, *Jumenta Philippi*, *Philips* Beaſts of Carriage. But for all that, I have not Faith enough to believe *Frontinus*, who ſaith, that the ſame *Philip* caus'd his Foot to carry at one time *Triginta dierum farinam*, meal for thirty days. And if his Son *Alexander* kept up that cuſtome, as it is like he did, then his Phalangites needed not to have yielded to the *Roman* Legionaries for heavy burthens in both long and weariſome marches, which you will eaſily grant to be true, if you will conſider the indefatigable expeditions of that magnanimous King through *Perſia* and *India*.

The *Grecian* Souldiers carry'd no Baggage,

Till *Philip* of *Macedons* time.

It ſeems *Ælian* hath not thought Caſtrametation a ſubject pertinent to his Treatiſe, for he ſpeaks nothing of it, and yet it is a very conſiderable part of the Art of War. I find the *Grecians* did not put their Souldiers to ſo much fatigue, as to fortifie their Camp every night, as the *Romans* did. They choſe their Caſtrametation to be in places of advantage, on Heights, Hills, or Riſing grounds, or where they might have a River or Water at their Back, or one of their Flanks, and if they had theſe, or any of theſe, they uſed to caſt up but a ſlight Retrenchment, unleſs they were to encamp ſome long time. Sometimes the Figure of the *Grecian* Camp was Oval, ſometimes equilateral Square, ſometimes Oblong, and I have read that *Lycurgus* appointed his *Spartan* Camps to be round, if they could have none of thoſe advantages I ſpoke of; the defect of that Figure is, that it wants Flanks, which ſhould not be wanting in any Fortification; but it had the advantage of other Figures, that it could contain more than any of them, becauſe, *Rotunda eſt omnium Figurarum capaciſſima*. If it be true, what ſome ſay, that the *Romans* learn'd their Art of Encamping from *Pyrrhus* King of *Epirus*, then we ſhall know what his or the *Grecian* manner was, when I come to ſpeak of the Caſtrametation of the *Romans*, where we ſhall ſee, if he was their Maſter, he needed not be aſham'd of ſuch Scholars. This *Pyrrhus* was Brother-in-law to *Demetrius*, Son to *Antigonus*, who was a great Captain under a far greater Captain, the famous *Alexander*; who, no queſtion, underſtood the Art of Encamping very well. We read, that the very day he fought his laſt Battel with *Darius* at *Arbela*, upon ſight of that numerous Army he had to deal with, he became doubtful how to carry himſelf in ſo great an exigent, and therefore withdrew his Army to an Hill, (which *Mazeus* the *Perſian* had deſerted) plac'd his Camp on it, and order'd it to be fortified, which was immediately done; for we read in *Curtius*, that after he had caus'd to put up his Pavillion, review'd the Enemies Forces, and re-

Caſtrametation.

Alexanders Camp at *Arbela*.

ſolv'd to give Battel, he commanded the Retrenchment to be caſt down, that his Batallions might march out in Breaſt. All this being done in a very ſhort time, ſhows that his Army was well acquainted with both Caſtrametation and Fortification.

To know how the *Grecians* kept their Watches and Guards, we muſt expect no light from *Ælian*, who ſpeaks nothing at all of that affair. Perhaps he hath been of one opinion with that Anabaptiſt Miniſter, who preaching on that Text, *Watch and Pray*, told his Audience, He would not trouble them with the various Interpretations of the word *Watch*, for he would aſſure them, in few words, that *Watch*, was as much as to ſay *Watch*. But becauſe I have not read of any eſſential differences between the *Roman* Guards and Watches, and thoſe of the ancient *Grecians*, I ſhall refer my Reader to my diſcourſe of both, in the twenty ſecond Chapter of my *Eſſays of the* Roman *Art of War*, where I ſhall inform him of any obſervable thing concerning them, mention'd by *Æneas*, in thoſe fragments of his, which all-devouring time hath left us, and thoſe are but few.

Pæan a Hymn to *Apollo*.

Before the *Grecians* began their Battels they ſung their *Pæan*, which was a Hymn to *Apollo*; after which they had their ſhout or cry, which the *Romans*, with a barbarous word, called *Baritus*. If they gain'd the Victory they ſung another *Pæan* or Hymn to that ſame Deity: Then they loudly cryed to the God *Mars*, *Alala*, *Alala*; doubling and re-doubling that word very often. Neither was this cuſtome peculiar to the *Greeks*, for we read in the Firſt Chapter of the Seventh Book of *Xenophon*, that *Cyrus*, the *Perſian*, uſed the very ſame thing when he fought that great Battel with *Cræſus*, wherein he was Victorious; for we read not of any *Pæan* any of them ſung, if they were beaten; thinking belike they were not oblig'd to thank their Gods for any misfortune that befel them.

Alala a cry to *Mars*.

By what I have ſaid, you may eaſily perceive how little, I think, we have learn'd of the moſt eſſential points of the Ancient *Grecian* Militia, from this great, and ſo much talk'd of Maſter of the Art of War, *Ælian*. And if any ſay, he only undertook to acquaint the Emperour *Adrian* with the marſhalling *Grecian* Battels, I ſhall ſay firſt, that he hath but very ill acquitted himſelf of that undertaking; and next, that he might have done that great Prince as great a favour to have inform'd him of all thoſe points of War, which he hath neglected; as of the manner how to marſhal a Phalange, and all the ſeveral parts of it.

CHAP. X.

One of our Modern Armies compared with the Macedonian *Phalanx.*

Modern Infantry reſembles the *Grecian* one.

OUR Batallions of Pikes in the Modern Wars would reſemble the *Grecian* heavy armed Phalange of Foot, if they were as well arm'd for the defenſive as they ſhould be, and as they were one hundred years ago. Our Musquets, Harquebuſſes, Fire-locks and Fuſees, give us an uncontroverted advantage over their light armed, or yet the *Roman* Velites, whatever *Lipſius* ſay to the contrary, as ſhall be ſhown in the laſt Chapter of my *Eſſays of the Modern Art of War*. A *Swediſh* Company, as it was in the time of the Great *Guſtavus* and ſince, being of one hundred twenty ſix men, reſembled the *Grecian* Centuriate, which conſiſted of one hundred twenty eight men: And a *Swediſh* Regiment wherein are one thouſand and eight men, comes very near to the *Grecian* Chiliarchy, wherein, according to *Ælian*, there were one thouſand twenty four men.

Since

Since the time that the *Switzer* Cantons confederated ſo ſtrongly, and fought with their Maſters ſo fortunately, that they got themſelves declar'd Free States, their great Batallions of ten, ſometimes twelve, ſometimes ſixteen thouſand (all arm'd for the Offenſive, with long and ſtrong Pikes) and having their Heads, Necks, Backs, Breaſts, Bellies, and Arms and Thighs well defended with Iron and Steel, reſembled perfectly a *Macedonian* Phalange of heavy armed Foot. And what great Victories they gain'd with thoſe Batallions ſhall be ſpoke of hereafter en paſſant. But one hundred years ago, and before that, they came ſhort of the *Grecians* for their Velites; for we read not, that then they made uſe of any Muſquet or Harquebuſs, though other Nations did. But not long after that time they began to follow the cuſtome of the *Germans*, who then, and long after, made up their Bodies of Foot of two thirds of Pikes, and one third of Fire-men. For to arm two parts of a Company of Foot with Muſquets, and one part with Pikes, is a cuſtome of a far later date. But of this more in another place. Upon the whole matter, I ſay, that our Infantry of Muſqueteers and Pike-men, (if they be well arm'd for the Defenſive) reſembles the *Grecian* heavy and light armed Foot, and ſo do our Cuiraſſiers and Light Horſe repreſent their Cataphracts and light armed Horſe. I wonder why the *Turks* pretend that their Janizaries repreſent the *Macedonian* Foot Phalange of heavy armed; for carrying Guns, Half-Pikes, and Javelines, they come far ſhort of the Phalange, in the ſtrength whereof the *Macedonians* (as they had reaſon) put their greateſt truſt. But if theſe Infidels be not guilty of greater crimes than of vain oſtentation, I think, as good Chriſtians, we are bound to forgive them. *Switzers.*

But ſince the time that Gun-powder made a loud noiſe in the world, I do not read of any *European* Army that ſo nearly reſembled the great *Macedonian* Phalange conſiſting both of Horſe and Foot, as that of *Henry* the Second, King of *France*, when he march'd into *Germany* to aſſiſt the two Proteſtant Electors of *Saxony* and *Brandenburg*, againſt the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth; and by the way took in *Metz*, *Thoul*, and *Verdun*, with which Towns, his Succeſſors, the *French* Kings, have not yet parted. This Army of his is very particularly deſcrib'd by a Noble Author, who, though he conceal his name, yet, as his writings ſpeak him to be an excellent Hiſtorian, ſo they bewray him to have been a Commander in the Wars, both in that Kings time, and in the Reigns of all his three Sons. By the relation of it, we will ſee how both the *French* Infantry and Cavalry were mounted and armed, and how their Batallions were marſhall'd about one hundred and twenty years ago. Army of *Henry* the ſecond, King of *France*.

His Foot was marſhall'd by his Great Conſtable *Monmorancy*, in three Batallions: One conſiſted of *Germans*, whoſe number was ſeven thouſand, and therefore I conclude them to have been two Regiments, each conſiſting of twelve Companies, and each Company of three hundred men or thereabout, according to the cuſtome obſerved then, and long after, by that Nation. They were arm'd Defenſively as the *French* were; but for Offence, two parts of them had Pikes, and the third part Harquebuſſes. They were commanded by the Rhinegrave, whom moſt of the *French* Hiſtorians call very vitiouſly, and almoſt ridiculouſly Count of *Rhingrave*, which is as much as Earl of *Rhineearl*. Theſe *Germans* were Mercenaries, or Auxiliaries at beſt, and therefore I ſhall not ſay they were properly of the *French* Army, which I am now to compare with the *Macedonian* great Phalanx, as *Ælian* deſcribes it. His *Germans*. How arm'd; Under the *Rhingrave*.

His *French* Infantry was divided into two great Batallions: The firſt conſiſted of fifteen thouſand fighting men, of theſe nine thouſand were heavy armed, and ſix thouſand were light armed. The nine thouſand had for their Defenſive Arms, Head-pieces, Backs and Breaſts, Gantlets, Sleeves and Taſſets; for the Offenſive, they had Swords, and long *Bois*, under which name you are to comprehend Pikes, Halberds, Partiſans, and long Staves, banded and pointed with Iron, and moſt of them all had Piſtols at their Girdles. The other ſix thouſand of the firſt Batallion, who were light armed, had for Armour, rich Morrions, and Jacks and Sleeves of Mail, and for Weapons, they had Swords and Harquebuſſes for the moſt part, and ſome Musquets, all bright, clear, and fixed. The ſecond *French* Batallion of Foot was compoſed of thoſe who were brought out of the Southern Provinces of *France*, His *French* Foot, How arm'd.

France, and it was ten thouſand ſtrong, whereof ſeven were heavy armed, and the other three thouſand light armed, they were armed much as the firſt Batallion was.

His Cavalry. His Cavalry was ſub-divided into *Gens d' Arms*, Archers, Light Horſe-men, and Harquebuſiers: His Cuiraſſiers or *Gens d' Arms*, conſiſting all of perſons of noble Families, were about one thouſand, admirably well mounted on *French* Courſers, *Turkey* Horſes, or *Spaniſh* Gennets. They were ſtrongly and heavily arm'd for the Defenſive; for Offence, they had each a Lance, a Mace, and a Sword, no word here of a Piſtol. Their Horſes were arm'd with Bards and Plates of Braſs, richly capariſon'd; and many other Horſes they had, on which (beſide their led Horſes) their Servants, Pages, and Grooms rode. The Captains and other Officers of theſe *Gens d' Arms* were in rich Armour gilded and curiouſly wrought, mounted they were on couragious Horſes, who were arm'd and richly capariſon'd, and their Harneſs cover'd with either Velvet or Cloath of Tiſſue, with Gold-ſmith work or Embroydery. Every one of theſe *Gens d' Arms* had an Archer, who followed him, by the *French* conſtitutions of War, who though then they uſed neither Bow nor Arrow (as formerly they did) yet did ſtill retain the name of Archers. They rode on ſmall, but very nimble Horſes, who vaulted pleaſantly; each of them carried a Lance, a Piſtol, and a Sword, all of them well accoutred, ſtriving who ſhould appear fineſt. The Light Horſe-men were mounted on good Nags, little, but very ſwift; for Armour, they had light Helmets, Corſlets, and Sleeves; for Offenſive Arms, each of them had a Cutlace, and either a half Lance, or a Piſtol, which of them he pleas'd, but not both. Of theſe Light Horſe there were about eighteen hundred. The Harquebuſiers were mounted on as good Geldings as they could make themſelves maſters of; they had Jacks, Morrions, and Sleeves of Mail for Defence; their Weapons were Swords, and Harquebuſſes of three foot long, hanging at the courches of their Saddles. He had about fifteen hundred of them.

Gens d' Arms.

How mounted and armed.

Archers.

Light Horſe-men.

Harquebuſiers.

Beſides all theſe, there were about four hundred *Engliſh* Gentlemen, all Volunteers, under the command of an *Engliſh* Lord; they were mounted on handſome and ſwift Geldings; they were provided with little Armour for Defence; their Weapons were Swords and Lances, like Half-Pikes, ſaith our Author. Theſe were King *Henry*'s Forces.

Engliſh Volunteers.

Setting the *Engliſh* aſide, we have of *French* Cavalry, one thouſand *Gens d' Arms*, one thouſand Archers, eighteen hundred Light Horſe, and fifteen hundred Harquebuſiers: Add theſe together, the aggregate is five thouſand three hundred. This exceeds the number of the *Macedonian* Horſe by one thouſand one hundred and eight. In the next place, ſet the Rhingrave and his *German* Foot aſide, the heavy arm'd *French* Foot were ſixteen thouſand, which wanted but three hundred eighty four of the *Macedonian* heavy armed Phalange. The *French* light armed Foot were about nine thouſand, which was eight hundred and eight more than *Ælian* allows to the *Macedonian* Velites. The *French* Foot and Horſe amounted to thirty thouſand three hundred Combatants, thoſe of *Ælians* great Phalange to twenty eight thouſand ſix hundred ſeventy two; the difference is ſixteen hundred twenty eight. But if we reckon on the *Engliſh* and *French* Volunteers, the Kings own Guards of *Scots*, *French*, and *Switzers*, with the Rhingraves ſeven thouſand *Germans*, this Army exceeded the number of forty five thouſand men; with which marched the Great Maſter or General of the Artillery of *France*, who had the conduct of forty four pieces of Ordnance, great and ſmall, with Powder and Bullets ſuitable to ſo many Guns.

Number of the whole *French* Army.

The Author tells us, that King *Henry* view'd this mighty Army of his near the City of *Metz*, where he ſaith it was drawn up in Battalia; but he forgot to inform us here of two very conſiderable points; the one, of what altitude or depth both the Foot and Horſe were; the ſecond, what diſtances were kept, or order'd to be kept, between the ſeveral Files and Ranks both of Horſe and Foot, and how great the Intervals were between the ſeveral Batallions and Bodies, as well of the Cavalry as the Infantry; for thereby we ſhould have been able not only to have made a probable conjecture, but determinately to have known, how much ground the whole Army took up in longi-

A great overſight.

longitude, but there are others who are guilty of this neglect as well as this Author of ours, who hath fail'd in this.

With theſe, indeed formidable Forces, did the *French* King intend to defie, and fight within the Bowels of the *German* Empire. *Charles* the Fifth, a greater and braver Prince than whom (though he had not been elected Emperour of the *Romans*) either for propriety and large extent of Patrimonial Dominions, or for perſonal Courage and Prudence, the Weſtern World had not ſeen ſince the time of *Charles* the Great. But whileſt this Magnanimous King is viewing, and exceedingly pleaſing himſelf with the ſight of his gallant Army, a beggarly and contemptible crew, of ſome Souldiers, ſome Soujats and Grooms, and ſome Countrey Clowns, in ſight of this great Prince, his Nobility in ſplendid equipage, and of his whole Batallions, charg'd thoſe who were appointed to guard the Baggage, and in ſpite of the King, then in his greateſt ſtrength, carried a rich and conſiderable booty into *Theonville*, an Imperial Garriſon not far from the place: Nor was this affront done ſo publickly to ſo powerful an Army at all reveng'd, only ſome Light Horſe were ſent before the Town, to vapour and brave the *Imperialiſts*, who fail'd not to ſally out, and skirmiſh with the *French*, from which bickering neither party carried away any thing but blows. And at length *Henry*'s great preparations came to nothing, for the two *German* Princes having (not without ſome ſtain to their Honour) made their Peace with the Emperour, without the *French* Kings privity, he was glad to return, and defend his own Territories againſt *Charles*, who was horribly incens'd againſt him, for offering to aſſiſt his Rebels (for ſo he call'd thoſe Electors) againſt his Lawful Authority.

Henry views his army,

And receives an affront.

As this *French* Army, which, I think, ſo much repreſented the Phalange, vaniſh'd; ſo the *Macedonian* Phalanx it ſelf (on which *Ælian* beſtows the Titles and Epithets of *Invincible*, *Inexpugnable*, and *Irreſiſtable*) after it had in *Philips*, and his Son *Alexanders* time, given the Law to the Eaſtern World, and after their deaths, had been kept up by *Alexanders* Succeſſors and Great Captains the ſpace of one hundred and ſixty years, yielded to fate, and was brought to nothing in *Perſeus* his time; and *Macedon* it ſelf reduced to a Province by the *Romans*, of whoſe Legions, Art, and Order of War, we are in the next place to take a view.

Concluſion.

PALLAS

PALLAS ARMATA.

Military Essays ON THE ANCIENT ROMAN ART of WAR.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of the Ancient Roman *Government, and Militia in General.*

THE hand of Heaven, which cast the Empire of the best part of the known World into the lap of the *Romans*, was the more visible, in that before they came to any great progress of Conquest, and after too, their State was obnoxious to those difficulties which might have render'd it not only incapable to overcome its Enemies, but subject to be a prey to any of its Neighbours. And of these, any who have perus'd their Histories, may, if they please, with me observe them which follow. Inward Diseases of the *Roman* State.

First, Their frequent change of Government, as, from Kings to Consuls, then to Consuls joyn'd with Tribunes of the People, from these to a *Decem-* First.

virate, from that to Military Tribunes, inveſted with Conſular Authority, from them to Conſuls again, from theſe to a *Triumvirate*, and from that to Emperours.

Second. Secondly, The almoſt continual jarrs and debates between the Senate and the People not only concerning the *Lex agraria*, and diviſion of Lands, but even about the Supreme Power of the Government it ſelf, in which the Commons ever gain'd ground, and at the long-run obtain'd the principal points and marks of the Soveraignty; thoſe were, the Election of Magiſtrates, yea, of the Conſuls, making and repealing Laws, power of Life and Death, and the laſt Appeal.

Third. Thirdly, The conſtantly Seditious Orations and Practices of the Tribunes of the People, whereby they publickly obſtructed many times the Levies of Souldiers, and the purſuance of many Victories gain'd againſt their Neighbours: Whileſt the State was yet in its Infancy, all thoſe alterations and contentions proceeding from an inward diſeaſe of State, could not chooſe but exceedingly weaken it in the undertaking any great action abroad. But,

Fourth. Fourthly, Their Cruelty and Ingratitude to their own Citizens and Captains, who had done them the beſt and greateſt ſervices, ſome whereof I ſhall inſtance in in another place; few of them all eſcaping a ſevere cenſure; enough to withdraw any generous Spirit from a deſire to ſerve them.

Fifth. Fifthly, Their frequent making Dictators, almoſt upon every ſudden apprehenſion of fear, or ſuppoſed danger; an Office ſo unlimited (having power to do and command what they pleas'd, without comptrol, appeal, or fear to be queſtion'd after their time expired) that it is a wonder none of them prevented *Julius Caſar*, in uſurping the Soveraignty.

Sixth. Sixthly, Their making two Conſuls of equal authority, the very fuel of diſcord at home, and of moſt dangerous conſequence abroad, when a powerful Enemy neceſſitated them to joyn their Forces. Take ſome Inſtances: In one of the Wars againſt the *Volſcians*, *Lucius Furius* was joyn'd in equal Command with *Marcus Furius Camillus* (that famous *Roman*, who freed his Countrey from the Invaſion of the *Gauls*) in this War young *Lucius* would needs fight ſore againſt old *Camillus* his advice; and well beaten he was, and had been utterly routed, if the old man had not waited his opportunity, and come to his reſcue with the *Triarii*. *Fabius* the Dictator (nick-nam'd the Cunctator) had *Minutius* joyn'd in equal command with him, who would needs with the half of the Army fight *Hannibal*, whether the Dictator would or not: The *Carthaginian* beats him, and had made an end of him, and perhaps of the War too, if old *Fabius* had not parted the fray. But the *Romans* eſcap'd not ſo eaſily at *Canna*; for there *Terentius Varro*, in ſpite of his Colleague *Paulus Æmilius*, fought with the ſame *Hannibal*, where both of them receiv'd ſuch an overthrow, that if he who gave it them, had follow'd *Maharbal*'s advice, and immediately marched, he might, in all probability, have din'd the fifth day after in the Capitol, and for ever have extirpated the City and name of the *Romans*. Here *Rome* was ſav'd not at all by the Senates prudence, but by her Enemies negligence.

Seventh. Seventhly, Their cuſtome to recall their Conſuls and Proconſuls at the end of every year (unleſs by mighty favour or invincible neceſſity they were continued) which made their Generals either deſperately hazard Battel, or grant an advantagious and honourable Peace to their almoſt conquered Enemies, leſt their Succeſſors ſhould have the honour to finiſh the War. Take theſe inſtances: *Sempronius*, againſt all reaſon, would needs fight *Hannibal* at *Trebia*, before his Colleague *Publ. Scipio* was recover'd of his wound, for fear new Conſuls ſhould come and rob him of the glory of the Victory: The like fear made *Titus Flaminius* grant an advantagious Peace to *Nabis*, the Tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, when *Titus* was almoſt Maſter of all *Greece*. So did *Scipio* the *African*, to the vanquiſh'd *Carthaginians*, after he had beat *Hannibal* at *Zama*; publickly profeſſing, that the ambitious deſires of *Claudius* and *Cornelius* (who aſpired to ſucceed him, and put an end to that long War) was the cauſe he did not finiſh it himſelf (wanting time) with the deſtruction of *Carthage*.

Eighthly,

Eighthly, Their extraordinary ſuperſtition beyond all other Nations: They must ſacrifice great and ſmall Beaſts, make Proceſſions, Lectiſterniums, and Supplications to all their Gods and Goddeſſes, (who were not a few) not only ſome days, but ſometimes ſome weeks, before their Generals were permitted to march from the City, whereby time and occaſion (not to be recovered in the matter of War) were very frequently loſt. All this muſt be done to appeaſe their angry Deities when any prodigies were ſeen or heard of, either within or without the City; for ſome whereof, natural reaſons might have been given; ſome of them were palpable and ridiculous lyes, and not a few of them compos'd either by the State or the Prieſts to cheat the credulous vulgar, and yet with the relation of them *Titus Livius* even nauſeates his Reader; inſomuch, that *Boccalini* tells us in one of his *Raguagli*, that when *Dion* was ſeverely reprov'd in *Parnaſſus*, before *Apollo*, for writing ſuch fabulous Miracles, *Livius* was obſerv'd to bluſh, as guilty of the ſame crime; yet *Boccalini*'s own *Tacitus*, and *Suetonius* uſe us very little better. *Livy* tells us of ſeveral Oxen that ſpoke, particularly of one that ſaid, *Cave Tibi Roma*. But I wonder why many more poor mens Oxen did not learn to ſpeak, ſince this Oxe for his ſeaſonable warning, (in bidding *Rome* beware of herſelf) was order'd to be fed on the publick charge. *Suetonius* tells us of a Crow, which towards the end of *Domitians* Reign, told the *Romans* from the Capitol, *That all ſhould be well*: If ſhe had not lov'd her liberty better than her meat, ſhe had not flown away, but ſtay'd ſtill and been fed at the publick expence of the City, and perhaps been worſhipp'd as Fatidick, for things did indeed grow well after that Monſters death; yet methinks ſhe was a very ill-natur'd Bird, that would not tell ſo good news in the vulgar language, which was *Latin* (for you are to know ſhe ſpoke in *Greek*) that the poor people of *Rome* (who were oppreſs'd by that bloody Tyrant) might have underſtood the comfortable Prophecy as well as the fabulous Prieſts. I pray you take the Story in Verſe: Eighth.

Tarpeio nuper ſedit quæ culmine cornix,
Eſt bene, non potuit dicere, dixit, Erit.

Upon the Capitol, the Crow
Did not ſay, All was well,
But, That things ſhortly well ſhould go,
Diſtinctly ſhe did tell.

Nor muſt the *Roman* Generals go out of *Rome*, till they took their auſpices right, nor muſt they fight, if the entrails of the Sacrificed Beaſts did not fully pleaſe the jugling Prieſts, or yet if the Sacred Pullets did not eat their meat well; and it was well enough known, how the Chicken-maſters couzen'd the Conſuls oft enough, with the eating or not eating of the Chicken, it being almoſt conſtantly in their power to make the Conſuls give Battel, or abſtain from it, when they pleas'd. *Julius Cæſar* would not be ſo cheated, for though the *Hoſtia* which he was to Sacrifice, run away from him, which was thought to preſage bad fortune, yet went he on to *Africk*, and at his landing there his foot tripping he fell; this his Souldiers thought very ominous, but he gave it another interpretation, and ſaid, He had taken poſſeſſion of the Countrey, *Teneo te Africa*. But contrary to what I have ſaid appear two famous Authors, *Machiavelli* and *Polybius*. The firſt, in his firſt Book of his Diſcourſes on *Titus Livius*, makes the *Romans* tenacious adhering to their ſuperſtition (which he calls Religion) to be one of the cauſes of their aggrandizing their Empire, and commends them much for ſuffering no Innovation to be introduc'd in their Holy Rites; yet all he doth upon the matter, is to ſhew that the Ancient *Romans* made a prudent uſe of their pretended Religion, and under the notion of it, govern'd their Common-wealth politickly: But I ſay, firſt, that is but one of his own conjectures, and notwithſtanding any thing he ſaith to the contrary, I ſuppoſe thoſe *Romans* were as eally ſuperſtitious as they pretended to be, even the Senators themſelves; and himſelf in the eleventh Chapter of that Book avers, that there was never *Machiavelli.*

greater fear of God for many ages, than in that ancient Republick; then by his own account, it was no pretended, but a real Religion. And is not this found Christian Doctrine, to aver, that the fear of God was, where Devils, under the notion of Deities were publickly ador'd and worshipp'd? Secondly, I say, if the *Roman* Senate was to be commended for not suffering any alteration to be made in that Religion which their second King *Numa Pompilius* had establish'd amongst them, then by *Machiavell*'s rule, we must approve of all the persecutions of the Heathen Emperours against the Christians, for thereby they did but endeavour to banish all new Religions out of their Dominions. Truly I think, that not any one part of that *Florentines* Writings smells ranker of Atheism than this doth. But *Polybius*, an universally approv'd Author, speaks very near the same language in the sixth Book of his History, where he saith, that that which with other Nations was accounted a Vice, was made useful by the *Romans*, for keeping their Subjects within the bounds of their duty; and that was, saith he, the superstitious veneration of their Gods in an extraordinary way; but withal he adds, that the *Romans* did well to restrain the fury and other passions of the Commons with unseen terrours, with feign'd and fearful bug-bears, and that both they, and other Ancient Nations had done prudently to induce in credulous minds the opinion of Deities, and of the torments of Hell; and though these have no existency, yet the Doctrine of them, saith he, is not to be rashly condemn'd, since it over-awes the vulgar. Whether this Discourse will not prove *Polybius* (though he knew not the true God) to have been in that Idolatrous age, wherein he lived, as very an Atheist, as *Machiavelli* was, when he wrote his Discourses on *Livy*, and his Book *Di Prencipe*, I shall not determine, but leave those who accuse him of that crime, and his Translator *Casaubon*, who defends him from that imputation, to debate the matter between them.

Polybius.

Ninth. Ninthly, Their horrible and bloody Civil Wars, enough to have destroy'd ten other Nations, as that between *Sylla* and *Marius*, Father and Son; and that between *Cæsar* and the *Pompeys*; and that of the *Triumvirate*: In all which, how much the *Roman* State was at a loss, may be conjectur'd by one review the Dictator *Cæsar* made of the *Roman* Citizens, even before he had made an end of the War, wherein he found the number to be less by one hundred thousand men than when he began that one Civil War, which had continued not full four years.

But there were other difficulties wherewith the *Roman* State had to wrestle, and those made up likewise an inward disease, which came unexpected and unlook'd for, and not being foreseen, could not well be prevented; and those difficulties are most proper for this discourse, because of a Military Subject; and those were the frequent and terrible Mutinies of the *Roman* Legions or Armies. Indeed these laid them open to the Attempts and Invasion of all their Enemies and maligning Neighbours, and have left beside, especially when unpunish'd, an eternal blemish on their Discipline of War, so much cry'd up by all Nations, and in all Ages; the like of which Mutinies, either for number or danger, I do not read to have fallen out in any Army of the World, if you except those infamous ones made by the King of *Spains* Forces in the *Netherlands*, about twenty or thirty years, or more, after the beginning of the Intestine Wars of those Countreys, whereof *John Petit*, *Strada*, and *Bentivoglio*, with other Historians of those times, may give the curious Reader a full account. Of the *Roman* Mutinies, some whereof were punish'd, some never, I shall give you these following Instances.

Mutinies in the Roman Armies.

Against Cæsar. When *Cæsar*, the greatest Captain that ever was, made War in *Spain* against *Pompeys* Legates, because he would not fight when his Legions would, they Mutini'd, and told him, they would not fight when he desir'd them. He pacified them with good words, as knowing it was not time to use force. At *Placentia* his ninth Legion Mutini'd, and refus'd to go to *Africk* with him, but desir'd to be dismiss'd, and he accordingly disbanded them. When *Lucullus* had gain'd a Victory against *Mithridates* and *Tigranes*, he could not get it pursued for the Mutiny of his Army, which would neither be entreated nor commanded to march, alledging they had serv'd out their time. The Leons which were left at *Corfinium* by the Senate and *Pompey*, to whom they

Against Lucullus.

they had sworn Fidelity, Mutini'd against their Governour *Domitius*, and deliver'd both him and the Town to *Cæsar*. *Aulus Posthumius Albinus*, a Legat and an Admiral, upon a false suspicion of Treachery, was barbarously murder'd by his own Army. *Caius Fimbria*, with the help of his Mutinous Souldiers murder'd the Consul *Valerius Flaccus*; and thereafter justly fearing the same measure, entreated one of his own Slaves to do him the courtesie to kill him. The Consul *Cinna*, because he would have had his Legions to fight against *Sylla* (at that time a declar'd Enemy to the State) is murder'd by them. *Lucius Scipio* being to fight with the same *Sylla*, is deserted by his Mutinous Souldiers, who went all over to the Enemy, nor were ever any of those Mutinies or Murders punish'd or look'd after. But because it may be said, most of all these were acted in time of Civil Wars, when Authority was trod under foot, and every man did that which seemed good in his own eyes; I will tell you of some Mutinies, and those of the deepest dye, that fell out, when the Ancient *Roman* Discipline was in its vigour, and was said to be executed with the greatest severity and strictness.

Against Domitius.
Against Albinus.
Against Flaccus.
Against Cinna.
Against Lucius Scipio.

I shall not speak of the Commons leaving the City, and going to *Mons Sacer*, or the Holy Hill, when they were brought back by the witty Parable of *Menenius Agrippa*; that being a Sedition or Secession of the people, rather than a Mutiny of the Souldiers. But sure those Legions, who without liberty given, came out of the Fields to the *Apennine* Hill, and made their demands to the Senate in Arms, was a Mutiny; but so far from being punish'd, that the Mutiniers got what they demanded. Consul *Cæso Fabius* beat the *Æquians* out of the Field with his Cavalry, but could not perswade his Legions to advance, or mend their pace, or make so much as a shew of pursuit; but on the contrary, they march'd back to their Tents, and offer'd rather their Throats to be cut by the Enemy (if he had turn'd head) than obey their Consul; nor was ever this pernicious and dangerous Mutiny punish'd. When *Appius Claudius* had marshall'd his Legions against the *Volscians*, they Mutini'd, refus'd to fight, and fled back to their Camp; and though many of them were kill'd in the Rear, yet neither Honour, Duty, or which is more, Self-preservation, could move them to turn their faces to the Enemy; their wickedness and obstinacy continued next day, when the Consul marching homewards, the *Volscians* again attack'd him, and made a carnage of the Rear of his men without any opposition, for none would fight, but all ran and fled, insomuch that the Enemy might have made the whole *Roman* Army his prey, if he could have made use of so favourable an opportunity. It is true, *Appius* found his time to punish the execrable Mutiniers; and did it to some purpose, by whipping first, and then beheading all the Centurions, as also all the Ensign-bearers that had lost their Colours, and the Souldiers that had cast away their Arms; all the rest he decimated, and beheaded every tenth man, saith *Livy*; bastinadoed, saith *Florus*: What manner of death this bastinadoing was, shall be told you in the twenty fourth Chapter of these Discourses. A Legion of four thousand *Romans* was sent to *Rhegium* to keep it for the State, they Mutiny, kill the principal Citizens, and keep the Town for themselves full ten years, at last being forc'd to yield, all that were taken alive, were well whip'd and beheaded in the great Market-place of *Rome*. *Posthumius* a Military Tribune, with Consular authority fought fortunately with the *Æquians*, (observe in all these that the *Roman* Empire was but yet in its Cradle) is call'd back to the City, in his absence his Army Mutinies against his Treasurer, beats him and wounds him: The Tribune returns in haste (and indeed he made more haste than good speed) and endeavouring to punish the Mutiniers, is himself ston'd to death by them; nor was this highest insolence and baseness ever punish'd, as both in Justice and Honour it should have been. *Sulpitius*, a Dictator, thinking to use the *Fabian* way, and protract the War against the *Gauls*, is forc'd by his Mutinous Army to fight, nor did he ever punish any of the Mutiniers, perhaps because he was successful in beating the Enemy; yet did not this favour so much of that *Roman* severity, for which they desir'd to be so much cryed up. At *Capua*, before *Hannibal* entred *Italy*, some *Roman* Legions hatched a dreadful and monstrous Mutiny, which portended no less than the ruine and dissolution of the

Against the Senate.
Against Cæso Fabius.
Against Appius Claudius.
Against the State.
Against Posthumius.
Against Sulpitius.

Against the Common-wealth.

the State it ſelf, they came to a head at *Lentulo*, fortified their Camp, and took *Titus Quintius* (who had been a Military Tribune) out of his Countrey-Houſe, and forced him to be their General: Neither was this moſt dangerous Mutiny appeaſed by the Authority of either the Senate, or the Dictator *Valerius*, but to the advantage of the Mutiniers; in ſo far, that the Horſe-mens pay was diminiſhed at the inſtance of the Mutiniers, who were all of the Infantry; and all becauſe the Horſe had refuſed to joyn with the Foot in that deteſtable deſign of ruining the Common-wealth. So you ſee the cuſtome of puniſhing honeſt men, and rewarding knaves, is not of a new date. Great

Againſt *Scipio* the *African*.

Scipio the *African*, a perſon of great authority (if ever *Rome* bred any) being in *Spain*, eight thouſand of his Army lay at a place called *Sucro*, a great way from him, they Mutiny, chaſe away their Tribunes, and chooſe Captains of their own, before two of whom were carried Axes, and bundles of Rods, the badges of Soveraign power: *Scipio* by policy and good words making fair weather with them, brought them to the reſt of the Army, and then ſuddenly laid hold upon thirty five of the Ring-leaders, theſe he whips and beheads, the reſt he pardons. The ſame *Scipio* had a Legat, one *Pleminius*,

Againſt *Pleminius*.

who lay at *Locri* in *Italy*, his Souldiers and thoſe of ſome other Tribunes go together by the ears, *Pleminius* compoſeth the matter, but becauſe the Tribunes had not done their duty in parting the fray, he will have them whipp'd with Rods; their Souldiers Mutiny, beat *Pleminius*, and cut off his Noſe. *Scipio* hearing of the diſorder, haſtens thither, acquits his Legat, as having done his duty; and for ſatisfaction to his Noſeleſs face, orders the Tribunes to be ſent in Fetters to *Rome*, there to receive their puniſhment, and ſo goes away. But when *Pleminius* put his hand to his Face and miſſed his Noſe, he could not be ſatisfied with the Conſuls arbitration, and therefore reſolved to cut out his own Revenge, which he performed with a very bloody Knife, for he put all the Tribunes to death with moſt exquiſite torments.

Not ſo great diſorders in the Modern Wars.

Let thoſe Modern Writers who ſo much cry up the Ancient *Roman* Diſcipline of War (and which of them all doth it not?) and complain of the ſlackneſs of the Modern one, tell me of greater Inſolencies, Mutinies, or Contempt of Authority, in any age, ſince the decadency of the *Roman* Empire, than theſe I have mentioned; all or moſt whereof fell out when the Military Laws of *Rome* were thought to be moſt ſtrictly obſerved; nor can it be ſaid, that the Ancient Diſcipline was worn out, for at the lateſt of theſe Mutinies at *Locri* the *Romans* were but young Lords, being Maſters of little more than the half of *Italy*, in one of the beſt corners whereof, *Hannibal* their ſworn Enemy, made yet his abode, and would have done ſo longer, if his unhappy Countrey-men had not firſt withdrawn their aſſiſtance from him, and at length called him home to *Africk*, to ſupport their now decaying and tottering State.

Notwithſtanding all theſe inward Maladies, enough to have conſumed the vitals of any State, the *Romans* in time prevailed over all thoſe, with whom they made either a juſt or an unjuſt War: for as the all-powerful God had pre-ordained them to be a mighty people, ſo he had qualified them with

Roman Vertues.

parts, abilities, and endowments, to attain to that greatneſs: Theſe were, True Fortitude, Prudence, Abſtinence, Temperance, Equity (either real or pretended) Patience, with an admirable Toleration of all manner of wants and difficulties, inuring their Souldiers to all manner of toyl and fatigue; and above all, with Magnanimity, as never ſuccumbing, or yielding to adverſity, but in their greateſt affliction, and loweſt condition, ſhewing greateſt Courage and Confidence; which thoſe Senators well witneſs'd, who would needs dye in their Robes, with the Enſigns of Majeſty, when the *Gauls* had taken and burnt their City. And after their total rout at *Canna*, when *Hannibal* ſent Embaſſadours with overtures of Peace to them, they ſent out and diſcharg'd his Meſſengers to approach the City: And after that, when that Great Captain came (a little too late indeed) and ſac'd their City with his Victorious Army, they ſold that piece of ground on which his Pavilion was erected, publickly by the Drum, at an over-rate; and to ſhew him that this was not a rant, one of their Conſuls offer'd him Battel two ſeveral days, but that great hazzard was hinder'd by fearful Tempeſts from Heaven.

With

With these, and other abilities, were the famous *Romans* fitted for the performance of that which the Almighty had order'd for them, and that was, to over-master the most part of the then known World, and to govern and rule all other Nations with a Rod of Iron.

Most of the *Roman* Tacticks lost.

They who desire to know perfectly the Ancient *Roman* Ordinances and Constitutions of War, have reason to wish that those Authors mention'd by *Vegetius*, were yet extant; which were, the Treatises of the Emperours *Augustus*, *Adrian*, and *Trajan*; but most of all, that of *Marcus Porcius Cato*, who was not only a great Senator, and an eloquent States-man, but an excellent Captain, whereof bear witness his prudent Conduct of Armies, his Victories, and his Triumphs, all yet on Record. And yet he professed, that he thought he had done the *Roman* Republick the greatest service, in preserving their Military Art from Oblivion, and transmitting it to posterity by his Writings. There is no question, but that Treatise of his, if it had not been lost, had clear'd us of many of those doubts and difficulties, which none that are extant do or ever will do. All that is left to give us a glimpse of light in the *Roman* Art of War, are some fragments of *Polybius*, and a Book of *Flavius Renatus Vegetius De re Militari*: Both of them Noble Authors, and eminent persons in their several times. For the last, he is so much cry'd up by most, and thought to be understood by all, that, I do confess, it must be my dulness that makes me not understand him in many places, wherein I think him so obscure, so wandering, and so little constant to himself, that I go away from him, and those who comment on him, as ignorant of some points of the *Roman* Militia, as when I met with either him or them. I am not guilty, nor shall be, of so great presumption, as to fix any blemish on a person whose name hath been held for so many ages in so much reputation, and therefore, I shall think, first, we have not all he wrote on that subject, though his Treatise seem to be full; and next, that when Printing first appeared in the world, some Papers of his have been too carelesly pieced together, and that perhaps put in several Chapters which should have been in one, (hence may come his frequent Tautologies) and a close made to a Paragraph, to which the Author perhaps intended an addition or interpretation, and thereby in some places he is made to speak that sense, which perhaps he never intended. Nor dare I qualifie *Vegetius*, as *Lipsius* in the sixth Book of his *Poliorketikon*, very magisterially does, in these words, *Bonus Vegetius hic & alibi solutus & negligens, & parum ad Genium Antiquum; nec peccarem, si talem Testem rejicerem, & contemnerem*; *Good* Vegetius, saith he, *here and elsewhere loose and negligent, who had little of the Genius of the Ancients; neither should I commit any sin, if I should reject or contemn such a Witness.*

Vegetius his Defects,

Excused.

Lipsius severe to *Vegetius*.

Though in the following Discourses I intend to speak of the *Roman* Military Art, in all its dimensions, yet it is not to be expected, that I either will or can explain all their Ordinances of War, which hath been done by none whose Writings are extant: I shall follow *Vegetius* in those points he speaks of, and wherein he is wanting (and he is that in many things) I shall take what help I can get from others; when I leave him, it shall be when I think him out of the way; nor shall I take upon me to tell my own opinion in any point, but where Reason, History, or other mens Authority, seems to impower me.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Military Election or Levy of the Roman *Souldiers.*

Three Orders in the *Roman* State.

THE great Bulk or Body of the *Roman* State was divided into three Principal Members; theſe were, the *Patritian*, the *Equeſtral*, and the *Plebeian*. Out of the firſt were choſen the Senators, Dictators, Conſuls, Pro-Conſuls, Prætors and Pro-Prætors; till the Commons, after long ſtrife, wrung from the *Patritians* the priviledge to have a *Plebeian* Conſul, and other Magiſtrates. Out of the *Equeſtral* Order were all their Horſe-men levied, ſo that all of the *Roman* Cavalry were Gentlemen, which cuſtome was followed by many Nations for many ages, but is now well near worn out. The *Roman* Horſe-men were choſen by the Cenſors. Of the *Plebeians* or Commons were the Foot Souldiers elected. *Vegetius* ſaith, that the Countrey-fellows were rather choſen, than thoſe bred in Cities; and, in the perſons who were to be elected, he doth not ſo much require bigneſs or talneſs of Body, (as *Marius* did) as the largeneſs of their Breaſts, the vivacity of their Eyes, the brawnineſs of their Arms and Legs. He makes choice rather of Artificers and Tradeſmen than Merchants, but of theſe he rejects Fiſhers, Fowlers, Clothiers, Confectioners, and all ſuch whoſe Trades are ſedentary; and hereby he excludes Taylors and Shoomakers, (but I have known good Souldiers of both) for all theſe he eſteems womanly: But he admits Hunters, Hawkers, Smiths, Carpenters, and ſuch as they. This upon the matter is all *Vegtius* tells us of the *Roman* Levy.

Roman Horſe-men all Gentlemen.

Foot Souldiers *Plebeians.*

Manner of the *Roman* levy.

Other Authors ſhew us the manner of their Levy, which was this: Every year when the Conſuls were elected, four Legions were levied, (unleſs ſome extraordinary occaſion requir'd more) that was two for every Conſul, which with as many from the Allies, made up two Conſular Armies. At that time did all the Tribes appear, which in the flouriſhing condition of the *Romans* came to be thirty five. In the firſt place, twenty four Tribunes or Colonels were choſen, whereof fourteen were of the *Equeſtral*, and ten of the popular Order: Suppoſe ſtill, that four Legions were to be rais'd, for if either more or leſs, the number of the Tribunes was augmented or diminiſh'd. *Vegetius* ſaith, that ſix Tribunes were conſtantly ordain'd for every Legion, whatever ſtrength it was of; but by his favour, *Livy* tells us in his Ninth Book, that there were but four Tribunes in every Legion in the War againſt the *Samnites*: And at that time the Tribunes were choſen by the Tribes, and from thence they have their denomination; and I find likewiſe they were choſen by the Tribes in the time of the Second Punick War, but in the *Macedonian* the Conſuls had the election of them. Two years after that War was ended, *Livy* informs us, the Tribes reſum'd their former liberty, and elected their Tribunes.

How the Legions were elected.

The manner in which the Tribunes or Colonels elected their Souldiers was this: Every Tribe divided its men that were fit for ſervice, by fours: Of the firſt four, the eldeſt Tribune of the firſt Legion choſe one, the eldeſt Tribune of the ſecond Legion choſe the ſecond; the eldeſt Tribune of the third Legion choſe the third, and the fourth man fell to the lot of the eldeſt Tribune of the fourth Legion. Of the ſecond four, the firſt Tribune of the ſecond Legion choſe the firſt. Of the third four, the firſt Tribune of the third Legion choſe the firſt. And of the fourth four, the firſt Tribune of the fourth Legion choſe the firſt; and ſo again alternatively, till the Legions were all compleat; and the election for all the four Legions as equally made as poſſibly it could be. Thoſe who were elected, were not always *Tirones* or *Novitiates*, for many of them had ſerv'd in the Wars before, but were ſtill oblig'd to be enroll'd at new levies (if elected) till they had ſerv'd out that time that

was

was appointed, and what that was, ſhall be immediately told you. Thoſe who were levied for the Foot ſervice, were ordinarily divided into four Claſſes: In the firſt were the moſt experimented, and were call'd *Triarii*; in the ſecond thoſe of the ſtrongeſt Bodies, and had the name of *Principes*; in the third were thoſe who were in their youthful years, and had leaſt experience, and were called *Haſtati*; in the fourth Claſs were thoſe who were ordain'd to be light armed, and had the name of *Velites*. Of all theſe, and every one of them, I ſhall ſpeak particularly in the ſixth Chapter.

How the Officers were elected.

The Tribunes had the power alſo to chooſe the Centurions, the Standard, Enſign, and Eagle-bearers, but not according to their own pleaſure, but according to the time they had ſerv'd, the degrees they had attain'd to, the Donatives they had got, and the ſervices they had done; and if any of them conceiv'd he got wrong, he had power to appeal from the Tribune to the Conſul. Obſerve here, that no man could be choſen to be an Officer, but he who had ſerv'd out half his time, which was this: The Horſe-men were oblig'd to ſerve ten years, and the Foot twenty, (ſuppoſe ſtill, that they were not mutilated, or made unſerviceable in the Wars) after that, they were *Emeriti Milites*, and were to get their Dimiſſions; and this ſometimes occaſion'd Mutinies, when the State could not conveniently ſpare them. The members elected for the War, were not to be under ſeventeen years old, nor above forty ſeven. But it is ſtrange, how *Vegetius* in the fourteenth Chapter of his Firſt Book, againſt the current of all Writers, affirms, that thoſe of fourteen years old ſhould be brought to the election, if the ancient cuſtome, ſaith he, were obſerv'd. But theſe Dimiſſions were ſometimes diſpenced with, when Reaſon of State required it: And *Livy* ſaith, that in the *Macedonian* War there was no Ceſſation from Arms, nor Dimiſſions granted, but to thoſe who were paſt the fiftieth year of their age.

How long a *Roman* Souldier was bound to ſerve.

Abſents from elections how puniſh'd.

If any abſented themſelves from the time and place ordain'd for election, they were puniſh'd; but how, neither *Polybius* nor *Vegetius* tell us. But *Lipſius*, that great Inveſtigator of Antiquity, out of Hiſtory informs us, that ſometimes they were fin'd in Money, or Beſtial; ſometimes they had all or moſt of their goods taken from them; ſome of them were corporally puniſh'd by bonds and impriſonment, ſome of them had whipping with Rods, and ſome had their Fingers and Thumbs cut off, and many of them were ſold for Slaves. He ſaith alſo, that ſome perſons were appointed (whom he calls *Conquiſitores*) to ſearch out, and find ſuch Delinquents. But in proceſs of time, eſpecially after the *Roman* State was converted into a Monarchy, this laudable and ſtrict way of election wore out, and decay'd; and inſtead of free-born, and of the luſtieſt and ableſt *Plebeians*, Soujats, Slaves, Drudges, and the Servants of Vintners and Cooks were elected and enroll'd, to the diſgrace of the *Roman* Militia, and ſubverſion of the Empire; whereof *Vegetius* hath juſt reaſon to complain.

Tumultuary levies.

Two things my Reader muſt obſerve here; firſt, that beſides this formal election, there was a ſudden and tumultuary levy, which was made when the danger was great, the Enemy prevail'd, or other Emergencies, or Reaſons of State required expedition. In theſe caſes, no reſpect was had to Age or Dimiſſions, but all, young and old (provided they were fit for ſervice) were enroll'd, and forc'd to take Arms in defence of the Commonwealth. The ſecond thing to be obſerved, is, that though moſt Authors ſay, that ſo long as the *Roman* State kept up its Ancient and ſtrict diſcipline, (this ſome will have to have been done till the time of the Emperours) all the *Roman* levies, whether formal or tumultuary, were all made of Freemen; notwithſtanding, I ſay, this aſſertion, Hiſtory tells us, that that noble Nation did not tye it ſelf ſo ſtrictly to that point of Honour; but both could, and did diſpence with it, when the Senators thought fit. For after the defeat at *Canna*, they bought eight thouſand Slaves from their Maſters, and enroll'd and armed them, who thereafter for their good ſervice done at *Beneventum*, were manumitted. Nor was this all, the Dictator *Junius Brutus*, by open Proclamation, invited all who were condemn'd for capital crimes, or who were baniſh'd and fled, and all who were impriſon'd for debt, to come and take Arms, exempting the firſt from all puniſhment, and

A ſtrange Proclamation.

the laſt from all payment. An action which ſeems not to reliſh much of Juſtice, but *Dura mater Neceſſitas*: Neceſſity will be tyed by no Law. And the like was practis'd afterward in the times of moſt of their Civil Wars.

CHAP. III.

Of their Arms, Offenſive and Defenſive, and their Military Oath.

Defenſive Armour moſt neceſſary.

NAture teacheth us to defend our ſelves, before we offend our Enemies; and indeed if we conſider it right, all the offence we ſhould intend is our own preſervation, or reparation for injuries done. For this cauſe all the Ancients had an eſpecial care to provide themſelves with ſuch Armour as might defend their Bodies from the ſtroaks, puſhes, or thruſts of thoſe with whom they were to fight; and there is no queſtion, but the confidence and opinion a Souldier hath, that his Body is well guarded from danger, doth much animate and encourage him to attack his Enemy.

Roman Horſemens Defenſive Armour.

The *Roman* Horſe-men (as *Vegece* hath it) carried for the Defenſive, a Corſlet (call'd a Cataphract, and from this, both heavy armed Horſe and Foot were called *Cataphracti*) a Head-piece, and a Target, which, he ſaith, was ſhort and round. He ſpeaks not of Greeves, Belly-pieces or Taſlets, perhaps he is defective here, for other Authors allow them. Nor doth he mention Boots, though there be reaſon to think, that every Horſe-man ſhould have had two Boots, ſince, as we ſhall ſee preſently, one Boot was allow'd to every Foot-man. For the *Roman* Horſe-mens Weapons, or Offenſive Arms, we muſt conſult *Polybius*, who gives them a Sword and a Lance, the Sword longer than that a Foot Souldier carried: It is ſtrange, that *Vegetius* ſpeaks nothing of this. Some Authors ſay, the Horſe-men carried likewiſe ſome Darts, which may be probable. *Joſephus* informs us, that they carried Lances, Long Swords, and two or three Darts within their Shields, the points whereof, he ſaith, were as long as that of a Lance; and the Lance had two points, one at each end. It might be ſo in *Joſephus*'s time, but the Ancient *Roman* Horſe-men made uſe of no Darts. How the light Horſe-men were arm'd, I cannot tell you; many very probably ſay, that no light horſe were made uſe of till the time of the Emperours, and but a few of them at firſt; and if this be true, *Vegece* might have told us, how they were arm'd, ſince he liv'd under an Emperour.

Offenſive Weapons.

Foot heavy armed.

The *Roman* heavy armed Foot wore Head-pieces, Back, and Belly-pieces, and Taſlets, all theſe of Iron or Braſs: They had likewiſe Iron Boots, but how many is a queſtion. *Polybius* ſeems to allow them two, for he ſpeaks of Boots in the plural number. *Vegetius* ſaith, they had each but one Boot, which he affirms, they wore on their Right Legs. His words are, *Dextris cruribus*, becauſe, as ſome imagine, their Targets defended their Left Legs, when they came to the ſhock. Yet for all this, *Livy* in the Fourth Book of his firſt Decad, ſaith, The *Samnites* wore their Iron Boots on their Left Legs, perhaps ſo did the *Romans* their Neighbours; but we ſhall meet with greater uncertainties. I ſhall now ſpeak particularly of ſome of theſe Arms and Weapons.

Their Defenſive Armour.

Though *Vegetius* doth much commend the Ancient *Roman* Arms, and layeth the blame of the loſſes the Empire ſuffer'd by the *Goths* and *Huns*, on the want of theſe Arms, yet is he not at the pains to give us ſo perfect a deſcription of them, as other Authors have done. He tells us of Shields, and that all the heavy

heavy armed Foot had Shields, but ſpeaks not of their form nor bigneſs. There be ſome, and among them *Achilles Terduzzi*, who make a difference between a Shield, and a Target; and it is this, the firſt was of a round figure, and the ſecond of a long, angular, or oval. If ſo, we muſt conclude thoſe uſed by the *Romans* to have been Targets and no Shields, in regard they were ordinarily four foot long, and two foot and a half broad. But notwithſtanding this nice diſtinction, I ſhall uſe the word promiſcuouſly, and call the *Roman* Target a Shield. If we conſider, that there was an allowance of three foot of ground between the *Roman* Files, and that the breadth of their Shields covered two foot and a half of that ground, we muſt conclude, there was but one half foot left for them, firſt to throw their Javelines or Darts, and then to preſent the points of their Swords againſt their Enemies; and their Shields being ſo near each other, and their Bodies ſo ſtrongly defended by them and their other Armour, it is no wonder, they either gave or received a charge couragiouſly. For *Vegetius* ſaith well in the twentieth Chapter of his Firſt Book, that thoſe who are expoſed naked to receive Wounds, muſt think more of flying than fighting: And in the end of that ſame Chapter he ſaith, that he who hath his Head and Breaſt well arm'd, is not afraid of Wounds, and therefore needs not fear to fight.

A nice diſtinction.

At firſt the *Roman* Shields were made of Timber, Bulls-hides, or other Leather, artificially interwoven and wrought together, the Timber being ordinarily of the Fig or Willow-tree, cut in ſmall pieces, and all well cover'd with the ſtrongeſt Leather: But *Camillus* having to do with the *Gauls*, who carried heavy ſlaſhing Swords, cauſed them to put a Margin or Border of Iron on the upper part of the Shield, thereby to reſiſt the force of their furious blows; and after *Camillus* his time, there was a ſtrong-pointed piece of Iron put to the lower part of the Shield, upon which they fix'd it in the ground, either when they ſtood Centinel, or when they ſtood in Battel aray, expecting an Enemy, as *Æmilius* his Legions did, when they were to fight with *Perſeus* and his *Macedonian* Phalange; for at thoſe times they lean'd and reſted themſelves on their Shields. They made alſo good uſe of thoſe points, by puſhing and thruſting with them at an Enemy, when they came to any cloſe medley. Many, and almoſt all Nations, beſides the *Grecians* and *Romans*, made uſe of Shields, eſpecially the *Gauls* and *Germans*, who peradventure had the uſe of them before the *Romans* were a Nation.

The *Roman* Shield.

Of Shields, either in Battel, or at the taking of Towns and Forts was compos'd that Figure, which the *Romans* called *Teſtudo*, or Tortoiſe, becauſe it reſembled that Animal, which covers it ſelf within its ſhell, and there were two kinds of it. The firſt was framed thus: The firſt Ranks cover'd their faces with their Shields, and all the reſt kept their Targets above their heads, thereby making ſuch a Wall of Defence, that they were not only able, ſay Authors, to deſpiſe all Darts, Stones, and Arrows, but to reſiſt a furious charge of either Horſe or Foot. But I wonder why any Tactick will call this figure of Battel Invincible, even againſt miſſile Weapons, ſince the *Romans* themſelves were oftner than once beaten by the *Parthian* Archers: And *Livius* tells us in his Tenth Book, that in the great Battel fought by the *Romans* againſt the *Samnites*, *Umbrians*, and *Gauls*, when both the *Haſtati* and *Principes* were well near routed, ſome Tribunes coming with the *Triarii* to the reſcue, found the *Gauls* ſerr'd together in a *Teſtudo*, covering themſelves with their great Shields, in ſuch a manner, that the *Roman Triarii* (who were heavy arm'd) durſt not hazard on them, till firſt with Darts, Javelines, and other Miſſiles, they put them in diſorder, and then they routed them. *Livius* tells us of the ſecond kind of the *Teſtudo*, made of Shields, at the aſſaulting of Towns, the manner this: So many Centuries, Maniples, or Cohorts, as the Conſul or General pleas'd, ſtood near the Walls or Ports with their Shields over their heads, the firſt Rank ſtood ſtreight, the ſecond bowed a little, the third bowed a little more than the ſecond, the fourth more than the third, ſo ſtill declining, till the laſt Rank, (ſuppoſe the tenth) kneel'd. Up their Backs as up ſtairs, did thoſe who were ordain'd to ſtorm, run to the aſſault, and ſo either enter'd, or broke down places for others to enter. This, I believe, was practis'd often in their Plays on the Amphitheatres, and indeed

A Tortoiſe of Shields.

Firſt kind.

Not Invincible.

Second kind of a Tortoiſe.

it was more to be uſed in jeſt than in earneſt, for great Stones thrown down by the Defendants, would eaſily have broken the Tortoiſe-ſhell, and then molten Lead, boyling Oyl, or ſcalding Water (all ordinarily practis'd on ſuch occaſions by the Ancients) would, to my ſenſe, either ſoon have kill'd, or chac'd away the Tortoiſe it ſelf.

It is my opinion, that, when the *Romans* march'd, and no Enemy in ſight of them, they carried their Head-pieces at their girdles, and their Shields, within covers, on their Backs; my reaſon is, *Ceſar* in the Second Book of the *Gallick* War, ſaith, that the *Nervians* gave him ſo brisk and ſudden a a charge, that his Souldiers had not time enough to put on their Head-pieces, or pull their Shields out of their covers. And it was neceſſary they ſhould have been covered, for the preſervation of thoſe Devices and Coats of Arms that were Painted on them, a cuſtome uſed by ſeveral Nations before *Romulus* laid the foundation of *Rome*. But both before, and long after the *Romans* had over-maſter'd the habitable World, or moſt of it, men uſed to put on their Shields what fancies or devices they liked beſt, ſome Birds, ſome Beaſts of ſeveral kinds, ſome the noble actions of their Anceſtors, ſome the Sun, ſome the Moon, and ſome a leſſer Star. This, I ſuppoſe, gave the riſe to many of our Romance Writers, to give ſeveral denominations to all their Knights Errant, by the devices of their Shields, and to make them diſtinguiſhable thereby, when their faces were undiſcernable with the Beavors of their Helmets. But in after ages, Princes thought fit to reſtrain men from the vanity of taking Coats of Arms as they pleas'd, till they were given them by authority. Hence have the Heraulds their riſe, and if they were permitted to exerciſe their office ſtrictly, it is to be thought, we ſhould not ſee ſo many extravagant Coats in the World. I was acquainted long ago with a *German* (and there be many good Heraulds of that Nation) who had aſſum'd for his Coat the *French* Kings Arms; I ask'd him his reaſon for it, he told me, That his Chriſtian name was *Lonis*, as well as that of the Moſt Chriſtian King, and ſince they had both one name, he knew not why they might not both have one Coat of Arms.

Coats of Arms.

The *Roman* Head-pieces, as many think, were of Leather, till the time that the *Gauls* invaded their Seigneory; and then *Camillus* the Reſtorer of *Rome*, caus'd them to make them of Iron or Braſs, and indeed they had need of ſuch to reſiſt the mighty ſtroaks of thoſe ſtrong-bodied *Barbarians*. I find, their Helmets were tyed under their chins with claſps of Leather, Iron or Braſs; nor can I learn, that any other part of their face was either armed or covered, which, no doubt, mov'd *Ceſar* at *Pharſalia* to bid his Souldiers ſtrike at the faces of the *Pompeyans*, after they had caſt their Javelines. *Miles, feri faciem*, were ſaid to be his words. Upon their Helmets the *Roman* Souldiers had three Feathers, either Red or Black, ſtanding ſtreight up, one foot and a half high, ſaith *Polybius*; and thoſe ſeem'd to add, ſaith he, ſo much to their ſtature, and made a fine ſhew. Theſe Feathers were the common Souldiers Creſts, but Commanders choſe for their Creſts ſuch things as beſt pleas'd their fancy; and by theſe they were known, as by the Devices of their Shields. As *Pyrrhus* King of *Epirus*, was known by his Creſt of Goats Horns.

Roman Helmets.

Creſts.

Their Corſlet, Cataphract, Cuiras, or Back and Breaſt, (for all theſe are one thing) was of Iron or Braſs, ſuch, ſay ſome Writers, that no Sword could pierce, much leſs a Dart or an Arrow: But this I will believe at full leiſure, for the Great *Alexander* at the Siege of *Gaza* had his Body wounded with an Arrow, through his Corſlet, which I may rationally ſuppoſe to have been as good as ever any *Roman* Legionary wore; but we ſhall have more of this ſtuff anon. Some inſtead of a Corſlet had a Jack, made in that ſame faſhion as Fronts, with Plates of Iron, and ſo artificially, that many wore them next their Shirts, with as much eaſe, ſay ſome, as we wear our Doublets. If I ſhould inform my Reader of a Corſlet made by a *Cyprian*, and preſented to *Demetrius*, which a Javeline ſhot out of a Catapult could not pierce; perhaps he would believe it as little as I do my ſelf. It is writ of ſome who made Jacks ſo well and ſo ſtrong of Linnen and Silk, that they could defend mens Bodies from Darts and Arrows, whereof ſome have been undertaken to be made

Roman Corſlets.

Jacks of Mail.

Jacks of Silk.

in

in our time Piſtol proof. But here, let it be enough to know, that the *Roman* Corſlets ordinarily were of Iron and Braſs.

Roman Swords.

There is no queſtion, but the Sword was the Weapon of Offence, in which the Valorous *Romans* put their greateſt truſt, as that whereby they gain'd their moſt glorious Victories. *Plutarch* affirms, that the *Roman* Sword was of ſo well temper'd metal, that no Head, Back or Breaſt-piece was able to withſtand its force, and their Helmets and Corſlets ſo ſtrong (as I told you before) that no Sword could pierce them. What ſhall I ſay then of all this, but that the *Roman* Souldier might be ſtout enough, ſince his Sword was irreſiſtable, and his Armour impenetrable. When I read all this fine Story, I fanſie them all to be Enchanted Knights, till I remember how the *Gauls* and *Carthaginians* in many bloody bickerings open'd their Veins through the ſtrongeſt Fortification of their Harneſs. Or if this ſhould be deny'd me, yet, I hope, it will be granted, that *Roman* Swords could pierce *Roman* Corſlets, in their Civil Wars, where ſo many thouſands of them dyed by the edge of the Sword. *Livy* tells us, that after a ſcuffle between the *Romans* and *Macedonians*, *Perſeus* King of *Macedon*, choſe rather to leave his men unburied, than diſcourage his Souldiers by looking on thoſe horrible, ghaſtly, and frightful Wounds, that were given by the *Roman* Swords, whereby Heads were cut in two pieces, notwithſtanding the *Macedonian* Brazen Helmets, and Legs and Arms were cut away notwithſtanding any Brazen Greeves or Boots, wherewith they were guarded. And yet, *Vegetius* ſaith, the *Roman* Swords were made for pricking and thruſting, as well as for cutting, ſlaſhing, or cleaving; the Souldier was taught to uſe his Sword both ways, yea, thruſting was more and oftner uſed than the other, as that which gave Death ſooner than cutting did, and did not expoſe the Body of the Souldier to danger, ſo much as the other did. And it is certain enough, that at *Pidna*, *Perſeus* his Phalanx was diſorder'd and routed by the *Roman* Sword-men, who getting within the long Pikes of the *Macedonians*, with thruſts pierc'd the moſt naked places of their Bodies. *Vegetius* ſeems to allow to every Souldier two Swords, one longer than the other, he calls them *Spatha* and *Semiſpatha*, Swords and Half-Swords; you may call them Swords and Daggers. They carried, he ſaith, their Swords on their right ſides, and ſo ſaith *Polybius* too; but where they carried their Daggers, none of them tells. But *Joſephus* ſays, they carried their longeſt Sword on their Left ſide, and the ſhort one on the Right. Some Authors would perſwade us, that the *Gauls* carried Swords as long as the Spears of other Nations, and that the points of their Spears were as long as other mens Swords. *Livy* ſays not ſo much, but he writes, that they had very terrible Darts.

Romantick.

Sword and Dagger.

Romantick Swords.

Roman Pilum.

Becauſe the *Roman Pilum* was not properly a Dart, I ſhall Engliſh it, as *Livius* his Tranſlator doth, Javeline. *Vegetius* in the fifteenth Chapter of his Second Book, makes two kinds of it, the longer and the ſhorter, the firſt was five foot long, and the ſecond three foot long; the firſt was alſo called *Haſtile*: the Iron of Both was Triangular, and to every heavy armed Souldier he allows two Javelines. But we need not believe him in any of theſe aſſertions. Firſt, for the length of the *Pilum*, *Polybius* affirms, that the ſhaft or handle of it was four Inches of circumference, that the Timber was four foot and a half long, and the Iron as much; but near the half of the Iron was claſp'd to the Timber, that the one half only added to the length of the Javeline: And thus by *Polybius* his account, the *Roman Pilum* was near ſeven foot long, almoſt two foot longer than *Vegetius* his longeſt, and might with more reaſon be called *Haſtile*. Some think, that only the *Haſtati* and *Principes* carried theſe Javelines, and that the *Triarii* had a Weapon of eight foot long, like our Half-Pikes, which they manag'd with both their hands, till they came within ſtroak of Sword, and that in *Marius* his time the uſe of it wore out. As to what *Vegetius* ſaith, that every Souldier had two *Pila*, Hiſtory contradicts him, that allows in ancient times but one; whether they had two or none in his own time, he knew beſt; but the old *Romans* darted their Javelines, as they were advancing towards the Enemy, and were commanded by their Generals to make haſte to come to dint of Sword, eſteemed by them the Prince of Weapons. So *Cæſars* Legionaries at *Pharſalia*, were order'd, after each man had

Its length.

had caſt his Javeline, to run to the ſhock, which accordingly they did. The
How they were thrown. manner of throwing their *Pila*, was, that the firſt Rank threw firſt, and immediately bowed down, that the ſecond Rank might caſt over their heads, ſo did the third, and fourth, and the reſt, till all the Ranks had thrown. When they ſtood in order of Battel, they us'd to ſtick their Javelines in the ground, till the ſign was given; ſo it ſeems they were ſharp at both ends, and no doubt, in time of Battel they might have made a Palliſado of them againſt Horſe, as *Swediſh* Feathers have been uſed in our time, yet we read not in Hiſtory, that any ſuch uſe was ever made of the *Roman Pilum*.

Being now to ſpeak of the *Roman* light armed foot, I ſhall deſire my Reader once for all to take notice, that *Vegetius* was deſir'd by the Emperour *Valentinian* to give him the Conſtitutions, Laws and Practice of the Ancient *Roman* Art of War, and not of any cuſtoms lately crept in: Notwithſtanding which he reckons among the light armed Foot, *Plumbati*, whom he likewiſe calls *Martiobarbuli*, and *Fuſtibularii*, whom I cannot Engliſh otherwiſe, than the firſt to be Lead-caſters, and the ſecond to be Slingers with Battoons: He reckons alſo Archers, but in Ancient Hiſtory we do not read of any of thoſe three, for
Roman Velites. the old *Romans* acknowledg'd no other light arm'd or *Velites*, but Slingers and Darters. Both theſe were armed Defenſively with Head-pieces of Raw-
How arm'd. Hides, and a Target four handful long, and of an oval form. For Offence, the Darter had a Sword, and ſeven Darts; the Slinger had a Sling, a Sword, and a number of Stones. Some allow alſo to both of them a little Javeline of three or four foot long. The *Spaniſh* Darts being wing'd at the point, could hardly be pull'd out of a Shield, or the Body of a man; ſuch Arrows are common,
The *Saguntine Falarica.* and are called Barbed. But the *Saguntine* Dart, which was called *Falarica*, deſerves to be taken notice of. *Livius* deſcribes it thus in his twenty firſt Book: *Falarica* was a kind of Dart uſed by the *Saguntines*, when *Hannibal* beſieg'd their City, (perhaps they invented it at that ſiege) it had a long ſhaft, round and even every where, except toward the end of it, and that was headed with Iron, three foot long, Tow being wrapp'd about it, ſmear'd with Pitch; this Tow they fired, when they were to lance the Dart, the violent motion increaſed the fire, inſomuch, as when it could not pierce the Body, it forc'd the Souldier to caſt away his Shield or Corſlet, and ſo expos'd him diſarm'd to the
Roman Darters. Darts or Arrows which were ſhot afterward. The Timber of the *Roman* Dart might be two foot long, and the bigneſs of a mans finger; the point of it of Iron, one foot long, ſharp, ſmall and ſubtile, that it might pierce, and in piercing bow, that ſo an Enemy might not make uſe of it, by throwing it back again, but this was the practice of other Nations as well as the *Romans*; yet I pray, obſerve what *Livy* ſaith in contradiction of this. In that Battel, which I mention'd but a little before, the *Tuſcans* gather'd up all the Darts (for they were allow'd to carry none of their own) which were ſtrayed all over the field, and, no doubt, had been all caſt before, and with theſe they diſorder'd the *Gauls* (who had made a Pent-houſe of their Shields) and ſo put them to flight. What ſhall we then believe? And is it not ſtrange too, that theſe Darters would throw their Darts four hundred foot; for my part, I dare not believe it, and if it be true, certainly the blow could not be mortal.

Roman Slingers. The *Roman* Slingers uſed to caſt Stones out of ordinary Slings, which they wheel'd about their heads, and would hit at the diſtance of ſix hundred Foot; for no leſs (as *Vegetius* affirms) was allow'd them at their exerciſe. Other Slingers the Ancient *Romans* had not. The Inhabitants
Baliartans. of the *Balearick* Iſlands, which now are called *Majorca* and *Minorca*, were eſteemed both the beſt and the firſt exerciſers of the Sling, the Mothers refus'd to give their children meat, till they had hit the mark was given them to throw at.
Ægeans. *Livy* in his thirty eighth Book crys up the *Ægean* Slingers, of whom one hundred not only beat back the ſtout *Samians*, when they ſallied out of their Town, but alſo never miſſing to hit them, when they appear'd on the Parapets of their Walls, forc'd them to render their City to *Marcus Fulvius* the *Roman* Conſul.
Benjamites. And yet it is more than probable, that neither the one nor the other were skilful or ſo ancient practicers of the Sling as the *Iſraelites* for there were 700 of one Tribe who could hit within an hair-breadth. With this Weapon did *David* obtain the Victory over *Goliah*, of which I ſhall ſpeak in another place.

Vegetius;

Vegetius hath reason to prefer the Sling to the Bow, in this regard, that an Arrow cannot wound unless it pierce, but a Stone bruiseth though it pierce not, and if it be of any weight, it killeth, notwithstanding the resistance of any Head-piece or Corslet.

In the times of the Emperours, or a little before, came the *Plumbati* or *Martiobarbuli* in fashion with the *Romans*. *Vegetius* tells us, what great services they did in the reigns of *Diocletian* and *Maximian*, but doth us not the favour to describe the thing it self. They threw Bullets of Lead of one pound weight. I do not remember whether *Livy* mentions any of them to have been among those *Roman* Slingers, who beat the *Gallo-Grecians* at *Olympus*. The *Fustibalus* or Battoon-Sling was a Sling of Leather tyed to a Battoon of four foot long, which the Slinger manag'd with both his hands: and out of which, saith *Vegetius*, he threw Stones as out of an *Onagra*, with so great force, that neither Target, Head-piece, or Corslet could resist it. But these expressions are ordinary with him. I am of the opinion there was no difference between the *Plumbati* or Lead-casters, and the *Fustibalarii*, or Battoon-Slingers, but that the first cast Lead, and the last great Stones; but how far, our Author tells us not.

Lead-casters.

Battoon-Slingers.

Archers were not reckon'd among the *Velites*, till the second Punick War, and even then, they were rather Auxiliaries, than either *Romans* or Allies. They were however made good use of after *Hannibal* invaded *Italy*. *Vegetius* in the fifteenth Chapter of his First Book, affirms, (for which he hath no authority of History) that the fourth part of the youth of *Rome* was train'd to the use of the Bow, for we read of no such custome. *Scipio Æmilianus* (who destroy'd *Carthage*) made much use of Bow-men against the *Numantines*, and without them, if you will believe *Vegetius*, he thought he could not over-master that Valorous Enemy. The Emperour *Justinian* made a singular good use of some of his Archers, which was this: He caus'd them to put on such Defensive Arms as his Legionaries wore, and mix'd them together; these Bow-men pour'd showers of Arrows on the Enemy, before their heavy armed could come within distance either to cast their Javelins, or draw their Swords; yea, the nearer they were, the more mischief they did, and when they came to a close medley, they quit the Bow, and took them to their Swords. How great use was made of Auxiliary Bow-men by the *Romans*, may be conjectur'd by this, that when some of *Pompeys* Legions storm'd one of *Cæsars* Castles at *Dirrachium*, and were beat off, thirty thousand Arrows were reckon'd to *Cæsar* himself, all which had fallen in the Sconce: And one *Scæva* a Centurion, shewed his Shield to his General, wherein were one hundred and thirty holes. Observe by the way, that Targets resisted the violence of Arrows. Some write, that *Augustus* caus'd them to levy *Roman* Citizens to be Archers, both on Foot and Horse-back; perhaps he had been taught to do so by the losses his Competitor *Anthony*, and before him *Crassus*, suffer'd by the *Parthian* Bow-men. The wicked Emperour *Domitian* was said to be so cunning an Archer, that *Suetonius* writes, he could direct his Arrows to the mark between the fingers of a Boy, stretched one from the other, without hitting any of them; of such we have heard in later times.

Archers Auxiliaries.

A good practice.

Shields resist Arrows.

After the *Roman* Souldiers were levied and arm'd, they were marked in the Hand, or some other place of the Body, and an Oath of Fidelity taken of them, which *Vegetius* in the fifth Chapter of his Second Book describes to be this; as it was impos'd by the Emperour *Constantine* the Great: *I Swear by God, by Christ, and by the Holy Spirit, and by the Majesty of the Emperour, whom I worship, that I will do all things that he commands me, and that I shall never desert his service, nor refuse to dye for the* Roman *Common-wealth.* Let us obserue some things of this Oath: First, That in these times, Christian Souldiers thought it no sin to pay Civil Worship to their lawful Prince. Secondly, They took more liberty than they should have done, to swear by the Emperour; for this being an Oath taken with mature deliberation, and in Judgement, was a greater sin in them than it was in *Joseph*, to swear rashly (by a bad custome he had learnt among the *Egyptians*) by the Life of *Pharaoh*. Thirdly, Our Author hath forgot to tell us, what manner of Oath the *Roman* Souldiers swore before the Emperours were converted to the Faith, or what Military Oath was made

Roman Military Oath.

to

to the State before the Heathen Emperours usurped it; though this should have been told us, who desire to know the Military constitutions of the Ancient *Romans*. I suppose, they swore by *Jupiter*, and all the rest of their Gods, to be faithful to the Senate, and People of *Rome*, to be obedient to their Commanders, and not to desert their Standards or Ensigns. This or the like Oath was exacted by the several Tribunes of every man under their Command. But I must inform my Reader that this publick and judiciary Swearing Fidelity was not practis'd by the *Romans* till the Second Punick War. For *Livy* witnesseth in his 22 Book that before that time no Oath was required of the publick Officers either of State or Militia, only the Foot Souldiers in every Century, and the Horse-men in every Decurio, were accustomed to promise and swear one to another, not to fly one from another, or to desert the service. But after *Hannibal*'s Invasion, a formal and solemn Oath was impos'd, which, I believe, had its first rise from the Oath which *Publius Cornelius Scipio* at that same time both swore himself, and forc'd other young Gentlemen (who, after the rout of *Canna*, were preparing to leave *Italy*) to Swear in these words: *I Swear with all my Heart, that I shall not desert the Republick, nor suffer any other* Roman *to desert it: If willingly I fail in this, then may the Greatest and Best* Jupiter *inflict on Me, my House, Family, and Goods, the worst of evils.* This Swearing and Marking were called the Military Sacraments, after which the Souldiers were enroll'd, and enter'd in pay; neither was it lawful for a *Roman* to fight with an Enemy till he had taken the Oath, and if he kill'd an Enemy before he swore Fidelity, he was to be punish'd as a Man-slayer. The word Sacrament, was by the Fathers in the Primitive times borrowed from the Militia, to signifie the Initiation, and Holy Mysteries of the Militant Church.

When first impos'd.

Its rise.

Sacrament.

Polybius tells us likewise, that the Souldiers at the time of their enrolling, swore to obey all the Commands of the Consul, and of all Officers under him. He says likewise, that when they came to be encamped, another Oath was exacted, not only from the Souldiers, but all that followed or belong'd to the Camp, whether Bond or Free, Master or Servant, not to steal any thing out of the Leaguer, and that, if they found any thing by chance, they should bring it to one of the Tribunes.

Another Oath.

Other Oaths were likewise sworn, sometimes voluntarily by the Souldiers with mutual consent, sometimes impos'd by some of the Commanders, most whereof were rash or vain; particularly one, That they should not return from Battel without Victory, as *Livy* in his Second Book informs us. And *Cæsar* in his Seventh Book of the *Gallick* War, says, that the Horsemen desir'd that it might be declar'd by a solemn Oath, that no man should return either to his Parents, Wife, or Children, who did not charge twice through the Enemy; which being agreed on, all were forc'd to swear. And in his Third Book of the Civil War, he tells us, how *Labienus* swore never to desert *Pompey*, but to share with him in all his Fortunes; the like did the rest of his Army. This Oath was sworn at *Pharsalia*, and was ill kept, for both *Pompey* deserted his Army, and was deserted by all those who had sworn to stand by him.

Rash Oaths.

An Oath ill kept.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Sieges, and Defence of Towns and Forts, and of the great Engines and Machines used in them, by the Romans, *and other Ancients.*

THE several ways by which Towns, Castles, and Forts, in our Modern Art of War, (as they are described in the twenty fourth Chapter of my Discourses of the Modern Militia) are taken, were all used by the Ancients; for Gun-powder hath only augmented the violence and fury of the Battery, and furnish'd us with more fearful and mortal Darts, than the men of old were acquainted with. In ancient times, Towns were taken by Circumvallation, and starving the Defendants out of them, they were taken by formal Sieges and approaches, they were taken by Assault, by Scalado, by Surprizal, and by Treachery; and they are still taken by some of these. If they conceiv'd the place, either for its Scituation, Fortification, or Defendants, so inconsiderable, that it did not deserve a formal Siege, or that they either could not, or would not spend time upon it, they storm'd it very soon after they came to it, with Ladders or Grapples, or with a Tortoise or Pent-house made of their Shields, whereof I spoke in the foregoing Chapter. And in doing this, they environed it with a *Corona*, as they called it, or a Crown; which is, they drew up their Armies round about the Town, in manner of a Crown, leaving no part free from being invested. But *Grotius* says, that the *Hebrew* Interpreters tell him, that when their Ancestors were to assault a Town, they left a part of it free unenviron'd, *non cingebant Coronâ*, that whoever came out at that place and submitted, should be pardon'd. I think this custome had prudence in it as well as pity, and verified the saying, *A Golden Bridge for a Flying Enemy*. This *Corona*, or Crown, was sometimes a single Crown, sometimes a Double, and very often a Triple one, according to the quality or greatness of the place, or the number of those that were to attack it. If it were a Three-fold Crown, the first was compos'd of the heavy armed foot, who were to give the assault, and in it to defend themselves with their Targets, and other Defensive Arms: Behind them was the Second Crown, of the *Velites* or light armed, whose business was, with Darts, Stones, and Arrows, to beat away the Defendants from the Parapets, that the heavy arm'd might storm with the less opposition. Behind these *Velites*, was the Third Crown, which consisted of the Cavalry; and these stood for two uses, first, to hinder the Foot from flying, (a thing practis'd sometimes in the Modern Wars) secondly, to prevent any danger that might arise by the sudden arrival of an unexpected Enemy. If it was not thought fit to try this sudden way of Expugnation, or that it had been try'd without success, then approaches were made with the help of those Engines, which have been time out of mind laid aside, as altogether useless in our Modern Expugnation of Forts.

The Ancients expugned Towns as we do.

Corona.

The first Crown.

Second.

Third.

These Machines were of two kinds, Lesser and Greater. The Lesser were the Mosles and all manner of Mantilets, which were indeed no other but Pent-houses and Shrowds, and under that name you may comprehend the *Vineæ*, *Plutei*, *Crates*, and such like; under the shelter whereof the Ancient approached to strong holds. The Greater Engines were the Tortoise, the Ram, the Scorpion, the Onagra, the Balist, and the Catapult; for most of which, men have not yet found out proper words in the Modern Languages. Then there was that great Engine which excell'd them all for efficacy, and matter of admiration, both to Antiquity it self, and to us too, who have seen and heard the Thundring Canon; and that was, the Moving or Ambulatory Tower.

Lesser Engines.

The greater ones.

To give a particular deſcription of all theſe, and of the Mechanical Structure of them, belongs properly to an Engineer, ſaith *Terducchi*, who was one himſelf. And *Stenechius* ſays, there is much difficulty and obſcurity in the explanations of their frames, which he who would curiouſly know, may, ſaith he, conſult *Vitruvius*, that great Maſter of Architecture. And when theſe Engines were in faſhion, a General of ſuch Artillery may, ſaith the ſame Author, look on ſome places of *Turnebus*. I ſhall alſo tell my Reader that Authors differ much in the deſcription of theſe Machines; but if any deſire to ſee the Figures of them, I refer them to the ſame *Stenechius*, and if he do not ſatisfie their curioſity, perhaps *Juſtus Lipſius* in his *Poliorcetikon*, will do it fully. However, it is fit I ſpeak a little of every one of them, and of their ſeveral uſes.

The deſcription of theſe difficile and obſcure.

The *Romans* were ſo far from challenging to themſelves the Invention of theſe Machines, that it is certain, they had not the uſe of them from the beginning of their City, nay, nor of their Republick, after they had baniſh'd Kingſhip. It is true, *Livy* ſays, that one of their Kings, *Servius Tullius*, appointed two Centuries of Tradeſmen, for making Warlike Engines, but theſe were of the leſſer kind. At the Siege of *Veii* (which laſted ten years) they had *Aggeres*, or Ramparts; *Vineæ*, or Vines; and Towers, but not Ambulatory ones. The *Vineæ* and *Plutei* are very oft confounded by Authors, and made to be one thing. Some make the difference between them to be, that the *Plutei* was made to ſloop but on one ſide, the *Vineæ* deſcended, and ſloop'd on both. But *Vegetius* makes them differ in this, that the *Plutei* had Wheels, the *Vineæ* none. They were eight foot high, ſeven broad, and ſix long, ſome ſay, ſixteen; for Authors do not agree. They were made of ſmall Timber, and were rais'd on Legs, and being interwoven with Twigs, ſometimes of the Vine-tree, they repreſented Arbours, and from thence had the denomination of *Vineæ*. Above they were covered with Hair-cloath and Raw-Hides, to ſave them from Wild-fire; as alſo with Hurdles, but below them with ſtrong Boards, where great oppoſition was expected; they had within them Rafters, on which was a Gallery, wherein the Beſiegers were ſhelter'd from Stones, Darts, and Arrows, when they made their approaches to the Ditch, and out of theſe they endeavour'd to chaſe the Defendants from their Walls and Parapets with all manner of miſſile Weapons.

Vineæ and *Plutei*.

The *Agger* was a Rampart of Earth and Hurdles, wherewith they environ'd beſieged Towns, and for their own Defence, againſt either the Enemy within the Town, or abroad; they fortified this Rampart both within and without, for ordinarily they had two of them, with Stakes or Palliſadoes. In ſome places of theſe Ramparts, at a convenient diſtance one from another, were Sconces built, which they called Caſtles and Towers. The uſe of theſe *Aggeres* was known in ſome places of the World before the name of *Rome* was heard of, or that any *Grecian* had put Pen to Paper, for it is of theſe Hurdles and Stakes, and other Timber for Ramparts, and it may be for the *Vineæ* and the Ram too, that *Moſes* is to be underſtood in his command to the *Iſraelites*, not to cut down any Tree that bore fruit, mention'd in the twentieth Chapter of *Deuteronomy*, of which I ſpoke before.

Agger or Rampart.

The *Moſculi* were alſo of the Leſſer Engines, made of ſtrong Boards covered with raw Hides; they mov'd on Wheels: And under them men were ſhelter'd when they approach'd to the Walls and Ditches. Some very rationally ſay, that the proper uſe of the *Muſculus* was to help to draw forward the great Moving Tower, to cleanſe and clear its way, and give it the name from that Fiſh which Naturaliſts ſay, goes before the Whale to be its guide, and to diſcover Rocks and Shelves: And ſo *Vegetius* ſeems to deſcribe it. But others, particularly *Ceſar* (who deſerves truſt) makes it a leſſer *Teſtudo*, or Tortoiſe, and deſcribes it at length in his Second Book of the Civil War. Others write, it had a ſnout like a Mouſe, wherewith it pick'd Stones out of a Wall, and was therefore called *Muruſculus*, and corruptly *Muſculus*: And there be ſome who ſay, it batter'd a Wall as the Ram did. So far do Ancient Authors differ.

Moſcli.

Beſide

Beſides the Tortoiſes compos'd of mens Shields, ſpoken of in the foregoing Chapter, there was an artificial Engine, which the Ancients called a *Teſtudo* or Tortoiſe. This was made of ſuch a bigneſs as it pleas'd the General of the Army, or General of the Artillery to appoint; within it was a great Beam, which ſometimes had on the end of it an Iron Hook or Grapple, which they ſhut forth when they thought fit to draw Stones out of a Wall, or for other uſes, and pull'd the Beam in again, when they pleas'd; and therefore they gave it the name of that Creature, which can put it ſelf out of its ſhell, and in again when it pleaſeth. And ſometimes on the end of this Beam, ſaith *Vegetius*, was faſten'd a great Iron Head for Battery, and was called a Ram, either becauſe the bulk of Iron was faſhion'd in the form of a Rams Head, or becauſe after every ſtroak, it was forcibly drawn back, that at its return it might batter more violently, as the cuſtome of Rams is, when they fight. This is all *Vegetius* ſpeaks of the *Teſtudo* or *Aries*, except that he makes the laſt to be put in the loweſt Stage of the Ambulatory Tower. *Teſtudo* or Tortoiſe.

But other Authors tell us, that the *Aries*, or Ram was of it ſelf a formidable Machine. And as the manner of our War is now, to give the worſe conditions to the beſieged, when they hold out the Battery of Ordnance; ſo of old, thoſe who did not yield before the Ram had touch'd the Wall, got the worſe quarters. *Ceſar* in his Seventh Book of the *French* War, ſays, he gave ſome of the *Gauls* their lives, becauſe they render'd themſelves before the Ram began to batter.

The deſcription of this Engine, is thus given us by *Achilles Terduzzi*: A great Beam and of a great length, 200 foot and more, made like the Maſt of a Ship, had an exceeding ponderous and great Head of Iron, which ſometimes reſembled that of a Ram, ſometimes it had another ſhape. This Beam was ſupported by two other great ones, which made the baſe of the Engine, they meeting above in a ſharp Angle, kept the Ram ſuſpended in an *Æquilibrie*. It was manag'd by Souldiers behind, and as many on both ſides as could be conveniently lodged, in Tortoiſes, Moſcles, or other Pent-houſes, that were ordain'd to convey it. No ſolidity or ſtrength of Walls was able to reſiſt the continuated and reiterated Verberations of this Engine, as *Joſephus* in his *Jewiſh* War, and many other Authors witneſs. And yet we have ſeen Stone Walls of Towns, built by the Ancients, make a notable reſiſtance againſt the Battery of Whole Cannon. It ſoon made ſuch a breach in the Wall, that Miners could lodge in it, and enlarge it as they pleas'd. In the time of its Battery, it was defended above with Hurdles, Baskets full of Earth, and Raw Hides, and on both ſides with Moſcles, Vines, and Tortoiſes, out of, or from under which the beſiegers inceſſantly caſt their miſſiles againſt the Defendants. And they, at the approach of the Ram to the Wall, beat it with huge great Stones, or heavy lumps and weights of Lead, tyed with ſtrong Ropes or Chains of Iron to a Crane or Telenon: Thoſe who were appointed to defend the Ram, endeavour'd to gripe thoſe Ropes or Chains with long Hooks or Grapples; and on the other ſide the beſieged eſſayed with long Scythes to cut the Cords, which govern'd and ſuſtain'd the Ram. The Defendants alſo uſed to hang over the Walls, Beds, and great ſacks fill'd with Straw, Feathers, or Wooll, which broke the force of the ſtroaks before they came to the Wall; and theſe are all of good uſe in any Retrenchment ſuddenly made up againſt the Battery of Canon, in our time. The Invention of a more dreadful Engine than the Ram, the Ordnance, did not hinder this Engine to be made uſe of by *Davalo*, Marqueſs of *Peſcara*, at *Pavia*, which when *Francis* King of *France* had beſieg'd, and that the Imperial Army could not draw him out of the Park to Battel, *Davalo* in the night time with three Rams broke down the Park-Wall (which *Giovio* ſaith, was of an admirable ſtrength) not thinking it fit to do it with Cannon, for alarming the *French*, yet the violent ſtroaks of the Rams were heard, but not at all ſuſpected; paſſage being made by theſe Ancient Machines, ſome Horſe and Foot enter'd, who ſoon took poſſeſſion of the great Houſe or Lodge of the Park, call'd *Mirabell*: This impos'd a neceſſity on the *French* King to fight, and though he did it well, yet was he beaten, and taken. *Aries* or Ram. How it was oppos'd. The Ram made uſe of at *Pavia* by *Davalo*.

The Telenon. The *Telenon* was such another Engine, as that we draw Water with out of Wells, call'd a *Sweepe*, or like those Cranes, wherewith great burthens, packs, or weights are pull'd up and let down. It was a huge Beam of Timber laid cross way, ballanc'd on another Beam fasten'd in the ground, the one end of the Cross-Beam mounting up, when the other was depressed. The besiegers made use of it, by making at one end of the Cross-Beam a little Houle of Boards or Osier Twigs, in which they might lodge three or four men, whom they might therewith set on any part of the highest Wall, to bring them Intelligence what the Defendants were doing. But the Besieged made better use of it, by tying great Stones or Lumps of Lead to it, with which, as is said before, they might beat in pieces either the Ram or Tortoise. And here I shall tell you, that the old Tactick *Æneas*, adviseth a hole to be digg'd through the Wall by the Besieged themselves, and out of it, with a Ram of their own, batter the Besiegers Battering-Ram. The Defendants used also, to tye to the Talenon, Hands, Drags, Clasping Irons, and Grapples, wherewith to lay hold on the Rams Head, as also by them (fasten'd to Iron Chains) to pull up men, when they came to assault their Walls; yea, and some of the Lesser Engines also. *Terduzzi* is of the opinion, that *Archimedes* his famous Machine, wherewith he drew up Ships into the Air, and let them fall with violence, was no other thing than this Telenon, but he gives not his Reasons for this opinion of his.

Baliſt. The Baliſt was a great Machine, out of which were shot, as some say, Darts, Lances, yea, Spears of thirty foot long, but others say, that it threw only great Weights and Stones. *Vegetius* gives it only power to throw Darts; Catapult. nor doth he at all mention the Catapult, which, some Authors say, shot very great Stones, and of it all other Ancient Writers take notice: And they are by them clearly distinguished the one from the other. *Philip*, the last King of *Macedon*, except one, at the Siege of *Echinum* had Ambulatory Towers, and upon them (saith *Polybius* in his Ninth Book) he had Catapults, and a platform besides for Baliſts: And in his Fourth Book he says, that the *Sinopians* being destitute of all necessaries, got abundance of rich gifts sent to them by several, and that particularly the *Rhodians* sent them, besides many other necessaries, four Catapults with Engineers to manage them; and more clearly in his fifth Book he says, that at the Siege of *Pale*, *Philip* had both Catapults and Baliſts. The diversity of Judgements of Authors concerning these two great Engines, was this: *Vegetius* saith, the Baliſt threw only Darts and Lances: *Ammianus*, who was *Vegetius* his Contemporary, and both a great Souldier, and a great Engineer, speaks only of Stones for that Engine. *Valerius Maximus* and *Vitruvius* (both of them great Architectors) affirm that Stones were the proper missiles of Baliſts, and that Catapults threw Darts, Lances, and Spears. *Polybius*, a great Captain, in that cited place at *Pale*, says, *Philips* Baliſts and Catapults threw Stones, and so confoundeth them; yet in another place he distinguisheth; for he saith, In that Battel at *Mantinea*, which *Mechanidas* the Tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, fought against *Philopœmon* the *Achæan*, the first had Catapults, which he plac'd in the Van of his Army, and Waggons laden with Darts for them, therefore they shot no Stones. But this is downright against a greater Captain than any I have yet mention'd, and that was *Julius Cæsar*, (who besides his other perfections, was an excellent Engineer) he saith, in the First Book of his Civil War, that the Catapult threw great Stones. In such a diversity of opinions, I think, *Achilles Terduzzi* offers a fair expedient of agreement, which is, that it is probable, in the times of the Emperours the names of Catapult and Baliſt were confounded, so that the one was taken for the other; or that by a new Invention, not heard of before, both the one and the other threw both Darts and Stones.

Difference among Authors concerning these two Machines.

An expedient of reconciliation.

The Baliſt and the Catapult were made and fram'd according to the weight of the Stone, and the length of the Dart or other missiles which they were ordain'd to shoot; as our Ordnance are founded according to the weight of the Bullet intended for them; from whence many of them have their denomination, as a three, four, or six pounder. I made mention of Baliſts and Catapults, in the fourth Chapter of the *Grecian* Militia, the Invention of which some would bestow upon *Dionysius*, one of the Tyrants of *Syracusa*, but I have prov'd in that Chapter from Holy Writ, that they were used many ages before

Of their Invention.

fore *Syracusa* was forc'd to submit to Tyranny. *Lipsius* seems to give it to the *Syrians*, which may be true; and though I told you, *Oziah* one of the Kings of *Judah*, had them on the Walls of *Jerusalem*, yet it was no such shame for the two Tribes to borrow the Invention of Military Machines from Heathen Nations, as it was sin for the ten Tribes to borrow and follow the pattern of the Altar of *Damascus* from their Idolatrous Neighbours.

There were, if you will believe Authors, some of these Machines, which could shoot Stones of one hundred, some two hundred, and some of them three hundred and sixty pound; and those that cast one hundred pound, threw their Stones the length of two *Stadia*, or Furlongs, and these make the fourth part of an *English* Mile. It was a custome also to cast into Besieged Towns burning Iron, Vessels with molten Lead, dead Horses, and Tubs and Barrels full of excrements, or any thing else, that could infest, annoy, or vex the Besieged. And some write, that out of a Catapult was shot a long Spear, or Lance, from one Bank of the River *Danubius* (where it is broadest) over to the other. This I dare not believe, for, I suppose, that mighty River, before he dischargeth himself, may be more than two *Italian* Miles broad; and I will suppose likewise, that Gunners will confess, that no piece of Ordnance will shoot a Bullet so far point-blank, especially over a River.

A strange story.

Vegetius in the fourteenth Chapter of his Third Book, allows *Carrobalists* to march with the *Roman* Army: *Terduzzi* thinks they were *Arcobalists*, they shot, as our Author saith, both Darts and Stones. *Vegetius* saith, they had many Conductors; but in the last Chapter of his Book, he says, every Century had a *Carrobalist* (this was a Balist mounted on a Carriage) and he allows Mules to draw it, and eleven Souldiers of the Century to manage it: Now observe, that in *Vegetius* his Legion there were five and fifty Centuries, and therefore fifty five *Carrobalists*; every one of which had eleven men to manage them. Multiply fifty five by eleven, the product is six hundred and five, and so many of every Legion *Vegetius* allows for these Engines. And I pray you observe here in passing, that *Vegetius* expresly allows eleven Souldiers for every Tent, or *Contubernium*, by which he doth not obscurely insinuate, that the Files of the *Roman* Foot were eleven deep. The greater these *Carrobalists* were, the further they carried their Darts; neither, saith our Author, could any Corslet resist their blow.

Carrobalist.

A File eleven deep.

The Onager, saith *Vegetius*, shoots Stones like Thunder-bolts, greater or lesser, according to the bigness or thickness of its Cords; so it is a kind of Catapult or Balist. It hath its name (as *Steuechius* says) from the *Greek* word, which signifieth a Wild Ass, for those Animals when they are hunted, fling Stones with their heels, at those who pursue them.

Onager.

The Scorpion, saith *Vegetius*, shoots small and subtile Darts, whereby present death was procur'd. But *Ammian* makes the Onager and the Scorpion to be all one thing; and he avers the *Onager* to be a new word brought in the room of the old one, which was *Scorpio*; and in the description he gives of it, cited by *Steuechius*, he makes it only to cast great Stones, and no Darts; so great a difference there is between him and *Vegetius*, who liv'd both at one time. Yet several are of *Vegetius* his opinion, and say, the Scorpion threw Darts and Arrows, and poyson'd ones too, and that from thence that Engine had its name. But on the other hand, this seems not probable; if it be true, as it seems to be, that all or most Nations have with a tacite assent made it their constant practice and custome, and so to pass for *Jus gentium*, or the Law of Nations, to abstain from all such malefices, as shooting poyson'd Darts, Arrows, or Bullets, or from poysoning of Victuals, Liquors, Waters and Wells, observ'd also in our Modern Wars. We read, it's true, of some exceptions from that general custome, and that Poyson hath been used in open, just, and declared Wars, but for these perhaps Invincible necessity may plead an excuse. The like we may say of Assassination of Princes, Generals, or eminent Commanders, whom a declared Enemy may lawfully kill, as *Ehud* kill'd *Eglon*, or as *Scævola* intended to kill *Porsenna*; but it is not at all lawful, but against the practice of a fair and declared War, to suborn, exhort, or hire any other, especially those who belong to, or are under the jurisdiction of that Prince or General, to kill any of them. But for all this, I do not deny

Scorpion.

Of Poyson'd Arrows, Bullets, Darts, Waters, or Wells.

Of Assassination.

deny, but a Soveraign Prince or State, may lawfully set a price on the head of a powerful Rebel, against whom they cannot proceed by the ordinary way of Justice. This much I have taken occasion to say on this subject, that I may not trouble my Reader with it hereafter. But to our present purpose, I say that the *Carrobalist*, the *Onager*, and the *Scorpio*, are but several species and sorts of the Catapult and Balist.

Ambulatory Tower.

And now I come to speak of the Moving or Ambulatory Tower, whereof that which *Vegetius* writes is enough to astonish any Reader, who hath not heard of it before, but he who will read other Writers, will easily believe all *Vegetius* says on that subject: He tells us, they were built after the form of Houses, thirty, forty, or fifty foot broad, and so high as to equal the height of Towers on the Wall. The Tower which our Author describes, is three stories high: In the lowest he lodgeth a Ram, with men to manage it, and that, when the Tower came within convenient distance, batter'd the Wall. In the third and highest stage he placed the *Velites*, who afflicted the Defendants with Darts and Arrows, and pelted them with Stones out of their Batton-Slings, to necessitate them to quit the defence of the Parapets: And in the middle Story he placeth a Bridge, one end whereof being laid upon the Wall, and the other remaining fix'd within the Tower, Bands of armed men pass'd safely over, and then, saith our Author, *Illico capta est Urbs*, Immediately the Town was taken. But he is mistaken, for Towns have been defended, when all these things were done. This is the Moving Tower, which is called *Turris Vegetiana*. If this Tower of his be wonderful enough, what shall we say of those Towers which were one hundred and twenty Cubits high, that is, one hundred and eighty foot, and sixty or seventy foot broad, in which might be eighteen or twenty several stages or stories, and every one of these capable to contain Balists and Catapults, and men to manage them, besides arm'd Souldiers to handle their Weapons. Or what shall we think of that Tower whereof *Livy* speaks in his thirty second Book, which one of the *Roman* Consuls made of several stories, out of which (you must suppose by Bridges) he sent whole Cohorts of Legionaries, one to sustain and relieve another, against a *Macedonian* Phalange, that stood in Battel ready to receive them within the Walls; and we are to believe, that the *Roman* Cohorts at that time were about five hundred strong, and yet the *Macedonians* made the place good against them all. The same Author tells us of another Tower, which *Hannibal* made at *Saguntum*, in which he had numbers of armed men, besider his great Machines. *Stenechius* tells us, that *Vitruvius*, Master of the Machines, or General of the Artillery, writes of a Moving Tower, which weighed three hundred and sixty thousand pounds, not reckoning the Men, Arms, and Engines that were within it: And that it could resist the force of Stones shot out of Balists of three hundred and fifty pound. But that which is more admirable than all I have yet said, is, what the same *Vitruvius* writes of an Engineer, who made a Counter-machine within a Besieged Town, by which he drew one of the Besiegers Ambulatory Towers, within the Walls of the beleaguer'd Town. Let me say here with *Ovid*, *Si sit credenda vetustas.*

Turris Vegetiana three stories high.

Towers twenty stories high.

A stupendious Tower.

An Incredible Engine.

How the Tower mov'd.

These Moving Towers were composed of great Beams, Joysts, Rafters, and Boards, cover'd with Raw Hides, and some of them were fac'd with Iron. They mov'd on many Wheels, which were push'd forward below with the strength of many men, assisted with Leavers; the Tower was open behind, that it might more conveniently be thrust forward by those numbers of men ordain'd for that purpose. Before it went many Mantlets, Vines, and Mosles, full of armed Souldiers, who were both to make way for it, and to defend it from those, who might sally out to burn or destroy it. It was sometimes drawn by Beasts of Carriage, but these had Machines before and about them, to defend them from the Darts and Arrows of the Besieged: This last part being neglected by *Vtix* King of the *Goths*, when he besieged *Rome*, the famous *Belisarius*, who was within the City, suffer'd the Tower to come pretty near the Walls, and then caused to be killed the Beasts with Darts and Arrows; this made the Tower stand still, and so render'd all its preparations (which were very costly) ineffectual, and the Fabrick it self contemptible and ridiculous to the Besieged.

Several

Several means were uſed to fruſtrate the effects of this dreadful Machine; theſe were, Firſt, A Deſperate Sally, by which the Beſiegers guards being beaten from the Tower, it ſelf became a prey, and was eaſily burnt. Secondly, They uſed to undermine the ground, which the Tower was to traverſe (and that was ſoon ſeen and perceiv'd) before it approach'd the Walls, and that indeed was a ſure way, for the vaſt weight of it, not having ground to ſupport it, would quickly make it ſink, and ſtick faſt. Thirdly, They uſed to make ſuch a Tower within the Walls, and oppoſe it to that without. This was, no doubt, a good help, but a very coſtly one. And Laſtly, They endeavoured to burn them with Wild Fire, or Fiery Arrows. How it was oppoſed.

Sometimes theſe Ambulatory Towers were made with that Artifice, that when one of them approach'd the Wall, whoſe height the Tower ſeem'd not to ſurmount, ſuddenly a ſmaller Tower (which was hidden within the greater one) of one or two ſtories high, was elevated with Scrues, to the great terrour and aſtoniſhment of the Beſieged City. *Turricula.*

I told you in the fourth Chapter of the *Grecian* Militia, that *Demetrius* could not be the firſt Inventer of the Moving Tower, (though it be very probable, he hath added much to it) for his Fathers Maſter made uſe of one of them at *Gaza*, and *Curtius* in his Second Book ſays, that *Alexander* had one of them at the Siege of *Mazacus* in *India*, which ſeem'd ſo wonderful to the *Barbarians*, that they thought ſome Deity, or more than humane ſtrength did aſſiſt that Magnanimous Prince. One of theſe Towers which *Julius Cæſar* erected againſt a Town of the *Nervians*, (if I miſtake not) wrought a contrary effect, for the Defendants laugh'd and flouted at it, as a thing made to no purpoſe, ſince it could not hurt them at ſuch a diſtance, till they ſaw it begin to move towards their Walls, and then they began to have other thoughts. The Moving Tower of an Ancient practice.

All theſe Machines were ordinarily made in the place where they were to be uſed, but if the Generals conceiv'd that at the Towns they intended to beſiege, they could not be accommodated with things requiſite for theſe Fabricks, then they carried all the materials along with them, on Camels, Mules, Horſes, Carts, and Waggons; As the Great *Turk* carrieth his Metal with him, till he come where he intendeth to make uſe of Ordnance, and there he cauſeth them to be founded.

Beſides all theſe ways ſpoken of for expugnation of Towns, the Ancients made frequent uſe of Mines; this the *Romans* call'd *Cuniculos agere*, becauſe Mines reſemble the digging of Rabbets; neither did the Beſieged in thoſe times want the knowledge to find out Mines, and provide Counter-mines againſt them. The way of Mining they uſed, and we ſtill do, is all one, except that they wanted the ſpringing of Mines by Gun-powder, and therefore the uſe they made of Mines produced a two-fold effect. Firſt, The Mine being brought within the Town, without taking notice of the Walls, Souldiers ſuddenly iſſued out, and run to the Ports to open them, and ſo make way for the Beſiegers to enter, and at that time ordinarily Alarms were given to all quarters, that the Beſiegers might be diverted, and not ſuffer'd to obſerve the Sally of thoſe who were enter'd the Town by the Mine: Such a Mine, and the effect of it, *Hannibal* had at *Saguntum*. Secondly, When they had made large Chambers in the Walls, they under-propt them with logs of dry Timber, and having laid ſtore of combuſtible matter beſide them, ſo ſoon as the Army was ready to ſtorm, Fire was put to the Train, and the ſupporters being burnt, the Wall immediately fell, over the ruines whereof the Beſiegers enter'd. And this effect had the Great *Alexanders* Mine at *Gaza*. *Æneas* tells us of a Shield of Braſs uſed in his time to diſcover Mines, for if it were plac'd directly above the place where the Miners were working, it would utter a ſound; later times have found a Drum and Dice upon it, or a Baſin of Peaſe or Beans ſerve the turn as well. Mines. First effect of the Ancients Mine. Second effect. Mines how diſcovered.

The ſame *Æneas*, an old *Grecian* Tactick, adviſeth againſt all manner of the Ancient approaches to Beſieged places, to hang up great Sails within the Walls, which he will have to ſerve for three uſes. Firſt, For Blinds, that what is done within, may not be ſeen by thoſe without, a thing ordinarily *Æneas* his Sails.

practis'd

practis'd in our Modern Wars. Secondly, That all the Darts and Arrows that are caſt or ſhot, even from the Moving Towers, may be receiv'd in theſe Sails, where ſticking all the day long, they can do no hurt, and at night may be taken out, and thrown or ſhot back to the Enemy. This would be uſeleſs againſt our Bullets. Thirdly, They were notable Defences againſt Fiery Arrows, ſhot ordinarily to fire Houſes thatch'd with Straw or Reeds.

But indeed, there is no ſuch ſolid or ſure defence againſt all manner of Approaches and Mines, againſt all Machines and Engines of the Ancients, and Batteries of Modern Artillery, as that which the ſame Author *Æneas* ſpeaks of, and that is, a Double Wall, and a Double Ditch. For the firſt, being long, and well defended, the ſecond impoſeth a neceſſity on the Beſiegers to begin new Approaches, new Batteries, and new Mines. But if the place be not doubly fortified, then he adviſeth the Beſieged to make a Counter-mure within that part of the Wall, againſt which the Aſſailants make their Battery. The ſame is done ſtill, or ſhould be done in all beſieged places. It is that we call a Retrenchment, and the *Germans* an *Abſuerd*. It was by this the *Plateans* kept out the long Siege of their Town againſt the *Lacedæmonians*, till hunger made them yield to their mercileſs Enemy: And hereby did the *Samians* fruſtrate all the means the *Roman* Conſul uſed for the expugnation of their City, with Catapults, Rams, and Moving Towers, till Famine forc'd them to ſubmit to his cruel pleaſure. Concerning Mines, Countermures, or Retrenchments, you may ſee a little more in the twenty fourth Diſcourſe of the Modern Art of War.

Counter-mures or Retrenchments.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the Military Exercises, Duties, Burthens, Marches, and Works of the Roman *Souldiers.*

THE *Roman* Souldiers being Levied, and Armed, and having sworn Fidelity, we are in the fourth place to see how they were Train'd and Exercised. And First, We will take all the help *Vegetius* vouchsafeth to give us: And assuredly, you will think he speaks very fully of all manner of Exercise, when I tell you, that he hath bestow'd upon that affair alone eleven full Chapters of his First Book, to wit, the 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 Chapters, wherein oftener than once, he tells us one thing twice over: And, as if he had forgot that he spent so much Time and Ink on that subject in his First Book, he falls to it *de novo* in the twenty third Chapter of his Second Book, which he entitles *De Exercitatione Militum*. But for all this, he hath not done the third part of the work that might in reason have been expected from him; which you will believe to be true, when I have told you all he saith of that matter, and all I inform you of concerning it out of other Authors. That which *Vegetius* saith of the *Roman* Exercises in all those Chapters, is briefly this: That the *Latine* word *Exercitus*, an Army, is deriv'd *ab exercendo*, from Exercising: That the *Tyrones*, or raw Souldiers were Train'd in the *Campus Martius*, *Mars* his Field, which lay near the *Tiber*, in which (when they were weary of their Land exercises) they wash'd themselves, and learn'd to Swim, a thing very incumbent for a Souldier to practise, because, saith he, Armies have not always the conveniency of Bridges, and must, in that case, when they either follow or retire from an Enemy, swim Rivers. Before *Vegetius* go further, I must remember him of two things: First, that *Campus Martius* got but that name after the *Tarquines* were banish'd out of *Rome*, for it belong'd to them in propriety; and at the time of their leaving the City was a Corn-field, as *Livy* tells us. Now certainly the *Romans* had their Military Exercises the whole time of the Reigns of their seven Kings. Secondly, I say, as Swimming is fit to be learned by all young men, especially Souldiers; so I think an Army is in a desperate condition, when the men who compose it, are put to swim for their safety from a pursuing Enemy, for by that shift, hardly will the tenth man escape; nor needs a retiring Army fear much hurt from an Enemy who cannot overtake it but by Swimming over Lakes and Rivers. But our Author proceeds, and tells us, that an Army must be taught to march in Rank and File, that an Enemy may take no advantage by finding it in disorder. The *Romans* had two kinds of a March, the Ambulatory, and the Cursory. By the first, they were (if so required) to march twenty *Italian* miles in five hours, and by the second, twenty five in four hours, with their full Arms, Baggage, and Burthens. Thirdly, He informs us, that the Foot Souldier was Train'd at a Stake or Pallisado of Wood, six foot long, fixed fast in the ground; he had a Target of Osiers, and a Club or Battoon of Wood; both of them double the weight of the Shield and Sword he was to make use of in earnest: With these he was taught to strike at the Pale or Stake, as if it had been an Enemy, to make fents and foyns at several parts of it, as if it had had Head, Body, Legs and Arms; but more especially the *Roman* Souldier was taught to thrust and stab with his Sword, for they found that by that manner of fence, they had the advantage of those Enemies who used slashing and cutting Swords. And at the same stake they were to cast their *Pila* or Javelines. But at other marks (namely, Sheaves of Corn or Grass) the *Velites* were taught to shoot and cast their missile Weapons; whether these were Stones or Lead, out of Slings and Battoon-

The summ of what *Vegetius* saith of Exercise.

Swimming.

Two kinds of March.

Exercises of the Foot.

Slings, Arrows out of Bows, or Darts out of their Hands. Fourthly, The Foot were taught at these Exercises to carry burthens of sixty pound, that being habituated, they might thereafter more easily carry their own Arms, Provisions, Baggage, or what else they were commanded to bear. Fifthly,

Of the Horse. The Horse men were taught to mount Wooden Horses in the Fields, if it was Summer; but in Winter, in Houses made purposely for that use, and thereafter to mount living Horses, at first, without Arms, but after they were expert, they were to get on Horse back with full Arms, either at the Right or Left side of the Horse, and as you will find hereafter, without Stirrups; and with drawn Swords or Maces in their hands. Thrice a month, saith *Vegetius*, by the constitutions of *Augustus* and *Adrian*, the *Veteran* Armies were to be Exercised, and to march ten miles out of their Camp, and back again that day. And he saith, that Souldiers were taught to run, leap Ditches, and to make Ditches and Ramparts. This is the substance of all that *Vegetius* delivers to us in those mention'd eleven Chapters of his First Book. Now in the twenty third Chapter of his Second Book, he troubles himself and his Reader with the repetition of most of this, only he adds, that the young Souldiers, or *Tyrones*, were Exercised twice a day, morning and evening, the *Veterans* once a day; and this was done without intermission. So it seems what he speaks here, is meant of Training particular Souldiers or Companies once or twice a day, and what he said before, was of Exercising the whole Army once a month. Thus far, and no further, we have the help of *Vegetius* in the matter of Training, drilling, or Exercising.

Burthens. Before I inform you further of the several kinds of the *Roman* Exercises, I must see what Burthens the *Roman* Souldiers were obliged to carry in their Marches, whether those were Ambulatory, or Cursory. And first, I believe, that the weight of sixty pound, which *Vegetius* saith they were bound to carry, was meant only of their Arms, Defensive and Offensive. And I suppose, you may be of my opinion, if you consider their heavy Head, Back, and Breast-pieces, their Greeves, Taslets, Target, and an Iron Boot, a Javeline or two, and a Sword, and it may be, a Dagger too. And if these weighed sixty pound, what shall we say of their Fardles, their Provisions, the Stakes and Pallisadoes they were bound to carry, and of some utensils to make ready their meat? and these perhaps were carried alternatively by those that belong'd to one *Contubernium*; for if I conjecture right, Beasts of Carriage were only allowed for carrying their Tents and Hand-mills. *Quintius Cincinnatus* being chosen Dictator, to lead an Army against the *Æquians*, caus'd every Legionary of his Army, besides his Arms and Baggage, to carry five days meat, and twelve Pallisadoes. It is true, his march was but short, the Territory of *Rome* being then of no great extent. And yet, you will think the *Romans* have been but at that time raw Boys, if you observe what follows. *Scipio Africanus* the Younger (who destroy'd *Carthage*) caus'd every one of his Foot Souldiers to carry provisions for thirty days, and seven Stakes, wherewith to Pallisado his Camp. *Cæsar* saith, that *Afranius*, *Pompeys* Legat in *Spain*, caus'd his Souldiers to carry meat for twenty five days, besides Stakes. The Famous Consul *Marius* intending a Reformation of the *Roman* Discipline (in his time corrupted) thereby to make himself more able to overcome the *Cimbrians* and *Teutones*, who had invaded the *Roman* Empire with a Deluge of men, made his Souldiers march with such excessive Burthens, as if they had been Asses, and thereby got them the name of *Marius* his Mules, *Muli Mariani*. To march at a running pace or trot twenty five miles in four hours so heavily loaded is truly admirable, and if you will consider what I have said in the Ninth Chapter of the *Grecian* Militia, what Burthens *Philip*'s *Macedonians* carried, and how far they marched, and observe what I say here of the *Romans*, you cannot but be ready to suspend your belief. And such marches under such heavy burthens not being now practis'd, I shall not blame you to think them well near incredible, as *Louis de Montgomery* seem'd to do, when he saith in his *French* Militia, that such Souldiers not being now to be found any where, he thinks (according to *Pythagoras* his Transmigration) they were converted into the Mules and Asses of *Auvergne*. And indeed our Modern Armies (whose heavy arm'd are scarce so well arm'd for Defence as the *Roman*

Exceedingly heavy.

Louis de Montgomery.

Velites

Velites were) do not march twenty *Italian* miles in one day, but with a very great loss in the Rear, whereas the *Romans* march'd further in five hours; which was practis'd by *Cæsar*, when he march'd after, and overtook the *Eduans*, who had deserted them: He march'd with all his Cavalry, and four Legions of his Foot. It is true, his Souldiers carried no Baggage with them, for that was left in the Camp with his Legate, who stay'd behind, with two Legions to maintain the Siege of *Gargovia*. It is written of *Galba*, (who was afterwards Emperour) that when he was Legate in *France*, he run on foot at the Emperour *Caius* his Chariot the whole time that his Army march'd their Cursion; which, as I have said, was twenty five miles in the space of four hours; *Galba* being then forty six years old. *Vegetius* saith, a *Roman* Army marched ordinarily twenty *Italian* miles in one day, and this is verified by *Cæsar*, who calls it, *Unius Dei justum Iter*: The just march of one day. But if the ground were rocky, Woody, full of Marishes, or otherwise of ill passage, then they were necessitated accordingly to take their measures, as well as other Nations were. In *Thessaly*, four thousand *Romans*, who were sent but as a fore-party (and were not troubled with Baggage) by the Consul *Martius Philippus*, had much ado to march fifteen miles in two days, saith *Livy* in his Forty fourth Book. But Souldiers were undoubtedly eas'd of those insupportable burthens, when this very strict Discipline became neglected and corrupted; and that there were almost as many Soujats, Drudges, or Slaves in the *Roman* Armies, as there were Souldiers in them: As when (the afterward Emperour) *Vespasian* march'd with sixty thousand men against the Rebellious *Jews*.

Marches almost incredible.

The just March of one day.

Being perfectly wearied of those terrible Burthens, I return to the exercises of the *Roman* Souldiers, and these I find divided into three kinds. The first is, of those who were peculiarly and properly called Military Exercises; the second, of those duties the Souldiers owed to their Superiour Officers; and the third, of their work and fatigue.

The Exercises properly called Military, were of seven sorts. First, To march or run in full Arms twenty, or twenty five miles in four or five hours time. Secondly, To leap over Ditches. Thirdly, To swim Rivers, at which *Julius Cæsar* was excellent. Fourthly, to skirmish or fight with Sword and with Target, heavier than ordinary ones. Fifthly, To lance and throw Darts and Javelines. Sixthly, To throw Stones at a mark, either with the Hand, Sling, or Batton-Sling. Seventhly, To mount or dismount a Horse on any side, in full Arms, with Swords or Maces in their hands, and without a Stirrup: The last *Vegetius* forgot, yet of all these sorts he hath made mention.

First kind of Military Exercises.

The Second kind of Exercises was of those Duties and Services the Souldiers owed and payed to their Officers and Commanders, beside the publick duties they owed to the State. These were to set up their Tents and Pavillions, to make convenient places for their Servants, Necessaries and Baggage, and sometimes to empale them round about, to keep all places about their Lodgings and the Streets likewise clean from mire, dirt, or dust, and (if they were to encamp for any time) to lay the ground with Sand, and much more of this nature. These services all Souldiers were bound to perform, except such, who for some reasons, were exempted and freed from all publick duties, and were only bound to fight, and wait on the Consuls. Those who had no exemption were called *Munifices*, Duty-doers. There are some who say, that the *Triarii* were free from these duties, and particular services to Officers; and full well it might be so, since they were bound to look to the Horses of the Cavalry, and therefore in Encamping were constantly quarter'd beside them, as you will see in my discourse of their Castrametation. But from other publick works they were not free, for they fortified the Camp; which both *Paulus Æmilius* and *Cæsar* testified, when they made the *Triarii* fortifie with Spade and Mattock, while they fac'd the Enemy with the *Hastati* and *Principes*.

Second kind.

The third kind of a *Roman* Souldiers Exercise was work and labour, which in our Modern Armies is not so unusual, as *Lipsius* would make it, as shall be demonstrated against him in its proper place. Indeed, there were not such creatures as Pioneers known in the old *Roman* Armies, all was wrought by the Souldiers

Third kind.

themſelves; yea, ſome write, that their *Velites* were not admitted to work, as unworthy to be imployed in a ſervice of ſo much reputation, and ſo it ſeems, it was a Maxime with them diametrically contrary to ours, which was, The greater Fatigue, the greater Honour. Of theſe publick works there were many kinds, theſe were, the Cutting, Carrying and Squaring Turf and Sods, Stakes and Palliſadoes for their Camps, Caſtles, Towns, Forts, and Sconces, the fortifying all of theſe, working and digging at the Approaches, and expugnation of Forts and Towns, the making and managing great Engines, Mining, Countermining, making Retrenchments or Countermures, cutting deep Ditches and Channels of a very great length, building Magazines, Amphitheatres, and other huge and vaſt Edifices, and all theſe with many more, not only in time of War, but of the calmeſt Peace, when no neceſſity could be pretended for them, and thoſe not ſo much for the ornament of Countries and Provinces, (though that was likewiſe taken into conſideration) as to inure the Souldiers to toil, and to keep them habituated to it, that when they were neceſſitated to fatigue in earneſt, they might find it eaſie, as that which was no new thing to them; and they found that this labour procur'd to the Souldiery both health and ſtrength. *Suetonius* ſays, that *Galba*, before he was Emperour, *Veteranum & Tyronem militem aſſiduo opere corroboravit*; He ſtrengthen'd both his old and raw Souldiers with daily work and labour.

Great fatigue.

And *Scipio* the leſſer, kept his Army conſtantly at hard work at the Siege of *Numantia*, where he frequently told his Souldiers, That he who would bathe his hands in the blood of his Enemies, muſt firſt ſoil them with dirt and mire. It muſt be obſerv'd, that the *Romans* fortified their Camps with their Swords at their ſides, as we read in Sacred Hiſtory *Nehemiah* did, and made the *Jews* do, when they re-built the Walls of *Jeruſalem*. We read, that *Corbulo*, a great Captain, and Reformer of decay'd diſcipline, put two of his Souldiers to death, becauſe he found them working at a Rampart, the one without either Sword or Dagger, the other with a Dagger, but without a Sword. The ſame *Corbulo* being commanded by his Tyrannical Maſter *Nero*, to make Peace with the *Germans*, leſt his Army ſhould languiſh with idleneſs, caus'd them to cut a Ditch three and twenty *Italian* miles long, between the Rivers of the *Maes* and the *Rhine*; for it was a rule with them, That labour hardens and corroborates, whereas idleneſs weakens and effeminates; the truth whereof is taught us by experience.

Severe Diſcipline.

But truly, who will rightly conſider the ſtupendous works of the *Romans*, made by a few men, and in a ſhort time, may (as one obſerveth) ſay, they were thoſe Gyants, who, as the Poets feign, caſt one Mountain on another, ſo to climb up to Heaven. For not to ſpeak of their building Temples, Theatres, Caſtles, Towers and Baths, their draining Mariſhes, cutting out Channels, Cauſeying ways, and Paving ſtreets, all which are the works of Peace, Who can read without admiration, of their Works and Fortifications in the time of War, as particularly either *Ceſars* Circumvallations at *Aleſia*, which he made both exceedingly broad and high, wonderfully ſtrong with Towers and Caſtles, well Palliſadoed both before him and behind him, the firſt to beſiege *Vercengentorix* within the Town, the ſecond to defend himſelf againſt the united force of all the *Gauls*, who he knew were preparing to come and raiſe the Siege, a work of ſixteen miles circumference; or thoſe works of his at *Dirrachium*, whereby he had almoſt beſieg'd *Pompey*, both ſtronger, and better provided than himſelf. *Spinola* his Circumvallations at *Breda* in the years 1625 and 1626, gives us ground enough to believe thoſe of Great *Ceſar* to be true. But methinks the *Nervians* far ſurpaſs'd them all, who (as you have it in *Ceſars* Fifth Book of the *French* War) having learned ſomething of Fortification from ſome Priſoners or Fugitive *Romans*, beſieg'd *Cicero*, one of *Ceſars* Legates, in his Winter quarter, where they made a Circumvallation of fifteen miles circumference, the Rampart eleven foot high, and the Ditch fifteen foot broad or deep, without the help of any Tools, except their Swords, (wherewith they cut the Turf and Sods) and their Head-pieces and Hands, wherewith they caſt up the Earth, and all this in the ſpace of three hours. An action ſo far beyond humane ſtrength, that it would far ſurpaſs all poſſibility of belief, if it were not warranted by the down-right relation and authority of ſo renown'd an Author, and an eye-witneſs.

Ceſars Circumvallations.

Spinola's.

The

The *Roman Novitiates* or *Tyrones* were taught t their Military Exercises, properly so called, by those who were nam'd *Campi Doctores*, as *Vegetius* calls them right, and not *Campi Ductores*, as *Stenechius* (who comments on *Vegetius*) misnames them, for they who taught them their Exercises were indeed their Masters, so long as they stay'd with them, but were not their Officers and Commanders. They were as our Drill masters in Towns or Counties, and had twice as much Pay and Proviant as the common Souldier, which was indeed as much as the Centurion had. After the Legions march'd from *Rome*, every File was Drill'd and Train'd by its Leader, who was called *Decanus*, and *Caput contubernii*, because a whole File was lodg'd in one Tent or Hut: And this *Decanus* was also to have the inspection of their Arms, that they were kept bright, clear, and sharp; and of their clothes, that they were kept in good order; for all which he had some small allowance more than the Common Souldier. I shall conclude this Discourse of Exercises, with what *Josephus* says of them: The *Roman* Exercises in Arms are (saith he) Battels without Blood, and their Battels are Exercises with Blood.

Campi Doctores Drill-masters.

Decanus, a File-leader.

Observe here, that *Polybius* speaks not one word of any of these three kinds of Exercises, and *Vegetius* nothing of the second kind.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Roman *Infantry, and all its several Bodies, and their Officers.*

HOW the Ancient and Illustrious *Romans* divided their Foot into heavy and light, and how both were Arm'd, I have sufficiently inform'd you. But there are some who say, they had no light armed Foot, till *Hannibal*'s time, I know no authority for this. It is true, *Livius* saith in his twenty sixth Book, that at the Siege of *Capua*, when it stood for *Hannibal*, was the first time that the *Roman* light armed Foot were mingled with the Horse; but this will not infer, that the *Romans* had no light armed Foot before that Siege of *Capua*. The truth of that affair was this: The *Capuans* at their Sallies ordinarily worsted the *Roman* Horse, till one *Navius*, a Centurion, made a proposition, that in such Rencounters the Horse-men should take Darters on the croups of their Horses, which was done. Now when the Besieged Sallied, and came up to the *Roman* Horse, the *Velites* alighted, and run before the Horse-men, throwing their Darts, (whereof they were order'd to have seven) at the Enemy, and then retir'd to their own Horse, having done (as may be supposed) so much mischief to the *Hannibalians*, and brought them into such disorder, that the *Roman* Horse often had a cheap Market of them. *Navius* might well have been the first *Roman* that thought of this way of fight of Horse and Foot mixed together, but it was practis'd long before his time by the Great *Alexander*, and others. And *Cæsar* bears witness, that long after *Navius*, *Arioviſtus*, King of the *Germans* used and practis'd it, who learn'd it not from *Navius*, or any other *Roman* in the world. *Lipsius* thinks, that in *Cæsars* time, there were no *Velites*, and I am content to be of his opinion, for though it be certain enough, that when *Cæsar* liv'd, there were in the *Roman* Armies, Slingers, Darters, and Archers, (all which were *Velites*) yet it may be said, these were but Auxiliaries; for after the *Socii*, or Allies, were made Burgesses of *Rome*, and that *Rome* it self was Mistress not only of all *Italy*, but many other places of the World, and so could for her Money get Mercenaries when she pleas'd,

Velites mixed with Horse.

it is probable, the *Romans* made no election but of heavy arm'd or Legionaries. But the reaſon *Lipſius* gives for his opinion will not prove the thing; it is this: *Caſar* ſometimes interlin'd his Cavalry with *Anteſignani*, now theſe were heavy arm'd, therefore he had no *Velites*; but this will not follow; for why might not the heavy armed Foot fight among the Horſe, as well as the Horſe many times were brought to fight among the heavy arm'd Foot, for that depended on the Conſuls pleaſure, to bring ſome Foot from the Battel to the Wings, or ſome Horſe from the Wings to the Battel, a thing frequently practis'd.

Velites where marſhall'd.

Theſe *Velites* had their denomination a *Velocitate*, from Swiftneſs. In time of Service or Battel, they were ſometimes imployed in the Rear, ſometimes in the Flanks, but for moſt part in the Van; and when they were over-maſter'd, they retir'd to the intervals of the Legionaries. Some apprehend, that in their Retreat they divided themſelves into three Bodies, the firſt behind the *Haſtati*, the ſecond behind the *Principes*, and the third behind the *Triarii*. But aſſuredly they are miſtaken, for after the *Velites* had quitted the field, the heavy arm'd began the Combate, firſt the *Haſtati*, and they being worſted, retir'd to the *Principes*, but this they could not do feaſibly, if a Body of *Velites* ſtood between them and the *Principes*, nor could the *Principes* retire to the *Triarii*, if another Body of *Velites* ſtood between them: And therefore I think I have reaſon to conclude, that when the *Velites* were beaten out of the field, they retir'd ſtraight to the Rear of the *Triarii*, through the direct intervals of all the three Claſſes of the heavy armed, and there attended the Conſuls further pleaſure. Yet if you look on any Figure of a Legion, you ſhall ordinarily ſee the *Velites* drawn up in three diſtinct Bodies, behind the three ſeveral Batallions of the Legionaries, which might have been done when they were marſhall'd, before the Fight began; but for the reaſon I have ſpoke of, could not be after they had fought, and retir'd. They fought *a la disbandad*, keeping no Rank or File, nor had they peculiar Officers, as the *Grecian* light armed Foot had. Several fanſie, nay poſitively affirm, they were to obey the commands of the Centurions of thoſe heavy arm'd *Maniples*, behind whom they were order'd to ſtand, when the Army was marſhall'd. Is it not pity, that neither *Polybius* nor *Vegetius* would clear us of theſe doubts, conſiderable enough, ſince they concern ſo conſiderable a member of the Ancient *Roman* Armies? And ſince *Lipſius*, *Terduzzi*, and the Lord *Preiſſac*, magiſterially take upon them to marſhal them in three diſtinct Bodies, and to be commanded by the Centurions that ſtood in the Van of the Maniples of theſe Legionaries drawn up before them; is it fair dealing in them, not to tell us who commanded theſe *Velites*, when they were skirmiſhing, and fighting in the Van of the *Haſtati*, and when all the Centurions of the heavy armed were obliged to ſtay behind, and attend their charges, in their ſeveral Maniples and Cohorts?

How they fought.

By whom Commanded.

The Body of the heavy armed Infantry was compos'd of three ſeveral Claſſes, thoſe were, the *Haſtati*, the *Principes*, and the *Triarii*.

Haſtati.

The firſt Claſs was of the *Haſtati*, who were, as I told you before, the youngeſt in the election, and for moſt part *Novitiates*. I find no difference of their Arms from thoſe of the *Principes*, and what thoſe were, I have told you in the third Chapter, to which henceforward I conſtantly remit you, as to the matter of Arms. But I conceive they had their name of *Haſtati*, *ab Haſtâ*, that is, a Spear, which probably they have carried in the Reigns of ſome of their Kings; and though afterward they came to change their Weapon, yet they ſtill retain'd their name. Theſe *Haſtati* made the firſt Batallion, whatever *Vegetius* ſay to the contrary, as ſhall be ſufficiently demonſtrated, when I come to examine his Legion.

Principes.

The ſecond Claſs was of the *Principes*, who were the ſtrongeſt and luſtieſt men, and had moſt of them ſerv'd formerly, and were in the ſtrength of their age, and had their denomination, peradventure, becauſe they were the principal men for ſtrength and vigour; theſe made the ſecond Batallion of the Legion.

Triarii.

The third Claſs was of the *Triarii*: *Lipſius* thinks they were called ſo, *quaſi Tertiarii*, becauſe they made the third Batallion. I think the Etymology is far ſought, but it is fit I admit it, becauſe I cannot give a better. Yet it is certain that their more ancient name

was

was *Pilani*, and their whole Body or Squadron was called *Pilus*, no doubt, from *Pilum* the Javeline; and if so, then it is more than probable, that in older times, neither the *Hastati*, nor the *Principes* carried Javelines, because both of them in History are called *Antepilani*. In *Polybius* his time, the *Triarii* carried no Javeline at all, and yet even then they kept their old name of *Pilani*. All the difference of Arms that I find between them and the other two Classes, both before, and in *Polybius*'s time, is, that the *Triarii* carried a short Spear, which they call'd *Hastile*, of nine foot long, and I have told you in the third Chapter, that the *Pilum* or Javeline, by *Polybius* his own description, was near seven foot long. Why these short Spears were given them instead of Javelines, Authors tell us not. *Lipsius* makes a conjecture, which in my opinion is a very sorry one. He saith, the *Triarii* being plac'd in the Rear of the other two Batallions, their Javelines could have done them no service against an Enemy at so great a distance. What a pitiful Reason is this? For the *Triarii* were not bound to fight with either Javeline, short Spear, or any other Weapon, till either the *Principes* and *Hastati* retir'd to them, or that they themselves were brought up to the Van; and in any of these two cases, Javelines would have serv'd them to as good purpose, as they did the two Batallions marshall'd before them. And if these short Spears serv'd the *Triarii* better when they came to fight, than the Javelines, then they should likewise have serv'd the other two Classes better than the Javeline, and so the *Pilum*, or Javeline, should have been laid aside as useless. And therefore, I think, *Lipsius* here hath not hit the mark. To me, it would rather seem, that in a medley, when perchance an Enemy vigorously pursued the *Principes*, the *Triarii* could not, without wronging their Friends (who were retiring) cast their Javelines with so much advantage, as they could manage these short Spears. In the Countrey now called *Lombardy*, then *Gallia Cisalpina*, the *Roman* Consuls, *Furius* and *Flaminius*, met with a numerous Army of the *Cisalpine Gauls*, these carried terrible long and heavy Swords, to avoid the fury whereof, the *Romans* thought it fit to take the short Spears from the *Triarii*, and give them to the *Hastati*, that either with them they might keep the Enemy at a distance, or while the *Gauls* were slashing at those short Spears, and that their Swords (for their weight not very manageable) were at the ground, the *Hastati* with their short Swords might get within them; and this succeeding as it was projected, gain'd the *Romans* the Victory, as *Polybius* in his Second Book tells us. I would he had told us too, whether these *Hastati* made use both of their own Javelines, and the short Spears of the *Triarii*, which is not improbable; or if they exchang'd Weapons for that day. But here give me leave to ask *Polybius*, *Vegetius*, *Lipsius*, *Terduzzi*, and all others who tenaciously prefer the *Roman* Arms to all others of the World, Whether a long *Grecian* Spear of eighteen foot, would not have done better service against the *Gauls*, than either a Javeline or a short Spear? Or if a *Macedonian* Phalange, strongly arm'd, carrying Pikes of one and twenty foot long, would have much valued or feared the long and heavy Swords of these *Cisalpine Barbarians*.

Called *Pilani*;

Carried short Spears.

Why they carried not Javelines.

Observation.

These *Triarii* were the eldest and most experimented of the *Roman* Foot, and therefore were kept for the last Reserve, not at all fighting, if the other two Bodies beat the Enemy; but if those were beaten, or order'd to retire, (as sometimes they were) then they arose, and made a fresh and furious onset, and if that prevail'd not, the safety of the Army depended either on their Flight, or on a fair and orderly Retreat. Hence in desperate cases they us'd to say, *Usque ad Triarios perventum est*. History tells us, that while others were fighting, the *Triarii* rested themselves, till the Consul or General gave them either an Order or a Sign to rise. But in what posture they rested, whether they kneel'd or sate; or if they kneel'd, whether they did it on one knee or both; or if on one knee, whether on the Right or the Left, is not to me very clear. *Vegetius*, in the twentieth Chapter of his first Book, seems to say on both knees, *genibus positis*, are his words, and indeed this was the easiest way. In the sixteenth Chapter of his second Book, he makes them kneel but on one knee, and this, I believe, is the truest. But in the fourteenth Chapter of his third Book, to my thinking, he makes them sit, which, I suppose, could not be

Triarii rest.

But how, is a question.

be true at all, for at that posture they could not with any conveniency make a Pent-house of their Shields, which both he and *Polybius* say, and which Reason teacheth, they were bound to do, to save themselves from the Enemies missiles.

Ordinarily the *Triarii* kept for the last Reserve.

There is no doubt, the *Triarii* did often recover the honour of the day, when it was well near lost. When *Lucius Furius* was well beaten by the *Volscians* at *Satricum*, *Livy* tells us in his sixth Book, that *Furius Camillus* advanc'd seasonably with his *Triarii*, charg'd gallantly, and obtain'd the Victory. The *Latines* after an obstinate fight at *Vesuvius*, had fair hopes of Victory, when they had wholly defeated the Left Wing of the *Roman* Army, and in it kill'd the Consul *Decius*, and forc'd both the *Hastati* and *Principes* to give ground on the Right hand: But *Manlius* with his *Triarii* fell freshly upon them, and recover'd the Battel. *Polybius* in his Second Book says, The *Triarii* were not only kept for the last Reserve on the Land, but at Sea likewise in their Naval Battels. Yet were they not always left for the last, for at or near *Capua*, the Consul *Petilius* perceiving by the extent of the *Samnites* Army, that they intended to out-wing him, (a danger to which most of the *Roman* Armies were obnoxious) did not stay till the *Hastati* and *Principes* had fought, but presently call'd up both the *Principes* and *Triarii* to the Van, and of them making a large Front, by a furious charge of all his three Bodies marshall'd in Breast, routed his Enemy. Neither do I make any doubt, but those six Cohorts which *Cæsar* call'd up to the Front of his Army at *Pharsalia*, were *Triarii*, for he says, he call'd them *ex tertio agmine*, out of the third Batallion. He did it to assist his Horse against *Pompey*'s Cavalry, which far surpass'd his in number, and to these Cohorts himself attributeth the Victory. And if he had not call'd them up before the fight begun, but delay'd (according to the ordinary custome) till his *Hastati* and *Principes* had retir'd, perhaps he should have made use of them too late; but he fore-saw the danger of that well enough, and prevented it.

But not always.

Since the *Hastati*, when over-power'd, were to retire to the *Principes*, and both of them, when over-matter'd, to the *Triarii*; there is no question, but in each of these Bodies there were distances and intervals prepar'd, wherein to receive one another, whether by the Retreat of the first to the second, or of both first and second to the third, or by the advance of the second and the third to the first. That these Intervals were, is granted by all, but what measure or podisme of ground for any of them, is not at all punctually set down by any, for any thing I know; an inexcusable oversight! but I shall speak of them all in my Discourse of Intervals. Here I shall only take notice of two things. First, That *Machiavel* errs, when he says in the Third Book of his Art of War, that the *Hastati* had no Interval, but fought in one Body, *Spessi & fermi*, Thick and close. For, if so, the *Principes* could not advance to their assistance, or yet conveniently and feasibly receive them (when they retir'd) within their Intervals, if they had not been marshall'd in smaller Bodies. I suppose this fancy had its birth only in *Machiavel*'s Brain, whose Head, no doubt, was full of more hurtful notions. The second thing I am to acquaint you with in this place, is, that whatever distance was allow'd between the Maniples or Cohorts of the *Principes*, for receiving the *Hastati*, the double proportion of distance must have been given between the Maniples or Cohorts of the *Triarii*, in regard they were to receive both the *Hastati* and *Principes*. *Polybius* in his fifth Book avers, that though the number of the *Hastati* and *Principes* might vary, and be greater or lesser, according to the strength or weakness of the Legion, yet the number of the *Triarii* never alter'd, but they were constantly six hundred. Now in his time the number of the *Principes* was twelve hundred, and that of the *Hastati* as many. *Achilles Terduzzi*, not adverting to what I have said of distances, concludes first, that the two formost Batallions were marshall'd twelve deep, (which I will not grant him) and next, that the *Triarii* were drawn up but six deep, which I would not fail to deny him, though I had granted him the first. His reason for the last assertion is, that the *Triarii* being but half the number of the other two Batallions, could not make an equal Front with the other two, unless they were drawn up but half their depth: But he doth not take heed, that if they had made an equal Front of men with the other two, they could not have receiv'd both the other two in their Intervals,

Error of *Machiavelli*.

A mistake of *Terduzzi*.

vals, but only one of them, and then they had not done that, for which purpoſely they ſtood in the third Batallion: And if he had adverted, that the Intervals between the Maniples of the *Triarii*, muſt have been double that which was allow'd to the other two Claſſes, that ſtood before them, he would have marſhall'd ſix hundred as deep as he did twelve hundred, for the double diſtance between the ſeveral Bodies of ſix hundred, made ſix hundred of equal Front of ground with the twelve hundred before them: ſo you may eaſily conſider that notwithſtanding the diſparity of their numbers, the difference of the ſeveral Intervals made the Front equal, (as to the ground) of all the three Batallions of *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*.

Triarii but 600 in every Legion.

The Reaſon, and the only Reaſon why we muſt believe, that the *Triarii* were conſtantly ſix hundred, is becauſe *Polybius* ſaid it was ſo; but I ſhall ſuppoſe, it was neither ſo before his time, nor yet after his time, nor doth he offer to give any reaſon why it was ſo in his time. *Lipſius* (who is very ready for ſuch things) offers to give two Reaſons for it, the firſt whereof is ſtark naught, and it is this, That the *Principes* came back to their aſſiſtance; but by this argument they needed not have been ſo many as ſix hundred, becauſe both the *Haſtati* and *Principes* came back to their aſſiſtance, and by this Reaſon the *Principes* ſhould have been but ſix hundred, becauſe the *Haſtati* came back to their help, before they were obliged to fight. But his ſecond Reaſon ſpeaks better ſenſe, which is, That the Conſul (who ordinarily ſtood near the *Triarii*) came with the *Evocati* of the *Romans*, and the *Extraordinarii* of the *Socii* or Allies, and joyn'd with the *Triarii*. What theſe *Extraordinarii* were, ſhall be told you in my Diſcourſe of the Allies, and what the *Evocati* were, I ſhall tell you juſt now.

And why.

Evocati what.

If you will believe *Lipſius*, the *Evocati* were only of the *Roman* Nation, but, I think, I am obliged rather to believe *Caſar*, who ſaith, he had his *Evocati* out of *Gaule*, and at that time of his Civil War, the *Gauls* were either Enemies, or Auxiliaries at beſt. Thoſe of the *Evocati* who were *Romans*, were ſuch as had ſerv'd out their time, and by the Laws of their Militia, were not bound to follow the War; yet upon the Intreaty or Letters of the Conſul, Pro-Conſul, or General, came without conſtraint, to wait upon him or them in that expedition. Some of them ſerv'd on Horſe, ſome on Foot, and were put in Troops and Companies, and had their Officers and Pay, but were exempted from all manner of Military duties, except fighting, and attending on him who commanded in chief. A great many of them went with *Scipio* to *Africk*, three thouſand of them went to *Macedon* with *Titus Flaminius*, two thouſand went with *Pompey* againſt *Caſar*. And *Auguſtus* in one expedition had ten thouſand of them. Beſides theſe *Evocati*, there were Volunteers, who having ſerv'd out their time, were not ordinary Souldiers, and not being call'd out by the Conſul, were not properly *Evocati*; neither had they any pay, but went to the War meerly of their own motion and free-will, either to do their Countrey ſervice, or to acquire Riches or Honour to themſelves and families, or for all theſe three reſpects together.

Roman Volunteers.

Proletarii what.

Now, there were, beſides all theſe Foot, which I have mention'd, ſome of the poorer ſort called *Proletarii*, and *Capite cenſi*, that were not admitted by *Servius Tullius*, King of *Rome*, to be enrolled for the War, but were left to ſerve at Sea, which at that time was eſteem'd diſhonourable, in compariſon of the Land ſervice. Yet in time of danger they were bound to take Arms (which were given them out of the publick Magazines) for the defence of the Walls of the City. But in proceſs of time, they came to be enrolled in Legions, particularly with *Marius* againſt the *Teutones* and the *Cimbrians*.

Rorarii and *Accenſi*.

Livius in his eighth Book, writing of that War which the *Romans* had with the *Latines*, mentions *Rorarii* and *Accenſi*, in two ſeveral Bodies, and he places them behind the *Triarii*; they were call'd from the Rear, according as the Conſul or General had uſe for them: They were the light armed Foot, and had thoſe names till the *Romans* beſieged *Capua*, in *Hannibal*'s time; then and there, it ſeems, they got the name of *Velites*, and that they kept. They were called *Accenſi*, becauſe they were the meaneſt in the Cenſe, and *Rorarii*, *à rore*, from Dew, becauſe in skirmiſhing they ſcatter'd themſelves, as Dew doth on Graſs. I ſhall tell you more of them in my Diſcourſes of a *Roman* Legion.

Each of theſe three Claſſes of the heavy armed Foot was divided into Centuries. Two Centuries made a Maniple, three Maniples made a Cohort, and ten Cohorts made up a Legion. A *Roman* Legion was of greater or leſſer number, according to the pleaſure of the King, Senate, People or Emperour, who was inveſted with the Soveraignty, or as the exigency of the preſent condition of affairs ſeem'd to require. *Romulus* ordain'd it to conſiſt of three thouſand men, one thouſand of each Tribe, whereof there were but three in his time, though afterward they came to be thirty five. Whether the Kings who ſucceeded *Romulus* kept the Legion at three thouſand Foot, I know not; but after Monarchy was baniſh'd the City, Legions came to be four thouſand ſtrong, ſometimes five thouſand, and twice, (if I miſtake not) ſix thouſand and two hundred.

Legion.

A Centuriate and Centurion.

Let us now ſpeak of the ſeveral Bodies of a Legion, and firſt of a Century. At the firſt conſtitution, I doubt not, but a Centuriate conſiſted of one hundred men, and its Commander was called Centurion, both the words being deriv'd from *Centum*, a hundred. But thereafter that band of men called a Centuriate, in Legions of four thouſand, or four thouſand two hundred (which was moſt, ordinary) came to conſiſt but of ſixty men in the two Claſſes of the *Haſtati* and *Principes*, and but of thirty, in the third Claſs of the *Triarii*. In the Claſs of the *Haſtati* there were twenty Centuriates, at ſixty men each of them, and thoſe were twelve hundred. Juſt as many Centuriates, and of that ſame number, for the *Principes* made twelve hundred more. In the Claſs of the *Triarii* there were likewiſe twenty Centuriates, but each of theſe conſiſted but of thirty men, which made ſix hundred, in all three thouſand heavy armed. The other thouſand or twelve hundred were *Velites*. But though each of thoſe Bands were but ſixty or thirty ſtrong, yet they, and their principal Commander kept their ancient denominations of Centuriate and Centurion. There were ſixty Centuriates in a Legion, though *Vegetius* ſpeaks of but fifty five, which ſhall hereafter be examin'd.

A Sub-Centurion.

The Centurion was choſen by the Tribune (as I formerly told you) and he had liberty to chuſe his own Sub-Centurion, whoſe ſtation was in the Rear, and was indeed nothing but our Bringer up. *Polybius* his Interpreter calls the Centurions, *Ordinum Ductores*, Leaders of Files, or of Centuriates, if *Ordo* be taken for a Centuriate, as perhaps it was; the Sub-Centurion he calls *Agminis Coadtorem*, and that is directly our Rear-man. This will not make a Centurion and Sub-Centurion to be our Captain and Lieutenant, (as ſome would have them to be) and if you will be pleas'd to conſider that a *Roman* Centurion commanded but ſixty, ſome of them but thirty men, and was himſelf no otherwiſe arm'd than the reſt of the Centuriate, only diſtinguiſhed by his Creſt, and that he ſtood in Rank and File with the reſt, either on the Right or Left hand of the Front of the Maniple: I ſuppoſe, you will think with me, that the *Roman* Centurions, for the matter of either Power or Honour, were no other than our Corporals, and their Sub-Centurions ſuch as Lanceſpeſats, eſpecially where Foot Companies are (as in our own time they were in ſeveral places of *Europe*) three hundred ſtrong, and conſequently every Corporalſhip ſixty men. The Centurions badge was a Branch, Rod, or Twig of a Vine, wherewith he had power to beat or whip thoſe of his Centuriate as they deſerv'd. It is not half an age ſince a Corporal uſed to carry a Muſket-reſt in his hand, wherewith he might beat thoſe of his Corporalſhip according to their Miſdemeanors. Neither will the matter of Profit or Pay make any difference between them, the *Roman* Centurion having but double allowance of either Wages, Proviant, or Donatives of what the common Souldier had, and ſo have our Corporals in all or moſt of our Modern Armies. *Polybius* informs us, that the Centurion might nominate his Sub-Centurion, that in caſe he ſhould dye in Battel, the other ſhould ſucceed him; and by this it ſhould ſeem, that ſo long as the Centurion liv'd, the Sub-Centurion had no command at all. But we do not at all read of Sub-Centurion till before that great Battel was fought between the *Romans* and the *Latines*, that a *Roman* Centurion, who was of a weak Body, knowing he was to encounter with a *Latine* Centurion who was ſtrong, deſir'd to have one joyn'd to him as his helper or Sub-Centurion, to aſſiſt him, as *Livy* at great length relates the ſtory in his eighth Book; and this, it may be, gave

Centurions our Corporals.

Sub-Centurion his riſe.

the

the riſe to that deſpicable Office of a Sub-Centurion, who is called an Option by *Vegetius*; a word, I do not remember to have read in any other Author, except once in *Polybius*. The Tribunes very often uſed their Centurions as we do our Marſhals and Proforces of Companies, and worſe, in cauſing them to lead the Malefactors out of the Camp, and there either ſee them put to death, or do it themſelves. After *Julius Cæſar* had uſurp'd the State, his Succeſſors, the Emperours, uſed their Centurions directly as their Hang-men, in cauſing them to put to death with their own hands, ſuch as they in their Arbitrary Government had ordain'd to dye. So one of them with his own hand kill'd the Empreſs *Meſſalina*, not by the Emperour *Claudius* his command, but by the direction of his freed Bond-ſlave *Narciſſus*. Another of them aſſiſted at the horrid murther of the Empreſs *Agrippina*, after he had baſely ſtruck her over the head with a Battoon. Every Centuriate had a Banner or Colours, and the Enſign-bearer was choſen by the Centurion; nor can I find, that this Enſign-bearer was any diſtinct Officer, but only ſome one of the common Souldiers, whom for his Courage and Strength the Centurion entruſted with the Enſign; for his Command was none at all, and his profit as little, being no otherwiſe paid than as other Souldiers were, only he was a ſtep nearer preferment than they.

Centurions ſometimes Hang-men.

Two Centuriates made a Maniple, ſo called from a wiſp or handful of Hay, tyed to a long Pole, which perhaps was the firſt Enſign that ever *Romulus* carried. The Maniple had no particular Commander, the oldeſt Centurion commanded the Right hand Centuriate, and the youngeſt the Left hand one. The Maniple had two Enſigns, one for each Centuriate. And this *Lipſius* (convinc'd by Hiſtory) acknowledgeth in the firſt Dialogue of his fourth Book of his Commentary on *Polybius*, yet in the third Dialogue of that ſame Book, he ſeems to allow but one Enſign to the Maniple. But he doth worſe, for in the third Dialogue of his ſecond Book (ſpeaking of that paſſage in *Livy*'s eighth Book, where he makes three Enſigns to be in one Maniple, made up of *Triarii*, *Rorarii*, and *Accenſi*) *Lipſius* ſaith it might be ſo; for, ſaith he, there may be Colours where there is no Commander, whereof the *Rorarii* and *Accenſi* had none. This is ſtrange Doctrine, Colours without Commanders. But obſerve more, that notwithſtanding the Authority of *Livius*, *Polybius* and *Vegetius*, who give an Enſign to every Centuriate, *Lipſius* in the eighth Dialogue of his ſecond Book, declares his opinion to be, that a Maniple conſiſting of two Centuriates, had but one Enſign. In what *Roman* Authors he hath read this I know not, but I am confident he ſaw neither of the two practis'd in his own Countrey, during the whole Wars between the King of *Spain*, and the Eſtates of the *Netherlands*, which began a little before he began to write. But it is fit we hear and anſwer the Reaſons, wherewith he endeavours to confirm his opinion: Firſt, He cites *Varro*, who mentions but one *Signum*, or Banner, in one Maniple. It is anſwer'd, That *Varro* in that place intended not to inform us, whether there were two Enſigns or one, in the Maniple, that not being the ſubject or matter of his diſcourſe; and therefore when he ſpoke of one, he did not deny but there might be two. Secondly, ſaith *Lipſius*, Since there was but one Eagle in the Legion, there ſhould be but one Banner in the Maniple. Truly, he might as well have ſaid but one Banner in the Cohort, the Analogy would have held as well, if not better. It was the *Romans* pleaſure to have but one Eagle in every Legion, and one Colours in every Centuriate, and the queſtion is *de re geſtâ*, of the thing done, and not of the cauſes and reaſons of the deed it ſelf. Thirdly, he ſaith, *Polybius* ſpeaks of two *Signiferi*, or Enſign-bearers, but not of two Enſigns. Neither doth that which *Lipſius* adds, help him, that he thinks, the one Enſign-bearer was to relieve the other when he was wearied. To the firſt part of this Reaſon, I ſay it is of no force; for when *Polybius* ſaid, there were two Enſign-bearers, he ſaid in theſe words, There were likewiſe two Enſignes. For if *Lipſius* ſhould ſay, In one Brigade there are two Colonels, would not any man infer, That there were two Regiments in that Brigade. To the ſecond part, That the one Enſign-bearer ſerv'd to relieve and eaſe the other; it is but a conjecture of *Lipſius*, and he gueſſeth not always right. For why ſhould there be two Enſign-bearers for one Enſign, ſince there was but one Eagle bearer for one Eagle, which was much heavier, and of more conſequence than an

A Maniple.

Lipſius will allow but one Enſign for a Maniple.

His Reaſons examined, and anſwered.

Firſt.

Second.

Third.

Fourth. ordinary banner. Fourthly, he tells us that when *Cæſar* beat *Pompey* at *Pharſalia*, he took nine Eagles, that is, ſaith he, one for every Legion, but he took only one hundred and eighty Enſigns; now, ſaith *Lipſius*, if there had been two Colours in every Maniple, he ſhould have taken five hundred and forty of them. I wonder why ſo grave a Man as *Lipſius*, would propoſe ſo ridiculous an argument; for firſt *Cæſar* got not all *Pompey*'s Eagles, for himſelf writes, that *Pompey* had one hundred and ten Cohorts, theſe made up eleven complete Legions, but *Cæſar* got but nine Eagles, and ſo he wanted the two belonging to the other two Legions; and if he had got all the Enſigns that belonged to thoſe nine Eagles, (reckoning two Enſigns to every Maniple) he had got no fewer than five hundred and forty, or yet (according to *Lipſius* his own account, reckoning but one Banner to every Maniple) if he had got all, he ſhould have got juſt two hundred and ſeventy, yet *Cæſar* declares he got no more than one hundred and eighty. What will follow upon all this, but that all the reſt of the Enſigns eſcaped, as well as the two Eagles, or that they were torn or deſtroyed by the Bearers, as is uſual in our own times for Enſigns to do. But he concludes, that whatever the Maniples of the *Principes* and the *Haſtati* had, yet each Century of the *Triarii* had but one Colour, becauſe of their ſmall number, but his conjecture is ill grounded, as not agreeable to ancient ſtory; for it being agreed on, that thirty Men of the *Triarii* ſhould make a Century, that Century ought to have had an Enſign as well as a Century of either the *Haſtati* or *Principes*, which, according to *Polybius*, conſiſted of ſixty Men, and according to *Vegetius*, of one hundred Men. And we ſee the like practice in our Modern Companies of Foot, which are ordained to be but of one hundred a piece, they have Colours as well as Companies of one hundred twenty ſix, or one hundred forty eight Men, or others of full three hundred Men.

All Centuriates had Colours.

I hope, if I queſtion the truth of ſome things, which *Lipſius* avers either here, or afterward, it ſhall not be eſteemed arrogance in me, for I reverence the memory of that great and learned Man, but it will, I ſuppoſe, be granted me, that he might eaſily erre in things that belonged not properly to his profeſſion, though I believe, no one Man hath given greater light, to the *Roman* Hiſtory, than he hath done. In the fifth Dialogue of the fifth Book of his Commentary, he himſelf gives free liberty to all Military Perſons to examine all he writes on a Military ſubject, provided, they be not *omnium literarum & artium rudes*, that is not altogether rude, and wholly ignorant of all Learning and Arts.

Apology of the Author.

A Cohort conſiſted of three Maniples, but neither were theſe three Maniples all of one claſſe, nor was the Cohort marſhall'd in one equal Batallion or Front, but it was order'd thus: A Maniple of the *Haſtati*, a Maniple of the *Principes*, and a Maniple of the *Triarii* made a Cohort, and theſe were marſhall'd ſo, that the Maniple of the *Principes* ſtood at a diſtance juſt behind the Interval that was (I pray you obſerve it) between two Maniples of the *Haſtati*, and not directly behind one of the Maniples of the firſt claſſe, and the third Maniple of the Cohort, which was of the *Triarii*, ſtood directly behind the Interval that was between two Maniples of the *Principes*. And to ſpeak it once for all, this was ever the *Roman* cuſtome, of marſhalling theſe three claſſes of *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*; except once at *Zama*, where *Scipio* drew them up in a direct and ſtraight line, one juſt behind another, leaving one Interval directly oppoſite to that, which was before it, to give way to the fury of *Hannibal*'s numerous Elephants, ſaith *Livius*; of both his Elephants and Horſe, ſaith *Polybius*: I ſhall neither buſie my Reader, nor my ſelf with the etymology of the word *Cohors*, which may be a *Greek* word, that ſignifieth a cloſe or incloſure; but I ſhall ſay, that though the centuriate was ſometimes ſtronger, ſometimes weaker of Men, according as the Legion was appointed to be, yet ſtill a Maniple was the ſame, that is, a Band of Men conſiſting of two Centuriates joyn'd together, and a Cohort was ſtill the ſame, that is, a Body compos'd of three Maniples, though not joyn'd together, till neceſſity forced either the retreat or advance of ſome of them. And being a Legion conſiſted of ten Cohorts, and the ſtrongeſt Legion we read of (as to its number of Foot) was ſix thouſand two hundred, I admire, why in the deſcription of the Ancient *Roman* Legion, *Vegetius* makes his firſt Cohort to con-

A Cohort.

How Marſhalled.

ſiſt

ſiſt of one thouſand Men and more, and all the other nine of five hundred and fifty apiece, whereas according to the number of his Legion, (which was ſix thouſand and one hundred) each Cohort ſhould have conſiſted of ſix hundred and ſixteen Men, or thereabouts. Neither doth his Commentator *Steuechius* defend him well, by telling us, that there were *Millenariæ Cohortes*, Cohorts of thouſands, for theſe were not Legionary Cohorts, but Bands, Batallions, or Bodies of ſuch Companies, Centuriates or Maniples, as the Prætor, Conſul, Imperator, or General choſen and appointed to attend him in the time of War, and were called *Cohortes Prætorianæ*, or Pretorian Guards, and were ſtronger or weaker, more or leſs numerous, according to the power, or the pleaſure of the Commander in chief, and afterwards they were the Guards of the Emperors, in time both of Peace and War. The firſt we read of that had one of them was *Poſthumius* the Dictator mentioned by *Livy* in his ſecond Book. The great *Scipio* gathered a choice number of his friends and Dependers together, to attend him in his *Carthaginian* Voyage, eaſed them of all Duties, but fighting, and allowed them a third more of pay, than others had. *Julius Cæſar* had none of them. *Auguſtus* had nine thouſand of them, whom he called *firmamentum Imperii*, the firmament, and eſtabliſhers of the Empire, but in time they came to be the Electors of the Empire, the Murtherers of the Emperors, and the bane of the Commonwealth: ſome of them ſerved on Horſeback, and yet ſtill retained the name of Cohorts.

Vegetius his Cohorts.

Pretorian Cohorts.

Emperour's Guards.

I believe *Lipſius* conjectures right enough, that in the time of the civil Wars, where Armies were made up of many Legions, and theſe made weak by long and continuated Marches, frequent Sieges and Battels, then I ſay, it is probable, Cohorts were modell'd in one Body, and uſed, as Maniples uſed to be in more ancient times; yet for all that, I will not grant to *Lipſius*, that the Cohort conſiſted of leſs than ſix Centuries, though they might be very weak, nor yet will I grant, that every one of thoſe ſix Centuries had not its own Centurion, and Enſign: for as in our Modern Regiments, a Captain is ſtill Captain, though his Company be not twenty ſtrong, and hath Colours always, till the Regiment is broken; ſo among the *Romans* every Century or Ordo had its Centurion and Enſign, till the Legion was diſmiſs'd and disbanded, which was frequently enough done.

Cohorts marſhalled as Maniples.

In every Legion there were ten Cohorts, neither had a Cohort any particular Commander over it, more than the Maniple had, ſo as yet, the Centurion was the higheſt Officer, yea the only Officer in a Legion, except the Tribunes, whereof for the moſt part there were ſix in a Legion, be the Legion of what ſtrength it would, yet the Legion was not divided among the Tribunes, nor had any one of them a particular command of any part of it, but all of them, and every one of them had the command of the whole Legion; but to ſhun both confuſion and contention, they commanded about a month by turns, for *Polybius* in his fifth Book informs us, that two Tribunes had the command for one month alternatively; his meaning certainly was, two Tribunes in a Conſular Army, in which there were two Legions of *Romans*, beſides Allies, and that is ſtill one Tribune for every Legion, and ſo the Tribunes had their turns, if it be true what *Polybius* ſuppoſes, that the Army ſtaid in the Field but ſix Months, and ordinarily they ſtaid no longer, and ſometimes not ſo long; yet we find that ſometimes they ſtaid abroad all the Winter over, the firſt practice whereof was at the Siege of *Veii*, and then, no doubt, the Tribunes took their turns of command, as they did in the Summer time. Here now, you ſee, we have ſix Tribunes in a Legion, and but one Tribune in a Legion. The other five had that ſame reſpect, ſervice, and obedience paid them, with him who commanded, and ſate in the Council of War with the Conſul, as well as he.

How many Cohorts in a Legion.

Military Tribunes.

The power and authority of the Tribunes was great enough, they judged of all cauſes, Civil, Criminal, and Military, but the laſt appeal was reſerved for the Conſul, or General. They might impoſe pecuniary mulcts and fines, and puniſh by defalcation of Pay, or Proviant, and by whipping likewiſe; yea *Polybius* ſays, they might paſs a ſentence of Death, others ſay, not without the Council. They received the Teſſera, or Watchword from the Conſul, whereof I ſhall give you a more perfect account in another place. They went before

Their Power.

Their Duties.

before to see the Camp measured out, according to the form of the *Roman* Castrametation, whereof hereafter.

Their station in Battel.

But where these Tribunes had their Stations in the time of Battel (for sure the other five were not idle then) neither *Polybius* nor *Vegetius* tells us one word; Doubtless they are to blame, for concealing that, and many other considerable points of the *Roman* art of War. And here again, I am forced to engage with *Lipsius*, who very frankly offers his conjecture, which is this; That all the six Tribunes stood beside or near the Consul, and that was, saith he, beside the Eagle on the right hand of the *Triarii*; but if he had remembred of some things, that no question he knew, he would not have vented this opinion of his: For, first, the Consul could not be beside two Eagles, and therefore the Tribunes of both Legions could not be beside him. Secondly, The Consul, as all History witnesseth, was so far from being constantly at the Eagle, that he was but very seldom beside any of the Eagles, except when he was to lead the *Triarii* up to the assistance of the other two Classes, and many times he did this by a sign, and not in Person. Thirdly, it had been great shame for a knot of Colonels to have stood all of them beside the *Triarii*, when the other two Batallions of *Hastati* and *Principes* were at hot work with an Enemy. Now, the reason, which *Lipsius* gives for this guess of his, is as extravagant as the conjecture it self, and I pray you, hear it. Because, saith he, the Tribunes in the *Roman* Camp quarter'd all very near the *Pratorium*, or Consuls Pavilion: and therefore, that in time of Battel, they should all be beside or near the Consul, is an Inference not worthy the youngest Novitiate in Logick: for, if this reason were valid, then all the Horsemen should have been embattell'd in the rear beside the *Triarii*, because in the Camp they quarter'd all beside them, as you shall hear afterwards. But since guessing is in fashion, why may not I guess too? yes, by *Lipsius* his permission, I think I may. I shall lose but little. My conjecture then shall be grounded on two undeniable truths, the first is, that the Tribunes had the command of the Horse, as well as of the Foot: The second, that the *Roman* Horse were almost constantly marshall'd in one Wing, and for the most part, in the right Wing, the left one being ordain'd for the Cavalry of the Allies, add a third truth to the other two, that the Horse had no Officers to command them, but Decurions, and these were Independent one of another: Let us then allow one of the six Tribunes to command the Horse. In the next place let us order two experimented Tribunes to stay with the *Triarii*, and the other two to command the *Principes*, and the sixth with my consent, shall fight with the *Hastati*. If this conjecture of mine please the Reader, as little as that of *Lipsius* pleaseth me, I shall not break my heart for the matter, for I have met with greater disappointments.

Lipsius erres in his conjecture;

And in the reason of it.

The Authors conjecture.

As to any other Officer of the Infantry, in the old *Roman* Militia, I find none. *Vegetius* tells us in the seventh Chapter of his second Book, of some mean Office-bearers, who perhaps in his time had some small allowance of pay more than ordinary: But in *Polybius*'s time, and before it, they were nothing but *Gregarii Milites*, common Souldiers; and we are now speaking of the ancient constitutions of the *Roman* Militia. But with *Vegetius* I shall speak a word of these meaner Office-bearers. *Tesserarii*, who received the word from the Tribunes. *Metatores* went before with the Tribune to measure out the Camp. *Mensores*, who in the Field gave the Souldiers ground for their Huts and Tents, and their several Lodgings in Towns and Villages, as our Quartermasters and Fouriers do. *Librarii* were petty Clerks and Scriveners, who kept the accounts of Pay, proviant, and donatives; all these in ancient times were appointed and chosen by the Centurions, remaining still common Souldiers, and changed at their pleasure. In that same Chapter *Vegetius* speaks of *Ordinarii*, *Qui in prælio primos ordines ducunt*, who in Battel, saith he, led the first orders. But here, to me he is very obscure, for *Ordines* may signifie *Estates*, which is not meant in this place; *Ordines* signifies Centuriates, and so *Casaubon* in his translation of *Polybius* useth it, and *Ordines* is very often taken for both Ranks and Files. If *Vegetius* had used *Ordines* here for Centuriates, then assuredly he would have said the *Ordinarii* were the *Principes*, or of them, for

Tesserarii, what.

Metatores, what.

Mensores, what.

Clerks.

Ordinaries, what.

according

according to his account, the *Principes* made the firſt Batallion, and ſo were *Primi ordines*, that is, the firſt Centuriates. But if by *Ordines* he meant Ranks, as all along he ſeems to do, then his *Primi ordines*, or firſt ranks, were nothing but File-leaders, whereof, indeed the Centurion himſelf was one, and the Dignity he had, was, that he marched and fought either on the right or left hand of his own Centuriate, as when two were joyned in a Maniple, the oldeſt Centurion ſtood on the right hand of the Maniple, and the youngeſt on the left. It is there alſo, where the ſame Author tells us, of ſome who were called *Auguſtales*, that were joyned to theſe *Ordinarii*, but he makes it not clear to us, what duty they did, nor could they at all belong to the Ancient *Roman* Militia, having been but ordain'd by *Auguſtus*, from whom they had their Denomination. The *Flaviales*, he ſaith, were, *tanquam ſecundi Auguſtales*, the ſecond *Auguſtals*, being Inſtituted by the Emperour *Flavius Veſpaſian*, from whom they had their name. What ſhall I ſay of theſe Auguſtals and Flavials, but that theſe two Emperours, have beſtow'd, it may be, a little more allowance of Pay or Bread upon ſome common Souldiers, than upon others, and as a mark of their favour, have perhaps, appointed the ſecond or third Rank to be next in honour to the Front, or the Rear, and thoſe who march'd in them, to be call'd by their names, Auguſtals and Flavials. *Vegetius* his *Torquati*, *Simplares*, and *Duplares*, were ſuch as had received gold Chains, or Bracelets, ſingle or double, as rewards of their Valour, Vertue and good ſervice, who beſides had many times given them a double allowance of Bread, Fleſh, and Wine: All theſe were nothing but common Souldiers, who enjoy'd ſuch benefits as theſe we have ſpoke of; and perhaps were not priviledged from the Duties of thoſe Souldiers, who were called *Munifices*, whereof I ſpoke formerly. As to *Vegetius* his Trumpeters and Horn-winders, whereof he ſpeaks in that ſame place, I ſhall have a Diſcourſe of them in a Chapter apart.

Auguſtals, what.

Flavials, what.

Torquati, what.

All of them common Souldiers.

It is there likewiſe, where *Vegetius* ſpeaks of the Creation of Tribunes, who, he ſaith, were choſen by the Emperors, after they were veſted with the Soveraign Power, and had their authority given them *per Epiſtolam ſacram*, which I may engliſh by an Imperial Patent, or Commiſſion. But in my Diſcourſe of Election, I have ſhown you, who uſed to chuſe the Tribunes after the Ancient *Roman* way. And in the ſame Chapter it is, that our Author qualifies thoſe (whom *Livy* calls *Subcenturiones*, and *Caſaubon* out of *Polybius*, *Agminis Coactores*) with the name of *Optiones*, they ſignifie all one thing, and I think, Bringers up: yet among theſe Rear-men there was one, who was choſen by the Centurion to aſſiſt him, and this was the Sub-Centurion, our Lanceſpeſate, if he was ſo much. But I pray you, take notice how *Vegetius* deſcribes theſe Perſons: *Optiones ab optando appellati, quod antecedentibus ægritudine prapeditis, tanquam adoptati eorum, atque Vicarii ſolent univerſa curare*, *Options*, ſaith he, they were called from wiſhing, or adopting, becauſe thoſe who marched before them, being hindred by ſickneſs, they as their adopted and Vicars uſed to have a care of all things. By this deſcription, they were nothing but Bringers up, and all Bringers up could not be Sub-centurions. And at beſt, the Sub-Centurion had all his power from his Centurion, and was, as his adopted Child to ſucceed him in his charge after his death, whether that happen'd by a natural or a violent way. But ſo far as I can yet perceive, this Sub-Centurion, this *Agminis Coactor*, this *Optio*, this adopted Child, ſignified nothing, nor could officiate any way, till his Father the Centurion dyed, or at leaſt, till he either fell ſick, or chanced to be wounded, and then this Adopted Son of his might ſupply his place, as his Deputy.

Options, what.

Vegetius his deſcription of them.

I find in ſome Authors, that every Legion had a Phyſician, but whether every Centuriate, Maniple or Cohort, had a Chirurgion, I know not, for I find nothing of it in any Author I have read. But ſince nothing is more certain, than that the *Roman* Souldiers and Officers were frequently wounded, and that we read of Conſuls and Dictators, who have made it a part of their work (as indeed it was) to viſit, comfort, and cheriſh the ſick and hurt, in their Tents, and Hutts, I think, we need not doubt, but their Armies were well provided of theſe Artiſts, without whoſe help, the comfortable words of a General, nay of a Prince, to a heavily diſeaſed Perſon, could ſignifie but little.

Phyſicians & Chirurgions.

The

The Eagle.

The Eagle was the Enſign or Banner of every Legion, it being the Arms of the *Roman* State, as it continues to be to the *German Roman* Emperours to this day. It was carried on the top of a long Pole or Spear, and was entruſted to the care and keeping of the firſt Centurion of the Legion, and that was he who commanded on the Right hand of the *Triarii*, but whether he carried it himſelf, or had only the inſpection of it, and was to anſwer for the loſs of it, I have read no Author who clears me, nor doth *Lipſius* offer me any help. And therefore I ſhall be of the opinion, that the Centurion who had the Command of the Legion next to the Tribunes, ought not to have been hinder'd in the exerciſe of his function, (eſpecially when he was both to fight himſelf, and teach others how to fight) with ſo great a burthen, as was the Eagle, with its long Pole; and till I get better information, I ſhall think that he had ſome other ſtrong luſty fellow to bear it, for the defence whereof, many Centurions at ſeveral occaſions, loſt their lives. I told you before, that in ancient times the whole Batallion of the *Triarii* was called *Pilus*, and themſelves *Pilani*; hence it is, that the firſt Centurion of that Claſs (to whom the Eagle was recommended) was called *Primipilus*, and was the firſt of the whole Legion, to which degree of honour (as being then capable to be a Tribune) he aſcended by many ſteps, as having been a Centurion of, and in all the other two Claſſes before: He had ſome priviledges, more than other Centurions had; one whereof was, that he might ſit in Council with the Conſul, Legates, and Tribunes. He who carried the Eagle was called *Aquilifer*, or Eagle-bearer; who ſtill, I think, could not be the *Primipilus*, of whom *Vegetius* in the eighth Chapter of his ſecond Book, ſays only *Aquilæ præerat*, He had the care of the Eagle.

By whom carried.

Primipilus, and his priviledges.

Enſigns.

The other Enſigns or Banners, of which I ſaid every Centuriate had one, and conſequently every Maniple two, were called *Signa*, Signs or Enſigns; for anciently *Vexillum* belong'd properly to the Horſe, and was that which we now call a Standard, though ſome Authors in later times have confounded *Vexillum* and *Signum*, and make them both ſignifie one thing. In theſe Enſigns of old, were drawn the Pictures of their Heatheniſh Gods, as likewiſe of ſome Beaſts and Birds, as of a Lion, a Tyger, or a Dragon, to ſtir them up to courage, fury, revenge, and bloodſhed; particularly, the Wolf was not forgot in their Colours, to denote, I think, that the founder of their City was nurſed by one of them. After the State was changed into a Monarchy, ordinarily they had in their Banners, the Pictures and Images of their Emperours: And *Vegetius* ſpeaking of them in the ſeventh Chapter of his ſecond Book, calls them that carry'd them, *Imaginiferi, qui Imagines Imperatorum portare ſolebant:* Image-bearers, who uſed to carry the Images of the Emperours. The Images of thoſe proud and ambitious Princes had a reverend kind of Worſhip paid to them. So we read in *Cornelius Tacitus*, that *Tiridates*, a *Parthian* Prince, when he had left his own, and came to *Corbulo*'s Army, ador'd *Nero*'s Image. There was a great Banner, not heard of in ancient times, that they called *Labarum*, which was never carried into the Field, but when the Emperour was perſonally with the Army; this reſembled our Royal Standard.

Images.

Labarum the Imperial Standard.

Anteſignani.

And Poſtſignani.

Subſignani.

Why ſo called.

But here is a queſtion. Since all the Centuries in all the three Claſſes had Colours, why the *Haſtati* in ſeveral Hiſtories are called *Anteſignani*, as thoſe who march'd before the Colours; and the *Principes*, *Subſignani*, as thoſe which march'd under the Colours; and the *Triarii*, *Poſtſignani*, as thoſe who march'd after the Colours: which ſeems to import that none of them had Enſigns but the *Principes*? To which is anſwer'd: The Colours of the *Haſtati* and *Principes* being before the *Triarii*, and their own Colours in the firſt Ranks, the *Triarii* were properly enough called *Poſtſignani*. The *Principes* were *Subſignani*, becauſe with them, ſay ſome, were the principal Colours, and by this ſame Reaſon they will have the *Haſtati* to be *Anteſignani*, becauſe (though they had Enſigns of their own) yet they march'd before the Principal Colours. Indeed we muſt be ſatisfied with this Reaſon, for lack of a better, and truly it is better than that of ſome, who ſay, the *Haſtati* were call'd *Anteſignani*, becauſe in time of fight, they ſent back their Enſigns to the *Principes*. This cannot hold, if it be true what we read very often in Hiſtory, that in time of

of Battel or Assault, the Ensigns, sometimes the Eagle it self, was cast into the Batallion or Camp of the Enemy, to animate the Souldiers to advance and charge with greater courage and fury to recover their Banners. This differ'd far from sending them back to the next Class of heavy armed.

A Commander of the whole Legion.

Vegetius speaks of a *Præfectus Legionis*, the Colonel, Brigadeer, or Major General of the whole Legion, who had the command over the Tribunes; but though it be undeniable, that such an Officer should have been, yet since neither *Polybius*, or any Ancient History mentions him, we must conclude, he hath come in request long after the Emperours had possess'd themselves of the Soveraignty of *Rome*. If any think, the Legates were these *Præfecti*, I will tell them it was not so from the beginning, as I shall shew in my Discourse of a Consular Army.

No Foot Officers but Tribunes and Centurions.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot find that in the Ancient *Roman* Militia, there were any other Officers in a Legion, but the Tribunes and Centurions; I still except the Decurions of Horse, whereof I shall speak in the next Chapter. All others were but Temporary Deputies, without Office or Pay, or else priviledged Souldiers, made free from some duties, or beneficed with some Donatives, for some particular pieces of good service performed by them, which did not at all make them Officers; and to aver, they were Officers without Pay, is something ridiculous. Now that none had Pay as Officers, but only Tribunes and Centurions (I speak still of the Foot) and that all others had Pay and Donatives only as Common Souldiers, shall be, I hope, clear'd by me, in my Discourse of the *Roman* Pay. That which, indeed, stumbles me most is, that the Ensign-bearers were not reckon'd to be Officers, and I conceive this hath been a neglect in both *Vegetius* and *Polybius*, that they have not given us right information of that matter. For I cannot but suppose, the *Romans* did assuredly give to their Ensigns some more than ordinary allowance for carrying the Colours; especially, since the third part of the Souldiers Pay and Booty, and of their Largesses and Donatives too, was deposited in the Ensigns hands, or at the Colours, till the time of the Souldiers Dismission; of which hereafter.

Yet on the other hand, to my best understanding, *Cæsar* doth not acknowledge any Foot Officer or Commander in a Legion, or in the Army, but Tribunes and Centurions. Hear himself in two several places: The first is, in his first Book of the Civil War, where he says, The Chieftain swore first, after him the Tribunes, after them the Centurions; and then, saith he, the Souldiers by Centuries. Not one word here of Sub-Centurions, Options, Ensign-bearers, Tesseraries, Measurers, Clerks, and the rest of that crew, who indeed were all of them but Souldiers in these Centuries. The second place is in his third Book of the Civil War, there he tells us, how an Oath was sworn not to desert *Pompey* (very ill kept) first, says he, *Labienus*, as Chief, swore, then the Legates (whereof *Labienus* himself was one), then the Tribunes, next them the Centurions, and then the whole Army.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Roman *Cavalry, and all its Officers.*

The ſum of what *Vegetius* ſaith of the Horſe.

WE have but a ſlender account given us of the *Roman* Horſe by *Vegetius*. All he ſaith on that Subject amounts to this: In the fourteenth Chapter of his Second Book, he ſays, As a Band of Foot is called a Century or a Maniple, ſo a Company of Horſe is called a *Turma*, that is, a Troop: That every one of theſe Troops conſiſted of thirty two Riders, whereof the Commander was called a Decurion, and he deſcribes him to have been a perſon not only well Arm'd and Hors'd, and active and expert in all feats of Horſemanſhip, but able to teach his Troopers to be ſo likewiſe, and to keep their Arms bright and clean, and their Horſes in good caſe. In the twenty third Chapter of his third Book, he informs us, that the Cataphract Horſe-men, or Cuiraſſiers, arm'd at all pieces, are free from Wounds (how could this be, when their Faces were not covered?) but were not able, ſaith he, to do great matters, becauſe of the heavineſs of their Armour, yet good at cloſe fight, either before the Foot, or mixed with them, to beat a Batallion of an Enemy. This is all. So we remain ignorant (till he come to marſhal his Legion) of the ſtrength of the Cavalry, and even then, for him, we know not how the Horſe-men were levied or elected, how they were paid, how they watched, or what other duties they were bound to do, how deep they were marſhall'd, when and where they marched, or fought, what diſtances were between their Ranks and Files; and what Intervals between their *Turmes*, or Troops. Let us ſee how *Polybius* will help us in all, or in any of theſe.

Omiſſions of *Vegetius*.

Election of the Horſe-men.

In his ſixth Book he ſays, In old times two hundred Horſe were aſſign'd for every Legion, and theſe were elected, after the Foot were levied; but in his own time, and long before it, three hundred Horſe were appointed for every Legion, and were elected before the Foot; and elected they were not by the Conſuls or Tribunes, as the Foot were, but by the Cenſor. This is all *Polybius* ſaith of their election. Out of Hiſtory we find that the *Roman* Horſe-men were all of the *Equeſtral* Dignity, that is, Gentlemen; yet in ancient times they ſerv'd on Horſes bought at the publick charges, and when any of them committed groſs faults, their Horſes were taken from them, which was juſtly accounted an ignominy. Thereafter when they came to ſerve on their own Horſes, (yet on the publick wages) there was a luſtration, or muſter of them, when the Cenſors pleas'd, but ordinarily it was once in five years, of all thoſe of that Rank, who were able, both for their Perſons and their Purſes, to ſerve on Horſe-back, and then they rode in State on the beſt Horſes, and in the beſt equipage they were able to procure, and paſt by the place where the Cenſors ſate as Judges. All thoſe who could be accus'd of no Miſdemeanour, rode on without interruption, but ſuch as the Cenſors could charge with enormous crimes, were ſtopp'd, and commanded to ſell their Horſes, which was no ſmall diſgrace to them. And this Muſter, or Show, was called *Tranſvectio*.

Tranſvectio.

Of the Duties of their Horſe-men, their Guards and Watches, and of their Pay, *Polybius* ſpeaks not much, I ſhall ſay ſomething of each of them in their proper places. He ſpeaks a little of the Diſtance between Troops, of which I ſhall treat in my Diſcourſe of Intervals.

First difference between *Polybius* and *Vegetius*.

The ſame *Polybius* avers, That the three hundred Horſe, levied or elected for each Legion, were divided into ten Troops, every one whereof conſiſted of thirty Riders, which made up compleatly three hundred Horſe. Here *Polybius* and *Vegetius* differ, the laſt allowing thirty two Horſe-men to a Troop, and the firſt but thirty; for certainly in Companies of ſo ſmall a number, two made

made a conſiderable difference. Out of theſe thirty Riders, ſays *Polybius*, three *Præfecti* were choſen, by whom he tells not, but lets us ſuppoſe by the Conſul, or ſome of the Tribunes. He on the Right Hand had the command of the Troop: In his abſence, he on the Left Hand had it; and he not being preſent, the third did officiate. Theſe three choſe three others, to be *Agminis*, or *Turmæ Coactores*, for ſo *Caſaubon* renders it in *Latin*. The firſt Elected *Præfectus*, was called *Turmæ Ductor*, the Leader of the Troop; the other two were called *Decuriones*, and I ſuppoſe one of them carried the *Vexillum* or Banner, though *Polybius* tells us nothing of it: And yet it ſhould not have been omitted, ſince every Troop had a Standard. Now by this reckoning of *Polybius*, ſo weak a Troop was but a Caporalſhip, and he who commanded it but a Caporal: The two other Decurions but Leaders of Files, and the three *Agminis Coactores* but Bringers up. For we do not find that any one of them was ſupernumerary, but the contrary, that all of them were members of the Troop, and elected out of the number of the thirty; ſo that without thoſe ſix, *Polybius* his *Turma* were but twenty four ſtrong: Nor ſhall you find that any greater Pay was allowed to any of theſe ſix, than to the other four and twenty. And this difference is alſo to be obſerved between *Polybius* and *Vegetius*, that the firſt ſpeaks of three Decurions, and as many Sub-Decurions, the laſt only of one Decurion. Nor indeed do I find at all any warrant in Hiſtory, for *Vegetius* his thirty two Riders, ſince all agree, that for moſt part three hundred Horſe were levied with each Legion, and theſe three hundred divided into ten *Turmas*, which made thirty for each Troop. But we ſhall examine how he diſpoſeth of theſe two ſupernumery Riders, when we come to ſpeak of his Legion.

Second difference.

How deep, or how many in File theſe Troops were, none of our Tacticks directly write; no more than they do of the depth or the heighth of the Foot. An inexcuſable overſight: For without the knowledge of that, we can neither know nor gueſs what ground a Maniple, Cohort, Troop, or Legion, could or might take up. *Vegetius* gives us ſome ground to conjecture, that in his opinion the Foot were eleven in File: For in the laſt Chapter of his ſecond Book, (as I obſerved before) he ſaith, for every Carrobaliſt, Mules were appointed to draw it, and to manage and have a care of it, a *Contubernium* of Soldiers, that is, ſaith he, eleven men. This will not poſitively make eleven in File, yet it gives a ſtrong preſumption, that *Vegetius* thought ſo, which if he did, and that it was ſo indeed, all Maſters of the Military Art have taken up their meaſures wrong, in appointing Foot Files to be of even and equal numbers, as ſixteen, twelve, ten, eight, and ſix. As to the *Roman* Horſe, ſome may have miſtaken *Polybius*, who think he inſinuates, they were marſhall'd eight in File: For who will conſider right what he writes, will find that in that place he ſpoke not at all of the *Roman* Cavalry. The paſſage is in the twelfth Book of his Hiſtory; where he puts himſelf to much trouble, to demonſtrate the vanity and abſurdity of *Caliſthenes*, his Relation of that great Battel fought in *Cilicia*, between *Darius* and *Alexander*, where that Hiſtorian ſaith, that the *Perſian* King marched with thirty thouſand Horſe in Battel, and called up his mercenaries to him, who were as many: All this in a ground not above fourteen *Stadia* or Furlongs in Latitude, which makes but one *Italian* mile and three quarters: As alſo that *Alexander* marched in Battel with his whole Foot forty *Stadia*, five *Italian* miles, in an uneven, woody, and broken ground. The impoſſibility of both which, *Polybius*, as an experienced Captain, undertakes to demonſtrate. And this he could not do, unleſs he had firſt conſidered how deep the Horſe were marſhall'd; otherwiſe he could not know of what Longitude the front of thirty thouſand Horſemen would be, whether they would require more ground than the fourteen Furlongs allowed by *Caliſthenes*, as no doubt they did. And therefore he agrees on eight deep; his words are theſe: In juſt Battels, ſaith he, the Horſe Battalion is ſo ordered for moſt part, that its deepneſs conſiſted of eight Riders. Now firſt he ſaith, for moſt part, *Ut plurimum*, not always; for indeed I doubt not but he knew well enough, it was not always ſo. Secondly, he ſpeaks there of *Perſian* and *Gracian* Armies, and what he ſays of the deepneſs of their Horſe Squadrons, cannot be appropriated to the *Roman* Cavalry. But he concludes at eight deep, eight hundred Horſe would take up in front one hundred and twenty five Paces, which is one Furlong; and conſequently

Deepneſs of the *Roman* Horſe not told us.

Polybius againſt *Caliſthenes*.

Perſian Horſe eight deep.

quently eight thouſand Horſe needed to have for their Front twelve hundred and fifty paces, that is ten Furlongs: And therefore *Darius* his thirty thouſand Horſe being eight deep, would in Front have poſſeſs'd of ground four thouſand ſix hundred eighty ſix paces, more than thirty ſeven *Stadia* or Furlongs, and theſe will make more than four *Italian* miles and a half; and as much ground *Caliſthenes* muſt have allowed to his Mercenaries. Obſerve here, that *Polybius* allows for one hundred Horſe in Front one hundred twenty five paces, which is more than ſix foot for a Horſe-man to ſtand on, and for diſtance between him and his ſide-man.

We know not how deep the *Roman* Horſe were.

But if *Polybius* his meaning be, that the *Roman* Horſe were marſhall'd eight deep, then *Vegetius* his thirty two Riders will do better than *Polybius* his thirty in a Troop, becauſe thirty two will make four Files compleatly, whereas thirty makes but three Files of eight, and a broken one of ſix. In ſuch a miſt do theſe two great Maſters of the *Roman* Art of War leave us, out of which neither accurate *Lipſius*, or any other of my reading hath offer'd to guide us. I conceive, according to thirty in a Troop, ten deep might have done well, and who can tell but *Polybius* meant ſo, when he appoints three Decurions to be File-leaders, and three *Agminis* or *Turmæ Coactores*, to be Bringers up. But that was indeed too many, it making the Longitude or Front ſo ſmall, as render'd it very eaſie to be environ'd or ſurrounded.

Unbridled & Unſaddled Horſes.

In theſe very ancient times, many Nations fought on Horſes, neither Bridled nor Saddled, and ſome had Saddles, but no Bridles; hence we read, that the *Africans*, eſpecially the *Numidians*, divided their Cavalry *in Frænatos, & Infrænatos equos*, into Bridled, and Unbridled Horſes: And it is a wonder, to read in *Livy* with what dexterity and agility theſe unbridled Horſes were rul'd and manag'd by the Hand, the Foot, or Rod of a Rider. Some again had Bridles for their Horſes, but no Saddles; ſo had the *Germans*, who laugh'd at the *Romans*, as ſoft and effeminate, for riding on Saddles; and yet theſe very Saddles which the *Romans* uſed, were nothing but a covering made of ſome piece of Cloath or Stuff, rich or mean, according to the quality of the Rider, or at beſt, of ſome bundle ty'd together for the eaſe of the Horſe-man, without either Iron or Timber in it, as our Saddles have; neither had any of them any Stirrups, to eaſe the Riders Legs, for theſe came firſt in faſhion in *Nero*'s time, if *Lipſius* his obſervation holds. Any thing of that nature that was uſed before, was but a Ladder of Cords, Wood, or Iron, to help the Horſe-man to mount his Horſe, if he were aged, indiſpoſed, ſick or lame; and ſo ſoon as he was on Horſe-back the Ladder was remov'd; perhaps not unlike to thoſe Iron Ladders of two or three ſteps high, uſed over all the *Netherlands* for Paſſengers to get up to their Waggons. Hiſtory tells us, that *Maſiniſſa*, King of *Numidia*, when he was fourſcore years old, or near that age, could mount his Horſe, without the help of any Stirrup or Ladder. And certainly, not only the *Romans*, but all other Nations were taught to get on Horſe-back without any of them, as now youths are taught in Academies, and did ride (inur'd to it by cuſtome) with as much eaſe without Stirrups, as we do now with them.

Saddles not ancient.

To charge with Unbridled Horſes.

The *Romans* ſometimes caus'd their Cavalry to unbridle their Horſes to make a furious charge, which often ſucceeded well. *Livy* in his eighth Book ſays, it was practis'd againſt the *Volſcians* with ſucceſs: And in his fortieth Book, he gives us the relation of a Battel the *Celtiberians* fought in *Spain* againſt the *Roman* Prætor *Fulvius*, wherein the *Romans* were very near worſted, the Enemy having caſt himſelf in a Wedge (at which manner of fight he was thought almoſt invincible) bore down all before him, till the Prætor told his Horſe-men, that charging deſperately on unbridled Horſes might recover the Victory; for, ſaid he, formerly ſuch a practice hath produced good effects. The Cavalry obey'd his order, and by a furious charge with Lances, routed the *Celtiberians*. Such a command in our time would be accounted both unpracticable and ridiculous; yet we may believe, that Horſes were ſo taught and manag'd then, that they would obey their Maſters without Bridles; and this we may ſuppoſe not to be impoſſible, the Rider making uſe of his hands; but truly, I think it ſomething ſtrange to read, that *Julius Cæſar* could ride great Horſes, without a Bridle at the full gallop, with his hands claſped together behind his back.

Julius Cæſar an expert Horſe-man.

Some-

Sometimes the *Roman* Generals, when they ſaw an Enemy prevailing, have brought their Cavalry, or a part of it, to the place of danger, and caus'd them to alight from their Horſes, and fight afoot with their Swords. This both reinforced the Battel, and mightily encourag'd the Foot, by ſeeing that thoſe who might have ſav'd themſelves by flight, reſolv'd to live and dye with them. Authors do not inform us how they diſpos'd of their Horſes when they came to the Foot Combate; but I ſhall imagine they did not let them go whither they pleas'd, but either appointed their ſervants (if they had any) or ſome of their own number to look after them; and I ſuppoſe alſo, they alighted before they came to the place where they were to fight, for ſhunning confuſion, and putting their own Foot in diſorder. *Cæſar*, before he began his Battel with the *Switzers*, made all his Horſe-men diſmount, and appointed them their ſtations, where they were to fight afoot; and to ſhew them a good example, he alighted firſt himſelf, and ſent away all the Horſes a good way from his Army, thereby to encourage his Legionary Foot, and make his Horſe-men know that their ſafety depended only on their own valour. But I believe he gave order that the Horſes ſhould be brought back ſo ſoon as the Enemy was perceiv'd to fly; for we find he and his Cavalry were ſoon remounted, and follow'd the chace very far: And I know no reaſon why it may not be believ'd alſo, that he kept ſome on Horſe-back by him, to carry all the Directions he gave, to the ſeveral Bodies of his Army in time of the Battel, which himſelf fighting on foot, could not perform. *Gracchus* (betrayed by his Hoſt) being environ'd by an ambuſh of *Hannibalians*, alighted, and fought well for his life, though he loſt it: But I think, he ſhould rather have hazarded to break through on Horſe-back to get to his own party, which was not far off, ſince death would ſtill have been the worſt of it. This ſtory you may read in *Livy's* twenty fifth Book. Though this practice ſucceeded well ſometimes, yet was it unfortunately attempted by the Conſul *Æmilius*, at the Battel of *Canna*; for after *Aſdrubal* had routed him and his Horſe on the Right Wing, he made his Horſe-men alight, and fight on foot among the Legionaries, as *Livy* tells us in that twenty fifth Book. And it would ſeem that *Hannibal*, that great Captain, did not approve this cuſtome; for the ſame Author ſays, when it was told him what the *Roman* Conſul had done, he ſhould have ſmil'd, and ſaid, He might as well have deliver'd them to me bound hand and foot.

Horſe-men fight on Foot.

I know not, if in our Modern Militia, this could be advantageouſly practis'd, being the Arms of our Horſe and Foot differ very much, whereas thoſe of the *Romans* were almoſt all one. I have indeed ſeen at the aſſaults of Towns, Horſe-men commanded to alight, and ſtorm with the Foot: And this hath reaſon for it, in regard that with their Piſtols, Carabines, and Swords, they were as able for that ſervice as the Infantry. Yet *Machiavelli* (who will needs reform the Modern Militia, and caſt it in his own Mould) gives us an inſtance that it was practis'd in the Field, a very little before his own time, and long after that Gun-powder had mightily alter'd the face of War. In the ſecond Book of his Art of War, The Count of *Carmignola*, General for the Duke of *Milan*, had ſix thouſand Men of Arms, and but a few Foot; with theſe he fought a Battel againſt the *Switzers*, arm'd with long and ſtrong Pikes, and is by them worſted, and forced to quit the Field. The Earl finding what advantage a Pike had againſt Horſe, preſented them once more Battel, but coming near, he order'd his Cuiraſſiers to alight (in imitation belike of *Julius Cæſar*, fighting againſt the ſame Nation) and fighting on foot, then, ſaith he, the *Switzers* Pikes not being able to pierce the Corſlets of the men of Arms, they were totally routed by *Carmignola*. Was it not well, that the ſtrong Pikes of the *Switzers*, puſh'd by their robuſt Arms and Bodies, did not overthrow the Earls Cuiraſſiers, though the points of them could not pierce their Armour.

Machiavelli

Philip de Comines tells us, that at the confus'd Battel of *Montleherry*, between *Lewis* the Eleventh, King of *France*, and *Charles the Warlike*, Duke of *Burgundy*: The ſaid *Charles* commanded many of his Gentlemen, who were Men at Arms, to alight from their Horſes, and joyn in fight with his Archers of Foot. Which action (ſays the Author) was honourable, and encourag'd others; and this cuſtome

cuſtome (ſays the ſame *Philip*) the *Burgundians* had learn'd from the *Engliſh*, when both of them, being Confederates, waged War together againſt *France* for the ſpace of thirty two years, without any truce.

Horſe and Foot mix'd togther

The cuſtome, which the *Romans* had to mix Foot with Horſe, begun at the Siege of *Capua*, was ſo frequent afterward, that I need not give many inſtances of it. *Cæſar* ſeldome fail'd to do it. When *Vercingentorix* had rais'd all *Gaule* about his ears, he ſent for *German* Horſe and Foot, who were accuſtom'd to fight one in company of the other, as he tells us in the ſeventh Book of his *Gallick* War. In *Theſſaly*, finding himſelf far inferiour in Horſe to *Pompey*, he conſtantly mixed ſome of his *Anteſignani* (who were Legionaries, and heavy armed, and of the youngeſt ſort, and ſo more able to march and run) with his Horſe; who became ſo expert in that manner of fight, that, as himſelf witneſſeth in his third Book of the Civil War, two hundred of his Horſe joyn'd with the like number of theſe Foot, were not afraid to buckle with thouſands of his Enemies Cavalry. And it was with that manner of fight, that he made that honourable retreat of his from *Dirrachium*, in ſpite of *Pompey*'s whole Army that purſu'd him. And it was with the aſſiſtance of ſix Cohorts of his *Triarian* Foot, that his Horſe beat his Competitors Cavalry at *Pharſalia*, and got him the Victory, as himſelf both confeſs'd and foretold. At *Uzita* in *Africk*, when he offer'd to fight againſt *Scipio*, *Pompey*'s Father-in-law, he drew up all his Cavalry on his Left Wing, and with them mixed all his light armed Foot, who, it ſeems, were Auxiliaries. The *German* Horſe-men uſed every one of them to chuſe a Foot-man, whom they knew to be ſtout, ſtrong, and ſwift: Theſe Foot-men either skirmiſh'd before the Horſe, as the *Romans* did at *Capua*; or fought in company with them; or ſtood at a diſtance behind them, that the Horſe might retire to them; and if both were forc'd to quit the Field, then the Foot-men laid hold on the Manes of the Horſes, and with that help run as faſt as the Horſe gallopp'd, till both came to their main Body; of all which *Cæſar* informs us in the firſt Book of the *Gallick* War. And this manner of fight was practis'd by *Arioviſtus*, King of *Germany*, and by *Vercingentorix*.

practis'd by *Cæſar*,

And by the ancient *Germans*.

Roman Cavalry how marſhall'd.

We find in Hiſtory, that when the *Romans* were to give Battel, aſſiſted by their Allies, for moſt part their Cavalry was marſhall'd on the Right Wing of their Army, and the Allies on the Left: So at *Canna*, *Paulus Æmilius* ſtood on the Right Wing with the *Roman* Horſe, and the Conſul *Varro* on the Left, with the Horſe of the Allies. Once *Scipio* at *Zama* gave the Right Wing to *Maſaniſſa*, King of the *Numidians*, and appointed *Lelius* to command the Left Wing, compos'd of *Roman* Horſe. But when they fought without Allies, then their Horſe were drawn up on both Wings; and ſometimes, as I have ſaid, interlin'd with Foot; but ſcarce, or rather never, did I read in any ancient Hiſtory, that they were marſhall'd by Troops among the Legionary Foot, whereof I ſhall tell you more hereafter, when I come to ſpeak of *Vegetius* his Legion. And how the ſame *Vegetius* contradicts *Polybius* in the matter of the *Roman* Horſe-mens Guards, ſhall be ſpoke of in my Diſcourſe of Guards, and Rounds.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of their Trumpeters, Horn-winders, and of the Classicum.

SInce we have now spoke of both Foot and Horse, it is fit we know to what Martial Instrument or Sound both should hearken. I find *Tubicines*, these were Trumpeters; *Cornicines*, these were Horn-winders; and *Buccinatores*, who, I think, used the Horns of Cows and Oxen; and the *Classicum*. All these were common to both Horse and Foot, neither had the one any title to pretend to either of these, more than the other had; nor were any of them peculiar to the one more than to the other, though now the Horse Troops appropriate the Trumpet to themselves, as the Foot do the Drum.

Trumpeters.

The Trumpet is an ancient Instrument of War; at first, and I believe, for many ages, made of Brass; hence the Poet, *Ære ciere Viros*, though the luxury of after-ages made their composition of Silver. We find they were common to almost all Nations not long after the deluge, and frequently used by a very ancient people; and which is more, by a people chosen and beloved of him, who promulgated his Law to them by sound of Trumpet, as well as by the dreadful noise of his *Æthereal* Cannon. But as it was used in the Temple to sound the praises of the Highest, by the Priests, who all, or most of them, had the skill of a Trumpet: So was it used in the time of War with their malignant neighbours; but which was worse, too much made use of by them for Sedition and Rebellion. *To your Tents, O Israel*: Words, which with the preceding ones, have sounded loud enough in our own ears, and in our own days.

The *Grecians* learned the use of the Trumpet from the *Tirenians*, and these having their name and original from the *Tirians*, had their Trumpets also from them. The *Tirians* being near neighbours to the *Jews*, learned many things of them, and probably the Trumpet likewise. The *Greeks* had the use of the Trumpet in *Homer*'s time, for he speaks of it in his Poems: Yet it seems they knew nothing of it at the Siege of *Troy*, else that Great Poet would have made mention of it in his Verses. This famous War of *Troy* fell out to be in the days of *Jephte*, Judge of *Israel*; and who knows but the fable of *Agamemnon*'s unwilling attempt to sacrifice his Daughter *Iphigenia* to *Diana*, in whose room came a Hart to be a voluntary offering, was borrowed by Antiquity from the true Story of *Jephte*'s vowing to sacrifice the first thing met him without the doors of his house; which chanc'd to be his only Daughter. But be that as it will, certain enough it is, that the *Israelites* made use of Trumpets three hundred years before either *Jephte* fought with the *Ammonites*, or the *Grecians* besieg'd *Troy*.

The use of the Trumpet is still retain'd, and in probability will, till the last Trumpet summon proud man to arise from the dust, and give an account to his great Creator, why he made so much use of that Martial Instrument for the destruction of his fellow Creatures. *Vegetius* says in the twenty second Chapter of his second Book, that the Trumpet was sounded by the *Romans*, when they went out to War, and when they were commanded to retire; as also when the Souldiers were called out to any work or labour imposed upon them, whether it were to fortifie themselves by Ditch or Rampart, or to make their marches either Ambulatory or Cursory. Briefly, The Trumpet required the Souldiers to move, but not the Ensigns, Standards, or Baggage.

Horn-winders.

The *Cornicines*, or Horn-winders, were those who sounded on Instruments made in the fashion of Horns, and, I doubt not, but in the Infancy of that Empire, they were no other but real Horns, such, perhaps, nay, without all peradventure, such as Swine-herds sound to gather together their herds. Yet these

theſe Horns, we muſt confeſs, gather'd theſe men together, who overcame Armies, ſubdued Nations, ſubverted Kingdomes, and deſtroyed Cities; but the honour over all Horns was given to that of the Ram, by the miraculous ſound whereof the Walls of *Jericho* were laid equal with the ground. At the ſound of theſe Horn-winders the Enſigns, Colours, and Standards moved. But in time of Battel both Trumpeters and Horn-winders ſounded: *Pariter canunt*, ſays *Vegetius* in that ſame place; he might have ſaid the *Buccinatores* too, if he had pleaſed. But what difference was between the *Cornicines* and theſe *Buccinatores* I know not, for both ſounded on Inſtruments of loud Wind-Muſick, bowed like Horns, unleſs that in the beginning of the Cities increaſe, they were diſtinguiſhed by the real Horns of ſeveral Animals. But *Vegetius* in the eighth Chapter of his third Book, ſays that all the *Roman* guards were ſet by the ſound of Trumpet, and were relieved by the ſound of the Horn Inſtrument. His words are, *A Tubicine omnes Vigiliæ committuntur, & finitis horis à Cornicine revocantur.* Now what is this, but that both the Trumpet ſounded, and the Horn blew at the relief of the Guards? The Trumpet, when four Souldiers went to the Poſt where they were to keep Sentinel a whole Watch, (that was three hours) and the Horn when thoſe that were reliev'd came from their Poſt.

Buccinatores.

Claſſicum, what it was.

I ſhould in the next place tell you what the *Claſſicum* was; and ſhould be glad if any Body would tell me what it was. I know *Claſſicum* commonly is taken for a Trumpet ſounding a charge, *Claſſicum canere*; and this hath its riſe from the cuſtome the *Roman* Conſuls had; when they were to begin the Battel they caus'd the *Claſſicum* to ſound, which immediately was followed by all the Trumpets and Horn Inſtruments of the Army. But for all this, I doubt ſtill whether the *Claſſicum* was an Inſtrument, or the ſound of an Inſtrument, and to ſpeak according to our words of Art, a Point of War; or if it was the noiſe of many Warlike Inſtruments all ſounding one thing at one time: Let us hear *Vegetius*, and I am afraid he will make the matter more obſcure. He deſcribes it thus: *Claſſicum appellatur, quod Buccinatores per cornu dicunt, hoc inſigne videtur Imperii, quia Claſſicum canitur Imperatore præſente, aut cum in Militem capitaliter animadvertitur.* That, ſaith he, is called the *Claſſicum*, which the Horn-winders ſpeak by the Horn. And this, ſays he, ſeems to be an Enſign of Soveraign command, becauſe the *Claſſicum* ſounds when the Commander in chief is preſent, or when a Souldier is to be capitally puniſhed. What ſhall we make of all this? If we underſtand not now what the *Claſſicum* is, *Vegetius* will ſay he is not to be blam'd; but for all that, I am, for him, ſtill in the dark. That which the Horn-winders ſpeak by a Horn, is to me very dark language; and yet that language of a Horn muſt be an Enſign of Imperial power; and withal, if a Souldier be to be hang'd, he muſt have the honour of that Enſign of Imperial power. *Lipſius*, who ſeldome fails to gueſs, and ſometimes hits right, thinks the *Claſſicum* was not one Inſtrument, or yet the ſound of one Inſtrument, but the noiſe of many, whether theſe were Trumpets or Horns, or both, which was one of the badges of Supreme Power; for where there was but one Conſul, there was but one of them; and where two Conſuls were together, there were two of them; and beſides other duties, they ſounded when the Conſuls were at Supper: for this reaſon the famous *Carthaginian Aſdrubal*, when he began to ſuſpect that he had to do with two *Roman* Conſuls, bid his Guards, Foragers and Waterers of Horſes, take heed, and acquaint him, if they heard two *Claſſicums*; and having learn'd it was ſo, he concluded, that the Conſul (who he thought was diverted by his Brother *Hannibal*) was joyn'd with the other, with whom alone he conceiv'd his work to be. For my part, I incline to believe, that in Hiſtory it is promiſcuouſly taken for the ſound, and ſometimes for the Inſtrument one or many, either Trumpets or Horns. They were made uſe of in all Banks and Proclamations. The *Claſſicum* was an Enſign of Supreme Command, for by it all the emergent and occaſionary orders of the General were promulgated; and by it both Officers and Souldiers were call'd together to hear the Commander in chief's pleaſure made known to them: And hence it is like, it had its derivation, becauſe by it the three Claſſes of *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, were call'd together to hear theſe Harangues and Orations, which frequently the Conſuls uttered in their

Vegetius his deſcription of it.

Lipſius his conjecture of it.

Whence it had its name.

their Tribunals or Pulpits; whether they were for admonition, encouragement, or punishment; and upon the account of this last, *Vegetius* is to be understood of his capital animadversion.

Left I forget to do it hereafter, I shall in this place take occasion to tell you, that besides this *Classicum*, there were two other badges of Imperial power, these were the *Prætorium*, and the Bundles of Rods and Axes. The *Prætorium* was a fair, and a large high Pavilion, wherein the Consul lodged, and kept his Councils of War. The Rods and Axes signified he had power to scourge and behead; these were carried by Lictors or Sergeants, whereof a Consul had twelve, a Proconsul six, a Legate as many, a Prætor had I know not how many, for it makes but little to our purpose. When *Scipio*, *Pompey*'s Father-in-law, came with his Legions out of *Asia*, and joyn'd with him in *Thessaly*, *Pompey* order'd a *Prætorium* to be erected for him, and that he should have a *Classicum*; I suppose, a knitchel of Rod and Axes too; though *Cæsar* doth not mention the last in his Commentary. Badges of Soveraign power.

As the Trumpet was of Brass, so in process of time the *Cornu* and *Buccina* were made of Brass too, and all the three who sounded, or winded them, were called *Æneatores*. Every Troop of Horse, and every Maniple, if not every Century of Foot had one, either a Trumpet, or a Horn, or both. I find not that these Trumpeters and Horn-blowers had any greater allowance of Wages, Proviant, or Fodder, for either themselves or Horses, than other Horse-men and Foot-men had (for with the first they rode on Horse-back, and with the second they marched on Foot) at any time; perhaps having spent much of their breath in sounding and blowing, they were eased from other works of toil and labour, and those were not a few. Whether the *Buccina* was sounded, or rather winded, at the relief of every guard, as *Polybius* says it was, shall be spoke of in my Discourse of Guards and Rounds. *Æneatores.*

CHAP. IX.

Of the Roman *Pay, Proviant, and Donatives.*

IT is reported of that brave *Athenian Themistocles*, that he affirm'd, whoever would shape or form the great Monster of War rightly, must begin with his Belly; and therefore before we joyn our Horse and Foot together, we must see how they shall be maintain'd. The *Romans* were a frugal people, till their successful Wars made their City the Treasure-house of the Worlds riches. The Pay they they allow'd their Souldiers was sparing enough, but *Vegetius* tells us not what it was. I find that three hundred years after the foundation of *Rome*, the Horse-men serv'd on their own charges; they might do it the better, for though their atchievements were often honourable enough, yet their expeditions were but short, for either upon a Victory or a Rout, they hasten'd back to the City. But after the Senate began to look far beyond their ancient limits, wages were allow'd out of the publick Treasury for both Horse and Foot. *Polybius* in his sixth Book informs us, that a Foot Souldier had the allowance of two *Oboli* a day, both which (if I mistake not) make but one *English* Penny; and a small measure of Wheat: A Centurion had a double allowance, and a Horse-man the triple of a Foot Souldiers Proviant and Wages, and a measure of Barley every month for his Horse. They allow'd to the *Socii*, or Allies, as much Wheat and Barley as they did to their own Souldiers, but they were oblig'd to maintain themselves with their own *Roman* Wages and Proviant.

Monies. But he tells us alſo, that what Proviant, Clothes, yea, what Arms were given to the *Roman* Souldiers, had rates ſet upon them, and were defalcated from their wages. Truly, I ſhould think their pay, at two half-pennies a day, could hardly furniſh them with Meat, much leſs Clothes and Arms; or if in that cheap world they could be furniſh'd with all three at that rate, they could not have much Money to ſeek, at leaſt very little to depoſite at their Colours; for this defalcation would indeed make their Pay very inconſiderable, and very unproportionable to the great duty and ſervices exacted from them. But *Lipſius* will mend the matter preſently, by telling us, that many times the State quit the Souldiers freely what they owed for either Arms, Proviant, or Clothes; or if any thing was taken, it was ſo inſignificant, that the Souldier parted with it pleaſantly, and without grumbling. I do not care much to be of *Lipſius* his opinion, though he hath not told us who were his Informers; for *Polybius* is poſitively of another judgement, in that place which I have cited: Nor do I remember, that in any other place of his Hiſtory, he ſpeaks any thing of the *Roman* Wages.

Severe uſage.

Here you may obſerve, what I told you before, that in the *Roman* Infantry there were no other Officers, properly ſo called, but Centurions and Tribunes, becauſe all others had but the allowance of common Souldiers, both in Wages and Proviant. A Tribune had the quadruple of a Souldiers Pay. Nor can I find that the *Præfecti*, or Decurions of the Horſe, had any more allowance of either Meat or Money than other Troopers had. The *Grecian* Pay, as to the proportion of it, was like the *Roman*, a Centurion having a Souldiers double allowance, a Horſe-man triple, and a Chiliarch quadruple.

Pillage.

But the *Roman* Souldiers had a greater encouragement to endure their hard fatigue than Pay, and that was the Plunder and Pillage of a Countrey, a beſieged Town, Caſtle, or an Enemies Camp. This was not due to them, and many times they got no ſhare of it, in regard, for moſt part, it was brought all to the *Quæſtor*, or Treaſurers quarters, and ſold; and out of the Monies made by that ſale, the Army was paid their wages, and the overplus was ſent in to the Treaſury of *Rome*. But the Conſul, or General, having the diſpoſing of it all in his power, very often gave it as a largeſs to the Army, either for ſome good ſervice done, or to encourage them to undergo ſome difficult and hard piece of work to be done. Neither had any man liberty to take what he could catch, but all was brought to a publick heap, and ſold by the Treaſurer, and then proportionably divided among all, according to every mans quality; a Centurion receiving double that which a Souldier got, a Horſe-man triple, and a Tribune quadruple: So that they who fought in the Field, and they who ſtay'd for the defence of the Camp, they who ſtorm'd a Town, and they who ſtood in Reſerve, ſhared all alike in the Booty.

A good order.

The *Romans* gave all their Proviant to their Armies in Corn, and did not trouble themſelves to make it either into Meal or Bread; and in their ſtrict diſcipline, Bakers were all baniſh'd from their Camps, and the Souldiers order'd to grind their Corn themſelves, (Hand-mills or Querns being allow'd them for that uſe) and thereafter to bake their own Bread. Many times they took not the pains to do either the one nor the other, but boil'd their Wheat with a little Salt, and ſo eat it up for Pottage. They uſed to carry with them Lard or Bacon, or ſome other fat, wherewith they ſmear'd their Bread. A little Bottle with Vinegar they bore alſo about with them, with a very ſmall quantity whereof they gave a reliſh to their Water, which was their ordinary drink, though Wine was not forbidden them; for *Mahomet* had then not intoxicated the World with his Doctrine, nor diſcharged the uſe of the juice of the Grape, which cheriſheth the heart of God and Man. The *Roman* Souldiers then drank Wine, for it was allow'd them, when conveniently it could be got; though Drunkenneſs was a crime ſeldome heard of among them. There were alſo ſometimes Oxen, Sheep, and Beeves divided among them, for preparing and making ready whereof, in the ſtricteſt time of their Diſcipline, the Souldiers were permitted to carry a Braſs Pot, a Spit, and a Drinking Cup; but I ſuppoſe, one of every kind of theſe utenſils were not allowed to every one of the Souldiers, but to a *Contubernium*,

Their ordinary Meat, And Drink.

Utenſils.

or

or Tent-full of them, whether that conſiſted of ten, eleven, or twelve. It was not permitted to them to dine or ſup when they pleaſed; but it being known by the *Claſſicum* when the Conſul went to Table, the Tribunes went to theirs, and ſo both Centurions and common Souldiers went to dinner with ſound of Trumpet. May not a man ſay, that here was a great deal of more ſtate, than good fare. Thoſe Generals who exercis'd ſtrict diſcipline, appointed their Souldiers to take their dinner ſtanding; marry, they permitted them to ſit at Supper; and I conceive, this was but a very ſober courteſie, to ſuffer a man who was weary with toil the whole day, to ſit down to his Supper at night.

They Din'd ſtanding, and Supp'd ſitting.

Beſides all this, the *Roman* Souldiery had reaſon to expect a Donative from their Victorious Generals, when they enter'd the Imperial City in Triumph. This cuſtome was very commendable; for the Largeſs given to them, incited others to carry themſelves gallantly againſt an Enemy, ſince they ſaw that in ſome meaſure, they would be ſharers with the chief Commander, both in Honour and Profit. What was given at that time to the common Souldier, was a rule to the Officer, for a Centurion got double, a Horſe-man triple, and a Tribune quadruple. *Scipio* the *African*, at his magnificent entry into *Rome*, gave four hundred Aſſes to every Souldier, ſome ſay but forty: if the firſt, it was noble enough, and no more neither; (for it would have amounted but to twenty five ſhillings Sterling) if the laſt, it was contemptible, for it ſignified but half a Crown. *Lucius Æmilius*, who ſubverted the *Macedonian* Monarchy, gave at his Triumph to every Souldier one hundred Seſterces, (which might be about fifteen or ſixteen ſhillings Sterling) and proportionably to the Centurions, Horſe-men, and Tribunes. But beſides the evil effects which many of the Conſuls avarice produc'd, their ambition to bring in great ſumms of Gold and Silver to the Treaſury, and their vanity to give their Armies Donatives at their Triumphs, ſet them on to the committing many Inſolencies, perfidious, unjuſt and diſavowable Plunders and Cruelties, which makes the names of ſome of the braveſt of them infamous to poſterity. Take one inſtance, *inſtar omnium*, of that ſame *Æmilius* I juſt now ſpake of: The deſire he had to bring the vaſt Treaſure of King *Perſeus*, and all he had ſcrap'd together in *Macedon*, into the *Roman* Treaſury; and withal, to give a Donative to his Army at his Triumph, tempted him (and the temptation prevail'd with him) to plunder the whole Towns of *Epirus*, the people whereof were no Enemies, nor ever had wrong'd the *Roman* State: And this execrable act he did under truſt, the Inhabitants imagining no ſuch uſage; nor was plundering all the miſchief he did them, for he ſold their perſons, to the number of one hundred and fifty thouſand of both Sexes for Slaves; and with the Money of that ſale he gave the Donative we ſpake of, to his Army. An action ſo full of baſeneſs, inhumanity, perfidy, and injuſtice, that Sir *Walter Raleigh* ſaith, If any Hiſtory ſpoke but one word to the contrary, no man would believe it could be true. You may read the ſtory of it in the laſt Book of *Titus Livius*.

Donatives at Triumphs.

A deteſtable action.

The half of the Donatives were ordinarily depoſited at the Standards and Enſigns, to be kept there for the uſe of the Souldiers till their diſmiſſion, leſt they ſhould idly or vainly ſpend it. This reaſon was ſufficient and ſtrong enough; but there was another, and it was this, that the Souldiers knowing a part of their ſtock and ſubſtance to be beſide the Colours, they ſhould never deſert them, but manfully fight for the defence of that, in the preſervation whereof they were ſo deeply concern'd. Though this was certainly a very prudent order, yet I cannot conſent to what *Vegetius* ſaith of it in the twentieth Chapter of his ſecond Book, that it was *ab Antiquis divinitus inſtitutum*: For he ſhould have remember'd, that he wrote of the Heathen *Romans*, and himſelf having the knowledge of the true God, he knew likewiſe, that the beſt of their Ordinances were but of Humane, and not Divine Inſtitution.

Half of Donatives depoſited.

In that ſame Chapter *Vegetius* ſays, that every Legion had ten bags, for the keeping this moyety of the Donatives; that is, a bag for every Co-

hort; and an eleventh bag there was, in which every Souldier caſt ſomething once a month, and that was reſerv'd for the Burial of thoſe Souldiers, who were able to leave nothing for their Interment. A very laudable cuſtome, for the Burial of the Dead was ever in all Nations in high requeſt. Truce for ſome days or hours to Inter the ſlain, was ſeldome or never refus'd by the moſt imbitter'd Enemy. *Hannibal* beſtow'd Burial on his Enemy *Marcellus*: And his Brother *Aſdrubal*, at the deſire of *Scipio*, buried thoſe *Roman* Tribunes whom he had kill'd in Battel. And *Juſtin* in his ſixth Book tells us, that when the *Grecians* deſir'd liberty to bury their dead, it was a tacite acknowledgement that they were overcome. But *Vegetius* will have theſe Bags to be kept by the *Signiferi*, the Enſign-bearers, whom therefore he will have not only to be faithful and truſty men, but learned, that they might perfectly keep the accounts of all that was conſign'd in their hands. And here indeed he is (as *Lipſius* in another place calls him) *ſolutus & negligens*; having forgot that in the ſeventh Chapter of his ſecond Book he told us, that the *Romans* had *Librarii*, Notaries or Scriveners, who kept the account of all that belong'd to the Souldiery; therefore not the *Signiferi*, or Enſigns, whoſe imployment was to attend their Colours.

Burial of the Dead.

Julius Cæſar, after all his Victories, doubled the wages of the *Roman* Souldiers for ever: The ſucceeding Emperours, according as they ſtood in need of the help of the Sword-men, eſpecially of the *Prætorian* Cohorts, augmented their Pay, and ſome of them for their bounty, were degraded and murther'd by thoſe very ſame Souldiers.

Roman Pay augmented.

CHAP. X.

Of a Roman *Legion, Marſhall'd according to* Titus Livius, *with* Lipſius *his amendments.*

THe word *Legio* hath its name *ab eligendo*, from electing: It was a great Body of men, divided not only into ſeveral ſmall Bands, but into three diſtinct Claſſes, *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, embattell'd one behind another; as I have ſhown you in my diſcourſe of the *Roman* Infantry. A Legion was not always of a like ſtrength, for ſometimes it conſiſted of three thouſand, ſometimes four thouſand, or four thouſand two hundred, ſometimes five thouſand, or five thouſand two hundred; and twice I find it was of ſix thouſand, or ſix thouſand two hundred, once with *Scipio* in *Africk*, and the ſecond time with *Æmilius* in the *Macedonian* War.

Titus Livius, that famous Hiſtorian, in his eighth Book giving a particular account of the great Battel fought between the *Romans*, and their old Allies the *Latines*, marſhals the *Roman* Legion in ſuch a confuſed way, that he is not at all intelligible; and hath given juſt reaſon to both Learned and Military men, to think that place is corrupt, and a ſenſe made of it, never intended by the Author. To avoid prolixity, and that I be not at the trouble to give you *Livy*'s words, firſt in *Latine* and then in *Engliſh*, I ſhall give you the ſtory as it is tranſlated by *Philemon Holland*, (except where he miſtakes) and then ſhew the errours of that deſcription of a Legion.

Livy his vicious deſcription of a Legion.

In former times, ſaith *Livy*, the *Roman* Batallions ſtood thick, and cloſe together like the *Macedonian* Phalanx, but afterwards they were ranged into Bands more diſtinctly, and laſt of all they were divided into thinner Squadrons, each of them containing threeſcore Souldiers, two Centurions, and one Port-enſign.

enſign. The Van-guard were *Haſtati*, Javelineers, in fifteen Maniples diſtant a little way from one another; ſuch a Squadron had twenty light armed, who carried a light Javeline, and ſome Darts to caſt afar; all the reſt were Targeteers. This firſt front contained the flower of the youth, who grew up as Apprentices in War-ſervice. Then follow'd after them of men of ſtronger and riper years as many Maniples, and theſe were called *Principes*. Theſe were follow'd (not hard at heels, as the Tranſlator adds) by all the Targeteers in gallant Armour. That Batallion of thirty Maniples was called *Antepilani*, becauſe the other fifteen Orders were placed under the Enſigns (not hard before them, as *Philemon* very viciouſly tranſlates it) and of theſe, every Order conſiſted of three parts, and every one of them was called *Primum Pilum*: It conſiſted of three Enſigns, and every one of theſe had one hundred eighty ſix men. The firſt Colours had with it the *Triarii*, old Souldiers, and of approved valour: The ſecond had the *Rorarii*, men of leſs experience, and younger years: The third was of the *Accenſi*, of whom they had leaſt confidence, and therefore caſt them in the Rear. Thus far *Livius*, and Mr. *Holland*, who put him in *Engliſh*. And indeed we have enough, and too much of this ſtuff. Let us now obſerve the errors of this diſcourſe.

The errors of it.

Firſt, It is queſtionable, if ever the *Romans* uſed the *Macedonian* Phalange, a Body compos'd purely of Pike-men; it is ſpoke of by none: and that this great Body in after times was caſt in Maniples, to me is fabulous; for certainly Maniples were uſed by *Romulus*; and though this were true, we muſt not for all that grant, that every Maniple had but ſixty men (that being only true of the *Triarii*) or if that were granted too, ſure we will not acknowledge that every band of ſixty (except ſtill the *Triarii*) had two Centurions, and one Enſign. Secondly, That every Claſs of the *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, had fifteen Maniples, is againſt all Antiquity, and the current of moſt, if not all Authors, who allow no more Maniples to a Legion but thirty, nor Centuriates but threeſcore, except *Vegetius*, who reduceth the number of the Centuries to fifty five. Now *Livy*'s deſcription of a Legion makes it contain forty five Maniples, and ninety Centuriates, and all this is point blank againſt himſelf in other places. Thirdly, We are told that each of the fifteen laſt Orders was divided into three parts, and every part was called *Primum Pilum*. Is there any thing more ridiculous, than to call that firſt, which was but ſecond or third? And if theſe forty five parts (for ſo many, if multiplied by three, it extends to) be all firſt, which of the forty five ſhall be laſt? Fourthly, Every one of theſe parts had its Colours; and ſo in the third Claſs there were forty five Enſigns, and but fifteen in each of the other two, a thing nothing probable. Fifthly, Every one of theſe Enſigns had one hundred eighty ſix men. Aſſuredly this is ſo extravagant, that it cannot plead for any ſhew of truth; for multiply one hundred eighty ſix by forty five, the product will be eight thouſand three hundred and ſeventy; and ſo ſtrong by this account, muſt the *Triarii* have been, joyn'd with the *Rorarii* and *Accenſi*; a thing ſo notoriouſly and palpably falſe, that it deſerves no refutation.

All occaſion'd by the firſt Printers.

This paſſage of *Titus Livius* hath been, no doubt, obſerv'd by many of his Readers, long before *Juſtus Lipſius* was born; yet for any thing I know, he is the firſt man that offer'd him help; and indeed he hath done gallantly, to vindicate ſo renowned an Author from theſe injuries the firſt Printers of his Decads have done him: For *Lipſius* ſaith, that aſſuredly this rhapſody of nonſence proceeded from the little underſtanding they had of the true Text. And *Steuechius* on another ſubject ſays, that Printers in the printing old Manuſcripts have committed ſuch groſs faults, that he knows not whether that admirable Art of Printing hath done more hurt or good to the Common-wealth of Learning. But to our purpoſe.

Lipſius mends the errors.

Lipſius helps the matter thus: Where we read, *Prima acies haſtatorum Manipuli quindecim*; We ſhould read, *Manipulique decem*: And ſo there were always ten Maniples of *Haſtati*, but not fifteen. For, *Triginta Manipulorum agmen* (which is meant of both *Haſtati* and *Principes*) read *Viginti*, and ſo there were but twenty Maniples of both theſe Claſſes. And where the vulgar Decads bear, *Quia ſub ſignis alii quindecim ordines locabantur*, we ought to read, *Alii decem ordine* (not *ordines*) *locabantur*. *Alii Decem*, of what? Of Maples;

ples; and ſo being ten Maniples of the *Triarii*, as there were twenty of the other two Claſſes, we have no more but our juſt number of thirty Maniples in the whole Legion. Fourthly, Where you find it written, *Earum unamquamque (ſcilicet partem) primum pilum vocabant: Lipſius* deſires you to read, *Earum unamquamque primam, primum pilum vocabant. Lipſius* tells us all this by piecemeal, as I have told it you; *Terduzzi* ſumms it up together in *Latine*, and then tranſlates it into his *Italian* language. I ſhall give it you in *Engliſh* thus: Every *Ordo* (that is Centuriate) had ſixty two Souldiers, one Centurion, and one Colours: The firſt *Acies* or Batallion was of *Haſtati*, in it were ten Maniples, diſtant a little one from another; theſe were the flower of the youth: As many Maniples of a more robuſt age follow'd, who were called *Principes*: Thoſe who follow'd them were all Targeteers, in brave Armour. That Body of twenty Maniples was called *Antepilani*, becauſe under the Enſigns other ten were placed in order, every firſt whereof was called *Primum Pilum*. Aſſuredly *Lipſius* hath very rationally corrected this corrupted place of *Livy*, and hath render'd it obvious to ſenſe; whereas before it was totally unintelligible: And I wiſh that this place of *Lipſius*'s amendment, were always inſerted when *Livy* is Reprinted.

But not all.

But I wiſh alſo, that *Lipſius* had mended another eſcape, which immediately follows; for in that ſame corrupted place of *Livius*, we read that every *ordo Triariorum tribus ex vexillis conſtabat*; that is, Every Maniple of them had three Enſigns; this impreſſion *Lipſius* retains, and that brings him to the neceſſity (whereof I told you in my Diſcourſe of the Infantry) to ſay, that Enſigns or Banners might be without Captains or Leaders; the matter ſtands thus: *Livius* in this Battel marſhals the *Rorarii* behind the *Triarii*, and the *Accenſi* behind them: Which at that time was politickly done by the Conſul *Manlius*; for having to do with the *Latines*, who were perfectly well acquainted with the manner of the *Roman* Embattelling, and who marſhall'd their Army in that ſame faſhion; he put thoſe raw blades of the *Rorarii* and *Accenſi* behind his experimented *Triarii*; and when the *Latines* prevail'd over the *Roman Haſtati* and *Principes*, the Conſul ſubtilly cauſed the *Rorarii* and *Accenſi* to ariſe, whom the *Latines* conceiving to be the *Roman Triarii*, cauſed their *Triarii* to come to the ſhock with theſe *Rorarii*, and after ſome fight put them to flight; then did *Manlius* advance with the true and freſh *Roman Triarii*, who eaſily overthrew the weary, and ſomething diſorder'd *Latines*, over whom he gain'd a glorious Victory. Now obſerve, that the *Rorarii* and *Accenſi* were *Velites*, and ſo had neither Officer nor Colours; and that every Maniple of the *Triarii* had two Centurions, and two Enſigns; call them *Signa* or *Vexilla*, as you will: And therefore I admire, neither can I wonder enough, why *Lipſius* for *ex tribus Vexillis*, will not deſire us to read *ex duobus Vexillis*; being every *Triarian* Maniple had two Enſigns, and the *Rorarii* and *Accenſi* none. Surely he might have changed three into two, as eaſily as thirty Maniples into twenty, and fifteen into ten; and by the bargain have ſav'd himſelf from a Paradox, of Colours without a Captain, and a Captain without Colours.

And errs himſelf.

Lipſius miſtaken.

Neither can I paſs, how the ſame *Lipſius* in that ſame place, thinks that *Livy* ſhould be mended, for ſaying that the *Roman* Legions in that ſame War with the *Latines* were five thouſand ſtrong; for *Lipſius* is of the opinion, it ſhould be read four thouſand; and all this, I think, to caſt all *Roman* Legions in *Polybius* his Mould of four thouſand, or of four thouſand two hundred. The reaſon he gives for his judgement is, I think, exceedingly weak: Becauſe, ſaith he, *Livy* in that ſame eighth Book of his Hiſtory confeſſeth that ten years before that War, the Legion was no ſtronger but four thouſand Foot. An ill conſequence: For it might very well be true, that ten years before, the Legion was but four thouſand, and yet it might have been thought very fitting to add one thouſand to them in the time of that dangerous War with the *Latines*. The year before *Scipio* carried the War out of *Italy* over to *Africk*, the Legions were but five thouſand apiece, yet he made ſome of them ſix thouſand. The year before *Lucius Æmilius* went to *Macedon*, the Legions were but five thouſand, yet in that expedition of his, they were made up to ſix thouſand. If one year brought forth ſuch alterations, ten years might have produced greater.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of a Legion, Marſhall'd according to Vegetius.

I May with much reaſon, deſire that from my Reader, which *Vegetius* deſires from his; and that is, that what is writ by him on this ſubject, may be attentively read, and read over again; becauſe, ſaith he, the deſcription I am to give is difficult and obſcure. Indeed, what others who have peruſed him have found, I know not; but I am ſure I find his deſcription of a Legion both difficult and obſcure, as he hath made it. This he Prefaceth in the fourth Chapter of his ſecond Book, and in the ſixth Chapter of that ſame Book he gives us the ordering of a Legion, and the Marſhalling it, in this manner:

The firſt Batallion of *Vegetius* his Legion.

You muſt know, ſaith he, that in every Legion there are ten Cohorts, but the firſt excells the reſt both in number and dignity: It conſiſts of the choice men, and with it is the Eagle, which is the prime Banner in every Legion. This Cohort hath in it one thouſand one hundred and five Souldiers of Foot, and one hundred thirty two heavy armed Horſe-men: It is called the Milliary or Millenary Cohort, and is the head of the Legion; for from it, when they are to fight, the reſt of the firſt Batallion is marſhall'd. The ſecond Cohort conſiſts of five hundred fifty five Foot, and ſixty ſix Horſe, and is called the Cohort of five hundred. The third Cohort hath the like number of Horſe and Foot, but in it, ſaith he, there muſt be the ableſt men, becauſe it ſtands in the middle of the Batallion. The fourth Cohort hath five hundred fifty five foot and ſixty ſix Horſe. The fifth hath juſt as many, but it hath need, ſays he, to be compoſed of very ſtout Souldiers, becauſe, as the firſt Cohort is to ſtand on the Right Wing of the Batallion, ſo the fifth is to ſtand on the Left hand. Theſe five Cohorts make up the firſt *Acies*, or Batallion. Our Author proceeds, and tells us, The ſixth Cohort conſiſts of five hundred fifty five Foot, and ſixty ſix Horſe; in it muſt be thoſe of the younger years (he means the *Haſtati*) becauſe the ſixth Cohort hath its ſtation behind the Eagle, and the Enſigns. The ſeventh Cohort hath in it five hundred fifty five Foot, and ſixty ſix Horſe. The eighth hath as many, but they muſt be couragious men, becauſe they keep the middle of the ſecond Batallion. The ninth conſiſts of five hundred fifty five Foot, and ſixty Horſe: And ſo doth the tenth, but the Souldiers muſt be good Warriours, becauſe they ſtand on the Left hand of the ſecond Batallion. Now you ſee the firſt Batallion conſiſts of three thouſand three hundred twenty five Foot, and three hundred ninety ſix Horſe. And the ſecond Batallion of two thouſand ſeven hundred ſeventy five Foot, and three hundred and thirty Horſe: Add theſe together, the aggregate will be ſix thouſand one hundred Foot, and ſeven hundred twenty ſix Horſe. And ſo the Legion is compleatly divided into theſe two Batallions, without Reſerve for a third Body; which, I pray you obſerve. And he avers there ſhould not be a leſſer number (mark it) of armed men in every Legion, a greater ſometimes hath been. And for a Corollary to this diviſion of a Legion, he ſaith, in the eighth Chapter of that ſame Book, that there were in every Legion fifty five Centurions. If any man be not ſatisfied with what he hath ſaid already, he may read him in the fifteenth Chapter of that ſame Book, and there he ſhall be ſure to hear him ſpeak that ſame language, with very little difference.

The ſecond Batallion.

The ſame thing over again.

Our Author ſays, By the example of one Legion he will declare how the Field ſhould be marſhall'd, when a Battel is to be fought. The Horſe, ſaith he, are to be plac'd in the Wings; let us remember this. The Body

of

of the Foot, ſaith he, begins to be order'd on the Right hand, where the firſt Cohort is plac'd: To this is joyn'n the ſecond Cohort; the third ſtands in the middle of the Batallion: To it joyns the fourth, and the fifth ſtands on the Left hand. All, ſays he, that fought in this firſt Batallion, were called *Principes*; and there he deſcribes their Offenſive and Defenſive Arms, needleſs here to be ſpoken of. The ſecond Battel, ſays he, was of the *Haſtati*, arm'd as the *Principes*. After theſe were the light armed, with *Plumbatæ*, Swords, Bows and Arrows; Slingers there were likewiſe, who caſt Stones out of Slings, and Batton-ſlings; alſo Darters, who, he ſaith, ſhot Arrows out of Manubaliſts and Arcubaliſts. Thereafter he tells us, (forgetting what he ſaid but ſeven or eight lines before) that the ſecond Batallion (O Memory, where art thou) conſiſted of *Haſtati*: And, ſaith he, (not remembring he had told us the ſame words in the ſixth Chapter) In the ſecond Batallion, on the Right hand, was plac'd the ſixth Cohort; to which was joyn'd the ſeventh: The eighth kept the middle Battel, accompanied with the ninth; and the tenth Cohort kept conſtantly the Left hand of the ſecond Batallion: And ſo our Author ends that Chapter. Thus we have twice in two ſeveral Chapters the deſcription of a full Legion divided into ten Cohorts, and theſe ten marſhall'd in two Batallions or Claſſes of the *Principes* and *Haſtati*, without any mention of the *Triarii*, or leaving room for them.

Triarii forgot.

But in the ſixteenth Chapter of that ſame Book, as if ſome body had awaken'd him out of his dream, he ſays, after all theſe Batallions, the *Triarii* were placed, arm'd with Cataphracts, Head-pieces, Swords, Daggers (*Semiſpathia*) two Darts, and Lead-Bullets (Weapons given to that Claſs by none but himſelf.) Theſe *Triarii*, ſays he, kneeling on one knee reſted, till, the firſt Battel chancing to be beaten, they might renew the fight. If any man think he hath done well to remember the *Triarii* at laſt, who were the *Romans* greateſt ſtrength, I ſhall be content he enjoy his opinion, provided he let me keep mine; which is, that he needed not now have mention'd them at all, ſince he hath already marſhall'd his Legion; all the ten Cohorts of it, and all the full number of ſix thouſand one hundred Foot, compleatly without them; whereof I ſhall tell you more in the next Chapter.

At length remembred.

Velites.

In the ſeventeenth Chapter of his ſecond Book he informs us, that in the beginning of the fight the *Principes* and *Haſtati* ſtood ſtill, and mov'd not; and the *Triarii* kneel'd or ſate (for he ſpeaks of both poſtures) till the light armed had skirmiſhed, and were beat in to the Legionaries; and after the Victory, the heavy arm'd kept their ground, and ſtood like a Wall, leaving the purſuit of the routed Enemy to the Horſe, and the *Velites*.

Legion once more marſhall'd.

But I cannot find in my heart to part with *Vegetius*, till I ſee how he will yet be pleaſed to diſpoſe of the *Triarii*: And I find him in the fourteenth Chapter of his third Book begin *de novo* to marſhal the Foot, as if he had never ſpoke one word of it before. It is, ſaith he, the Law of embattelling, to place the old and experienced Souldiers in the firſt order (here he confounds *Ordo* and *Acies*) and theſe were called *Principes*. In the ſecond were the *Haſtati*, and then he ſpeaks of Diſtances between the Orders, whereof I ſhall tell you in my diſcourſe of Intervals. The third Order or Body was of the ſwifteſt *Velites*, as Darters, and the youngeſt Archers. The fourth was of the youngeſt Archers, (Good Lord, again youngeſt Archers) and theſe, ſaith he, who were called Lanciers, and were alſo called *Martiobarboli*, and were Lead-caſters: If theſe beat the Enemy, ſaith he, they purſued him too; but if they were beaten, they were receiv'd by the firſt and ſecond Batallion; ſuppoſe of heavy armed: You ſee how *Vegetius* loves to refreſh his Readers memory. Well then, the third and fourth Batallions fought before the firſt and ſecond, or any of them came to the ſhock. In the fifth Batallion our Author places Carrobaliſts, Slingers and Batton-Slingers. But I muſt propoſe a queſtion or two by the way. Firſt, Did the third and fourth Batallions, both which, as you ſee, he makes to conſiſt of the *Velites*, after they had fought with, and were repelled by an Enemy, retire only to the Rear of the *Haſtati*, or to the Rear of the Army? I ſuppoſe the laſt, though *Vegetius* through inadvertency, ſaith only to the Rear of the two firſt Batallions; for if ſo, they had undoubtedly obſtructed very much the advance of the *Triarii*, or the Retreat of both *Principes* and *Haſtati*; my

Strange repetitions.

Two queſtions.

next

next Query is, why *Vegetius* doth not appoint the Slingers, and Batton ſlingers to skirmiſh in the Van, as well as the *Velites* of the third and fourth Batallions, ſince they were all light armed: and if it be ſaid the Slingers could caſt their ſtones over the heads of the two Batallions of heavy armed, I anſwer firſt, their ſtones would do leſs hurt at that diſtance. Secondly, the Archers in the third and fourth rank could have done as much. Thirdly, the keeping their ſtation and place in the fifth Batallion hinder'd the *Triarii* to advance. Now if theſe of *Vegetius* his third and fourth Batallions were obliged to go to the Van, and fight or skirmiſh there, why did he not appoint the light armed of his fifth Batallion to do ſo too, ſince they were all lyable to one Duty. But I hinder him to Marſhall his ſixth Batallion. The ſixth order or body, ſaith he, conſiſted of (and now welcome *Triarii*) Warriors furniſht with all manner of Arms and Weapons, whom the Ancients called *Triarii*. Theſe, ſaith he, uſed to ſit (then they kneeled not) behind all the other Batallions, that being whole and ſound, and in breath, they might with more vigour attack the enemy; for if any thing fell out otherwiſe than well with the Batallions that ſtood before them, all hopes of recovery depended on them. Now if our Author hath ſpoken well of the ancient *Roman* Legion, I am ſure he hath ſpoken enough of it. He hath been at much pains to make up that Legion, but that you may the better ſee the defects of it, I ſhall be at the trouble to take it down in pieces in the enſuing Chapter.

Triarii.

CHAP. XII.

Vegetius *his Legion reviewed and examined.*

WHoever hath read, or ſhall be pleaſed to read *Vegetius* his Treatiſe *De re Militari*, will believe with me, that he intended nothing leſs than to write the Military conſtitutions and cuſtoms of Levies, Arms, Exerciſing, Marſhalling, Embattelling, Marching, or other Laws and Points of the Art of War uſed in his own days; but in the contrary, the *Roman* way and method of War of the ancient times. And this he profeſſeth all along, not only in his Prologues to his Maſter the Emperour *Valentinian*, but almoſt in every Book of his Treatiſe. In the Prologue of his ſecond Book, he ſays, the Emperour had commanded him to ſet down the *Antiqua*, the ancient cuſtoms. In the Prologue to his third Book, he avers, that the Emperour had commanded him to abbreviate in one Piece all the ancient Military Cuſtoms and Conſtitutions which were diſperſed and ſcattered in ſeveral Books and Authors. And in one word he Entitles his Epitome, Inſtitutions of Military matters out of the Commentaries of *Cato*, *Celſus*, *Trajan*, *Adrian*, and *Frontinus*. Now, none of theſe wrote, or could write of any Military Cuſtoms practiſed in *Vegetius* his time, as having liv'd ſeveral ages before him, and he acknowledgeth himſelf that the Art of War of his days was but a ſhadow, and ſcarce that of the ancient one. But by the way I muſt tell you, that *Steuechius* thinks *Adrian* wrote no Military Conſtitutions, ſince at his deſire *Ælian* had compoſed that Piece *de Inſtruendis Aciebus*, whereof we have ſpoken. But his reaſon is exceedingly weak, for *Adrian* might very well have written the *Roman* Military Art, and yet have dedeſired *Ælian* to write the *Grecian* one. But to return, *Vegetius* in the twentieth Chapter of his firſt Book having given us an account of the ancient *Roman* Arms, acknowledgeth that they were wholly worn out, and that in compariſon of them, the Foot of his time were naked, which had given ſo great an advantage to the Barbarous Nations of the *Gothſ*, *Huns* and *Allans*. To the Eighth Chapter of his ſecond Book, he gives this title, *Of thoſe who were leaders of the*

Vegetius obliged himſelf to write of the old *Roman* Militia;

Not that of his own time.

ancient Centuries and Files. And the Seventh Chapter of that Book he begins with these words, Having expounded, saith he, the ancient ordering of a Legion. And in many other places he witnesseth, that it is the ancient *Roman* Militia, that he is to open to us, and no new one which had deviated from that old one.

Seven Errors in the Description of his Legion.

This being premised by me to anticipate objections, I make bold to charge *Vegetius* with seven gross Errours in the description of his Legion, yet all seven will not amount to one mortal sin, (which, they say, be likewise seven) nay, nor to one capital crime. But if he be guilty of all these, or any of these, then I say, he is not so good as his word in the fourth Chapter of his Second Book, where he promiseth *Ordinationem Legionis antiquæ, secundum normam Militaris Juris exponere*: To expound to us the right ordering of an ancient Legion according to the Rule of Military Law. But I shall endeavour to justifie my charge in this following order.

First Error.

First, I question the number of his Legionary Foot, which he makes to be six thousand one hundred, and all heavy armed; mark that I read once of six thousand, and once more of six thousand and two hundred, (and in that number were comprehended the *Velites*) but never of six thousand and one hundred. The truth is, *Romulus* made his Legion three thousand, after him it was augmented and diminished according to the King, Senate, or peoples pleasure, or the necessities of the State to 4000, to 4200, to 5000, to 5200, and sometimes (but very seldom) to 6000, or 6200, as Regiments are now made stronger and weaker in our modern Levies, according to the pleasure of the Prince or State who makes them; but for most part the ancient *Roman* Legion was 4000, or 4200. *Livy* in his Sixth Book says, four Legions were levied against the *Gauls*, each of 4000 Foot. In his Seventh Book, he says, that in the Consulship of young *Camillus*, four Legions were raised, each of 4200 Foot. In his Eighth Book he tells us, that in the War against the *Latins*, every Legion consisted of 5000 Foot. In his Ninth Book he makes the Legion to be 4000 Foot, in the War against the *Samnites*. In his 21 Book he speaks of six Legions, each of them 4000 Foot. And not to spend more time in Instances, the same Historian (out of whom and *Polybius*, I suppose *Vegetius* borrowed his greatest light of History) says in his 22 Book, that every *Roman* Legion was 5000 Foot in the time of their dangerous War with their redoubted enemy *Hannibal*; but after that was ended, they were reduced to 4000 till the *Macedonian* War, except that some of them were made 6200 by *Scipio*. Unless then once in *Africk*, and once in *Greece*, we never find a Legion 6000 strong, but never at all to be 6100, as *Vegetius* would have it to be constantly. He would have done himself much right, and his Reader a great favour to have told who levied these Legions of 6100. if it was so in his own time, or yet in the decadency of both the *Roman* Empire and Militia, that makes nothing to his purpose, it is the ancient customs we require of him, for it is these he promised to us. But if we take in all these three Bodies of light armed Foot which he so frequently mentions in the number of the Legion, as *Polybius* doth the *Velites* in his Legion, and proportion 400 light arm'd for every 1000 heavy arm'd, as the same *Polybius* doth; then *Vegetius* his Legion shall exceed 8500, of which we read in no story. Now if all these Instances I have given out of *Livius*, and in another place shall give out of *Polybius* be true, then *Vegetius* his assertion, that a Legion should have no fewer than 6100 heavy arm'd Foot, can have no truth at all in it, and that also which he subjoins in that same sixth Chapter of his Second Book must be false.

Second Error.

Secondly, I cannot believe him that either every Troop consisted of 32 Horse, or that 726 Riders belong'd to every Legion. If I trust either the one or the other, I must give the lye to two more ancient Writers than himself, that is *Polybius* and *Livius*. The last whereof in his Seventh Book saith, four Legions were elected, and for every one of them 300 Horse. In the dangerous War against *Hannibal*, no more but 300 Horse for a Legion. *Livy* in his Ninth Book speaks but of 300 Horse for every Legion in the War with the *Samnites*. In the great battel of *Canna* they were but 300, as that Historian witnesseth in his 22 Book. In his 29 Book he saith, *Scipio* had no more in *Africk* but 300 Horse for every Legion, the Foot whereof were 6200. And his brother *Lucius Scipio* had

had no more in *Aſia* but 300 for every Legion of 5400 Foot. Neither had the Conſul *Æmilius* more Horſe for a Legion in *Macedon* than 300, though the Foot were 6000. Once I read in *Livy*, it is in his 40 Book, and if I remember right, it was againſt the *Ligurians*, that 400 Horſe were ordained for each Legion; otherwiſe according to *Livius*, the number was conſtantly 300. *Polybius* all along in his Hiſtory allots no more Horſe to a Legion but 300, except once, (and I pray you obſerve it) it is in his Second Book, where he ſaith, the Senate ſent two Legions to *Sicily*, each conſiſting of 4000 Foot, and 200 Horſe; and as this is the leaſt number I read of, ſo that of *Livy*'s 400 Horſe againſt the *Ligurians* is the greateſt number of Horſe for one Legion. In the Wars againſt both the *Gauls* and *Carthaginians*, *Polybius* gives but 300 Horſe to every Legion. In the dividing his 726 Riders, *Vegetius* errs twice, firſt for allowing 22 Turms or Troops to the Cavalry, Ten being the ordinary number; next for allowing 32 Riders to each Troop, whereas there were but 30: Both which aſſertions of mine are grounded on Hiſtory, and are likewiſe taken out of *Polybius* his Sixth Book, as I have made it appear in my Diſcourſe of the *Roman* Cavalry. Beſides, our Authors error in *calculo* may be charged on him as a *Peccadillo*, for though we ſhould admit 22 Troops in every Legion, and thirty two Riders in every Troop, the number will not amount to 726, for multiply 32 by 22, the aggregate will be but 704. But in ſteps *Steuechius*, and lends *Vegetius* his hand, and ſays the Decurions muſt be added, who being 22 in number, (one for every Troop) makes *Vegetius* his number 726 compleat. But this ſhall not help him, for Decurions, Standard-bearers, Trumpeters, or Horn-winders, (if Troops had any of the laſt) were all of the number of the 30, and none of them Supernumeraries, as I have made it appear out of *Polybius* in my Diſcourſe of Cavalries, and therefore they muſt be of the number of the 32 likewiſe. And if I ſhould permit *Steuechius* to make the Decurions ſupernumeraries, he will be obliged to give me leave to reckon the Cornets and Trumpeters not to be of the number of the 32, and theſe being 44 in number would increaſe the horſe of every Legion to 770, and if he pleaſe he may reckon the *Turmæ*, *Coattores*, or Bringers up, who by *Polybius* his account were three for every Turme, and conſequently 66 in 22 Troops, and then an addition being made of all, we ſhall find the aggregate of the Horſe for *Vegetius* his Legion to be 836.

The third complaint I make is that *Vegetius* Marſhals two Troops of Horſe with every Cohort, and four Troops with the firſt Cohort. Obſerve that here it is not the queſtion whether this way of Marſhalling be good or not, nor is it the queſtion, whether it be not good, that Foot & Horſe ſhould be near one another when they fight, but the queſtion is, whether the ancient *Romans* uſed this way, or not, or if this be the right way of ordering or Marſhalling an old Legion, which *Vegetius* promiſed to give us. I aver it is not; and I know no old Author will contradict my aſſertion. It will be loſt labour to inſtance theſe Battels deſcribed by ancient Hiſtorians, who mention nothing like this manner of Embattelling. In my Diſcourſes of both Infantry and Cavalry, I have ſhown how Horſemen have fought on foot, how they have fought with horſes unbridled; and how Foot and Horſe have been mingled together in Skirmiſhes, and Battels; but I read not in any Author of this method of Marſhalling, that *Vegetius* ſpeaks of; nay the current of Hiſtory evinceth the contrary for moſt part, the Horſe were drawn up in the wings, and the Foot in the Battel. So it was at *Canna*, where the Conſul *Æmilius* fought on the right hand with the *Roman* Cavalry, and *Terentius Varo* on the left with the Horſe of the Allies. The like was done at the Battel of *Metaurus* againſt *Aſdrubal*. In the two Battels which *Scipio* fought in *Africk*, the very ſame was practiſed. Sometimes all the Horſe were Marſhalled in one of the wings as *Cæſar* drew up all his in the right wing of the army; and *Pompey* moſt of his Cavalry on the left hand of his army at that great Battel of *Pharſalia*, where theſe two brave *Romans* fought for no leſs wager than the Empire of the World. At *Uzita* the ſame *Cæſar* being to offer Battel to *Scipio*, *Pompey*'s Father-in-law, drew up all his Horſemen on the left-wing of his army, and mixed Foot with them. *Polybius* in his 14 Book informs us that the Great *Scipio* being to fight againſt *Syphax*, Marſhalled his *Roman* Horſe in one wing, and his Auxiliaries in the other. And which is very obſervable againſt *Vegetius*, he ſays in that ſame place, that in doing ſo, *Romana Militia* Third Error.

consuetudinem simpliciter servavit. He simply and purely observed the custom of the *Roman* Militia.

Horse belonged not properly to Legions;

Nor will it be one full step out of my way to tell you, that I think Horse do not at all belong to a Legion, it being as I suppose wholly composed of Foot; for though most Historians tell us, that when Legions were levied, Horse were also raised, and punctually for every Legion 300 Horse, yet must not that be so understood as that these 308 horse were to be reckoned to be a member or part of that Legion; nay, most Authors disjoin them, and say, so many Legions, and so many Horse were raised. Let *Cæsar* an Author beyond all exception be Judg. In the Seventh Book of the *French* War, he says, he gave to his Legate *Labienus* (the same who afterward deserted him) four Legions, and kept six with himself; and that you may be sure he meant only Foot, he subjoins that he ordered him to take a part of the Cavalry with him, how many he tells not; but if every Legion was to have a set number of horses, that great Captain (who loseth no words in his Commentaries) needed not have mentioned Horse; for when he said, he sent four Legions, we should have known that 2904 horse were sent according to *Vegetius* his account of 726 Horse, for every Legion, or 1200 according to the true account of 300 for every Legion.

Proved from *Cæsar*,

In his Third Book of the Civil War, he sent *Cassius Longinus* to *Thessaly* with one Legion, and two hundred Horse, not with 726, nor yet with 300. He sent *Calvisius Sabinus* to *Ætolia* with five Cohorts, and a few Horse. He sent *Cneius Domitius* to *Macedon* with three Legions and 500 Horse. Hear him speak once more, for he deserves to be heard, he tells us in that same Book, that *Scipio*, *Pompey*'s Father-in-law, brought out of *Syria* to *Greece*, *Omnes Legiones, Equitesque:* All the Legions and the Horsemen. If Horse belonged properly to Legions, why did he distinguish them, who knew the Military Art, and the words of the Art best of any? But *Vegetius* shall be invincible for me, unless he beat himself, which he will presently do. For notwithstanding all he hath said in the sixth Chapter of his Second Book, yet in the 15 Chapter of that same Book he confesseth that *Equites locantur in cornibus*: Horsemen are placed in the wings. And in the 17 Chapter he says, *Equites ponuntur in cornibus, ita ut loricati omnes juncti sint peditibus:* The Horsemen are placed in the wings, so that all the heavy arm'd horse join with the Foot: What means that, join with the Foot? It is that one part of them joined with the Foot on the right hand, and the other on the left; and so himself clears it in that very Chapter, where he saith, If Horsemen be too weak, according to the custom of the Ancients, Footmen who are swift, arm'd with light Targets, and exercised in that manner of fight, are to be mixed with them; for Foot mixed with the Horse, and Horse joined to the Foot, are two several things. And in the first Chapter of the same Book he saith the Horse are called the wings, because they protect the foot, *ad similitudinem alarum*, to the similitude of wings: Let now any man reconcile *Vegetius* to himself, and he and I shall be very soon good friends.

And out of *Vegetius* himself.

Fourth Error.

But the *Hastati* make a terrible clamour, and cry they have wrong done them by *Vegetius* in Marshalling the *Principes* before them. They say that being the youngest and least experienced, it was some honour done to them to place them in the first Battalion, for thereby they were exposed to the first fury of an enemy, which many times they valiantly repell'd; if not, they served at least (as the Great *Turk*'s *Asapi*) to blunt both the Enemies Courage and Swords. The *Principes* cry as loud, that *Vegetius* hath rob'd them of the dignity, they always had to stand in the middle between the *Hastati* and the *Triarii*, and to be look'd on as the restorers of the Battel, when the *Hastati* were worsted. But neither of them hath so good reason to complain as the *Triarii*, whom we shall hear anon. And assuredly to me it seems very strange, that not only in the mentioned places, but all along in his whole Treatise, our Author Marshals the *Principes* before the *Hastati*, against the universal consent of all History. *Livy* in his Seventh Book tells how *Lenus* the Consul drew up his *Hastati* in the Van, the *Principes* in the middle, and the *Triarii* in the Reer, against the *Gauls*; and then was the *Roman* Discipline strictly observed. So were the *Hastati* in the Van, when *Marcellus* fought at *Canusium* with *Hannibal*, Liv. lib. 27. And in his 37 Book he informs us that *Scipio Asiaticus* in the battel he fought with *Antiochus*, ordered his *Hastati* in the Van, the *Principes* in the middle, and the

Triarii

Triarii in the Rear. And that I may not weary my Reader with inſtances, I believe, and upon good grounds, that in all *Livies* Decads that are extant, *Vegetius* nor any for him ſhall not read, that the *Haſtati* were placed behind the *Principes*, except once that it is written (I ſuppoſe not by himſelf) in his Thirtieth Book, that *Scipio* in his battel againſt *Syphax*, and *Aſdrubal* Marſhall'd the *Principes* before the *Haſtati*. And *Lipſius* hath good reaſon to think that this place is falſified, ſince *Polybius* (out of whom it is like *Livy* hath the ſtory) writes the very contrary, that is, that *Scipio* Marſhall'd the *Principes* behind the *Haſtati*; and if this place were not corrupted, then *Livius* ſhould contradict himſelf, for in his Eighth Book he ſays once for all, *Haſtati omnium primi pugnam ſubibant*: The Javelineers, ſaith he, firſt of all began the battel. And ſure the ſame *Scipio* at the battel of *Zama* againſt *Hannibal*, placed the *Haſtati* in the Van, by a good token; for they were ſo mixed with the enemy, that he was glad to found a Retreat for them, that he might have ground to bring his *Principes* up to the Medley, which the ſame *Livy* reports to us.

In the fifth place *Polybius* complains that *Vegetius* hath murther'd five of his Centurions, for he in his Sixth Book appointeth ſixty for every Legion, whereof *Vegetius* in the eighth Chapter of his Second Book produceth but five and fifty; yet he needs not be afraid to be brought to any juridical trial for this aſſaſſination. Truly it ſeems ſtrange to me that *Polybius* his Legion conſiſting but of 3000 heavy armed, ſhould have ſixty Centurions, and that of *Vegetius*, which was a hundred more than twice as ſtrong, ſhould have but 55, for all his 6100 were heavy arm'd, as he deſcribes them in that ſame Chapter. I can fancy no reaſon for this, but that it was his fancy to write ſo: I confeſs indeed it is more than probable that at the firſt inſtitution by *Romulus*, that band of men which was called a Century, conſiſted of one hundred men; and ſo the Centurions were no more but thirty, and in proceſs of time in a Legion of that ſame ſtrength might be ſixty; for as I told you in my Diſcourſe of the Infanteries, though the particular bands of a Legion came to conſiſt but of ſixty men, and thoſe of the *Triarii* perhaps but of thirty men, yet ſtill the denominations of Century and Centurio remained as before. But never was a Centurio heard of that commanded more men than one hundred, except in *Vegetius* his Legion, in the firſt Cohort whereof (conſiſting of 1105 men) every Centurion commanded 184 men; if there were but ſix Centuriats in that Cohort, as is to be ſuppoſed; for if you divide 1105 by ſix, the Quotient will be 184 with the fraction of, one; but till *Vegetius* his number of 55 Centurions be made more clear to us, than yet it is, we may ſafely believe with *Polybius*, that in one Legion though not ſo ſtrong as that of *Vegetius*, there were no fewer than ſixty Centurions, to which *Titus Livius* doth give his conſent in his Eighth Book, as the place is amended and corrected by *Lipſius*, according to the true and genuine ſenſe of the Author. Fifth Error.

Sixthly, to my ſenſe it is undeniable, ſince the *Roman* Militia was reformed, and indeed almoſt inſtituted by *Tullus Hoſtilius*, that there were ten Cohorts in every Legion, even when it conſiſted but of 3000; three Centuries at that time making a Cohort, and afterwards three Maniples, every one whereof was compoſed of two Centuriats. If the Centuries conſiſted of full hundreds, then each Maniple contained two hundred, and conſequently the Cohort conſiſted of ſix hundred. And ſo we may ſuppoſe *Scipio* and *Æmilius* their Cohorts to have been, when their Legions were ſix thouſand a piece. And this Cohort of 600 men is the ſtrongeſt we read of; for in my Diſcourſe of *Roman* Infantery, I have diſtinguiſht the Pretorian Cohorts from the Legionary ones. But a Cohort of 1105 men, as *Vegetius* will have his firſt Cohort to be, is not to paſs muſter, and as little warrant he had to make every one of his other nine Cohorts to conſiſt of 555 heavy armed. Sure he might with more eaſe to himſelf have given to his right-hand Cohort 700 men, and to every one of the other nine, 600; and this had compleated his Legion of 6100, and by the bargain he had kept ſixty Centurions in it, by giving to the ſix Centurions of the firſt Cohort, 116, or 117 men a piece, and to every Centurion of the other nine Cohorts, 100. Or if he had made his Legion compleatly 6000 and no more, he might have given equally to every Centurion of ſixty, one hundred men, and this had been the faireſt and impartialeſt dealing. But how the whimſie of his fractions of fives Sixth Error.

flew

flew in his head I cannot tell, unleſs to trouble both himſelf and his Reader.

Seventh Error.

But ſeventhly, Room, room, cry the *Triarii*, they can have no longer patience either to kneel or ſit, they are all on foot, *Conclamant arma*, they expect neither *Principes*, nor *Haſtati* to retire to them, but advance in full arms, threatning they will be members of the Legion, and the principal members too; and in the Legion they will be, though it were over *Vegetius* his belly. They are very angry that in the ſixth and 15 Chapters of his Second Book, he ſhould have muſter'd a compleat Legion without them, their clamour is ſo loud, that to pacifie them, *Vegetius* in the 14 Chapter of his Third Book, aſſigns them place behind three bodies of light armed, and ordains them to be the ſixth Batallion, and to give them ſome eaſe after the wrong he had done them, he allows them to ſit, whereas before he had order'd them to kneel, ſometimes on one, ſometimes on both knees. But indeed they have no reaſon to be ſatisfied with ſuch favours, ſince he hath wholly exterminated them out of the Legion, in both his deſcriptions of it; for he divides the whole Legion, and all the ten Cohorts of it, and every man of theſe ten Cohorts into two *Acies*, or Batallions; in the firſt whereof he placeth the *Principes* conſiſting of five Cohorts, in which are 3325 men. In the ſecond he rangeth the *Haſtati* in five Cohorts, in which he muſters 2775 men, which make compleatly up his full number of 6100 heavy armed. So you ſee in both theſe places there is no room left, nor mention made of the *Triarii*. And though in his Third Book he appoints them to be in the Reer, yet the Legion being made up of the *Principes* and *Haſtati* without them, it muſt follow that in *Vegetius* his account the *Triarii* were no Legionaries. Beſides all this, they accuſe him of either theft or robbery, becauſe in the beginning of the *6th* Chapter of his Second Book, he hath either ſtoln or violently taken from them the *Eagle*, and given it to the firſt Cohort of the *Principes*; for they aver that it, being the prime Enſign of the Legion, was recommended to their care, and the keeping of it to their *Primipilus*, or firſt Centurion. How *Vegetius* will anſwer to all theſe accuſations, I know not, but thoſe who will defend him had beſt do it out of his own Books; for I have conſulted his Commentator *Steuechius*, and find he pleads nothing at all for him, nay, nor ſeems not to take notice, that he ſtands in need of his help, for Commenting on that ſame Chapter I laſt ſpoke of: all he tells us is that there was but one *Eagle* in a Legion, wherewith he ſaith he thought fit to acquaint *Novitiates* (a great ſecret) and that there were many Enſigns, and is pleaſed to give us the figures of thoſe Images *Vegetius* ſpeaks of, this is all. And indeed to tell it once for all, *Steuechius* is large and prolix enough to explain things where no difficulty appears, but where matters are debatable, I find in him nothing but a profound ſilence.

Steuechius taxed.

Vegetius his Tautologies.

I ſhall not need to tell my Reader how *Vegetius* repeats things over and over again, nor how his Tautologies are obvious, *Uſque ad nauſeam*, nor yet what brave men, experienced Soldiers, and expert Warriors, he will have to be placed in the Cohorts that ſtand on the right and left hands, and in the middle of both his Batallions, of which he compoſeth his Legion. But I dare preſume to ſay that if any of the ancient *Roman* Dictators or Conſuls, who Triumphed glorioufly over their enemies, had liv'd in the Emperour *Valentinians* time, they would rather have choſed to have ſubmitted the fortune of their battels to the doubtful Die of War once more, than to have Marſhall'd their Legions after *Vegetius* his Model.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of a Roman *Legion, Marshall'd according to* Polybius.

I Speak so often of *Polybius*, that I think it will not be amiss to tell you what he was. His Father *Licortas* was a famous Citizen of *Megalopolis*, who by his Valour and Vertue came to be the Supreme Magistrate (whom they call'd Prætor) of all the *Achæans*. This Prætor by his charge presided in their Councils, and was their Chieftain in their Wars. *Licortas* succeeded to the renowned Captain *Philopæmon*, who was cruelly forced by the *Messenians* (after he was their Prisoner) to drink a full draught of deadly Poison. *Polybius* was a Souldier in *Greece*, and as himself witnesseth in his eleventh Book, was a Commander in the *Achæan* Army, under *Philopæmon*, at the Battel of *Mantinea*, against *Machanidas* the Tyrant of *Lacedæmon*, who was there overthrown and kill'd. He was long after that a great favourite, yea, a Counsellour of that *Scipio* who was sometimes called *Africanus Minor*, and sometimes *Numantinus*; because he ended the *Carthaginian* and *Numantine* War, with the destruction of both Cities. There were some reasons why *Scipio* should be kind to *Polybius*, because his Natural Father *Lucius Æmilius*, (for this *Scipio* was but the adopted Grand-child of the great *Africanus*) was the Author of carrying many hundred *Achæans* Prisoners to *Rome*, (for no reason but suspicion) among whom *Polybius* was one, who lay full seventeen years Prisoner there, where he had leisure enough to learn both the *Roman* language and customes. *Scipio* was a very great Captain, a strict reformer of the old *Roman* Militia, and a severe Disciplinarian, from whom *Polybius* could not but know all the mysteries of the *Roman* Art of War, being a person of so great abilities, as those parcels of his History, yet extant, speak him ta have been; and truly we have reason to be sorry that we are robb'd of those Books of his, of which all-devouring time hath deprived us. Let us hear how he marshals a *Roman* Legion.

What *Polybius* was.

A Legion in that *Scipio Minor*'s time, consisted of four thousand two hundred men, as many times it did both before and after him; whereof six hundred were *Triarii*, and made the third Batallion, obliged to kneel on their Right knee, till either the other two Classes retir'd to them, or that the General commanded them to rise and advance. These, he saith, were never more than six hundred, though the Legion chanc'd to be four thousand two hundred, as many times it did. And for this we must take his word. Before the *Triarii* stood the *Principes*, men in the flower of their age; and before them, the *Hastati* in the Van; they were the youngest and rawest of all the heavy armed; each of these two Batallions consisted of twelve hundred; and all the three were alike arm'd, except that the *Triarii*, instead of *Pila*, carry'd short Spears; of all which I have spoken sufficiently already. So you see all *Polybius* his heavy armed amounted to three thousand: The rest, which were twelve hundred, were, saith he, *Velites*; and these, he says, were levied of the poorest and most inconsiderable sort of the people. Nor do I find, that he divides these twelve hundred *Velites*, into three Squadrons; one whereof should stand behind every one of the Classes of the heavy armed, of all which I have already spoke, in my discourse of the Infantry; and yet *Terduzzi*, and the Sieur *de Preissack* would father this upon *Polybius*: But indeed, in my judgement, he leaves the light armed to be disposed of in the Flanks, Van or Rear, as the General conceiv'd they might be most useful. He appoints his Legion to be divided into thirty Maniples (suppose still the heavy armed) each Maniple to consist of two Centuriates; to every Century he allows an Ensign and a Centurion, whom he permits to chuse his Sub-Centurion;

The *Polybian* Legion.

Centurion; of all which I have already ſpoke. The numbers of the *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Velites*, might alter, according to the ſtrength of the Legion, but not the *Triarii*. He tells us, that three hundred Horſe were levied with every Legion; but ſays not, that they made a part of every Legion. Theſe three hundred Horſe he divides into ten Turms or Troops, and Officers them, as I have ſhown you in my Diſcourſe of the Cavalry. He leaves them to be marſhall'd, where the Commander in chief thought they might do beſt ſervice. And now we have the *Polybian* Legion.

No word here for all this, how deep, that is, how many in File, either of Horſe or Foot; or what, or how much ground was allowed for diſtance between Files or Ranks; or yet how great the Intervals were between the ſeveral Maniples of every one of the Claſſes, or what between the Claſſes themſelves, or between the ſeveral Troops of Horſe. A great over-ſight, for of all theſe we are forc'd to hear other mens conjectures, and make uſe of our own, as we ſhall offer to do in the following Chapter.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Diſtances, and Intervals of the ſeveral Bodies and Batallions of the Foot and Horſe.

BEfore we proceed to our conjectures, it will be fit, firſt to know what this word *Interval* properly ſignifies, and how it is taken. In both Ancient and Modern Fortifications, Towns, Caſtles, and Camps were defended not only with Ramparts of Earth, and Walls of Stone, but alſo with great Logs or Stakes of Timber, which we call Palliſadoes, theſe the *Romans* in their language called *Valli*, and, I ſuppoſe, thereafter the Rampart it ſelf got the name of *Vallus* and *Vallum*; hence perhaps our Wall. Theſe Stakes were, and are of two kinds, longer and ſhorter; the firſt ſtood ſtraight up from the ground, the ſecond had the one end of them fixed in the Rampart, and the other lying on it, to hinder an approach to it; diſtinguiſhed by the *Germans* by ſeveral names, for they call the long Stakes Palliſadoes, and the ſhort ones Stockadoes, both the one and the other ſharp-pointed at both ends. The Ground, Earth, or part of the Rampart, between two Palliſadoes or Stockadoes, is properly called an Interval; but it is borrow'd, and appropriated to any diſtance between Bodies greater and ſmaller; yea, to the ſpace that is between one time and another, an Interval of time is now language proper enough, and Phyſicians borrow it, and call an Intermitting Ague, *Febris Intervallata*, an Intervalled Feavor.

Vallus and *Vallum*.

Interval what.

What diſtance or Intervals there were between *Roman* Ranks, and between Files between ſeveral Bodies of either their Horſe or Foot, no ancient Author hath clear'd to us, but left us to grope in the dark. Nor can we well gueſs at them, till we condeſcend how many in File both Horſe and Foot were marſhall'd. I told you before, that *Vegetius* in the twenty fifth Chapter of his ſecond Book, ſeems to make the Foot eleven deep, becauſe, as I told you, he orders a *Contubernium* of Souldiers to manage a Carrobaliſt, and that, he ſaith, conſiſted of eleven men. But this doth not prove that *Vegetius* his File was preciſely eleven, no more than what he ſaith in the fifteenth Chapter of his third Book (that ten thouſand men drawn up in ſix Ranks, will take up ſo much ground in Front) will prove, that the *Roman* Foot were drawn up ſix deep. And ſo for *Vegetius*, we know not the deepneſs of either the *Roman* Foot or Horſe. Nor will we be one jot the wiſer for *Polybius*

Deepneſs of the File not told

By *Vegetius*.

lybius; for the discourse he hath in his twelfth Book, where he speaks of Horse eight in File, doth not concern the *Roman* Militia, for he speaks there of *Macedonian* and *Persian* Warriours, and is confuting *Calisthenes* his History of the Battel of *Issus*, between *Alexander* and *Darius*, as I noted before. *Achilles Terduzzi* imagines the *Roman* Foot to have been twelve in File, but that was to make good his conjecture of the quantity of ground a Consular Army took up, whereof I may chance to speak hereafter. But the common opinion carries me along with it, that both the *Roman* Horse and Foot ordinarily were marshall'd ten in File, but upon emergencies, Generals might alter it; though, I confess, the strong reason for it to me seems very weak, which is, that the Leader of the Horse was called *Decurio*, and he of the File of Foot *Decanus*; for this last is appropriated to other Offices; and the first by *Ælian*'s Translator is given to the Leader of a *Macedonian* File, which consisted of sixteen. But this supposition, as probable, we must make the basis or ground, on which to build our most probable conjectures of the Intervals of several Bodies and Classes, in which both our Authors give us small assistance, yet I shall give you all I can pick out of them, or others, on that Subject.

Nor by *Polybius*.

Roman Horse and Foot ten deep.

When *Polybius* in his twelfth Book told us, that for most part Horse-men were ranged eight deep (meaning, I think, the *Persian* Horse) he subjoins, that there must be an Interval between several Troops; but what that Interval was, he forgot to tell us: It is pity, he who knew things so well, should needlessly have kept them up from us as secrets; the reason he gives for an Interval between two Troops doth not weigh much, because, saith he, they must have ground for conversion; that is, to face to either Right or Left hand, or by any of them to the Rear. If any of these be needful, whole Squadrons of four, six or eight Troops joyn'd together, may do it as easily and conveniently as single Troops, which consist of three or four Files at most. But conversions on that same ground are seldome necessary, never convenient. But being left to guess, how many foot of Interval, Troops ten deep required one from another, I conjecture, eight Foot; which I ground on that, the same *Polybius* saith in that same twelfth Book, which is, that a *Stadium*, or Furlong, contain'd eight hundred Horse drawn up in Battel. Then I say, First, a *Stadium*, is the eighth part of an *Italian* mile, one hundred twenty five paces, six hundred twenty five Foot. Secondly, eight hundred Horse, being at our Authors rate eight in File, are one hundred in Front. Thirdly, For every Horse-man to stand on Horse-back, and room to handle his Arms; I allow, with others, four foot of ground, and so for one hundred Horses, four hundred Foot. Fourthly, According to *Polybius*, and, I suppose, the *Roman* rule, the eight hundred Horse must be divided into several Troops, and in each of them but thirty Riders; so there will be twenty six compleat Troops, and twenty Horse-men for the twenty seventh Troop. Fifthly, Twenty seven Troops require twenty six Intervals. Now allow with *Polybius*, a *Stadium* for eight hundred Horse-men; that is, for one hundred in Front, and for these hundred allow with me four hundred Foot for the Horse-men to stand on, you will have of six hundred twenty five foot of ground for your twenty six Intervals, two hundred and seventeen foot; and that will be eight foot, and near one half, for every Interval. So my opinion is, (if I understand *Polybius* right) that the Interval between two single Troops was about eight foot.

Intervals between Troops

Conjectured

Out of *Polybius*.

But let us fancy the *Roman* Horse to have been ten in File, and so every Troop only three in Front, for so I probably think they were; and let us remember, that in every Consular Army there were twenty *Roman* Troops, and forty of the Allies; in all sixty. Fancy those sixty Troops drawn up in one Field, upon one of the Wings of the Army (as several times all the Cavalry was marshall'd on one Wing) they must have fifty nine Intervals. Next, remember that sixty Troops, at thirty in a Troop, were compos'd of eighteen hundred Riders; these drawn up, ten in File, made one hundred and eighty Leaders; allow to every one of these four foot, that will amount to seven hundred and twenty foot; then for fifty nine Intervals (which, according to *Polybius*, sixty Troops must have) you are to allow four hundred seventy two foot (at eight foot for each Interval) I suppose still that which I can scarcely believe, of so many Intervals; but add four hundred seventy two foot, to seven hundred

Too many Intervals.

and twenty, the aggregate will be eleven hundred ninety two ſoot. How theſe ſixty Troops, marſhall'd ſo thin, ſo few in Front, with ſo many Intervals, could ſtand out the brisk and furious charge of a numerous and couragious Enemy, is beyond my fancy; unleſs they have been interlin'd with well-armed Foot.

Overſight in *Polybius*.

As to the Diſtances between Bodies of Foot, *Polybius* in the twelfth Book ſo often cited, allows expreſly ſix foot between Files, but he is to be underſtood in that place of the *Macedonian* Phalanx, confuting the impertinent relation of *Caliſthenes*; but he ſpeaks not there or elſewhere of diſtance between *Roman* Files: And yet here is an inadvertency in that great man, as we ſhall ſee another immediately in *Vegetius* of the ſame nature. *Polybius* allows ſix thouſand foot of ground for the Front or Longitude of ſixteen thouſand men ſixteen deep, and ſo we have one thouſand Files; between every one of the Files he allows ſix foot of diſtance, ſo the diſtances do compleatly take up his ſix thouſand Foot, and ſo no ground is allow'd to ſtand on; to which, if he had adverted, he would have allow'd one foot to each man whereon to ſtand, and conſequently ſeven thouſand foot for one thouſand Files in Front. But I ſhall not queſtion the ſix foot of diſtance between Files, being I have told you in the *Grecian* Militia that much was neceſſary for their Pike-men between Ranks on their march, though not between Files; and that in ſtanding in Battel, they uſed *Denſatio*, three foot of diſtance, and in fight, *Conſtipatio*, one foot and a half.

Two in *Vegetius*.

Vegetius is more inexcuſable than *Polybius*, for he allows for the Ranks one foot of ground to ſtand on, in theſe words, *Singuli Bellatores ſtantes ſingulos obtinent pedes*, Every Combatant, ſays he, takes up one foot of ground. But that he allows none for them to ſtand on, when he ſpeaks of Files, I prove thus: In the fourteenth Chapter of his third Book, he allows three foot of diſtance between Files; and in the next place ſaith, that ten thouſand men, marſhall'd ſix deep, made a Front of ſixteen hundred ſixty ſix: and ſo it doth with a fraction only of four; hitherto he is very right, but concludes very ill, that theſe ſixteen hundred ſixty ſix Files took no more ground up in Front but one thouſand paces, that is five thouſand foot. A thing purely impoſſible, for three foot of Diſtance is allowed by himſelf between File and File; and next, ſixteen hundred ſixty ſix Files require ſixteen hundred ſixty five diſtances; multiply ſixteen hundred ſixty five by three, the product is four thouſand nine hundred ninety five; theſe want but 5 foot of *Vegetius* his one thouſand paces. Where ſhall then the ſixteen hundred ſixty ſix Combatants ſtand, certainly they had ſixteen hundred ſixty ſix foot of ground to ſtand on; add ſixteen hundred ſixty ſix to four thouſand nine hundred ninety five, the aggregate is ſix thouſand ſix hundred ſixty one foot; a third more than *Vegetius* allow'd to ſixteen hundred ſixty ſix Files: In imitation of him, *Terduzzi* commits the very ſame errour in his fifth and ſixth Chapters.

The firſt in diſtance of Files.

The ſecond of Ranks.

In the next place, *Vegetius* allows ſix foot of diſtance between Ranks, becauſe men muſt run when they throw their Darts and Javelines, for ſo they caſt them with greater force; *Vehementius*, ſaith he, I think he ſpeaks reaſon, but not at all ſenſe; when he avers, that ſix Ranks of men (having one foot of ground allow'd for every Rank to ſtand on, and ſix foot between one Rank and another) took up forty two foot of ground, from the Van to the Rear; that is, as I think, from the toes of the Leaders to the heels of the Bringers up; for by his own account and allowance, ſix Ranks can take up no more from Van to the Rear than thirty ſix foot; as thus, ſix foot for the ſix Ranks to ſtand on, and thirty foot for the five diſtances. The error ſeems to have proceeded from a fancy he hath had, that ſix Ranks muſt have ſix intervals, which is not only falſe, but ridiculouſly childiſh: In regard, in ſix Ranks, there is one diſtance between the firſt and ſecond Rank; the ſecond between the ſecond Rank and the third; the third between the third and fourth Rank; the fourth between the fourth and fifth rank; and the fifth diſtance between the fifth and ſixth Rank. And for his firſt error, that ſixteen hundred ſixty ſix Files take no more ground in Front than five thouſand foot, it will be a folly to defend him by ſaying, three Foot were but allowed both for Files to ſtand on, and diſtance between them, for a diſtance (as Lieutenant-Colonel *Elton*, in his compleat Body of the Military Art deſcribes it well) is a place or Interval of ground between every particular File and File, and Rank and Rank, and therefore no part of that ground on which the Files or Ranks ſtand. When

Definition of a Diſtance.

I look'd

I look'd upon theſe places of *Vegetius*, and conſider'd them, I could not but approve of *Lipſius* for qualifying him (but on another account) with the Titles of *Solutus & negligens.*

The ſame *Lipſius*, in the fourth Book of his Commentary, quarrels with *Polybius*, for not informing us what diſtances the ſeveral Maniples kept one from another, nor what Intervals were kept between the three great Claſſes; and if that piece of *Polybius* be not loſt with others of his works, aſſuredly it was an inexcuſable overſight. I dare not accuſe *Vegetius* of this neglect, though *Lipſius* ſeems to do it; for I am apt to believe, that what he ſpeaks of the diſtances between Ranks (as I have underſtood him, it is in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters of his third Book) he may have meant Intervals between the greater Bodies; for in theſe places he uſeth the words *Ordo* and *Acies* indifferently, and though *Ordo* be ſometimes taken for a Rank, ſometimes for a Band or Company, yet *Acies* is ever taken for a Battel, or Batallion. And to me it is clear enough that in the mention'd places he takes *Ordo* for Batallion, and makes ſix of them, the firſt of *Principes*, the ſecond of *Haſtati*, the third, fourth and fifth of light armed, the ſixth of *Triarii*. Now it is palpable, theſe great Bodies were not Ranks (for every one of them, if I miſtake not, conſiſted of ten Ranks) but were all ſeveral Batallions, whereof, as I told you before, he compoſed his Legion. But whether he meant Ranks or Batallions, the error I mention'd was ſtill the ſame, in making ſix ſeveral Bodies (be they Ranks, Files, Squadrons or Batallions) to have ſix diſtances, for they cannot poſſibly have more than five. But if in theſe places he allow'd but ſix foot of Interval between theſe Claſſes, and great Bodies; it ſpeaks him to have been almoſt out of his wits when he wrote it, as the Reader may collect from the inſuing Diſcourſe.

Vegetius hard to be underſtood.

But being neither *Polybius* nor *Vegetius* help us much in the matter of Intervals, *Lipſius* in his fourth Book comforts us, and tells us, he will not ſuffer ſo profitable a buſineſs as is the knowledge of Intervals to remain in darkneſs; *In finibus noctis*, are his words, In the Borders of Night; and therefore promiſeth out of the plentiful Magazine of his own reading, to clear the whole matter to us. But I am afraid he will not be a man of his word, for the greateſt undertakers, are ſeldome the beſt performers: However it is fit we hear him, for he deſerves it.

Lipſius undertakes much,

First, He tells us, that he conceives, that the Interval between the *Haſtati* and the *Principes* was fifty foot, and between the *Principes* and the *Triarii* one hundred. Next, concerning the Intervals between the Maniples of any of the three Claſſes (which the *Romans* call'd *Via Directa*) he ſaith, if the *Velites* were to ſtand in them, the Interval might be of twenty or thirty foot; if not, ten foot was enough. This is briefly all he ſays on the matter. But aſſuredly, if this learned man could conveniently have left the Univerſity of *Louvaine*, and followed the *Spaniſh* Armies but one Summer, or, as we call it, one Campagne; he would have ſeen, under the conduct of the famous Dukes of *Alva* and *Parma*, (the greateſt Captains of that age) who liv'd at the time that he was writing his Books, how pitifully ſimple that School-ſpeculation of his was. I muſt confirm my opinion with Reaſon, for authority of Writers I have no more than he, and that is none at all.

But performs little.

Each of the two Claſſes of the *Haſtati* and *Principes* conſiſted of twelve hundred men, which being marſhall'd ten deep, made one hundred and twenty Files; *Vegetius* allows three foot diſtance between Files, theſe make three hundred and ſixty foot in Front, add one hundred and twenty foot for the Files to ſtand on; the ground that either of theſe Batallions ſtood on, was four hundred and eighty foot in Longitude; but to ſhun debate, I ſhall be content to allow but one foot for every File to ſtand on, and two foot of Interval between Files, and ſo the Front of the *Haſtati*, (though they had been all marſhall'd in one Body, as they were in ſeveral Maniples) took up three hundred and ſixty foot. A leſs ſpace of ground cannot rationally be given for an Interval between them and the *Principes*, than the three hundred and ſixty foot they took up in Front; for when they either fled or retir'd to the ſecond Batallion, they muſt have had ſufficient ground to caſt themſelves in ſome good order, by Maniples to take up their places in the Intervals of the *Principes*. Now three hundred and ſixty foot is but ſeventy two paces, which certainly are ſoon traced by men

Interval between *Haſtati* and *Principes*.

men either flying or retiring haſtily. For to imagine that the *Romans* punctually kept Rank and File, when they were neceſſitated to a ſpeedy Retreat, is a vain ſpeculation. If this be allowed me, then it cannot be denied me, that the Interval between the *Principes* and the *Triarii* muſt have been twice as great, that is ſeven hundred and twenty Foot, becauſe the third Batallion was in time of need to receive both the other two. Here then were two great Intervals, one between the *Haſtati* and *Principes*, and the other between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*, both of them called by the *Romans*, *Via tranſverſa*. This conjecture of mine may ſeem rational enough to thoſe who have obſerved in our modern Armies, the Intervals between the Brigades Marſhall'd in the Battel, and theſe of the reſerve, for leſs ground for them than what a *Brigade* takes up in front, is not uſually given.

Between *Principes* and *Triarii*.

Supported out of *Polybius*;

But to ſupport my own opinion, and convince *Lipſius* of the vanity of his, I ſhall pick ſomething out of the 15 *Book* of *Polybius*, where he tells us that *Hannibal* marſhal'd his third *Batallion* more than one *Stadium* behind his ſecond one, and in doing ſo, ſays he, he followed the *Roman* cuſtom; obſerve this. Now a *Stadium* is ſix hundred and twenty five foot, and this wants but ninety five foot of my allowance of ſeven hundred and twenty for an Interval between the *Principes* and the *Triarii*; and for that remember that he ſaid more than a *Stadium*, and you may believe without hereſie, it was the fourth part of another *Stadium*; and if ſo, *Hannibals* Interval between his ſecond and third *Batallion* was ſeven hundred and eighty one foot, that will be ſixty one foot more than I required between the ſecond and third *Roman Batallions*.

Lipſius his firſt Inſtance confuted.

But *Lipſius* would maintain his conjecture with two Inſtances out of *Cæſar*, but when they are examined, they may happily make more againſt him, than for him. The firſt is, when *Afranius* was to fight with *Cæſar* in *Spain*, the ground between the two Camps where the two Armies were ranged was but two thouſand foot, whereof ſaith *Cæſar*, every Army took up a third, the third Third being left for the Charge. Will *Lipſius* infer from this, that the Interval between the firſt and ſecond Batallion was but of fifty foot, and that between the ſecond and the third only of one hundred? No ſuch matter, for where the ground was ſo ſcarce, three foot between ranks was enough; and I doubt if ever more was allowed to the heavy armed, nay nor ſo much, after their *Pila* were caſt; a third part of two thouſand foot will be ſix hundred ſixty-ſix. Draw up all the three *Batallions* one behind another, make each of them ten deep, they will make in all thirty Ranks, for which allow twenty-nine diſtances, each of three foot, will make eighty-ſeven foot, and thirty foot being allowed for the thirty ranks to ſtand on, will amount to one hundred and ſeventeen foot, on which ground all the thirty ranks could conveniently enough ſtand. Now we have five hundred forty nine foot for the Tranſverſe Intervals, which were two. Of the five hundred forty nine foot, allow two hundred to the Interval between the firſt and ſecond Batallion, and three hundred forty nine for the Interval between the ſecond and the third. But here you will ſay, the two Tranſverſe Intervals had not ſo great a ſpace of ground as I required for them; I grant it you, and what then; I did not oblige *Roman* Generals to allow ſo much ground when they had it not, but to give as much when conveniently they could. And even here I have demonſtrated, that though *Cæſar* and *Afranius* were pinched for want of ground, yet both of them might have allowed more by fifty foot to the leaſt of the Tranſverſe Intervals, than *Lipſius* doth to both the Intervals.

His ſecond Inſtance confuted.

The ſecond Inſtance is, when *Cæſar* ſays, *Pompey* drew up his army in *Theſſaly*, ſo near his Camp, that darts could have been caſt out of his fortifications over the heads of all his three Batallions, and therefore he concludes the Intervals between them muſt have been of a very ſmall extent. To this I give a two-fold anſwer: Firſt, I ſuppoſe theſe Darts were to be caſt out of Scorpions, Onagers, and Catapults, and if theſe, or any of them could ſhoot Spears (as it is written of them) over the *Danube*, where it is broadeſt, then I believe (though I never ſaw that River) they could throw Darts more than four Stadiums, or Furlongs, which will be two thouſand five hundred foot, and all the ground I require for a *Roman* Army Marſhall'd in three Batallions one behind another, allowing ſix foot between Ranks, and three hundred and ſixty between the firſt and the ſecond Batallion, and ſeven hundred and twenty between the

ſe-

ſecond and the third, amounts to no more but twelve hundred and ſeventy two foot.

My ſecond anſwer is, that at that time *Pompey* had no mind to fight, and therefore drew up near his Camp, that he might fall back to it, when he pleaſed, (as he then did) and ſo in Marſhalling needed not keep the ordinary cuſtom of Intervals.

But the Intervals *Lipſius* gives between one Maniple and another in all the three *Roman* Claſſes of Foot which were called the direct ways or ſtreets, not theſe Tranſverſe ones whereof I have ſpoken, are yet more irrational, and his conjecture of them leſs obvious to ſenſe, as of the other. He ſaith if the *Velites* be to ſtand in theſe Intervals, they may be of twenty or thirty foot, if not of ten. But I ſay firſt, if the *Velites* ſtand there, they are no Intervals at all. Next, if they be ordered to ſtand between the Maniples of the heavy armed, as much of ground muſt be allowed them, as wherein they can conveniently ſtand and fight; now that cannot be certain, but according to their number, as ſuppoſe them twelve in front, (whether ten, ſix or four deep, it matters not) *Lipſius* muſt allow them twelve foot for their twelve Files to ſtand on, and thirty three foot for eleven diſtances between Files, and that is forty five foot: Where are then *Lipſius* his twenty or thirty foot. But *Lipſius* knew well enough that the *Velites* were not to ſtand in the Intervals of the heavy armed, but only either to advance to the Van, or retire to the Reer through them; and he knew too that the Intervals between Maniples were principally for the Maniples of the firſt Claſs to fall in the Intervals of the ſecond Claſs, and the Intervals of the third Batallion for the Maniples of the other two to fall back to them: and therefore to allow but ten foot for every one of theſe Intervals is an inexcuſable error in him, and a conjecture which hath no coherence with ſenſe, nor can ever be juſtified by reaſon. That General never breath'd that could draw up a band of men conſiſting of twelve Files in ten foot of ground. Now every Maniple of the *Principes* and *Haſtati*, according to *Polybius* whom *Lipſius* follows, conſiſted of one hundred and twenty men, and theſe being ten deep, conſtituted twelve Files, theſe have eleven Intervals, every one of which being three foot, make thirty three foot; add twelve to that for the twelve Files to ſtand on, the aggregate is forty five foot, and if you allow but two foot for every Interval between Files, the Interval between two Maniples muſt be thirty four foot, for it is not poſſible you can allow leſs ground for an Interval than that which a Body poſſeſſeth, that is ordain'd to ſtand in that Interval. Hence I think it is obvious to common ſenſe, that all the Intervals between the Maniples of the *Haſtati* and *Principes*, were of forty five foot, or thirty four at leaſt. And thoſe of the *Triarii* of ninety foot, or ſixty eight at leaſt, in regard they were to receive the Maniples of both the *Haſtati* and *Principes*.

Lipſius his direct Intervals examined.

True Intervals between Maniples.

In the clearing this point of Diſtances I have been perhaps too prolix, and have uſed repetitions, which I condemn in others; but being it is almoſt impoſſible to have ſo much as a general notion of a *Roman* Army, how it was Marſhall'd, (or of any other Army) unleſs you know the Intervals, I have not thought it amiſs to ſpend a little paper on that Subject. And indeed we are left as in many other Points (neceſſary to be known) ſo in this, to grope in the dark. Nor have I been ſo ſevere to the learned *Lipſius* for his extravagant conjectures of *Roman* Intervals, but I ſhall be ready to accept (and deſire others to do ſo too) of his own excuſe, which I ſhall give you in his own words, as I find them in the fourth Book of his Commentary. *Hen tenebras meas, aut rerum veterum, quas revera per leves conjecturas, & fallacia veſtigia venamur.* Ah, ſays he, my darkneſs, or that of ancient things, which indeed we muſt hunt after with uncertain conjectures, and through fallacious footſteps.

Lipſius excuſed.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Roman *Allies, and Auxiliaries, and the miſtakes of ſome Authors concerning them.*

YOU may read very frequently in *Roman* ſtory of *Socii*, Allies, and Confederates, who were obliged by Covenant and Stipulation to ſend out ſuch an aſſiſtance of men for the City of *Rome* as the Senate or the Conſul required, till a little before *Julius Caſar*'s time; after that you ſhall read no more of them, for then they were all made Citizens of *Rome*, and reckon'd to be of one Incorporation. The difference between Allies and Auxiliaries was, the firſt could only be *Italians*, the ſecond were of any other Nation. Hence it is that though we read of no Allies that join'd with *Lucullus*, *Sylla*, *Pompey*, *Caſar*, *Anthony*, *Veſpaſian*, and his Son *Titus*, yet we find their Armies mightily ſtrengthened by Auxiliaries. But indeed the *Romans* did but fool ſome of the *Italian* Towns and Republicks with the goodly ſhow of Alliance, and the honourable title of *Socii*, whereas truly they uſed them no better than Vaſſals, obliging them to follow them in the purſuance of their ambitious deſigns, with as many Forces of Horſe and Foot, as the Senate pleaſed to impoſe on them, and to ſerve at their own charges, except a little Proviant, which with the help of theſe ſame Allies they took from an enemy. Hence came theſe many grievances of the Confederated Towns, mentioned in the *Roman* Hiſtories, and once a total rupture of the *Latins* from them, till after much blood-ſhed they were reduced to their former condition.

Roman Allies ill uſed.

Till the *Romans* had over-maſtered *Hannibal*, *Philip* of *Macedon*, and the great King of *Syria*, *Antiochus*, we ſhall ſeldom read of any of their Armies that were not puiſſantly aſſiſted by their Allies; the number either as to Foot or Horſe, of which that aſſiſtance conſiſted, may be collected from the ſeveral times of their conjunction; but that they were determinately and conſtantly ſtinted to ſuch a number, can never be prov'd out of ancient ſtory; yet I find *Vegetius* very poſitive in it, and in the firſt Chapter of his Third Book, he offers to aſſure his Reader that neither Allies nor Auxiliaries were ever in one army ſtronger than the *Romans*. Take his own words, *Illa tamen ratio ſervata eſt ne unquam amplior multitudo Sociorum Auxiliariumve eſſet in Caſtris, quam Civium Romanorum:* That care, ſaith he, was taken that no greater number of Allies or Auxiliaries, ſhould be in the Camp, than of *Roman* Citizens. And *Machiavelli* in the Third Book of his Art of War, ſays that every Conſular Army conſiſted of two Legions, which were eleven thouſand Foot, and two Legions of Allies, which made alſo eleven thouſand Foot. I ſhall firſt ſpeak a word to both of them together, and then ſeverally to each of them. Both of them had read *Livy*, and till they had produced a more Authentick Hiſtorian, none of them ſhould have given him the lye ſo broadly. This Author in his Twenty firſt Book tells us, that after *Hannibal* came to *Italy*, *Cor. Scipio* and *Sempronius* levied ſix Legions of *Romans* each of four thouſand Foot, and for every one of them three hundred Horſe, and in that ſame place he caſts up the total of them to be twenty four thouſand Foot, and eighteen hundred Horſe, and of Allies ſaith he, forty four thouſand Foot, and four thouſand Horſe. This wanted but four thouſand of the double number of the *Roman* Foot, and four hundred more than double the number of the *Roman* Horſe. In his Thirty fifth Book he informs us that in the War againſt *Antiochus* the Conſul *Quintius* raiſed two Legions, each of five thouſand Foot, in all ten thouſand, and ſix hundred Horſe; and of the Allies, ſaith he, twenty thouſand foot, and eight hundred Horſe. The number of the Foot was double the *Roman* Infantry, and the Horſe exceeded the *Roman* by two hundred. In the *Iſtrian* War, a little before that of *Macedon*,

Number of the Allies,

Miſtaken by *Vegetius*,

Miſtaken by *Machiavelli*;

Prov'd out of *Livius*.

Livy

Livy in his forty firſt Book ſays, ten thouſand *Roman* Foot, and three hundred Horſe were levied, and of the Allies twelve thouſand Foot, and ſix hundred Horſe. And to make ſhort, hear him once for all in the Third Book of his Hiſtory. It was agreed and concluded, ſaith he, that the Army ſhould conſiſt of two parts Confederates, (theſe then were the *Latins* and the *Hernicks*) and one third part Citizens. If theſe Inſtances evince not the raſhneſs of that aſſertion, that the Allies were never ſtronger than the *Romans*, then *Livy* hath baſely cozen'd us. But *Vegetius* will perhaps bring *Polybius* to ſupport him, who in his Sixth Book ſays, The Allies Foot were for moſt part equal with the *Roman* Foot, but their Horſe were double the number of the *Roman* Cavalry. To this I anſwer firſt, that by this account the Allies were ſtronger than the *Romans*, their Horſe being double the number of the other, and therefore they were not of equal ſtrength. Secondly, what if *Polybius* had ſaid that both *Vegetius* and *Machiavelli* aver, *Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus*; and indeed if he had ſaid ſo much, he had nodded to the heighth of a perfect ſleep, and might have been ſaid to have dream'd. Thirdly, he ſays not that the Foot were always of equal numbers, but *ut plurimum*, for the moſt part, and I queſtion the truth of that too. And laſtly, if he had meant they were always of a like ſtrength, he had foully contradicted himſelf; for in his Second Book he hath theſe words: Before *Hannibal*, ſays he, invaded *Italy*, the *Romans* levied againſt the *Gauls* four Legions, each conſiſting of five thouſand two hundred Foot, which were twenty thouſand eight hundred Foot, and for every Legion three hundred Horſe, which were twelve hundred; and of the Allies, ſaith he, were raiſed thirty thouſand Foot, and two thouſand Horſe. And in that ſame Book he ſaith, that the *Roman* preparations (I ſuppoſe againſt *Hannibal*) amounted to ſeven hundred thouſand Foot, and twenty thouſand Horſe, a third part whereof (conſidering the ſenſe of that time) could not be *Romans*; and yet (ſaith this Hiſtorian) *Hannibal* invaded them with few more than twenty thouſand men.

Polybius defended.

To *Vegetius* I ſhall ſay particularly, that when he avers the *Romans* ſuffered not their Auxiliaries to exceed their own ſtrength, he did not remember what *Livy* told him in his Twenty fifth Book, how *Cneius Scipio* truſting to the aid of thirty thouſand *Celtiberian* Auxiliaries, was betray'd by them when he was to fight with *Aſdrubal*, for they left him every man, and join'd with the *Carthaginian*. A Caveat (ſaith the Hiſtorian) for the *Romans*, and all other States and Princes, to take no more Auxiliary ſtrangers in their Camps than they could well overmaſter. In the next place I ſhall make bold to ask *Machiavelli*, what he meant in the Third Book of his Art of War, where he ſays, though the Confederates Foot never exceeded the *Roman* Foot (the contrary whereof I have prov'd) yet their Horſe, ſays he, were permitted to be ſome more. Say you, *ſome more*, yes indeed, *ſome more*, if it be true, what your ſelf ſaid a little before, that the *Roman* Horſe of a Conſular Army were but ſix hundred, and theſe of the Allies one thouſand four hundred: This is a *ſome more* indeed. But it is probable I may meet with him upon this very ſame ſubject in the next Chapter.

Vegetius wrong in the number of Auxiliaries;

And *Machiavelli* of the Allies.

But we ſhall not be able to make an eſtimate of the marſhalling, marching, or encamping of a *Roman* Conſular Army, till we condeſcend on the number of the Allies, without whom few or none of them in ancient times went to the fields. Let us therefore without further conteſt follow the authority of the famous Hiſtorian and Captain *Polybius*, who (as I have cited his words already) ſays, the Allies for moſt part were equal in Infantry with the *Romans*, and double the number of their Cavalry. Then it will be clear, that not only in our Authors time, but often both before and after it, every Legion of the Allies conſiſted of four thouſand two hundred Foot, and their Horſe for every Legion were ſix hundred, becauſe we may conjecture probably out of *Livy*, the *Roman* Legion was of that ſtrength, and that the Horſe were three hundred.

We muſt follow *Polybius* for the number of the Allies.

Out of the number of the Allies, by the Conſuls appointment, were taken thoſe whom the *Roman* Hiſtorians call Extraordinaries, and theſe were not a few, for they were the fifth part of the Foot, and the third of the Horſe; as ſuppoſe out of two Legions, conſiſting of eight thouſand four hundred Foot, one thouſand ſix hundred and eighty were taken, which was the fifth part, and out of twelve hundred Horſe, four hundred were taken, which was the third, and theſe

The Extraordinaries of the Allies.

theſe were the gallanteſt, beſt arm'd, beſt mounted, and of the greateſt repute. There be ſome ſuch as *Lipſius* and *Terduzzi*, (who would gladly make us believe they have converſed with the Ghoſts of the old *Roman* Politicians, and ſo know their *Arcana* and ſecrets) who ſay this was done under the mask of an honourable employment, to keep them at a diſtance from their friends, that they might not combine to the prejudice of the *Roman* State; and they ſay that upon this ſame account the reſt of the *Socii* and Allies were in March, Camp and Battel, kept aſunder by the interpoſition of the whole *Roman* Infantry: I may believe it was ſo, becauſe I never heard any ancient *Roman* ſay any thing to the contrary. But if theſe Confederates had intended to have betrayed at any time their Imperious Allies, the *Romans*, they might eaſily have contriv'd the matter either in Camp or Battel, to have joined with an Enemy to the evident deſtruction of as many *Romans* as were then in the Fields: For in Battel the left-hand Legion of the Allies, and all their Cavalry being marſhall'd together, might without any ſtop have ſtept over to an enemy, as in the diſcourſe of a Conſular Army will appear. And in a Camp the two ſides of it were recommended to the care of the Allies, (as you will ſee in their *Caſtrametation*) and ſoon may a man be deceived who truſts the Aphoriſm, *Diſce diffidere*, Learn to diſtruſt. If all this might have been true, where *Roman* and Allies Legions were of equal ſtrength, ſure in Armies where the Allies were far more numerous than the *Romans*, they might if they had intended it, have done miſchief enough.

An idle conjecture.

Out of theſe Extraordinaries were ſome choſen both of Horſe and Foot, and theſe were called *Selecti*, as *Polybius* his Interpreter renders it, or *Ablecti*, as *Lipſius* will have it to be. Theſe, ſays *Polybius*, did not only lodge in the Camp behind the Tribunes, and near the General, but alſo in Battel, and on other occaſions they uſed to attend the Conſul, and the Queſtor, but of what number theſe *Selecti* were, neither *Polybius*, or for any thing I know any for him, doth inform us.

Selecti of the Allies.

Theſe Legions and Horſe-Troops of Allies were Officer'd, Marſhall'd, Encamped, and Diſciplin'd according to the *Roman* cuſtom, only with this difference, that thoſe who commanded *Roman* Legions were called Tribunes, but thoſe who commanded the Legions of the Allies were called *Præfecti*. I conceive the reaſon of the difference of the title was this, the Tribune was elected for moſt part by the Tribes, whence he had his name *Tribunus*; but thoſe of the Allies were nominated by the *Roman* Conſuls (for the Allies had no power to appoint or Commiſſionate their own *Præfecti*, that had intrencht too much upon the Lordly power the *Romans* ſtill kept in their own hands) and were bound moſt ſtrongly to obey that Conſul with whom they join'd. So we ſee how little difference the haughty *Romans* made between their Confederated friends and their vaſſals, which I hinted in the beginning of this Chapter; and in this point the Conſuls had more power over the Allies than over the *Romans* themſelves; for the *Roman* people for moſt part choſe the *Roman* Tribunes, and not the Conſuls.

Roman Conſuls power over the Allies.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of a Roman *Consular army, and some Mistakes concerning it.*

I Know not from whence this denomination of a Consular Army is come, unless it be that *Polybius* in his Sixth Book saith, that ordinarily every year four Legions were levied for the States service, two for every Consul, and this *Livy* doth witness to have been done often. But neither the one nor the other hath asserted that a Consul never had more or fewer Legions in his Army than two. *Polybius* means that a Consular Army consisted for most part of two *Roman* Legions; six hundred Horse, with two Legions of Allies, and twelve hundred Horse. But he never said that it was constantly so, for then he had contradicted his own History in many places. But I rather conceive Authors call that a Consular Army which had in it the above specified number of Horse and Foot, by the authority, and upon the word of *Vegetius*, who describes both a Pretorian and a Consular Army in the first Chapter of his Third Book. I shall faithfully *English* his words thus: *The Ancients* (saith he) *having by exrerience learned to obviate difficulties, chused rather to have skilful than numerous Armies; therefore they thought in Wars of lesser moment, one Legion with the Auxiliaries, that is ten thousand Foot, and two thousand Horse might suffice, which the Prætors as lesser Chieftans often led in Expeditions. But if the enemy was reported to be strong, then a Consular power with twenty thousand Foot, and four thousand Horse was sent, with a greater Captain. But if an infinite multitude of the fiercest Nations did rebell, then too great necessity forcing them, two Chieftans with two Armies were sent, with this command, that either the one Consul, or both, should look to it, that the Commonwealth should receive no damage. In fine* (saith he) *since the* Roman *people was to make War almost every year in several Countries, against divers enemies, they thought these forces might suffice, because they judged it was not so profitable to entertain great Armies, as those that were well exercised and trained in Armes.*

Vegetius describes a Pretorian, and a Consular army;

And contradicts himself,

Thus far *Vegetius*: let us take his Discourse in pieces, and examine it according to his own writings, and no mans else.

First, In the sixth Chapter of his second Book, he avers, there should be no fewer in a Legion than six thousand one hundred Foot, and seven hundred twenty six Horse: in this place, he saith, a *Prætorian* Army, (wherein there should be a Legion of *Romans*, and another of Allies) should have ten thousand Foot, and two thousand Horse; the Foot two thousand two hundred fewer than in his own account there should be in two Legions, and the Horse five hundred forty eight more than himself allows to the Cavalry of two Legions. And to let us see, that he will keep a proportionable way in contradicting himself, he says, against a strong Enemy a Consul was sent with twenty thousand Foot, and four thousand Horse; and that is, as he explains himself in the fourth Chapter of his second Book, two Legions of *Romans*, with the help of the Allies; now I beseech you hear him speak for himself; and first, in the sixth Chapter of his second Book he says, that the Legion must consist of six thousand one hundred Foot, and seven hundred twenty six Horse. Secondly, In this first Chapter of his third Book, he makes four Legions of the *Roman* and Allies Foot to be but twenty thousand, which by his own rule should have been twenty four thousand four hundred; for his words formerly were, that no Legion should be under six thousand one hundred, and those heavy armed too; and whereas by his own appointment, in the sixth Chapter of his second Book, every Legion should have had seven hundred twenty six Horse, more than any other Author allow'd: In this Chapter he increased their number to one thousand, for he orders the Horse of four Legions to be full four thousand, the Foot of a Consular Army four thousand four hundred below,

First in the Pretorian army,

Secondly in a Consular army,

and the Horſe one thouſand ninety ſix above his own allowance. You ſee how *Vegetius* claſheth with *Vegetius*, it is not I that quarrel with him.

His inadvertency,

In the ſecond place, he ſaith, if an infinite multitude of fierce Nations rebelled; Rebelled, againſt whom? Certainly he means againſt the *Romans*; but how could they rebel, before they profeſt to be ſubject? Aſſuredly, theſe fierce Nations he ſpeaks of, ſwore neither fealty nor homage to *Romulus*, nor *Rome* when he firſt founded it. If they defended themſelves, ſo long as they could, from the dominion of ſtrangers, they did what nature commanded them, and were no Rebels. He will find *Spain* it ſelf, after long and bloody Wars, never reduced to a Province till *Auguſtus*'s time. You ſee what words his inadvertency prompts him to utter. In this caſe of a great Rebellion, he ſays, two Conſuls with the Armies were joyn'd together, with a command to look to it, that the Common-wealth ſuffer'd no damage. But this command was given many times when two Conſuls did not, nor needed not bring their forces together.

His contradiction of *Roman* ſtory.

Thirdly, You have heard him aver, that in the great wars, which the *Roman* State manag'd, their greateſt Army conſiſted of twenty thouſand Foot, and four thouſand Horſe, twenty four thouſand in all; and that two of thoſe Armies joyn'd together, making of both forty eight thouſand Combatants, did ſuffice in the greateſt danger. Truly *Vegetius*, if *Hannibal* had been alive when you wrote this, he could have inform'd you, that he forc'd your Maſters, the *Romans*, to joyn two ſuch Armies and more, before ever they had to do with thoſe fierce Nations you ſpeak of; except a few *Spaniards*, and the *Ciſalpine* or *Italian Gauls*; unleſs you take the *Sicilians* and *Carthaginians* to be thoſe fierce Nations; with the firſt whereof they quarrel'd and invaded them, and with the ſecond broke Peace, without either regard to Juſtice, or ſenſe of Honour. But tell me, had the two Conſuls at *Cannæ*, no more but forty eight thouſand *Romans* and Allies? read *Polybius* his fourth Book, you will ſee they had eight Legions of *Romans*, and as many Allies, at five thouſand Foot each Legion, and three hundred Horſe, and theſe extended to eighty thouſand Foot, and ſeven thouſand two hundred Horſe, reckoning the Allies Cavalry double that of the *Romans*. Read *Livy*'s twenty ſecond Book, you will ſee *Hannibal* kill'd at that ſame Battel, forty five thouſand *Roman* Foot, and two thouſand ſeven hundred Horſe, beſides Allies; and the ſame Hiſtorian will tell you in plain language, that the *Roman* Army at that place conſiſted of fourſcore and ſeven thouſand fighting men. And before *Hannibal* enter'd *Italy*, had the *Romans* no ſtronger Armies againſt the *Gauls* than forty eight thouſand men? Yes, both *Polybius* and *Livy* will tell you of far greater numbers, read in other Hiſtories whether *Marius* had but forty eight thouſand *Romans* againſt the fierce Nations of the *Cimbrians* and the *Teutones*. How vain a thing it is then for an Author of *Vegetius* his reputation to aver, that againſt the mightieſt Enemy, two Conſular Armies, each of twenty four thouſand men, were ſufficient, againſt the current of Hiſtory.

A bold aſſertion of *Vegetius*.

Fourthly, He lays it down for an unqueſtionable truth, that one Conſul had never more than two Legions of *Romans*, and as many of the Allies, againſt the moſt powerful Enemy. Be pleas'd to hear his own words, in the fourth Chapter of his Second Book: "*In omnibus Auctoribus invenitur, ſingulos Conſules adverſus Hoſtes copioſiſſimos, non amplius quam binas duxiſſe Legiones, additis auxiliis ſociorum*: In all Authors, ſaith he, it is found, that every Conſul never led more againſt the moſt numerous Enemies than two Legions, with the aſſiſtance of the Allies. And that it ſhould not be ſaid, he had writ ſo manifeſt an untruth, without a reaſon, he adds, "*Tanta in illis erat exercitatio, tanta fiducia, ut cuivis bello, duæ legiones crederentur ſufficere.* They were ſo well train'd, and had ſo great confidence, that two Legions were thought to be ſufficient for any War. Did ever man write ſo? If two Legions were ſufficient in any War, why were four Legions and two Conſuls, imployed againſt the fierce Nations, he juſt now ſpoke of? But I will come nearer him, and tell him, that it is very often found in Authors, that one Conſul or General had the Conduct of more than two Legions, and therefore *Vegetius* his words that I cited laſt muſt either be falſe, or thoſe Authors whom I ſhall cite, do groſsly abuſe us. I ſhall not repeat the buſineſs of *Cannæ*; but be pleas'd to take theſe other Inſtances.

When

When *Cæſar* heard of the dreadful preparations of the *Helvetians*, to ſtop that inundation, he poſts to *Italy*, and raiſes two new Legions, joyns them with three *Veterans*, brought them to *France*, and with one he had there already, he made ſix in all, and with theſe fought the *Helvetians*, and thereafter, *Arioviſtus*, all in one Summer. This he writes in the ſecond Book of the *Gallick* War. Here were more than two Legions, yet but one Conſul. In his fifth Book he ſays, he invaded *England* with five Legions, beſides a vaſt number of *Gauls*, *Numidians*, and *Balearians*, having left his Legate *Labienus* in *Gaule* with 3 Legions, and three thouſand Horſe; here a Conſuls Legate commanded more Legions than two. The moſt part of the time *Cæſar* ſtay'd in *Gaule*, he had ten Legions, till *Pompey* and the Senate cheated him of two of them. *Petreius* and *Afranius* had ſeven Legions in *Spain*, *Pompey* had eleven at *Pharſalia*, beſides a world of Auxiliaries; and there *Cæſar* had eight, and at *Brunduſium*, when he was in purſuit of the flying Senate, he had twelve Legions. Thus we ſee, that Great *Cæſar*, the moſt daring Conſul that ever was, thought not two Legions ſufficient againſt any Enemy, or in any War. Before his time, the two Conſuls, *Marius* and *Scipio* joyn'd their Armies together againſt the *Cimbrians*; and, as *Florus* tells us, loſt in the Battel eighty thouſand *Romans*, and forty thouſand Servants and Baggage-men. Sure in theſe two Conſular Armies there were four Legions four times told. And the ſame Author ſays that *Mark Anthony* the *Triumvir*, entered *Media* with eighteen Legions, and ſixteen thouſand Horſe, all theſe Conſuls and their Legates liv'd long before *Vegetius*, and I doubt not but he hath read all their ſtories: but I ſhall lead him up to thoſe times, when his *Romans* were not ſo powerful as to raiſe ſo numerous Legions, and yet in them we ſhall ſee that the Conſuls were not ſtinted to two Legions a piece, as he hath very confidently declared, they were: *Polybius* ſaith, that before the ſecond Punick War, the *Romans* had ſeveral hundred thouſands in arms; I hope then no man (except our Author) will ſay, that every Conſul had but two Legions allotted him. In the Conſulſhip of young *Camillus*, the City being environed with enemies, ten Legions were levied; two of them were left for defence of *Rome*, four were given to the *Prætor*, and *Camillus* took four to himſelf, each conſiſting of 4 thouſand two hundred Foot, and three hundred Horſe. Thus we ſee not only that a Conſular Army had four *Roman* Legions in it (a thing denied by *Vegetius*) but a Pretorian one had four, to which our Author allows but one. You may read this in *Livy*'s Seventh Book, and in that ſame place he tells us, that the Conſul *Popilius Lenus* marched with four full Legions againſt the enemy, leaving a conſiderable army at *Rome* to wait on all hazards. In his Sixth Book, he ſaith old *Camillus* (who defeated the *Gauls*) marched with four Legions againſt the *Volſcians*. One inſtance more, which may ſerve to decide the queſtion if there were any, the ſame Hiſtorian in his Second Book informs us, that the Dictator *Marcus Valerius*, levied and enrolled ten Legions, whereof he gave three to every Conſul, and kept four to himſelf. Obſerve, that at that time the *Latines* were Allies, and levied their proportions, as many Foot as the *Romans* did, and twice as many Horſe, if not more of both the one and the other. Obſerve alſo, that in thoſe times the *Roman* Seignory was of no large extent; for *Livy* ſpeaking of theſe Levies of *Valerius*, ſays, ſo many Legions were never levied before; he means, never at one time. Theſe are ſufficient enough to prove *Vegetius* to have been too confident, when he ſaid that never *Roman* Conſul conducted more than two *Roman* Legions, even againſt the moſt numerous Enemies.

Inſtances of later times to the contrary: Of *Cæſar*,

Petreius and *Afranius*, *Pompey*,

Marius and *Scipio*,

Of more ancient times,

Before the ſecond *Punick* War,

Young *Camillus*,

Popilius Lenas,

Old *Camillus*,

Marcus Valerius.

But he is in no danger for all this, becauſe he is ſupported by one, who by his other writings hath made himſelf well enough known, and that is *Nicol Machiavelli*, who in the third Book of his Art of War, very magiſterially tells us, that the Allies Foot never exceeded that of the *Romans*, but their Horſe were ſome more; I have ſpoken to both theſe in the laſt Chapter: But he adds, that the *Romans* in their greateſt neceſſity never uſed more than two Conſular Armies, and that each of them conſiſted of twenty four thouſand Combatants. I hope, the inſtances I have uſed againſt *Vegetius* in this ſame cauſe, may ſerve ſufficiently to confute *Machiavelli*. But here I muſt obſerve the *Florentines* preſumption, in the modelling his *Roman* Conſular Army. Firſt, He makes every Legion to conſiſt of five thouſand five hundred Foot, a thing

Machiavelli's his aſſertion

we never heard from any other Author, nor he from *Vegetius*; who is conſtantly for ſix thouſand one hundred Foot. Next, he makes the Cavalry of the Allies to be ſeven hundred for every Legion, contrary to moſt Authors, who make them but ſix. But we ſhall let that paſs with him, that thereby he may make up his Conſular Army of twenty four thouſand men, thus: Two *Roman* Legions, eleven thouſand Foot, Allies Foot as many, theſe amount to twenty two thouſand; then ſix hundred *Roman* Horſe, and fourteen hundred of the Allies, are two thouſand Horſe; in all twenty four thouſand. Let this, I ſay, be given, but not granted him; why concludes he poſitively, that two Conſular Armies conſiſted of fifty thouſand fighting men? Where did the Secretary of *Florence* learn this Arithmetick, to make fifty the aggregate of twice twenty four? Yet if he be not guilty of more dangerous errors, we may pardon him this. But to return to *Vegetius*, he gives me too oft juſt occaſion to think that *Lipſius* wrong'd him not much, when he ſaid of him, that he was, *Veterum rerum parum firmiter ſciens*, Not throughly acquainted with ancient matters.

Confuted.

CHAP. XVII.

Of a Conſular Army, Marſhall'd in the Field; and of ſome general Officers belonging to it.

IN ſo important an affair, upon the right or wrong managing of which, depended the conſervation or ruine, not only of the *Roman* Armies, but of the State; *Polybius* affords us no more light than what he hath done in marſhalling the Legionary Foot; and if he be right in that, we are to look for little or no help from *Vegetius*, whoſe ordering of a Legion we have rejected; only we admit what he ſays in the fifteenth Chapter of his ſecond Book (though thereby he contradicts himſelf) that, *Equites locantur in cornibus*: The Horſe are placed in the Wings. But having in the ſeveral fore-going Chapters ſhown you how (as far as any Authors have given us light) the Foot were marſhall'd; of what number both they and the Horſe were, and how they were drawn up; of what number the Allies were, and how they were divided: I ſuppoſe, our buſineſs now is, how to joyn them in one Body or Army, and when it comes to a battel, to obſerve what cuſtomes were uſed by the *Romans*, and other Ancients.

Though as either occaſion offer'd, emergency required, or neceſſity forced, the *Roman* Captains uſed ſeveral figures and forms of Battels, yet that which was moſt ordinary, and moſt uſed, was the quadrate or ſquare; but I do not at all mean an equilateral one, as *Terduzzi* would gladly have it to be, to which purpoſe he puts himſelf to more trouble than he needs; and in doing ſo, he ſhews himſelf more an Engineer (as I believe he was to *Baſta* the Emperour, *Rodolph* the Second's Captain General in *Tranſilvania*) than a Marſhal of a Field needs to be. But I mean ſuch a Quadrate or Square, as the General of the *Roman* Army imagined, that either the ground, the poſture of the Enemy, or his own deſigns did or might prompt him to make. But in regard we can ſay but little to Marſhalling, till we condeſcend, of what and how many members ordinarily the *Roman* Armies were compoſed, and though the numbers of both *Roman* and Allies Legions varied oft, yet becauſe for moſt part the Legion conſiſted of four thouſand two hundred Foot, and the Horſe were three hundred, and that ordinarily two Legions, and ſix hundred Horſe were ſent to the Field with a Conſul, and that alſo for moſt part the Foot of the Allies was equal to that of the *Romans*, and almoſt conſtantly they were double their

Terduzzi over nice.

number

number in Horſe; let us follow *Polybius*, and ſay the Conſular army conſiſted of ſixteen thouſand eight hundred Foot, and eighteen hundred Horſe, in all eighteen thouſand ſix hundred.

Neither do I think I can tell you better how a *Roman* Army was Marſhall'd, when it was to fight, than to inform you how *Scipio* the Great, or the *African* drew up his Army when he was to fight againſt *Syphax* and *Aſdrubal*, and that out of the Fourteenth Book of *Polybius*. There the Hiſtorian tells us that the *Roman* Conſul drew up his Foot in the Body or Battel, firſt his *Haſtati*, next his *Principes*, and thirdly his *Triarii*; on the right wing were his *Roman* Horſe, and on the left his *Numidians*. And here our Author in one word, and once for all tells us, that it was the conſtant cuſtom of the *Romans* to Marſhall their Armies in that faſhion: His words are, *Et in hoc Romanæ Militiæ conſuetudinem ſimpliciter ſervavit.* And when the ſame *Scipio* fought againſt his redoubted enemy *Hannibal*, he did the very like, only with this alteration, that he commanded his Legate *Lælius* to command the *Roman* Cavalry on the left wing, and ſet King *Maſaniſſa* with his *Numidian* Horſe on the right.

Roman Army Marſhall'd by *Scipio*.

This one example may teach us how the *Roman* Armies were ordinarily Embatteled. But here is no word of the Allies. I ſuppoſe, if *Scipio* had any, as likely he had, their Horſe were join'd with the *Roman* Horſe in one of the wings in both thoſe Battels, ſince the other wing at both times was given to the Auxiliary *Numidians*. But where an Army was purely compoſed of *Romans* and Allies, they were Marſhalled (as we may gather out of *Polybius* his Sixth Book, and other Authors) in this manner, the *Roman* ſix hundred Horſe were placed on the right wing, upon their left-hand the firſt Legion of the Allies Foot, conſiſting of three thouſand four hundred (for eight hundred of it was taken out for Extraordinaries) upon the left-hand of the Allies firſt Legion, ſtood the firſt *Roman* Legion, and next it the ſecond; and upon the left-hand of it was Marſhalled the ſecond Legion of the Allies; and upon the left-wing ſtood the Confederates Cavalry to the number of eight hundred, for four hundred of their twelve hundred were cull'd out for Extraordinaries. Now thoſe eight hundred Horſe of the Allies were divided into twenty Turmes or Troops, as the *Roman* ſix hundred Horſe were likewiſe, but with this difference, that in every Troop of the Allies there were forty Riders, but in the *Roman* Troops there were only thirty. Thus was the groſs or bulk of the *Roman* armies Marſhalled. As to the *Evocati* of the *Romans*, and the *Extraordinarii* of the Allies, *Polybius* hath told us no more than what I have told you in my Diſcourſe of the Allies, that they were Encamped beſides the Conſul, and were to be near him in the field, and to wait on the Treaſurer alſo. But we are left by him and others to conjecture how, in what particular place or places, they were ordain'd to fight. And truly I ſhall be eaſily induced to believe that ſometimes the Conſul placed three hundred of the Allies Extraordinary Horſe on the right hand of the *Roman* Horſe in the right wing, and ſo made that wing ſtronger by one hundred than the other, for otherwiſe the left wing had been two hundred ſtronger than the right. The fourth hundred of the Extraordinary Horſe, *Terduzzi* will have to ſtay with the Conſul, and probably they did ſo. The Allies Extraordinary Foot were divided into two great Squadrons, one whereof ſtood between the firſt Legion of the Allies, and the firſt Legion of the *Romans*, on the right-hand of the Battel; the ſecond Squadron ſtood on the left-hand of the ſecond *Roman* Legion, between it and the ſecond Legion of the Allies.

Army of *Romans* and Allies Marſhal'd together in the Field.

Station of the *Extraordinaries* uncertain.

Thus *Lipſius* and *Terduzzi* will have it to be, and I think it may be probable enough that it was ſo, yet I doubt none of theſe two can tell me, who told them that it was ſo. In another place *Lipſius* thinks that both the *Evocati* and *Extraordinarii*, at the Conſuls command, join'd with the *Triarii* to reinforce the Battel, and truly this is not improbable, but the queſtion is where they ſtood before they were commanded to join with the *Triarii*? for as *Lipſius* Marſhals them in the Intervals of the *Triarii*, they would hinder the *Principes* and *Haſtati* to join with the *Triarii*. What *Terduzzi* ſaith on this ſubject, I ſuppoſe he hath out of *Lipſius*; for though they were coetaneous, yet I find *Lipſius* often cited by *Terduzzi*. But I ſhall wrong none of them, if I ſay that neither of them in this particular had more warrant than their own *Leves conjecturæ, & fallacia veſtigia*, as *Lipſius* calls them. If you will believe *Vegetius* in the eighteenth Chapter of his Third Book,

Book, the Conſul ſhould have made uſe of the *Extraordinarii* both Horſe and Foot to environ and ſurround the Enemies left wing: if you ask me why the Conſul might not as well have ſurrounded the enemies right wing as his left? I muſt anſwer you that *Vegetius* hath kept up the reaſon from us as a ſecret.

Station of a *Roman* Conſul in Battel.

In that ſame Chapter *Vegetius* ſays that the Commander in chief ſhould ſtand between the right wing of the Horſe and the Foot, as a fit place from whence he might take up his meaſures, and encourage and relieve both his Horſe and Foot. *Lipſius* and *Terduzzi* fix him to the *Aquila*, or the Eagle on the right hand of the *Roman* Legion. But *Polybius* ſaith in that Battel I juſt now ſpoke of, *Scipio* gave the right wing to *Maſaniſſa*, and the left to *Lælius* to command. It would ſeem then that himſelf ſtaid with the Foot, and ſo indeed he did, for he cauſed a retreat to be ſounded to the *Haſtati*, that he might advance with the *Principes*. But ſince I may gueſs as well as others, I ſuppoſe he ſtood between the two *Roman* Legions, and conſequently beſides the Eagle of the ſecond Legion, and aſſuredly that part being directly the Center of the army, it was in my opinion the only proper place for a Captain-General; but when two Conſuls were joined together, it was not ſo, for ordinarily the one commanded the right wing of the Horſe, and the other the left. So it was at *Cannæ*, where the *Romans* were beaten by *Hannibal*; ſo it was at *Veſuvius*, where *Manlius* got the Victory over the *Latins*, after the death of his Colleague *Decius*; ſo it was at *Metaurus*, where *Nero* and *Livy* defeated and kill'd *Aſdrubal*. But indeed where there was but one Conſul or General, he ſeldom tyed himſelf to one place, but rode where he ſaw his Preſence was moſt needful. So did that *Manlius* I juſt now mentioned, ſo did *Cæſar*, and ſo did many others of the ancient *Roman* Captains. And it had been no prejudice either to *Lipſius* or *Terduzzi* to have ſuffer'd a Conſul in a Conſular army to have ſtood where he pleaſed, either beſides the firſt Eagle, or the ſecond, or beſides none of them.

Other General Officers in a Conſular Army.

Vegetius in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh Chapters of his Second Book ſpeaks of ſome more Offices in a Conſular army than *Polybius* doth, and theſe were three, *Præfectus Legionis*, *Præfectus Caſtrorum*, and *Præfectus Fabrorum*. It is ſtrange we do not read of theſe three great Commanders among the ancient *Romans*, and yet in my opinion they had the two laſt, as by the deſcription of their Offices, the Reader will quickly conceive. As to the firſt, *Polybius* makes no mention of him, and if there had been any ſuch Officer in his time, he neither could or would have paſt him, when he gave us the particular deſcription of a Legion, and all its Officers; and more eſpecially when he tells us, that the Tribunes received the word or *Teſſera* from the Conſul, and gave it to the Centurions, and that the ſaid Tribunes took on them to judg and give definitive ſentence in their Legions, which they could not have done if there had been a *Præfectus* above them. So it ſeems he hath been a new Officer created after the Emperours came in play.

Præfectus Legionis,

Colonel of the Legion.

This *Præfectus Legionis*, this Brigadier, or this Legionary Colonel, (for I know not how to *Engliſh* it) according to *Vegetius* his deſcription in the ninth Chapter of his Second Book, was an Officer of great experience, was obey'd by all the Tribunes, Centurions, and Soldiers; the care of Men, Horſes, Clothes, and Arms belong'd to him. By his order they were drill'd and train'd, and by his authority the Soldiers were puniſht for their miſdemeanors by the Tribunes. But mark it, he had only this power in the abſence of the Legate, and as his Deputy; *Legato abſente, & tanquam ejus Vicario*, ſaith *Vegetius*. Now if every Legion had a Legate, I ſhould believe the Legate was Colonel, the *Præfectus*, Lieutenant Colonel, the Tribunes were Captains, and the Centurions, Corporals, as I obſerved before in my Diſcourſe of the Infantry. *Polybius* indeed ſpeaks of Legates, but of no *Præfecti*, except among the Allies.

Præfectus Caſtrorum,

Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance.

The *Præfectus Caſtrorum*, ſaith *Vegetius*, had the care of the Poſition of the Camp, the ordering the depth and breadth of both Ditch and Rampart, the care of the Sick, and of the Phyſicians who were ordain'd for their cure. He had the overſight of the Chariots, Carts, Waggons, and Pack-horſes, of all the Mechanick Inſtruments for cutting and preparing Timber and Wood, and other matter for making Warlike Machines, and the Engines themſelves. All this ſeems to make this Officer to be the Lieutenant-General of the *Roman* Artillery.

The

The *Præfectus Fabrorum* was he who moſt reſembled our Modern Maſter of the Ordnance, or General of the Artillery; for it was he who had the prime care of the *Armamentarium*, or Magazine, in which was ordinarily not only ſtore of all kind of Arms and Engines for Expugnation and Propugnation of Towns, and ſtrong Holds, but alſo of all kind of Inſtruments and Materials for making them, and more particularly for the making up and defending their *Hiberna*, or Winter-quarters, in which were Shops for making all manner of Arms and Weapons both for offence and defence, and under his Conduct were alſo all manner of Materials for making Bridges, (for which purpoſe little Boats were carried along with their Armies) with Smiths, Carpenters, Joiners, and other Artificers, with thoſe who had skill to work in Mines; for though the Soldiers not only helpt, but alſo perfected moſt of thoſe works, yet there were ſome deputed, who had skill both to work themſelves, and to direct others. Neither will this prove that the *Roman* Armies carried Pioniers along with them, (for theſe were the Soldiers) but only that ſome Companies were deputed, to whoſe more ſpecial care all theſe works were recommended, and theſe were of a very old Inſtitution, in the reign of *Servius Tullius* King of *Rome*, for he appointed two Companies of Carpenters and Smiths for that purpoſe. *Præfectus Fabrorum*, or, General of the Artillery.

We read alſo frequently of Legates in *Roman* Armies; at the firſt Inſtitution there was but one, and he was ſent with the Conſul to repreſent the Senate and people, by whom he was choſen, and ſometime the Conſul had power to chuſe his own Legate. He ſat in Council with the Conſul, and gave his advice, but neither he nor the whole Council might impoſe on the Conſul, who conſtantly kept a Negative voice, and the Soveraign command over all. In the Conſuls abſence the Legate commanded abſolutely, and before him went ſix *Lictors*, or Serjeants, with Axes and Rods. But when the Conſul returned, the Legates command ceaſed. In proceſs of time there were two Legates ordain'd for each Army, and thereafter as many Legates as there were Legions, over which they had the command, according as *Lipſius* in the Second Book of his Commentary declares, in which I ſhall not oppoſe him, though I find no ſuch thing in Hiſtory, I am ſure neither *Pompey* nor *Cæſar* had ſo many Legates as they had Legions, either when they were preſent themſelves, or when they were abſent; *Pompey* had ſeven Legions in *Spain*, and with them but two Legates, theſe were *Petreius* and *Afranius*. When *Cæſar* was in *England*, he had but one Legate with three Legions, and a great Cavalry in *Gaul*, and that was *Labienus*. Nor do I find, that either of thoſe two great Captains had a Legate for each Legion that fought at *Pharſalia*. In the time of the Emperours (and perhaps in the reign of *Auguſtus*) there was a Legate for every Province; and it may be a Legate or more for every army beſides. Legates.

In every Army there was a Queſtor, he was the Treaſurer, kept the Caſh, paid the Army, diſtributed the Wheat to the Men, and the Barley to the Horſes. To him was delivered all the Pillage that was taken from the enemy either in Villages, Towns, or Camps. He ſold it all, and out of the money gave either the Army their Wages, or Donatives, according as he had order from the Conſul, whoſe directions he was bound punctually to obey. Queſtor, or Treaſurer.

Though the power and command of a Dictator was uncontroulable in matters both of Peace and War, yet in the fields his Authority was no greater than that of a Conſul; but yet there was this difference, the firſt could not be call'd in queſtion afterwards, whereas the ſecond might. Where a Dictator was, he choſe his own Maſter of the Horſe, and though this title ſeems to import, that he who had it, had no power over the Foot; yet it was not ſo, for under the Dictator he commanded both Horſe and Foot, and was in effect his Lieutenant-General. Thus you have in this Diſcourſe, and in thoſe of the Infantry and Cavalry, a full account of all the Officers that I have read of in any Author that belonged to a *Roman* Army. Dictator. Maſter of the Horſe.

Though the Army which we have deſcribed in this and the foregoing Chapter, had the name of a Conſular Army, and that *Vegetius* makes a Prætorian Army to be but half the number of the Conſular one, yet it is needleſs to bring Inſtances from Hiſtory, to prove that greater armies than theſe conſiſting of four Legions have been commanded not only by Conſuls, but by *Proconſuls*, *Prætors*, and *Propretors*, in ſeveral of the *Roman* Wars.

The

The Conſuls ſtate when he went to any Expedition.

The chief Commander of the army, when he was to march from the City, was obliged to ſacrifice in the Capitol, and there to take his *Auſpices*, the foreboding Omens, or (as *Philemon Holland* calls them) the *Oſſes* of his good fortune in that Expedition, and then he rode out of the City in great ſtate and ſplendor, *Paludatus*, in a glorious and rich Embroidered Coat of Arms, convoyed by a gallant company of his choiceſt friends, with his *Lictors*, or Serjeants before him, with Axes and bundles of Rods, the ordinary number whereof (if the General was a Conſul) was twelve. Theſe ſolemn Rites, Ceremonies and Cuſtoms might not be neglected; if they were, the Generals had neither the prayers and good wiſhes of the people, nor the willing obedience of their armies. *Caius Claudius* going to *Illyria*, went from *Rome* in the night-time, without any ſolemnity, but ſo ſoon as he came to his army, he found his Soldiers in a mutiny, which though he puniſht ſeverely enough, yet he found himſelf neceſſitated not only to go back to *Aquileia*, but to return to *Rome* it ſelf, there to make his Vows, ſacrifice, and go out of the City in pomp, according to the accuſtomed manner.

Velites neglected.

But for all we have ſaid of *Roman* armies, we ſee not yet where the *Velites* were marſhall'd, nor how they fought; we muſt believe that which is moſt probable, that they were marſhall'd behind the *Triarii*, and that they marched through the Intervals of the heavy armed, to the Van, and fought there till they did either beat the enemy, or were beaten by him back to the Reer. If any deſire to ſee the figure of a Conſular army, he may meet with one of them in *Terduzzi* his Book of the ancient and modern Machines, and another in *Lipſius* his Commentary on *Polybius*, each after the fancy of the Author, but ſince I intend not in this Treatiſe to preſent my Reader with any figures of my own, I ſhall not trouble him with any that belong to another.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of ſeveral Figures of Armies uſed by the Ancients in their Battels.

IF a General or Commander in chief have not the choice of the ground where he is to fight, he muſt marſhall his army according to the advantages or difficulties of it. But if he may make choice of the place of Battel, then no doubt he may model his forces as he pleaſeth, without tying himſelf to any other preſcripts or precedents of others. Notwithſtanding which he muſt be very wary, not to caſt his army in ſuch a figure as carries along with it intricacy, ſuch as may make both the ordering and obſerving it difficult, and more eſpecially he was to be very ſhie of changing the Figure of his army in the time of action, in regard that the bulk of an army is compoſed of ſuch members as are for moſt part rude, groſs, and of ſo dull underſtandings, that they are not able in an inſtant to apprehend the reaſons of ſudden alterations, or to dive into the deſigns of their great Commanders; and therefore a change of the form of a Battel, after an army is engaged, may caſt it into confuſion, which may quickly render it a prey to an attentive and vigilant enemy.

Dangerous to alter the Figure of an Army in time of action.

Five Figures of Batallions.

The Figures of Armies uſed by the Ancients, not only *Grecians* and *Romans*, but even of thoſe Nations, likewiſe whom both theſe were pleaſed to qualifie with the title of *Barbarians*, were for moſt part of five kinds. Theſe were the Quadrate or Square, the Wedg, the *Tenaille*, or Tongs, the Saw, and the Globe.

Quadrate Turrite.

The Quadrate or Square they ſubdivided into three ſorts, to wit, the *Turrite*, the *Lying Lateritial*, and the *Simple Lateritial*. The *Turrite* was that Battel whoſe height or depth was much greater than its front; As, draw up a thouſand men

men ſix deep, let them face either to the right hand or left, you ſhall ſee them but ſix in front, and a hundred ſixty ſix deep, it is the *Quadrate Turrite*, ſo called becauſe its height or depth makes it look like a Tower; it was but ſeldom uſed, and indeed it is very uſeleſs.

The *Simple Latrice* is where all the *Latera* or ſides of the Battel, that is front, reer, and both flanks are of a like extent. One hundred men drawn up ten deep, gives you the *Simple lateritial Quadrate*; becauſe it is a Battel equal on all ſides, it is alſo called the *Æquilateral quadrate*, of this form were the ancient *Egyptian* Battels, as I have told you in the *Grecian* Art of War: ten thouſand of their men Marſhall'd a 100 deep, made them a 100 in front, a 100 in reer, and a 100 in each flank, ſo that face them any way you pleaſe, ſtill they were a 100 in front. Simple Lateritial Quadrate.

The lying *Lateritial* ſquare, or quadrate, is a Battel in which the front is of a greater extent than the flank, or where there are a great many more men in the rank, than in the file as 16000 men (after the *Grecian* way) Marſhall'd 16 deep, gives you a front of 1000 men, and the flank but of 16. And this was uſually both the *Grecian* and *Roman* way of Embattelling, and continues ſo ſtill in our Modern armies. So when you read in ſtory that an army march'd in a Quadrate form, as *Livy* ſpeaks both in his Second and Thirteenth Books, and *Saluſt* alſo ſays, that *Marius* matched againſt *Jugurtha* with a Quadrate army; you are to underſtand it, that they marched in order of Battel, ready to fight, and that the form of their Batallions was Quadrate, but do not imagin they were *Æquilateral*, or *Simple lateritial*. It is from the Quadrate form (which the *Romans* call'd lying *lateritial*) conſiſting of four angles, that our word Squadron hath its denomination; a word uſed now (for any thing I know) in all *European* Languages. By what I have ſaid it appears, that though it were granted to *Terduzzi*, as it is not, that the *Romans* drew up their Foot twelve deep; yet that will not conclude their Batallions, whether leſſer Bodies or greater, to have been *Æquilateral* quadrate, as he would have them to be, for in their Maniples drawn up, as he would have them twelve deep (ſince every one of them conſiſted of an hundred and twenty men) they could make but ten Files; now ten in front, and twelve in file, makes no more an *Æquilateral* Batallion, than a hundred twenty men Marſhall'd ten deep, and twelve in front can repreſent that figure. This lying *Lateritial* quadrate, whereof I now ſpeak, is that form of Battel whereof *Vegetius* is to be underſtood, when he ſpeaks of a quadrate army with a long front. Lying Lateritial Quadrate. *Terduzzi* nicely curious.

The *Wedg* I have ſpoke of in my diſcourſes of the *Grecian* Militia, but I would not have my Reader to imagin that theſe Wedg-battels ſpoken ſo much of in ancient Hiſtories, were ſuch as are painted to us, beginning with one man, then two, next three, and ſo to the end of the Chapter (though that method might be well enough obſerved in a ſmall body either of Horſe or Foot) but they were Batallions condenſed, and at cloſe order, the point conſiſting of a good many men, yet pointed, becauſe the Body grew broader and broader, till you came to the Reer where it was broadeſt; for to imagin that in the heat of the fight, any Batallion of the moſt experienced Soldiers, can be ſuddenly caſt into ſo punctual a form, (as firſt one, then two) by the readieſt General that ever was, is a Speculation never reduced, or reducible to practice. And ſo you are to underſtand the Wedg in which the *Theban Epaminondas* caſt ſome of his Infantry at the Battel of *Mantinea*, whereby he broke the *Laconians*, was not a *flim-flam* of one, two, three, and four, (he had no time to tell ſtraws) but a good maſſie body of men, perhaps of fifty, ſixty, ſeventy, or a hundred in front, growing greater till it came to the end. This Wedg-battel conſiſted of three angles, the foremoſt point making one, and the broad end furniſht the other two; and indeed it is a Triangle, but not an æquilateral one. I told you in another place out of *Livius*, how the *Celtiberians* had well near routed the Prætor *Fulvius* by their Wedg-battel, till he defeated them with a deſperate Charge of unbridled Horſes. He who thinks that this Wedg-battel of theſe *Spaniards* began with one man at the point, and by equal degrees came to a great many at the end of the Wedg, hath a ſtrong imagination. *Livy* in his twenty ſecond Book calls that Batallion of *Macedonians*, (who ſtood ranged in Battel within the Walls of *Cenchrea* to receive the Aſſailants, when the *Roman* Conſul was to ſtorm) a Wedg, and yet it was a Phalange condenſed, only ſmaller at the point, than at the reſt of its dimenſions. And he might have call'd it Wedg-figure. How it is rightly to be underſtood.

a *Teſtudo*, or Tortoiſe, if he had pleaſed, for they ſtood all covered with their Shields and great Targets, which repreſenting the Tortoiſe covered with its ſhell, gave that figure of Battel its denomination.

Globe, or Ring-figure.

The Globe-battel was a Batallion that appear'd to be of a round figure, and if it was perfectly round, the *Engliſh* have worded it well, in calling it a Ring, I find it oftner mention'd in modern than in ancient ſtories. I ſhould think thoſe who uſe it, were on the defenſive, for men ſtanding in a perfect Globe-figure, can neither purſue, nor run away without breaking their order, and figure of their Battel, and ſo unglobe or unring themſelves. Mr. *Elton* gives us its figure, and tells us right ingeniouſly how it is made; but ſure it is not feaſible for great bodies to caſt themſelves into that figure. I incline to their opinion who think it was but a Wedg of a leſſer body, and being ſmaller ſeem'd more Circular. And I the rather think ſo, becauſe *Cæſar* in his Books of the *Alexandrine* War, ſays, that *Domitius* one of his Legates ſav'd a Legion by caſting it in a Ring, when the reſt of his Army was routed at *Nicopolis* by *Pharnaces*; for if that Legion had been in a perfect round figure, it could not have retir'd as it did, from him who by his victory was maſter of the Field.

Tenaille, or Tongs.

The *Tenaille*, Tongs or Shears, was nothing but the reverſe of the Wedg, and was to be uſed only againſt it; for whereas the Wedg was ſharp at the point to pierce any Batallion that ſtood againſt it; ſo the *Tenaille* open'd its arms to receive and embrace the Wedg, having its bulk notwithſtanding behind to oppoſe it, if it could not be broke by the arms of the *Tenaille*. And a Squadron may very ſoon caſt it ſelf in a *Tenaille*, either by advancing its two flanks (the Body ſtanding *pied ferme*) or yet by making the middle part (againſt which the point of the Wedg prepares) retire a little, both the flanks ſtanding ſtill, either the one or the other way makes the Squadron a *Tenaille*.

The Saw.

The Saw was a great Batallion compoſed of ſeveral Squadrons, all marſhalled in the form of Wedges, the angular points of which Wedges repreſented the teeth of the Saw; and the Bodies of the ſeveral Wedges ſtanding in a direct line repreſented the body of the Saw. Some have writ that the ſeveral Maniples of a *Roman* Legion did repreſent the Saw, taking the Bodies of the Maniples for the Teeth, and the Intervals for the body of the Saw.

But how could that be, for the Bodies of the Maniples, and the ſeveral Intervals between theſe Bodies, were all of one equal front, and ſo are not the teeth and body of a Saw; and unleſs theſe Maniples had been made a little ſharper at the front, than of either ten or twelve men, the reſemblance would not have holden. We do not read that the *Romans* uſed it at all.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Of some Customes used by the Romans, *and other Ancient Nations, before, in the time of, and after their Battels.*

THE *Gracians* sung a Hymn and a *Paan*, both before and after their Battels; but before they begun, unless they were surprized, they offer'd Sacrifices to such of their Gods and Goddesses, as either they hoped would be for them, or feared might be against them: The inspection of the Entrails of the sacrificed Beasts, was an ordinary thing with the *Greeks*, as all their Historians tell us; nor was this custome peculiar to them, for the Enemy of Mankind was worshipp'd by the *Romans*, and other Nations, as well as by the *Grecians*. Before the *Romans* came to the Battel, they were somewhat nice in observing how the Sacred Pullets did eat their allowance; which furnish'd a fair occasion to the Chicken-masters to usurp a power to perswade or dissuade the Consuls from fighting, when they pleased. Instead of these, in our Modern Wars, before the Battel, the Turk with great devotion, attends the sight of the new Moon; and both he, and other *Mahometans*, howl loud enough to their Impostor, who is otherwise so taken up, that he hath no leisure to hear their babblings. Christians either humbly offer, or should humbly offer the Sacrifices of their Prayers to the True God, who gives Victory to whom he pleaseth. In the Primitive times, they sung a *Paan*, and a Hymn, *Crux Vicit*. Sacrifices.

After the Heathens thought they had made their Deities propitious, their Chieftains laboured to encourage their Armies with good Words, Speeches, Orations, and Promises of Rewards: Their Speeches were sometimes premeditated, and sometimes extemporary. The *Roman* Generals used to harangue their Armies, when they were to promulgate new Ordinances, to punish grievous Crimes, or to fight with an Enemy; sometimes in the Camp, and sometimes in the Field. And all this was also done by other Nations, though it may be not so well. Harangues.

When the *Roman* Generals resolv'd either to fight or offer Battel, they caus'd a Scarlet or Purple Coat of Arms to be hung upon the point of a long Spear at their *Prætorium*, or Pavilion; and this was *Signum Pugnæ*, the sign of Battel; and then every one prepar'd himself for his proper work. But before that, for most part, the Souldiers had direction to refresh themselves with Sleep and Meat, and this indeed was well done of them, but they were not the only men who did it; other Nations used it, particularly, we read, that *Hannibal* practis'd it at *Trebia*; for there he order'd his Army, the night before he fought, to take their rest and refreshment, and next morning set upon the *Romans* when they were fasting; to which *Livy* in his twenty first Book, mostly attributes his Victory. After these things the Army was marshall'd in the Field; whereof I have already spoken sufficiently. The Scarlet, or Purple Coat of Arms. Refreshment.

Being ready to come to the shock, the *Tessera*, or Word was given, which all, both Officers and Common Souldiers received, that by it they might know one another, and so discern an Enemy. The *Tessera* was either one Word, or one Sentence, as *Fœlicitas*, *Libertas*, *Venus Genetrix*, (one of *Julius Cæsar's*) *Optima Mater*, given by *Nero*, The worst of Sons. Among the Emperours, after their conversion to the Faith, *Deus Nobiscum*, God with us, was ordinary; and so it continues to be often used among the *German*, *Danish*, and *Swedish* Armies. Next to the Word, was the Shout, and this either was not, or should not be raised, till the Armies were at that distance, that they could immediately come to blows: This was done to encourage their own men, and terrifie their Enemies. *Livius* in his fourth Book informs us, that where The *Tessera*, or Word. *Baritus*, or Shout.

this cry or ſhout was very loud, ſhrill, and continued without interruption; it was interpreted to be a certain ſign of Victory: but if it was dead, cold, and unequal, often begun, and often interrupted, it bewray'd fear and diſcouragement, and portended ruine and deſtruction. It was uſed by all Nations, as well as the *Romans*, and the word *Baritus*, whereby Hiſtorians expreſs it, was borrowed from the Ancient *Germans*, whoſe cry, they ſay, ſounded like the pronunciation of that word. They cryed no more after they came to the medley, elſe it would have hinder'd them from hearing the Commands of their Officers, either by word of mouth, or the Trumpet. Though the loud noiſe of Cannon and Musket in our Modern Wars, may ſeem reaſon enough to ſuppreſs this ancient cuſtome of ſhouting, yet it neither ought to be, nor yet is it baniſh'd out of our Armies. The *Germans*, *French*, *Danes* and *Swedes*, in their advance, and before they give Fire, have their *ca, ca, ca*: And no doubt, with an advance, a ſtout heats and inflames the Blood, and helps to encourage. The late Uſurper, and his Armies, made but too good uſe of it. Theſe things were previous to a Battel; First, The Purple Coat of Arms at the Conſuls Pavillion. Secondly, The Exhortation or Harangue. Thirdly, The Marſhalling the Army. Fourthly, The Word, or *Teſſera*. Fifthly, The *Claſſicum*: And Laſtly, This Shout or *Baritus*. Of the firſt five that were ordinarily practis'd, *Cæſar* ſpeaks in the Second Book of his *Gallick* War, as neceſſary; for when he was almoſt ſurpriz'd by the *Nervians*, he writes thus: *Cæſar*, (ſaith he of himſelf) had all things to do at once, the Standard to be ſet up, (that is, the Scarlet Coat) his Army to marſhal, his Souldiers to exhort, to cauſe the ſign to be given by the Trumpet, and to give the Sign; this laſt Sign ſignifieth the *Teſſera*, otherwiſe the words had been ſuperfluous, of which that great man cannot be taxed. As to this laſt Sign, which was the Word, the Ancients found that ſame difficulty, with which all Armies are ſtill troubled; and that was, that by the often requiring and giving it, the Enemy came to the knowledge of it, and then it was uſeleſs. *Lipſius* tells us, that he reads in *Polyænus*, that one *Acues* an *Arcadian* Captain, being to fall on the *Lacedæmonians* in the night time, or, as we now call it, to beat up their quarters, inſtead of a Word, he commanded his Army to require no Word at all, but to uſe all thoſe who ſought a Word, as Enemies; ſo that the demanding the *Teſſera*, bewray'd the demander to be a *Lacedæmonian*, who at that time receiv'd a notable overthrow. The *Roman* Conſul, when he was to fall on, caus'd the *Claſſicum* to ſound, which was ſeconded by the neareſt, and immediately by all the Trumpets, Horns, and Horn-pipes of the Army.

A pretty ſtory.

Claſſicum a ſign of Battel.

And now the Battel begins, concerning which an old queſtion is not yet perhaps decided, Whether it was better to give or receive the charge? The *Roman* Dictator *Coſſus* (as *Livy* hath it in his ſixth Book) being to joyn Battel with a powerful Army of the *Volſcians*, commanded all his Foot to ſtand ſtill, and fix their Javelines in the ground, and ſo receive the Enemies charge; which being violent, put them out of breath, and then the Legionaries clos'd with them, and routed them. Great *Pompey* gave the like order at *Pharſalia*, but not with the like ſucceſs, for he was totally beaten. But *Machiavelli* with his accuſtomed confidence (to give it no worſe name) in the fourth Book of his Art of War, takes upon him to give the definitive ſentence, and awards the Victory to him who receives the charge: And ſaith alſo, that moſt Captains chuſe rather to receive than give it, yet he inſtances only one of the *Fabii*, who, by receiving the charge of the *Samnites* and *Gauls*, was Victorious. But we muſt liſten to a greater Captain than any he hath named, and himſelf to boot, and that is *Julius Cæſar:* who by giving the charge in the *Theſſalian* Plains, gain'd the Soveraignty of the *Roman* Empire, and blames *Pompey* for following the bad advice of *Triarius*, to wait till *Cæſar* charged him. His words, whereby he ſeems to void this difference, you have in the third Book of his Civil War, which are theſe in *Engliſh*: "But on the contrary, ſays he, I think this was done "by *Pompey*, without any ſhew of reaſon, (meaning his keeping his Souldiers "from advancing to the charge) becauſe there is, ſaith he, I know not what gal- "ant vigour, and natural inclination to courage born in all men, which Captains "ought rather to cheriſh, ſtir up, and augment, than any way mollifie, or re- "ſtrain. Thus far Great *Cæſar*. But on the other hand, if an Army be drawn

A queſtion, whether to give or receive the charge?

Machiavelli's opinion.

Cæſar's judgement of it.

up

up in an advantageous ground (suppose a Hill, or fenced with Marish, River, or Rock) the quitting of which may prove prejudicial (as the loss of all advantages, especially in matters of War doth) it alters clearly the case, and those who have done it either in Ancient or Modern Wars, to the irrecoverable loss of their Masters, have much mistaken *Cæsar*, who never practised it; and assuredly those who do it, had need of good fortune, otherwise they may be sure to be branded in true Histories with either perfidy, or inexcusable folly; and even in Romances, with too much generosity. To keep advantages.

In the time of Battel, all, both Commanders and Souldiers did their duties, by punctually obeying the commands of their Generals, though to the certain and inevitable loss of their lives; if not, they were sure to incur those punishments, whereof I shall speak hereafter. Nor were they obliged to obey the commands given them before the Battel only, but all those orders and signs that were given them in the time of Battel: These *Vegetius* in the fifth Chapter of his third Book, calls Signs, and divides them into three sorts, Vocal, Semi-vocal, and Dumb. The Vocal were the verbal commands of the Officers, especially the Consul, and Tribunes. The Semi-vocal were the several sounds of *Classicums*, Trumpets, and Horns; as *March*, *Charge*, *Retire*. The Dumb signs were the Ensigns, Standards, and Eagles; as also the elevation of the Hand, of a Colours, or a Lance, or the shaking of a Spear by a Consul, or General: But these were agreed on before the fight began, and were either given to the whole Army, or but to a part of it; as, when you see such a thing done, then you are to do so and so. These Dumb signs would not do much good in our Battels, where the smoak of Powder would render many of them imperceptible. Signs in time of Battel.

And now the Battel is ended, and the *Romans* are either Victorious, or have lost the day: If the first, they were to pursue the Enemy to his Camp, or clearly out of the Field; and not only so, but to follow him so close, that he might have no time to rally, and to force him out of his strong holds, before he recover'd breath to gather strength. But we shall find not only *Hannibal* defective in this so important a Duty of a Great Captain, but many of the *Romans* themselves, even against this *Carthaginian* Arch-enemy of theirs. *Livy* informs us in his twenty seventh Book, that at *Cannium*, *Marcellus* beats him; *Hannibal* gets to his Camp, and in the night time marches out of it; *Marcellus* not pursuing him, got work enough to do with him afterward. The same Author tells us in his twenty ninth Book, that the Consul *Sempronius*, and Pro-consul *Licinius* fought with the same *Hannibal* in the *Brutian* Countrey, and defeated him; but they not pursuing, he got the rest of his Army safely to *Croton* next day. In his thirty first Book he says, *Philip* of *Macedon* was worsted by the *Romans* in two Horse fights, but not being pursued by the Consul, and leaving great Fires in the Camp, he escap'd to the Mountains. *Cæsar* defies all his Enemies to challenge or charge him with this oversight; for he never beat one of them in the Field, (which he did very often) but he was sure to be Master of his Camp before he slept. But you may read all along in *Livy*, when the *Roman* State was but beginning to grow, that when their Dictators or Consuls had beaten any of their Neighbours, *Tuscans*, *Veians*, *Volscians*, *Samnites* or *Latines*, for most part, they made no more ado, but march'd back to the City, which, I suppose, the ambition of a Triumph frequently led them to. To pursue a Victory, Not always practis'd by the *Romans*: Never omitted by *Cæsar*.

But if these very often Victorious *Romans* receiv'd the foil, as sometimes they did, they did even that which many more ancient people did before them, and many younger have done since; and that is, they either fled, or retir'd: If they fled downright, without taking notice of their Camp, either their speed carried them away, or they saved their lives, by submitting to such conditions as themselves often imposed upon those, who by the chance of War, came to be their Captives; of which I shall speak in my discourse of Prisoners. Of what advantage or disadvantage flying or retiring to a Camp was, shall be touched, when I come to view *Lipsius* his comparison of the Ancient and Modern Militia. In this place I shall only say, that the *Romans* did not always leave their Camps fortified and mann'd, when they went out to Battel. At *Ciminia*, the Consul *Fabius* made his Baggage-men demolish the fortification of his Camp, and fill up the Ditches, while he put his Army in Battel array, Of a Retreat to a Camp.

array, in which he iſſued out, fought the Enemy, and beat him, as you have it in *Livy*'s ninth Book. And it is in that ſame Book, where he tell you, that the Dictator *Q. Fabius* order'd *C. Fabius* to fall upon the *Samnites* with his new levied Army, while the Dictator himſelf, at another quarter ſallied out of his Camp with his whole Army, and did not only not leave any to defend the Camp, but order'd likewiſe all his Tents and Baggage to be burnt, that by taking away all hopes of a Retreat, he might force his Souldiers to fight couragiouſly, both for the ſafety of their lives, and the recovery of their goods, or the equivalence of them, by the plunder of the Enemies Camp, all which came to paſs. The like of this action of the *Roman* Dictator, Hiſtory tells us, hath been practis'd by others, particularly by *William* the Conquerour, when he invaded *England*, who after his landing, caus'd them to burn all his Ships, which were not ſo few as eight hundred.

Una ſalus victis, nullam ſperare ſalutem.

CHAP. XX.

Of the March of a Conſular Army.

SUppoſing that, which very often fell out, that the *Romans* gain'd the Victory in their laſt Battel, and had again neſtled themſelves in their Camp, let us ſee in what order they march'd out of it, either to purſue an old Enemy, or to find out a new one. In this point of the *Roman* Militia, *Lipſius* puts himſelf to ſome needleſs trouble to comment on *Polybius*, for I think he is ſo clear in it, that *Liſius* doth him diſ-ſervice, in offering him his help, where he needs it not at all. I ſhall therefore tell you, how *Polybius* ordereth the march of a Conſular Army, without ſtaying for *Lipſius* his tedious explications.

Lipſius officious.

Preparations to a March.

At the firſt ſound of the Trumpets and Horns, every man gather'd his Baggage, Burthens, and Fardels together, and had them ready to truſs up, if they were Officers, on their Pack and Sumpter horſes; if common Souldiers, on their own Backs; At the ſecond ſound they loaded either themſelves, or their Beaſts: And at the third ſound they marched. Now, though *Polybius* mentions it not, nor *Lipſius*, (who will comment on him) yet we are to believe, that all Conſuls were ſo diſcreet that they made no great Interval of time between the ſecond and third ſound, becauſe it could not be very pleaſing to either Man or Beaſt, ſtanding under heavy burthens, to loſe any of that time which they might have ſav'd in making their Journey.

Order of the *Roman* March.

After the third ſound, they marched in this order: Firſt, marched the Extraordinaries of the Allies, as being neareſt the Conſuls Pavilion, and near to the *Prætorian* Port. Theſe were follow'd by the firſt Legion of the Allies, and after it, the Baggage of the Extraordinaries, and of that firſt Legion. In the third place march'd the firſt Legion of the *Romans*, and its Baggage after it. Fourthly, The ſecond *Roman* Legion, followed by both its Baggage, and the Baggage of the ſecond Legion of the Allies: Which in the fifth place was follow'd by the ſecond Legion of the Allies, that was in the Rear of the Infantry. The place where the Cavalry was to march, was uncertain; ſometimes both Extraordinary and Ordinary Horſe march'd all in the Van, ſometimes in the Rear, ſometimes on both the Flanks, without the Baggage, according as the General reſolv'd to make uſe of them; taking up his meaſures by the nearneſs of an Enemy in either Van, Rear, or Flank: And ſometimes the Cavalry march'd divided into Van and Rear. *Polybius* ſhews us alſo, that if there were ground enough, and great ſuſpicion of an Enemy, then the Baggage of the *Haſtati* of every Legion was ſent before them, which they followed themſelves, after them came the Bag-

gage

gage of the *Principes*, and then themſelves followed in the third place, by the Baggage of the *Triarii*, which themſelves follow'd. If an Enemy appear'd in the Van, the Baggage of the *Haſtati*, was immediately turn'd to a ſide, and the place where it had been, was poſſeſs'd by the *Haſtati* themſelves; the ſame was done by the *Principes* and *Triarii*. And we may ſuppoſe, that if an Enemy appear'd in the Rear, the Baggage of the *Triarii* was turn'd aſide, and its place poſſeſs'd by converſion; or facing to the Rear by themſelves, and the other two Batallions in that ſame manner were to ſecond them. What I have ſaid of one Legion, is ſpoken of all the four of a Conſular Army, the two *Roman* Legions, and the two of the Allies.

Some difficulties and doubts concerning the march of the Baggage.

But in *Polybius* his deſcription of the march of a Conſular Army, there ariſe to me ſome difficulties, which *Lipſius* hath not at all clear'd, nay, nor ſpoken of; though he ſpeak enough of that, which may be well enough underſtood without him. As firſt, conſider how it can be imagin'd, that the ground would always allow the *Romans* to march in the order I laſt ſpoke of, that is, every great Batallion of a Legion to have its Baggage in the Van of it: For by ſuch a March, in a Countrey full of Hedges, Ditches and Incloſures, it is not poſſible, but their Legions would be wonderfully embaraſs'd with their Servants, Horſes, and Baggage; neither could the three Batallions of every Legion, or of all the three, upon the attack of an Enemy make their evolutions from among their Baggage ſo dextrouſly and readily, but they might by an active purſuer, be brought to inextricable difficulties. I am therefore of opinion, that Time hath robb'd us of a page or two of *Polybius* his Writings, which would have explain'd this, and have made us know his own ſenſe, better than either *Lipſius* or *Terduzzi* doth. The laſt of theſe two doth wonderfully pleaſe himſelf in affirming, that an Army ſhould always march in that very order, wherein he who commands it, reſolves to fight. Here he fights with his own ſhadow, for, I ſuppoſe, none will deny, that an Army ſhould march in Batallions, great Bodies, Brigades, and Squadrons, yea, all in Breaſt, if the ground will permit it. But if not, then I hope, *Terduzzi* will permit a General to march in ſuch Bodies, ſmall or great, as with conveniency he can. But what if I deny to *Terduzzi* the thing it ſelf, for I dare aver, never *Roman* Chieftain intended to fight an Enemy in that order, as *Polybius* makes the Conſular Army to march: For who will fancy the *Haſtati* fought with their Baggage before them, or that the *Principes* advanced to the relief of the *Haſtati*, through their own Waggons and Carts? But grant him all he ſays, to be true, what is that to the thing in queſtion, which is, whether the ordering the Baggage to march between the ſeveral Batallions of a Legion, was conducible to obtain the great and main end and ſcope of all Armies, which is to overcome an Enemy? And ſince I think it was not, I am ſtill of the opinion, that *Polybius* his right meaning is not yet fully elucidated to us, either by himſelf, or any other perſon whatſoever.

Not at all clear'd by *Polybius*, or any other.

Roman Souldiers carried all their own Baggage.

And I will deal yet more freely, I do not well, or rather not at all underſtand, what is meant by the Baggage of the ſeveral Batallions of *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*; for what belonged to the Souldiers was carried on their own backs, (if all be true that we have told you formerly) except their Tents and their Hand-mills, and theſe, I think, might with little loſs have taken their hazard in the Rear of every Legion, nay, of the whole Army, if the Enemy was expected in the Van; or, they might ſecurely enough have been ſent to the Van, if the Enemy was in the Rear. So as ſtill *Polybius* his dividing the Baggage of a Legion into three parts, and putting a third before every Batallion, is myſterious to me.

Lipſius ſtands gazing and admiring at the excellent order of the *Roman* march, and crys out, *Mira eorum hic Providentia & Diſpoſitio:* Their Providence and Order here, ſaith he, was wonderful. But I wonder much more, that this Order of theirs did not ſometime bring miſchief upon them. For firſt, you are to believe, that the daring *Romans* for moſt part ſought their Enemies, who in that caſe could not but be in their Van, either marching to mete them, or marching away from them: If the Enemy marched to meet them, the *Roman* Baggage, either before the Legion it ſelf, or between the ſeveral Bodies of it, could not but give them thoſe inevitable embaraſſes, and inconveniences, where-

whereof I have ſpoken. If an Enemy marched from them, why did ſo prudent a people as the *Romans* were, make their own Baggage a hinderance to them in overtaking that Enemy, in whoſe purſuit they marched? For let any man conſider it right, the Great Baggage, that is, the Artillery, Engines, and Machines, or the ſtuff whereof they were to be made, their ſpare Arms, the Shops where, and Utenſils wherewith they were made; the Conſuls Pavilions and great Baggage, the Treaſurers train of Moneys and Proviant, and many times of Plunder, would take up ſo much ground between the ſeveral Legions and Troops, that without theſe hinderances, a Conſular Army might have joyn'd an Enemy in leſs time by half then it could do with them; which *Cæſars* ſpeedy march from *Gergovia* after the *Æduans*, without Baggage, did ſufficiently demonſtrate.

What advantages the *Nervians* propoſed to themſelves, by the manner of the March of the *Roman* Baggage between Legions (and ſure theſe advantages had been greater, if every Batallion of a Legion had had its Baggage in the Van of it) will be known to any who will attentively read *Cæſars* Second Book of the *Gallick* War; for they having learn'd how the *Romans* us'd to march, reſolv'd to ſet upon his firſt Legion, whileſt its Baggage gave a ſtop to the reſt to come up to its aſſiſtance: *Cæſar*, who was as happy as prudent, and as prudent as fortunate, learn'd their deſign by his Spies, and preſently alter'd the manner of his Countries March: He commands his Cavalry to ſet forward, and after it ſix Legions, and after them the Baggage of his whole Army, and in the Rear-guard two Legions more. If he had not done ſo, he might have receiv'd a notable, yea, an indelible affront from that ſtout and warlike Nation; which as it was, left him not the Field without a very bloody reſiſtance. Nor was this the only time *Cæſar* did ſo (though it is the only time mention'd by *Lipſius* and *Terduzzi*) for when he advanc'd with four Legions againſt the *Bellovaci*, he caus'd three Legions to march firſt, then the Baggage, which his fourth Legion followed. Perhaps he practis'd this more frequently, though it is not often mentioned: And in all his Retreats, he ever ſent his whole Baggage to the Van of his Army. Thus you ſee Great *Cæſar*, (who lived long after *Polybius*) did not tye himſelf ſo ſtrictly to the cuſtome of the *Roman* March, but he both could, and did alter it, according as he thought it ſtood with the conveniency of his affairs; and ſo ſhould all prudent Captains do.

We cannot tell how the *Velites* march'd.

But I cannot get one view of the *Velites* in all this March, and here our Authors leave us again to our conjectures. Certainly, if the whole ſixth Book of *Polybius* his Hiſtory be extant, and if ſome parcels of it are not loſt, (as I ſhrewdly ſuſpect there are) he forgot himſelf, when he forgot to tell us, where and how the *Roman* light armed (who made up more than the fourth part of the Infantry) marched; for to tell us (as *Lipſius* doth) that they marched where the Conſul appointed them, is to tell us juſt nothing; for neither heavy armed Foot, nor Horſe marched where they pleaſed, but where the General ordered them. Yet it is a probable, and a very rational conjecture, that the *Velites* marched neareſt that place where the Enemy was, whether that was in the Van, Rear, or Flank of the Army, ſince they were by their skirmiſhes to begin the Fight. But I fear in the next Chapter we ſhall have more groping, before we find the quarter where they lodged.

Obſerve, that the Legions of both the *Romans* and *Socii* did change Van and Rear daily by turns. I have told you before, the *Roman* ambulatory March was twenty *Italian* miles in four hours, and the curſory twenty five. But I ſuppoſe, without Baggage; and with it twenty miles was *Unius diei juſtum iter*; The juſt march of an Army for one day.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Quartering, Encamping, and Castrametation of a Consular Army.

Quartering in Towns and Villages.

After a long, and it may be, a hard and tedious March, it will be time to lodge our Consular Army; and lodged it must be in Towns and Villages, or in the Fields. If in the first, they had nothing to demand from their Hosts, but Bed and Lodging, and were to pay for all they spent in meat, drink, or fire. In the time of the Emperours, the Legates and Presidents of Provinces, caused them to furnish the Armies (as they marched through their jurisdictions) out of the publick Magazines (which was discounted from their wages by the Treasurers) or caused the Countrey people to bring in provisions of all kinds, as to open Markets, where they were sold to the Souldiers for ready money, at the ordinary rates of the Countreys, in which the Armies chanced to be; the contraveners and disobeyers of orders being severely punished. The way in which Officers and Souldiers used to be quartered in Houses (to avoid strife between them and their Hosts) was this: The whole house was as equally divided as might be, into three parts, whereof the Master of the house chose the first, the Souldiers the second, and the third and last returned to the host, who by this means had two thirds.

Souldiers hard labour in Encamping.

When the Army was to be quartered in the Field, which we call Encamping, (and which consisteth of two parts, Castrametation and Fortification) the common Souldiers had a harder labour than in their days March, in regard, (beside the measuring the ground) they were to Fortifie the Camp, with Ditch, Rampart and Pallisado, and to pitch the Tents of all their Commanders, and cleanse their quarters, before they got leave to take notice of their own Tents, or Huts.

In the matter of Castrametation (which is one part of Encamping) after the *Roman* way, we are to borrow all our light from *Polybius*, and our own conjectures; for *Vegetius* speaks but very little of it, and that little is in very general terms. But for the Fortification of the Camp, we are more obliged to *Vegetius* than *Polybius*. The first spends five full Chapters on Encamping, to wit, the twenty first, twenty second, twenty third, twenty fourth and twenty fifth of his first Book; and either for fear that he had forgot something in all these Chapters, or else, according to his custome, to refresh his own or our memories, he falls again to his Castrametation in the eighth Chapter of his third Book. The summ of all he saith on that Subject will amount to this: Summ of what *Vegetius* saith of Castrametation.

"He laments that in his time, the ancient custome of fortifying Camps was "worn out, for want whereof, says he, we have known many *Roman* Armies "afflicted by the sudden incursions of the barbarous Nations: Besides, saith he, "if they be worsted in any Battel, having no Camp to retire to, they fall by the "edge of the Sword unrevenged, like brutes; neither doth the Enemy make an "end of killing them, till he is weary of pursuing them. He says, The Army is "to Encamp where it may have store of Fuel, Wood, Water and Fodder, where "the air is wholsome, and free from Marishes; and if it be to stay any time, it "must be well looked to, that no Hill be near, from whence an Enemy may "infest it, and that the place be not subject to inundations of Waters. The "Camp is to be of such an extent, that neither Men, Beasts, nor Baggage, "be pinched for want of room; nor must it be so large, but that the Fortifica-"tions of it in all its circumference, may be sufficiently defended by the men "that are within it. This is all he says of Castrametation. As to the Fortification of the Camp, he tells us one and the same thing of it, in the twenty fourth Chapter of his first Book, and in the eighth Chapter of his third Book,

and it is shortly this: "That there were three several sorts or ways of fortifying a Camp: First, if there was but little danger, the Rampart should be made but three foot high (suppose above the line) and this Rampart was to be made of Turf cut out of the place where the Ditch should be, and the loose earth of the same, the which Ditch should be nine foot broad, and seven deep; and this was called *Fossa tumultuaria*, or a Ditch suddenly cast up, and it seems was used when the Army was to stay but a night or two, and no enemy near it.

And of fortifying the Camp.

Thus far *Vegetius* is clear, but in describing the other two ways of fortifying, he is extreamly confused, both in his first and third Book. But if I guess right at his meaning, he intends to tell us that the second way of fortification was when an imminent danger of an enemy appeared, then the Ditch was nine foot deep, and twelve broad, and the Rampart above the line four foot high; and thirdly, when they found themselves in the greatest hazard, the Rampart was planted about with these Stakes and Palisado's, which the Soldiers were obliged to carry about with them. So that reckoning from the top of the Rampart to the bottom of the Ditch, it was thirteen foot high, and the Ditch it self twelve foot broad. I would he had said either eleven or thirteen, for then he had not contradicted himself, for he told us before that in Fortification the *Romans* were accustom'd to observe an odd number. The Turf whereof the Rampart was made, used to be half a foot deep, one foot broad, and one foot and a half long.

Thus far *Vegetius* concerning the Fortification of the *Roman* Camp.

But that which he adds in the eighth Chapter of his Third Book, is not to be omitted, That all Generals who Encamp their Armies for any time, as the *Romans* did frequently whole Summers, and whole Winters, (the first whereof were called *Æstiva*, and the last *Hiberna*) should have a provident care, and should make it their great work, that not only fuel, fodder and water be supplied near hand, but that all manner of necessaries for back and belly, and all munitions may be brought safely, and without empeach of an enemy to their quarters. To which effect, if there be not fortified places all along the Country through which these provisions are to be transported, then some ought to be builded, one whereof should second another; these *Vegetius* calls Castles, *Castella*, a Diminutive, as he tells us from *Castra*.

Castella what,

The Ancients either in their own Territories, or in those of their Conquests, did even so as is practised to this day, and that was, They built Forts, Towers, Sconces and Castles in these places where it was thonght they might be most useful, either for the preservation of the Country from the sudden irruptions of ill affected neighbours, or to put such a restraint on the inhabitants themselves as to keep them from rebellion; for this purpose long and strong Walls were sometimes built with excessive cost and labour, we may yet see some reliques of *Severus* walls, built for the safety of the *Britains* from the Incursions of the *Scots* and *Picts*.

For what use built.

The Castles which they intended to keep constantly guarded, were for most part built round, of thick and strong walls to resist the battery of the Ram, and if they had Curtains, these were flanked *a l'antique* with round Turrets. These *Castella* the *Romans* called also *Burga*, I know not whether they borrowed the word from the *Germans*, or the *Germans* from them, for the old *Dutch* word *Burg*, yet in use, signifying a Strength, Hold, Fort or Castle; many of them were built by the *Romans* in *Germany*, and some of them are to be seen at this day. The Governours of these Castles or Forts were called *Custodes & Magistri Burgorum*, which at first were only committed to them, during the pleasure of the Consuls and Emperours; afterwards by the liberality and bounty of Princes, these Keepers were made hereditary Governours, and long after, the Castles and Burgs themselves, with many fair lands belonging to them, were given to them and their heirs in property for ever, to hold them in Vassalage. Hence comes the name of *Castellans*, a title of great honour and profit in *Poland*, where they enjoy it but for life, the King having the disposal of it afterward. Hence the title of *Burggrave* in *Germany*, which in the language of that Country is of greater honour than the title of an Earl, which in *Dutch* is simply *Grave*. And that dignity of *Burggrave* to this day is there very honourable, and kept

Burg a *Latine* and a *German* word, signifieth a Fort.

Castellan.

kept by the greateſt Princes of the *German* Empire as an addition, and that no ſmall one to the reſt of their great Titles, as the Elector of *Brandenburg* is the hereditary *Burggrave* of *Nuremburg*. Burggrave.

In proceſs of time Villages, Hamlets, and little Towns were built beſides theſe Burgs, many whereof are become great and famous Cities, which keep yet their denomination from the *Burg* or Caſtle, beſides which they were at firſt edified, ſuch as *Straburg*, *Augsburg*, *Nuremburg*, *Wirtsburg*, *Lunenburg*, *Neramburg*, *Hamburg*, and many others. And as at the firſt building theſe Caſtles or *Burgs*, the Keepers were called *Magiſtri Burgorum*; ſo to this day the principal Magiſtrates and Mayors of Cities are called *Burgomaſters*.

The *Roman* Soldiers having finiſhed the fortification of their Camp, are next to be lodged within it: I am afraid it will not contain them all, yet let us ſee how *Polybius* will accommodate his Conſular Army, for we have done with *Vegetius*.

It was the duty of that Tribune whoſe lot or turn it was to officiate for the Legion, to go before (no doubt with a guard) and ſome Centurions with him to take up ground for the Camp, and to meaſure out all the ſeveral quarters of it. Which that you may the better comprehend, we ſhall divide the *Roman* Camp into two, but not equal parts; theſe were called the upper and the lower parts: in the upper lodged the Conſul, the Treaſurer, the Legates, the *Evocati* of the *Romans*, and Extraordinaries of the Allies, the lodgings of the Tribunes and *Præfecti* were alſo there, and in it was the Market-place, and a large place to receive ſtrangers. In the lower part of the Camp were quartered all the four Legions of the *Romans* and Allies in ſeveral Maniples, and all the Troops of Horſe, of both the one and the other. Diviſion of the *Roman* Camp into two parts.

The Tribune who meaſur'd the Camp, firſt choſe ground for the *Prætorium*, that is the Conſuls Pavilions and Tents, and allow'd for it two hundred foot ſquare, the ſuperficial meaſure whereof was eight *Italian* miles; for multiply two hundred by two hundred, the product will be forty thouſand foot; and theſe make eight miles, and no doubt himſelf, his friends, ſervants and baggage might be well enough accommodated in ſuch a compaſs of ground. That ground was marked with a white flag, and all the other quarters with red ones. And here be pleaſed to obſerve that the *Romans* keeping conſtantly one way of *Caſtrametation*, they were ſo well acquainted with it, that no ſooner any of the Army ſaw by the white flag, where the Conſul was to lodge, but every one knew how to go ſtraight to that quarter that was deſign'd for him: As well, ſaith *Polybius*, as Citizens know how to go to their houſes, after they enter any of the Ports. Upon both hands of the *Prætorian* were the quarters of the Treaſurer and Legates; for the firſt were allowed two hundred foot in length, and a hundred in depth, for each Legate a hundred foot long, and fifty deep. *Prætorium*, or Conſuls Pavilion.

To the Foot of the *Evocati* of the *Romans*, *Lipſius* (and *Terduzzi*, and the *Sieur de Preiſſack* following him) allow eighty foot in length, and two hundred thirty eight in breadth, and to the Horſe of the *Evocati*, eighty foot in length, and a hundred twenty five in breadth; perhaps they gather this out of *Polybius*, but I am very ſure, notwithſtanding any of their aſſertions to the contrary, the number of the *Evocati* being uncertain, (for they were voluntary, ſometimes more, ſometimes fewer, and ſo not definite) one and the ſame meaſure of ground could not always, and at all times be allowed to them. But all theſe being thus quarter'd on both ſides of the *Prætorium*, there was a ſtreet of one hundred foot broad, which traverſt the breadth of the Camp, the name whereof is forgot, between which Street and the Alarm place were lodged the *Extraordinaries* of both the Cavalry and Infantry of the Allies; for the quarters of their Horſe eighty foot in breadth, and a hundred ſixty ſeven in length were allowed; and for their Foot two hundred foot in length, and ſeventy in breadth. Within the *Extraordinaries* of the Horſe was the Market-place, which they called *Forum*. Without the Foot of the *Extraordinaries*, and next them was the place of arms, or the Alarm-place, and this was of one equal breadth in all the four quarters of the Camp, to wit two hundred Foot, kept yet in our Modern *Caſtrametations*. Next to this place of arms was the Rampart, and that Port which was called *Porta Prætoriana*, the *Prætorian* Port. Now though the *Roman* Conſul by this account was not in the middle of his Army, (as *Xenophon* Who were quarter'd in the upper part of the *Roman* Camp. *Evocati*. *Extraordinaries*. Alarm-place. Prætorian Port.

would have all Generals to be) yet *Lipſius* thinks it enough that he was *in medio Ducum*, in the middle of his Captains, I know not why this was enough, but let us ſee how.

Behind the *Prætorium* on the right hand of it were the Tents of the ſix Tribunes of the firſt *Roman* Legion, and upon their right hand the Tents of the ſix *Præfecti* of the Allies, on the left hand of the *Prætorium*, at ſome diſtance behind it were the Tents of the ſix *Roman* Tribunes of the ſecond Legion, and on their left hand the ſix *Præfecti* of the ſecond Legion of the Allies were quartered. The *Sieur de Preiſſac* and his Tranſlator Captain *Cruſo* in their delineation of the *Roman* Camp place the Tents of all the twelve Tribunes, and twelve *Præfecti*; as *Lipſius* doth in his firſt figure, which himſelf found ſubject to cenſure, and therefore helpt it in the next Page. In the firſt he makes the left hand Tribune of the firſt Legion, and the right hand Tribune of the ſecond *Roman* Legion to place their Tents cloſe behind the *Prætorium*, and by that means they took away the mutual proſpect of the Conſul from his Legions who were quartered behind him, and of the Legions from the Conſuls Pavilion which was pitcht before them. This *Preiſſac* did alſo, but *Lipſius* helped and mended his by leaving the *Prætorium* viſible to all quarters; and this *Preiſſack* was bound to do likewiſe, but he did it not. Beſides this error, *Preiſſack* allows a hundred and fifty foot-ſquare for every Tribunes Tent, whereas *Polybius* allows but fifty, and allows enough when he doth ſo; this I conceive to be the Printers fault, whereof I thought fit to acquaint the *Sieur de Preiſſacks* Reader. So you ſee that the twelve Tents of the *Roman* Tribunes, and the twelve Tents of the *Præfecti* of the Allies, took up twelve hundred foot of ground-ſquare, fifty foot ſquare being allowed to each of them. Obſerve here that *Polybius* tells us not at all where, or in what place of the Camp the Allies *Præfecti* lodged, and this gives juſt cauſe to *Lipſius* to complain of his careleſneſs in this point, which *Lipſius* himſelf hath very well ſupply'd in quartering them where they ſhould be, that is in the front of their Legions, as the *Roman* Tribunes were placed by *Polybius* in the front of theirs, as I have told you, and in imitation of *Lipſius*, *Preiſſack*, and *Terduzzi* quarter them juſt ſo. This is all I have to ſay concerning the *Caſtrametation* of the Superior or upper part of the *Roman* Camp. And ſo I come to the lower one.

Tribunes and Præfecti.

Below the Tents of the Tribunes there was a Street which traverſed the whole breadth of the Camp, and divided the ſuperior part of it from that inferior one which I am now to deſcribe. This Street was a hundred foot broad, and was called *Via Principalis*, the principal Street; whether it had that name, becauſe it was near the Conſuls Pavilion, the Tribunes Tents, and the Eagles; or becauſe if the Camp was of any long continuance, they erected their Altars in that Street is no great matter. This Street was interſected by another, which did run the whole length of the Camp, from the *Decuman Port*, to the *Prætorian* one. This Lane divided the right hand *Roman* Legion from the left hand one, and conſequently had on each ſide of it the half of the Conſular Army. On the right ſide of it were quartered the Horſe and Foot belonging to the firſt *Roman* Legion, and on the right hand of that Legion the firſt Legion of the Allies in this following order.

Inferior part of the Camp.

Via Principalis.

Neareſt to the Street was quartered the Cavalry belonging to the firſt Legion, all in one Row or Street; call it as you pleaſe, for *Polybius* his Interpreter uſeth both *Striga* and *Vicus*, a Row and a Street. This Row was divided into ten ſeveral quarters, each of which was to contain and lodge a Troop conſiſting of thirty Riders, with their Horſes, Arms and Baggage. Every one of theſe ten Quarters was a hundred foot ſquare, and conſequently the whole Row was a thouſand foot long, and a hundred foot broad. If you pleaſe to multiply a hundred by a hundred, you will find the product ten thouſand Foot, and ſo much ground had every Troop of thirty Horſe allowed to it. And that I may tell it you once for all, every Maniple of the *Principes* and *Haſtati* had as much, but not the *Triarii*, as you will ſee anon. On the right hand of the Horſe were quartered the *Triarii*, who being but half the number of the *Haſtati* and *Principes*, to wit, ſix hundred, they had but fifty foot of ground in breadth, but in length as much as the Horſe, to wit, a thouſand foot, divided equally into ten parts, to every one of which parts was aſſign'd a Maniple conſiſting of ſixty men.

Quarters for the *Roman* Horſe of the firſt Legion.

Triarii.

men. Multiply a hundred by fifty (for every Maniple of the *Triarii* had a hundred foot in length, and fifty foot in breadth) the product is five thouſand foot, and ſo much ground of ſuperficial meaſure had every Maniple of the *Triarii*. They were obliged to have a care of the Horſes belonging to the Cavalry, to feed them, and ſee that in the night they ſtrayed not to the diſturbance of the Camp, and ſo you may think the Horſemen needed the fewer Grooms. Next the *Triarii* was a Street fifty foot broad; on the right hand of it was a Row of Tents, in which lodged the *Principes*, who were twelve hundred in number, divided into ten Maniples, each conſiſting of a hundred and twenty men: to every Maniple was allowed as much ground as to a Troop of Horſe, to wit, a 100 foot ſquare; ſo to all the ten Maniples a thouſand foot in length, and a hundred in breadth. On their right hand quartered the *Haſtati*, all in one Row, twelve hundred in number likewiſe, and had an equal allowance of ground. The *Haſtati* were divided by a Street fifty foot broad from the Allies, who conſtantly quartered on their right hand.

Principes.

Haſtati of the firſt *Roman* Legion quartered.

You will remember that in my Diſcourſe of the Allies I told you that the third part of their Horſe, and fifth part of their Foot were taken out to wait on the Conſul, and were called *Extraordinaries*, whom accordingly I have quartered in the upper part of the Camp near the Conſul. Their Horſe at firſt were ſix hundred for every Legion, whereof two hundred being lodged in the upper part, we have but four hundred to quarter in the lower part of the Camp. Theſe being by one third ſtronger than the *Roman* Cavalry, had of ground a third more in breadth allowed, but alike length; the quarter then for the Horſe of the firſt Legion of the Allies was a thouſand foot in length, and 133½ foot in breadth, which contained them well enough; this quarter was equally divided into ten parts for ten Troops, each conſiſting of forty Riders. Upon the right hand of theſe Horſe were quartered the Foot of the Allies firſt Legion, remember every one of their Legions at their firſt coming forth was three thouſand heavy armed, as the *Romans* were; but the fifth part of that number, to wit, ſix hundred being taken away by the Conſul, and lodged beſides him, we have now but two thouſand four hundred to quarter, for whom as much ground was allowed, as to both the *Principes* and *Haſtati*, as to the breadth, ſo they had a thouſand foot in length, and two hundred in breadth; multiply the one by the other, the product is two hundred thouſand foot, which ſuperficial meaſure of ground contain'd them well enough. I muſt tell you of an overſight I have obſerved in my Lord *Preiſſack*'s *Roman* Caſtrametation, which is, that he allows to the Allies Foot as much ground as I have done now, but no more ground to their Horſe than to the *Roman* Cavalry, which was not fair, being the one was ſtronger by one third than the other. It is of little or no conſequence to us to know, nor is it worth our curioſity whether the Allies quarter'd their Foot by Maniples, or by Cohorts, concerning which *Lipſius* to me ſeems to be very needleſly ſollicitous. Upon the right hand of the Allies Foot was the alarm-place conſtantly two hundred foot broad, and next to it was the Rampart.

Horſe of the Allies firſt Legion lodged,

And their Foot all in one Row.

We are in the next place to quarter the ſecond *Roman* Legion, and the ſecond Legion of the Allies, which is ſoon done by allowing to every part and member of them the like quantity of ground for length and breadth, as we did to thoſe of the two Legions on the right hand, as thus: On the left hand of that Street which I told you run from the *Decuman* to the *Prætorian* Port, and interſecteth the *Via principalis*, were the ten Troops of Horſe belonging to the ſecond *Roman* Legion lodged, all in a Row; next them the *Triarii*, upon their left hand, a Street fifty foot broad, on the left hand of which lodged the *Principes*; next them the *Haſtati*, on their left hand another Street of fifty foot broad; upon the left hand whereof were quarter'd the Horſe of the Allies, and on the left hand of them their Foot, on whoſe left hand was the Alarm-place, and next to it the Rampart and Ditch.

The other two Legions quartered.

And now we have our whole Conſular Army very formally quarter'd in a Camp of an æquilateral ſquare figure, as *Lipſius*, *du Preiſſack*, and *Terduzzi*, will needs have it to be, though hereafter upon ſtrict examination, we ſhall find it not to be exactly ſo. And what needs the whole be ſo, where all the parts neither are or can be æquilateral? In the upper part of the Camp the *Prætorium* and the Tribunes quarters, with thoſe of the *Præfecti* of the Allies, were æqui-

The figure of the *Roman* Camp.

lateral

lateral ſquare, but ſo were not the quarters allotted to the Queſtor, Legates, *Evocati*, or *Extraordinarii*. In the lower part of the Camp the quarters ordain'd for the ſeveral Troops of Horſe, and for the Maniples of the *Roman Haſtati* and *Principes* were aquilateral, but ſo were neither the quarters of the *Triarii*, nor of the Allies Horſe and Foot.

In the next place before I go further, I ſhall tell you that in this Camp there were four Ports, theſe were the *Prætorian*, *Decuman*, and the right hand principal Port, and the left hand principal Port. The two firſt were at the two ends of the Camp, and the other two at the two ſides. The firſt had its name becauſe it was neareſt the *Prætorium*, and out of it the Conſul marched. The *Decuman* ſerv'd for bringing in proviſions and fodder, for taking Beaſts out to water; as alſo out of it were carried the Soldiers that were ordain'd to be puniſhed; from whence ſome think it hath the name *Decumana*, from the Decimating Soldiers alike guilty, and puniſhing the tenth. But we read in *Livies* thirty fourth Book, that the *Gauls* aſſaulted Conſul *Sempronius* his Camp, and enter'd it at the Port *Quæſtoria*, and committed great ſlaughter till they were beat out. We read alſo of a Port called *Quintana*, which ſome think was all one with that called *Queſtoria*, and had this name from the Queſtor, or Treaſurer, who lodged neer it, and the other from the Street *Quintana*, near which that Port was; but the Queſtors quarters being afterward remov'd to the ſuperior part of the Camp, to be near the Conſul, that Port was ſhut up.

Four Ports in the *Roman* Camp.

Obſerve next that in the *Roman* Camp there were eight Streets, five whereof went in the length of the Camp from the one end of it to the other, and were called *Via Directa*, or direct and ſtraight Streets; the other three traverſt or croſt the Camp in the breadth of it, and were called *Viæ tranſverſæ*, or croſs Streets. Of the five direct Streets, one divided the length of the Camp equally into two halves, and on each ſide of it, as I told you, lay the half of the Conſular Army Encamped.

Eight Streets in the *Roman* Camp.

Between the *Triarii* and *Principes* of the firſt *Roman* Legion was the ſecond direct Street; between the *Roman Haſtati* of the firſt Legion, and the Allies firſt Legion was the third direct Street. Between the *Triarii* and *Principes* of the ſecond *Roman* Legion was the fourth direct Street, and between the *Roman Haſtati* of the ſecond Legion, and the Allies ſecond Legion was the fifth direct Street. All theſe five Streets were each of them fifty foot broad. But all five of them either never had names, or have loſt them. The three croſs Streets traverſed the latitude of the Camp. The one of them was in the upper part of the Camp, and divided the *Prætorium* from the quarters of the *Extraordinaries*, and was of one hundred foot broad, and hath loſt its name. The ſecond croſs Street divided the upper part of the Camp from the lower one, as I told you before, and was called *Via principalis*, and was likewiſe a hundred foot broad. The third croſs Street interſected the quarters of the Legions right in the middle, leaving five Maniples on every ſide of it, as likewiſe five Troops of Horſe from the ſides; it had its name of *Quintana*, and was fifty foot broad. Theſe were the Ports and the Streets of the *Roman* Camp.

Five direct ones.

Three traverſe Streets.

Be pleaſed likewiſe to obſerve that *Polybius* in his Sixth Book (out of which Shop all this ſtuff of the *Roman* Caſtrametation is brought) makes the length of the Camp to be between the *Prætorian* and the *Decuman* Port, and where theſe are, he calls the two ends of the Camp, and the breadth of it he reckons to be from the right hand principal Port to the left hand principal one. All this being premiſed, we may now take up the *Podiſme*, or foot-meaſure of the *Roman* Camp, as we have deſcribed it. And firſt the length of it from the Prætorian Port, two hundred foot are allowed for the place of Arms, ſeventy for the Extraordinary Foot, and eighty for the Extraordinary Horſe, a hundred for the traverſe Street with the unknown name; next to that, two hundred foot for the *Prætorium*, and fifty for the Tribunes and *Præfecti* their quarters, and this cloſeth the ſuperior part of the Camp; for the places ordain'd for the Queſtor, Legates, *Evocati*, and *Forum* were on both ſides of the *Prætorium*, and ſo added nothing to the Camps Longitude. After this, reckon for *Via principalis*, a hundred foot, and for the length of the Legions quarters a thouſand foot; for the Street *Quintana* fifty foot, and for the Alarm-place beſides the *Decuman* Port two hundred foot. If you will add theſe together, the aggregate will be two thou-

The Longitude of the Camp.

thouſand and fifty Foot, which is the Longitude of the whole *Roman* Camp.

If you will exactly know the breadth of it, be pleaſed to enter the Camp at the principal Port on the right hand, and traverſe that Street till you come to the left hand Port, and at your entrance you ſhall find two hundred foot for the place of Arms, next to that two hundred foot for the Foot of the Allies firſt Legion, and then 133⅓ foot for their Horſe, next to them a Street of fifty foot, on the left hand of that a hundred foot for the *Haſtati*, and a hundred for the *Principes* of the firſt *Roman* Legion, and on their left hand you will ſee a Street fifty foot broad; and beſides it the *Triarii*, who poſſeſs fifty foot, and upon their left hand the ten Troops of Horſe belonging to the firſt Legion, who take a hundred foot for the breadth of their quarter, then you will ſee that Street which runs from the *Decuman* to the Prætorian Port, (except where the Conſuls Pavilion hinders it) which is fifty foot broad; and upon the left hand of it you may perceive the quarters of the Horſe of the ſecond *Roman* Legion, take up a hundred foot in breadth, and the *Triarii* next them fifty foot, on whoſe left hand is a Street fifty foot broad. Next to it behold the *Principes* have a hundred foot, and the *Haſtati* a hundred foot; then you will perceive a Street fifty foot broad, which divides the *Haſtati* from the Allies of their ſecond Legion; their Horſe you will ſee, take 133⅓ foot in breadth, and on their left hand their Foot have two hundred foot; and next them you will come to the Alarm place, ſtill two hundred foot broad. And when you have traced that place of Arms, and are come to the left hand Port, which they called *Siniſtra principalis*, you may if you pleaſe add theſe numbers together, and you will find the aggregate to be two thouſand and ſeventeen foot, which is the latitude of the whole Camp. The Latitude of it.

You may remember that the length of our Camp was calculated to be two thouſand and fifty foot, and the breadth of it being two thouſand and ſeventeen, it is thirty three foot longer than it is broad. It is true the odds is not great, yet ſuch as makes its figure not to be perfectly æquilateral ſquare, which is the figure ſo much contended for. But *Terduzzi* ſays that here a rigorous ſtrictneſs in the meaſure is not to be look'd to, things being done, ſays he, in a Martial not a Geometrical field. But I am of opinion that no meaſure ſhould be more, ſtrictly obſerved than that of ground allowed for Encamping, for if it be not, you ſhall hardly ſhun ſtrife and altercation, and which is worſe, diſorder and confuſion. *Roman* Camp not exactly æquilateral ſquare.

Now let us ſee if you pleaſe, how much ground this Conſular Camp contained, or (which is all one) what was the ſuperficial meaſure of it. This you may do, by multiplying the length by the breadth, to wit, two thouſand and fifty, by two thouſand and ſeventeen, the product will be (if I have caſt it up right) 4134850; divide this number by five, to make paces of it, the Quotient will be 826970, and this will want only thirty paces of eight hundred and twenty ſeven *Italian* miles. Superficial meaſure of the *Roman* Camp.

I wiſh *Polybius* had left us a figure of his Camp, for if he did, it is loſt. To ſupply which defect, ſeveral have attempted to do it. *Lipſius* gives us one in his Commentary on *Polybius*, you may ſee another in *Achilles Terduzzi* his Military Machines, the third in the *Sieur de Preiſſacks* Military queſtions; theſe two laſt for moſt part borrow theirs from *Lipſius*, for they differ not except in ſome few things which I have touched in paſſing. A fourth is to be ſeen in *Steuechius* his Commentary on *Vegetius*, and indeed that differs from *Lipſius* his figure in ſome material points, if I have obſerved well, and they are theſe. Several figures of the *Roman* Camp.

Firſt, *Steuechius* allows fifty foot in length for the quarters of the *Electi* of both Horſe and Foot, more than *Lipſius* doth. Secondly, he takes theſe fifty feet from the Tribunes, and quarters them in a parallel line with the *Evocati*; whereas *Lipſius* quarters them behind the *Evocati* and the *Prætorium*. Thirdly he leaves no room for the *Præfecti* of the Allies, who were twelve in number, and for whom *Lipſius* allow'd ſix hundred foot ſquare, (to wit, fifty for every one of the twelve) and in a parallel line with the Tribunes, below the *Evocati*, and next to *Via principalis*. Fourthly, *Steuechius* alters the whole ſite of the Camp, for he makes the *Decuman* Port to be neareſt the *Prætorium*, and the Prætorian one to be furtheſt from the Conſuls Pavilion: ſo by this account that Port which to *Lipſius* is *Principalis dextra*, is to *Steuechius*, *Principalis ſiniſtra*; and ſo indeed he calls it in his figure. Differences between *Lipſius* and *Steuechius* figures.

I know

I know not how they ſhall be reconciled in theſe points, and eſpecially in the laſt; For upon the one hand, I think it agrees with reaſon, that the *Prætorian* Port ſhould have been neareſt the Enemy, as out of which the Army was to march in queſt of that Enemy; and no doubt, the Conſul would chuſe to lodge as near the Enemy as he could, and on the head of that Army of his own, which faced conſtantly towards the Enemy, ſince he did not quarter in the middle of his Army. And conform to this, we find the Fronts of the ſeveral quarters of both Horſe and Foot, that were lodged in the inferiour part of the Camp, to face all towards the *Prætorium*, and *Via Principalis*, on the other ſide whereof were the Tribunes quartered. Neither doth it ſeem reaſonable, that the Conſul, and his Tribunes quartered in the Rear of the Camp, for ſo they muſt have done, if they had lodged ſo far from the *Prætorian* Port, out of which the Army was to march. And all this makes for *Lipſius* his poſition of the *Roman* Camp: Yet I muſt tell you, that on the other hand, I think *Steucchius* may not only alledge his own Author *Vegetius* to be for him, but *Polybius* likewiſe. Let us hear them both, I ſhall *Engliſh* them faithfully. *Vegetius* in the twenty third Chapter of his firſt Book ſays, "The *Decuman* Port is behind the *Prætorium*, out of which the delinquent Souldiers "are carried to their puniſhment. Behind the *Prætorium*, that is not far from it. And this inſinuates, that the aſpect of the *Prætorium*, or Conſuls Pavilion, was towards the furtheſt end of the Camp, where *Steuechius* will have the *Prætorian* Port to be. For if *Vegetius* had meant, that the further end of the lower part of the Camp was the place where the *Decuman* Port was, he needed not have ſaid it was behind the *Prætorium*, but behind all the quarters of the Legions, as *Lipſius* makes it to be. And *Polybius* in his ſixth Book, ſpeaking of that nameleſs ſtreet which traverſeth the upper region of the Camp, hath theſe words, and I pray obſerve them. "Over againſt the *Prætorium*, "ſaith he, there is a ſtreet, which carrieth to the Poſtern parts of the Camp. Here he ſeems to be very clear for *Steuechius*; if he be not, hear him once more: He had been ſpeaking of the extraordinary Horſe of the Allies, and he adds theſe words: "Averſe from theſe Horſes, are quarter'd the Extraor-"dinary Foot of the Allies, looking to the back of the Camp. Now theſe Extraordinaries were quarter'd in the upper part of the Camp, and not far from the *Prætorium*, and faced to the Rampart; which by this place of *Polybius* was the back of the Camp; and conſequently the Port neareſt it, was the *Decuman*. I ſhall leave it to thoſe who underſtand Caſtrametation better than I either do, or profeſs to do, to compoſe the difference.

Reaſons for *Lipſius*.

Reaſons for *Steuechius*.

But all four, *Lipſius*, *Du Preiſſac*, *Terduzzi*, and *Steuechius* differ from their Maſter *Polybius*, for he expreſsly mentions a *Forum*, or Market place, and quarters for two Legates, to be all in the upper region of the Camp. The *Forum*, *Lipſius* hath not in his Figure, though it be mention'd in his Table, nor have *Preiſſac*, or *Terduzzi* one in theirs; a great overſight in all three. *Steuechius* hath indeed the *Forum* on the Left hand of the *Prætorium*, but for that he exterminates both the Legates out of his Camp, to whom the other three are ſo hoſpitable as to afford Lodging; and yet all four are one way or another inexcuſable.

Both of them differ in ſome things from *Polybius*.

The *Romans* allowed Tents both to their Horſe men and Foot, in every Tent were ten men, and thoſe had the name of a *Contubernium*, whereof I ſpoke before, though *Vegetius* makes it to conſiſt of eleven, wherein I believe few joyn with him. By this account, three Tents ſerv'd all the Horſe-men of one Troop, and twelve ſerv'd a Maniple of Foot of one hundred and twenty Men. I find their Tents were made of Leather, for holding out of rain, and were carried at the publick charges. *Terduzzi* ſays they were low and flat, and he calls them in his *Italian* language, *Trabacche*; which is, Booths or Shelters. In this place *Lipſius* offers to fill up a corner of their Tent with a *Vas*, ſo he calls it; a Veſſel, or a Tub, (and indeed it is but the tale of a Tub, to ſay no worſe of it) wherein he will have the *Roman* Souldiers to do the work of nature: He ſays, it is but his own conjecture, and truly, it is ſo poor a one, that he might have kept it to himſelf, and the Tub too. For who will imagine, except *Lipſius*, that the Contubernals did make one of theſe Veſſels at every nights Leaguer, or elſe that they carried it about with them by turns?

Roman Tents.

the

the firſt very improbable, and the ſecond exceedingly ridiculous. He might have learn'd of the *Jews*, and all late Caſtrametators too, to have ſent them for ſuch an errand a pretty way without the Camp.

The ſame *Lipſius*, and to ſecond him *Terduzzi*, are very prolix in the commendation of the regularity, form, conveniency, and order of this Camp; of which a man is oblig'd to believe no more, than what agreeth with his own reaſon. Among other things, the firſt of them will have us believe, that no woman was ſuffer'd in the *Roman* Camps. And becauſe he foreſaw that it might be objected, that *Scipio* the *Numantine*, in his Reformation of Military Diſcipline, diſcharged the Camp of all Whores; from whence it might be inferr'd, Firſt, That married Women were ſtill kept in the Camp; and Secondly, That Whores had been permitted to be in it before *Scipio*'s Reformation; he boldly avers, that the *Latine* word *Scorta*, in that place is not taken for Whores, but for *Viri mulieroſi*. Whether the word will admit that interpretation, I dare not diſpute with *Lipſius*, whom *Boccalini* ſtageth in *Parnaſſus*, confeſſing, that he was nothing but a meer and a pure Grammarian. But I cannot underſtand what he means by his *Viri Mulieroſi*, if not thoſe whom we call *Sodomites*, or Buggerers: And if ſo, we may infer, that theſe were either allow'd of, or conniv'd at, before *Scipio* reform'd that ſinful abuſe: And this perhaps gave occaſion to a Poets wiſh,

Women in *Roman* Camps.

Lipſius extravagant.

Romanis utinam patuiſſent caſtra puellis.

Since Natures Laws muſt be obey'd,
or men will go aſtray,
Why do you women then command
out of your Camps to ſtay?

And if this be *Lipſius* his meaning, then I am ſure, the ancient *Romans* who gloried ſo much in the profeſſion of moral Vertues, owe him the lye; I ſuppoſe, he forgot here what a little before he had told us in that ſame Book, out of *Tacitus*, that a laſcivious woman was found in carnal act with a Souldier in the principal ſtreet, which was accounted Holy, becauſe their Altars were erected in it; neither did the Hiſtorian complain, that a woman was in the Camp, or was found with a man in the Camp, but that ſhe had profaned ſo ſacred a place of the Camp. Now if no woman had been permitted to be in the *Roman* Camp, then that woman could not have play'd the Whore in ſo publick a place of it. But *Lipſius* knew well enough, that the Empreſs *Agrippina*, *Nero*'s Mother, honour'd the place of her birth on the banks of the *Rhine*, with a Colony of *Romans*, which in time grew to be the famous City of *Cologne*; now ſhe could not have been born there, if her Mother *Agrippina* had not been permitted to be in the *Roman* Camp with her Husband *Germanicus*.

Colonia Agrippina.

There is no doubt, but in the leſs ground an Army can be Encamped, the more defenſible it is: But that Topick, *Fruſtra fit per plura, quod fieri poteſt per pauciora*, is not at all true, but with this reſtriction, *ſi æque commode fieri poteſt*: And therefore it ſhall be eaſily granted, that this almoſt equilateral Camp of the *Romans* was excellent, if all was contain'd within its circuit, that ought to be within it. But I am ſure, upon a ſtrict examination, we ſhall not find it to be ſo. *Terduzzi* ſays, the circuit of this Camp was eight thouſand Foot, little more than one *Italian* mile and a half, and he ſaith right: He ſays moreover, that within it were quarter'd ſixteen thouſand eight hundred Foot, and eighteen hundred Horſe-men, beſides Servants. Herein he ſaith not right, as ſhall be demonſtrated anon. And firſt in this Camp, I find no place for an *Armamentarium*, or Magazine, no place for their Engines and Machines, their Catapults, Baliſts, Rams, Towers, and the reſt of their Artillery; and though it be true, that theſe were carried ſeldome about with the Army, yet it is as true, that the materials whereof they were compos'd, were often carried with their Armies; and if this be not granted me, yet I am ſure, they will allow a quarter for thoſe who were to make, guide, conduct and direct them; and in a word, for thoſe who were ſet aſide for that ſervice by *Servius Tullius*, King of *Rome*; but in this Camp there is no room at all for them, or for any Arms, or any

Roman Camp defective.

Firſt, No *Armamentarium*, or Magazine in it.

thing elſe which might be ſaid to belong to a publick Magazine; nor are they ſo much as mention'd by *Polybius*, *Lipſius*, *Du Preiſſac*, *Steuechius*, or *Terduzzi*. Certainly, it had been unadviſedly done to lodge them without the Camp, where the men might eaſily have been kill'd, and all the materials and utenſils burnt or deſtroy'd by an Enemy. This *Terduzzi* would ſeem to obviate, by telling us, that there was nothing in the Magazines, but Javelines and Arrows, and theſe he ſays would take up but little room: Yet he does not tell us where that little room was, for he aſſigns no void ſpace for it. Next, he ſets the Machines on the Retrenchment, let it be ſo. But did theſe Engineers, Carpenters, Smiths, and other Artificers, to whoſe care the Machines were recommended, lye night and day beſide them, on that Retrenchment; I hope he will not ſay that. Thirdly he ſays, that the Treaſurers quarters, and the ſtreet *Quintana* might have been made of a leſſer length or breadth, for reception of theſe Engines. Could any man have expected to have heard ſuch an expreſſion drop from a perſon, whoſe other writings ſpeak him to have been a great Maſter of Reaſon: For, who knows not, that in caſe of neceſſity, the *Prætorium*, the Legates and Tribunes Tents, and all the whole quarters, of the Camp might have been made of a leſſer extent. We know from *Livy*, that when *Claudius Nero* made that march which prov'd ſo fatal to *Aſdrubal*, and joyn'd with his Colleague Conſul *Livius*, all his ſix thouſand men were quarter'd and accommodated in *Livy*'s Camp, without enlarging it; every Tribune of *Livius*'s lodging a Tribune of *Nero*'s, every Centurion a Centurion, every Maniple a Maniple, and every Troop a Troop; in doing which perhaps many of themſelves walk'd in the Streets and the Alarm-place. But here we ſpeak of a formal Camp, which ſhould be of that capacity, as to contain all that ought to be within it. And therefore *Terduzzi* having ſaid but little for my ſatisfaction, I ſay ſtill, that the Camp we have deſcrib'd was deficient in this point; beſides that, I know no place allow'd for Beaſts of Carriage, appointed for carrying theſe Machines, Boats, Materials, and other neceſſaries for publick uſe.

Secondly, No quarter for the *Velites*.

But in the ſecond place, I have a greater complaint to make, for I miſs the *Velites*, for whom I find no quarter at all allowed, and they were no fewer than four thouſand eight hundred men in every Conſular Army. *Polybius* is extreamly careleſs of them, for as he aſſign'd them no place to march in, ſo he allows them no place to lodge in: This makes *Lipſius* exclaim, "*O Polybi, cur ſiluiſti? "per te ſumus*, &c. O *Polybius*, ſays he, why waſt thou ſilent in this? by thee "we are either in an errour, or darkneſs, out of which one word from thee "might have clear'd us. Concerning this important matter, men being left to gueſs, I ſhall tell you three ſeveral conjectures, and then chuſe which you will. And indeed it is a buſineſs of importance to ſend the fourth part of an Army to look for their quarters, when they might have been lodged with as much conveniency as the other three parts were.

Three Conjectures where they lodged.

First Conjecture

First, Before *Lipſius* his time, ſome were of the opinion, that the *Velites* were divided among the heavy armed, and forty eight of them lodged with every Maniple of the *Principes* and *Haſtati*, and twenty four of them with every Maniple of the *Triarii*; and by this way the twelve hundred *Velites* of every Legion will be compleatly quarter'd. Now, you may eaſily make an account, that by this means four of them were quartered in every Tent of the heavy armed, a thing hard to be done, if not impoſſible; beſide, that it made the *Contubernium* to conſiſt of fourteen inſtead of ten, and according to *Vegetius*, of fifteen. This opinion *Lipſius*, with good reaſon, rejects as very extravagant, as indeed it is.

Confuted.

Second Conjecture

The ſecond Conjecture is his own, and it is this: That the *Velites* of the two *Roman* Legions were quartered at the two ends of the Camp on the Alarm-place, and the *Velites* of the *Socii*, or Allies, on the place of Arms on both ſides. He ſays, that they wanting Defenſive Arms, and having but little Baggage, little room would ſerve them. Yet room they muſt have, and no room they can have by this expedient of *Lipſius*, but what is taken from the place of Arms; the ground whereof *Polybius* (the great Doctor of the *Roman* Caſtrametation) will have to be no leſs than two hundred foot of breadth, and that for ſeveral good reaſons expreſſed by himſelf, which quantity of ground

Confuted.

was

was always kept by the ancient *Romans*, and by the Caſtrametators in *Lipſius* his own days (who would have laughed at this fancy of his) and is ſtill kept to this day. Neither could *Lipſius* allow leſs ground for the *Velites*, than the half of that which the heavy armed had, and that was rather too little; ſo that of neceſſity fifty foot muſt have been taken from the Alarm-place for their bad accommodation: Now this cannot be done without reflecting on *Polybius*, who if he had intended any ſuch thing, would have allowed only one hundred and fifty, and not two hundred foot for the breadth of the Alarm place, which the Ancients called *Pomerium*. Next, how can you call that the place of Arms for the heavy armed, where the light armed have taken up their lodgings, and pitched their Tents? Beſides all this, *Polybius* is very poſitive, that the Extraordinaries of the Allies ſhould lodge neareſt the Rampart, at the *Prætorian* Port, (the place of Arms being only between them and it) the heavy armed *Roman* Foot at the *Decuman*, and the *Socii* at the two ſide Ports; which could not be, if the *Velites* were interpoſed between them and theſe Ports and Ramparts. And *Lipſius* might likewiſe have remembred, that one of the reaſons why *Polybius* would have two hundred Foot of void ground between the Rampart, and the Souldiers Tents, was that the Souldiers by that diſtance might be ſafe from Darts or Arrows, thrown or ſhot in the night time by an Enemy over the Rampart. Unleſs *Lipſius* thought that the *Velites* receiving theſe Darts and Arrows in their Bodies, did ſerve as a ſecond Retrenchment to the heavy armed. So, be *Lipſius* his conjecture right; or be it wrong, he may own it himſelf, and own it indeed he muſt, for he cannot father it on *Polybius*.

The third conjecture is of *Terduzzi*, who will have the *Velites* to be quarter'd without the Camp, in the *procaſtria* or Suburbs of it; and to bear them company, he ſends out with them all the Merchants, Victuallers, and Sutlers. I think this the plaineſt language of all, for within he ſaw it was impoſſible to lodge them. But I admire what pretext of authority he hath out of Hiſtory for this opinion; all he ſays is, that in time of danger, they were receiv'd again within the Camp, but he puts us juſt where we were, the queſtion being ſtill where they were quarter'd, when they were receiv'd within the Camp. For we read that the *Romans* were often beſieged within their Camps for ſome conſiderable time, ſo was the Conſul *L. Minutius*, till he was reliev'd by the Dictator *A. Cincinnatus*; ſo was *Cicero* one of *Cæſar*'s Legates by *Ambiorix*, and himſelf likewiſe forc'd by that ſame Enemy to keep ſome days within his Camp: Where were the *Velites* lodged all this while? And I pray you obſerve, that but juſt now *Terduzzi* aſſur'd us, that within the Camp was quarter'd the Conſular Army of ſixteen thouſand eight hundred Foot, and eighteen hundred Horſe, and of that number he now ſends four thouſand eight hundred out of the Camp, for want of quarter within it, not to come back till time of danger: His own words are, *Ricevendoli dentro, ſolo in tempo di pericolo*; Receiving them within, ſays he, only in time of danger. Here I am either miſtaken; or *Terduzzi*, beſides the improbability of his conjecture, foully contradicts himſelf.

Third Conjecture.

Confuted.

Thus we ſee the poor *Velites* very ill uſed; for if you will remember what I have obſerved of them in the preceding Chapters and in this, you will think with me, that they were marſhall'd and fought I know not how, they marched I know not when, and they were quarter'd I know not where. I ſhall not imagine for all that, that they were Spirits, but I think, it may be diſputed Problematically, whether they were *Individua Vaga*, or not. And ſo I take my leave of them.

Velites Individua Vaga.

In the third place, I find in this Caſtrametation no more place or ground allowed for Centurions, Decurions, Enſign and Standard-bearers, than for the common Troopers and Souldiers; and this confirms me in that opinion, whereof I have oft told you, that the *Romans* had no greater eſteem of any Officer below a Tribune, than we have of Corporals and Lanceſpeſats. *Terduzzi* affirms they had more room, I wiſh he had told us how or where, for among the *Turmes* and Maniples, they had no more than private Souldiers and Riders, for any light he or any other hath given us.

Thirdly, Officers lodged like common Souldiers.

Now all theſe defects proceed from the flim flam conceit of an equilateral Square, whereas all might have been very well accommodated in a Camp of an oblong Figure, in adding more rows to the Latitude of the Camp, and keeping

All theſe defects ſoon helped.

ing the ſame Longitude. And the not doing this, I attribute to the obſtinacy of theſe I have ſo often mention'd, *Lipſius*, *Preiſſac*, *Steuechius* and *Terduzzi*, and ſome others of their gang, who will rather loſe 4800 men than an equilateral Figure; for I muſt advertiſe my Reader, that their Maſter *Polybius*, doth not only permit an addition to the Latitude but to the Longitude of his Camp. *Si magis copioſæ ſint Legiones, pro ratâ ad Longitudinem & Latitudinem adjiciunt*: If the Legions be more numerous, accordingly they add to both the length and the breadth. And *Vegetius* tells us in the eighth Chapter of his third Book, *Pro neceſſitate loci, vel quadrata, vel trigona, vel rotunda, vel oblonga caſtra conſtituet*: According, ſays he, to the neceſſity or ſite of the place, you may make your Camp Quadrate, Triangular, Round, or Oblong: And in another place, he ſaith, Semi-circular: But for this Figure, I ſhould think, it were requiſite to have behind the Camp, either a Fortified Town, a Mariſh, or an unfordable River, and guarded with a Bridge.

Roman Camps might be of ſeveral figures.

We may imagine, that the Camp of the *Iſraelites*, after they had croſs'd the Red Sea dry-ſhod, was the moſt orderly, as being directed by the all-wiſe God, who is the Soveraign Lord of Hoſts, and we find both their Exteriour and Interiour Camps were quadrangular: For we read in the trueſt of Books, that in Quartering, three Tribes fac'd towards the Eaſt, three towards the South, three towards the Weſt, and three towards the North. And within that vaſt Leaguer, was an inward one, conſiſting of the *Levites*, who encamped alſo *en Carree*, facing Eaſt, South, Weſt, and North. Theſe were the Guards of the Lords Ark. Yet being that the Sacred Text tells us, that all theſe Tribes were not of equal ſtrength and number, it muſt follow, that thoſe who were moſt numerous, had moſt ground allowed them, and conſequently more rows of Tents, and more room for their Beaſts and Baggage, and therefore the form of the whole Camp could not be Square, but oblong. And here I ſhall alſo ſay, that the manner of the *Iſraelites* Encamping and Caſtrametation did more reſemble our form (whereof we ſhall ſpeak in its proper place) than the *Roman*, for we find the Ark of God (who was the Conductor, and Great General of that Army) lodged in the Center and middle of the whole Camp: About it, the *Levites* (who were honoured to be its Guards) and without them, and about them the other Tribes, as they were marſhalled by *Moſes*, the man of God. And as they were Encamped, ſo we read they Marched: Firſt, the Enſign of *Judah*, and under it three Tribes: Next, the Enſign of *Reuben*, and under it three Tribes: After them, marched the *Levites* in the middle of the Army, and in the center of them the Ark: After them came the Enſign of *Ephraim*, under which were three Tribes; and in the laſt place marched the Enſign of *Dan*, and under it three Tribes.

The Rampart and Ditch of the *Roman* Camp, as to both the ends of it, were made and defended by the two *Roman* Legions, and the Allies were obliged to fortifie and maintain both the ſides of this Conſular Camp, of which I have ſpoken perhaps more than enough. See the Figures of *Lipſius*, *Steuechius*, and the Lord *Preiſſac*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Guards, Watches, Watch-word, and Rounds.

IF this Camp, though never so strongly fortified, be not carefully guarded, it will be but a prey to a resolute Enemy. Both the *Roman* and *Grecian* Guards were, as ours are, of both Horse and Foot; the difference is this, they had several Guards for the day and the night, ours continue twenty four hours, unless some emergency alter the custome. You have the *Roman* Guards expressed by three several words common in Authors, and though all three signified Guards in some sense, yet if I mistake not (with submission to others) these three several words signified three several things. *Excubiæ*, *Vigiliæ*, and *Stationes*, were the three words. *Excubiæ*, I conceive, signified the men who kept Guard and Sentinel: *Vigiliæ*, the several distinct times, in which they were to keep Guard and Sentinel: And *Stationes* were the places where they kept Guard and Sentinel, which we call ordinarily Posts. The Ancients divided the night, Summer and Winter (beginning at six at night, and ending at six in the morning) into four *Vigiliæ* or Watches, allowing three hours to every Watch, after which time the Night-guards were relieved by the day ones; for we read not of any *Vigiliæ* in the day time. From hence we have in all ancient stories the actions of the night season, describ'd by the first, second, or third hour of the first, second, third, or fourth Vigil. And so the Knights of old, and some yet (Knighthood being a Military Order) were to keep their Vigils on the Eve before they received that Order. *Statio*, is a word that comes *à stando*, from standing; and is, as I said, taken for a Post, yet the denomination is not from the place where, but the manner how they watched, and the posture is said to be standing: Yet it is not to be thought, that all the *Roman* Guards stood, only the Sentinel, for the other three that were on a Post, lay down and slept. Whether their Horse-guards stood constantly, their Riders being on Horse-back, Authors make it not clear: I suppose it was only the Sentinels, yet probably it was otherwise: And because it was an extream fatigue either in the heat of Summer or cold of Winter, we read in *Livy*'s 45 Book, that the Consul *Lucius Æmilius* in the *Macedonian* War, order'd the Horse-guards to be relieved at noon; so the day from six in the morning till six at night, was equally divided by two several guards of Horse: I know not whether the Foot-Guards were also changed, it seems not; else the Historian had mentioned it; and if not, that Consul hath had a more tender regard to Horse than Men. The Military word *Station*, hath since been appropriated to all other professions, yea, and to all other Trades, be they never so mechanick and low; yea, to all Magistrates and Office-bearers, how high soever, even to him who is vested with the Soveraign and Supreme Power: So that every man in his Station, is a word now proper enough.

Excubiæ what.

Vigiliæ what.

Stationes what.

The Ancients kept Guards both without and within their Camps: Within, the *Romans* order'd a Maniple to watch at the *Prætorium*, or Consuls quarters, day and night. Three *Quaternions* of Souldiers watched at the Treasury, two at the Legates quarters, and two for every Tribune, and one was appointed to look to the quarters of every Maniple; all these were of the *Principes* and *Hastati*, for the *Triarii* kept Guards at the Horse-quarters. Every hundred foot of the Rampart had a Quaternion of Souldiers to guard it. The reason why these Guards were called Quaternions, was, because each of them consisted of four Souldiers, that were ordered for one Sentinel, which they kept by turns. We find these Military terms of the *Romans* used by the Pen-men of the New Testament; In the twelfth Chapter of the *Acts of the Apostles*, it is said, that *Herod* delivered St. *Peter* to be guarded by four Quaternions of Souldiers

Roman Guards within the Camp.

Souldiers, that is, to four Guards, each compoſed of four Souldiers, every one of which Quaternions or Guards, was to keep a Centinel upon him. The Quaternio, or the four Soldiers was to watch full twelve hours, every one of them a Vigil, to wit, three hours; and it is to be preſumed, one of them ſtood Centinel one whole Vigil, becauſe they could not well by their Glaſs divide a Vigil of three hours into four ſeveral parts; and truly that was too long, for in four hours time a Centinel might very readily have been both weary and ſleepy.

A Quaternion, what.

For any thing I yet know, the Guards without the Camp were only kept in the day time, and before every Port of it a Cohort of Foot, and a Troop of Horſe watched; but when an enemy was near, their Stations or Guards were doubled, tripled, or quadrupled, according as the danger ſeem'd to require. This ſaith *Terduzzi* was an eaſie duty, becauſe, ſays he, there were forty Cohorts, and forty Troops in the four Legions, and therefore he thinks they watched but every tenth night. But he did not conſider how many Guards were kept within the Leaguer, for if he had, he might have concluded that the Foot ordinarily watched every fourth night; and when the Guards were doubled, or tripled, the Duty would come upon them every ſecond, if not every other day. The Conſul or General appointed the Stations or places where Guards ſhould be kept without the Camp, which in reaſon ought to have been ſo order'd that they might have had ſuccours according to the neceſſity or exigence of affairs, and therefore you may find that *Caſar* when he cauſed his Guards to advance nearer the enemy, and further from his own Camp, he ſtill commanded freſh Troops and Cohorts to be brought out to fill up their room, and to ſupport and ſuſtain thoſe who were advanc'd in caſe of a retreat. *Livy* tells us in his Thirteenth Book, that *Manlius* was accuſed at *Rome* by the Tribunes of the people for keeping weak Guards without his Leaguer, and that they attributed the loſs of both Camp and Army to that.

Roman Guards without their Camp.

Miſtake of *Terduzzi*.

It was death for any man of what degree or quality ſo ever to deſert or leave his ſtation, let the pretext be never ſo plauſible or advantageous. *Livy* in his Fourth Book ſays that he read it in the *Roman* Annals, that the Dictator *Poſthumius* put his own Son *Aulus Poſthumius* to death for advancing beyond his ſtation, though thereby he gain'd an advantage of the enemy. And though that Author writes that he did not believe it, yet it may be true for all that. *Lipſius* commends much the *Roman* cuſtom of having four Soldiers on one Poſt, and for not committing the keeping of it to one Centinel, as the manner is now to have but one man at every Port of a Town. But this Bookiſh man was ſo much taken up with the Theory of the ancient Militia, that he ſtudied but little the practice of the Modern; for I dare be bound for it, that in the Country where he lived he never ſaw a Centinel at a Port of a Town, but where there was a *Corps du guard* cloſe by of more than four Soldiers, though they were not oblig'd to ſtand all Centinel at one time more than the *Roman Quaternio* was, whereof only one ſtood. But the old Tactick *Æneas* will not have Centinels to ſtand ſingle, but two or more together, and to ſtand but a very ſhort time, for which he gives two reaſons, firſt, for fear that being long on duty they might fall aſleep; ſecondly, that they might have no time to practiſe with an enemy, but frequent rounds and viſits of the Corporals might prevent both theſe.

Deſertion of a Station, death.

Miſtake of *Lipſius* of the Modern Guards.

Grecian Centinels.

Lipſius in this place falls alſo a quarrelling with his Maſter *Polybius* for not telling him what Poſts the Allies kept within the Camp, or how the Ports and Ramparts were guarded. But he wrongs him; for when *Polybius* told him what Duties the *Roman* Legions performed, he gave ground enough to *Lipſius* (who is ſo ready with his conjectures) to gueſs that the Legions of the Allies kept the like Guards, and did the like Duties as the *Romans* did. And ſince *Polybius* had already ſaid that the *Roman* Legions were bound to fortifie and defend the two ends of the Camp, and the Allies the two ſides; I conceive *Lipſius* might without ſuſpicion of witchcraft have gueſs'd, nay, paſt his word for it, that the *Romans* kept Guards at the *Prætorian* and *Decuman* Ports, and the Allies at the two principal Ports. And now I hope *Lipſius* is reconciled with *Polybius*.

Lipſius quarrels with *Polybius*,

But without reaſon.

The *Roman* Watch-word was given in this manner: The Tribunes whoſe turn it was to officiate, and the *Prafecti* of the Allies received it from the Conſul,

Roman watch-word, or *Teſſera*.

ſul, and towards night at the going down of the Sun, one of the laſt Maniple of Foot, and one of the laſt Troop of Horſe lodged near the *Decuman* Port, (being made free of other Duty) went to the Tribune and received from him a piece of wood, perhaps of Parchment or Paper, which was called a *Teſſera*, on which the Watch-word was written; this Soldier (whom *Vegetius* calls *Teſſerarius*) and this Trooper carried the *Teſſera* to the Centurion and *Decurion*, and deliver'd it to them before Witneſſes, *adhibitis teſtibus*, and they in the ſame manner to their fellow Centurion and *Decurion*, and ſo from one to another till it came to the firſt Centurion and *Decurion*, who redelivered it to the Tribune, who by ſome note (which it ſeems every one of the ſeveral Claſſes of the Legion had) or mark on the *Teſſera*, immediately knew if it had gone through them all; if not, inquiry was made, and the Delinquent was ſoon found out (ſince in that caſe that every Centurion was to prove by Witneſſes that he deliver'd it) and ſeverely puniſht. And this cuſtom *Achilles Terduzzi* prefers to the Modern way of whiſpering the word in one anothers ear. But moſt men are better pleaſed with things they never ſaw, than with thoſe they daily ſee, a *Faſtidium* or loathſomeneſs of our preſent condition being a mark of the depraved nature of man; for certainly the Watch-word in our times is given with as much ſecurity, and with a great deal of more eaſe than it was by either the *Grecians* or *Romans*. The ſeveral Guards or Quaternions of Soldiers, had each of them a *Teſſera*, which were taken from them by the Rounds, as you will ſee anon.

Terduzzi ill to pleaſe.

The Rounds were called *Circumitiones*, or *Circitiones*, and thoſe who went with them, as *Vegetius* hath it, *Circumitores*, or *Circitores*. This duty belong'd to the Horſemen, as to thoſe who in dignity were next to the Tribunes. By this alſo you may ſee in what ſmall account Centurions were with the *Romans*, who did not truſt them with viſiting their own Foot-guards, (a thing any *Lanceſpeſate* may do with us) but confer'd the honour of that on Horſemen. In every Legion one Troop was ordain'd to look after this duty every day by turns, but the whole Troop was not imployed in it, only four of them had that ſervice put on them. The manner was this: The Præfect or prime *Decurion* of the Troop order'd his *Subdecurion*, or his Deputy to acquaint ſuch four whoſe turn it was to ride the Rounds that following night, and this the *Subdecurion* was bound to do before he din'd; as alſo at night he was to acquaint the *Decurion* of the next Troop, that it was his turn next night after to order the Rounds: If any of them fail'd in this duty, they were lyable to heavy cenſure. The four Horſemen who were appointed to ride the Rounds, caſt lots who ſhould ride the Rounds of the firſt, ſecond, third and fourth Vigils. After that they went all four to the Tribune to be clear'd by him, what Guards they were to viſit, and if there were any new Poſts ordain'd beſides the ordinary ones. Having done there, they went to ſleep beſides the *Primipilus*, or firſt Centurion of the *Triarii*, which was quarter'd neareſt the *Eagle*, and this was an honour to him, as *Terduzzi* ſays, and ſo indeed it might be; but I deſire to know if they did not lye without the door of his Tent, in regard I think he could hardly accommodate them within. After Supper the Guards being ſet, he whoſe turn it was to ride the firſt round, went about the whole Guards belonging to that Legion, and from him who was Centinel he took the *Teſſera*, which he carried away with him, and ſo he did from all the reſt of the Quaternions; the like was done by the ſecond *Circitor* in the ſecond Vigil, and ſo by the other two in the third and fourth Vigils: hence you may ſee that every Soldier of the Quaternion had a *Teſſera*, otherwiſe the four *Circitors* could not have brought back each of them one. If the Round found a Centinel aſleep, he did not demand the *Teſſera* from him, nor did at all waken him, but requir'd the other three to be witneſſes of the miſdemeanor, and theſe three for honour ſake convoy'd the *Circitor* or Round to the next Guard. Why the three men who were awake ſhould have left their Poſt to be kept by a ſleeping man, only to complement a Round, let the admirers of Antiquity tell, I cannot. Yet I believe the Rounds found but few ſleeping, for they had fires allow'd them, by the light whereof they might diſcern both an enemy and a Round, and one Guard was almoſt conſtantly calling to another to keep them awake: beſides, it is not likely that all the other three of the Quaternion were aſleep; and if any one of them were awake,

Roman Rounds.

A duty incumbent on the Horſmen.

A Centinel found aſleep.

wake, it is not probable he would ſuffer his fellow Centinel to be taken ſleeping. And in proceſs of time they follow'd the example of the *Grecians*, and uſed Bells, by which one Guard correſponded and anſwer'd another; for *Polybius* tells us, that of all Nations the *Romans* were the apteſt to learn and imitate the commendable cuſtoms of others. Next morning very betimes, the Rounders went and gave the Tribunes an account of their diligence; and where they found a *Teſſera* wanting, either by the ſleep, negligence or deſertion of any of the Guards or Centinels; the Delinquent if apprehended, was puniſhed by the *Fuſtuarium*, the manner whereof you may learn in the next Chapter ſave one. After the *Roman* Guards were ſet at night, it was not lawful for any man to go out of his quarters.

Grievouſly puniſhed.

Grecian Rounds.

Æneas will have it that the *Grecian* Rounds went but from one Guard to another, and not round the whole Town, Fort, or Camp, for that ſays he, keeps many Rounds going together without confuſion. He would have all Rounds or *Circitors* to ride where Horſes might conveniently be had, but no Round either to go or ride till he were commanded ſo to do by his Superior, either by word of mouth, or ſome ſign, ſuppoſe a fire or a Lanthorn. He will have all his Rounds to give the word to the Guards, and not to receive it from them, as the *Romans* did their *Teſſera*, which indeed ſeems to be the ſurer way; but his Rounds he permits not to give the Watch-word till the Guards require it. And in time of danger he will have the Guards when they require the word from the Rounds (if it be in the night-time) to utter ſome words or ſounds (ſuch as have been order'd by the General or Governour of the place) and the Rounds beſides the giving the Watch word, to utter ſuch counterſounds as have been agreed on. But if it be in the day-time, (obſerve by this, that Rounds rode in the day, at leaſt in the morning) then the Guards when they asked the word, were to give ſigns, and the Rounds counter ſigns, ſuch as were condeſcended on by him who commanded in chief on the place. As ſuppoſe when one of the Guards required the word from the Round, he would put his Hat or his Head-piece on his face, breaſt, or belly, and upon that ſign the Round was to advance, or order his Lance or Spear as a counter-ſign.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Priſoners of War, of Parleys, Treaties, and Articles.

SIN brought War into the World, and though we do not read of any publick War before the Deluge, yet *Moſes* tells us of a private one between the two Brothers *Cain* and *Abel*, which ended with the death of the righteous one.

Reaſon why Priſoners are taken in War.

In all publick Wars that ever were, Priſoners have been taken, over whom the Victor always aſſum'd to himſelf power of life and death. And I believe for moſt part, the lives of Priſoners were ſaved, not ſo much out of pity and compaſſion, as out of intereſt, thereby to draw advantages either by exchanging them for others who had fallen into that ſame miſery, or by ranſoming them for money, or to make profit of them by Drudgery and Slavery. And though we read not in the Hiſtory of *Moſes* (and I conceive it is not only the trueſt but the oldeſt in the world) of any Priſoners of War taken, before *Lot* was taken by *Amraphel* and *Chaderlaomer*, yet I cannot imagin but *Nimrod* and his Succeſſors (though bloody enough) ſpared the lives of many, whom they made Priſoners in thoſe Wars which they waged againſt their neighbours; for I ſuppoſe Conqueſt was the beſt title they could pretend to for their Soveraignty, witneſs theſe words in the 14 of *Geneſis*, *Twelve years they ſerved Chaderlaomer, and in*

the

the thirteenth they rebelled. Sure then before these twelve years they were free people, and that which made them Vassals was the longest and sharpest sword. And when *Abraham* rescued *Lot*, and his goods, the women also, and the people; there is no doubt but he took some Prisoners of *Chaderlaomer* his party, which he had beaten, else the King of *Sodom* had not said to him, *Give me the persons, and take the goods to thy self.*

The Law of Nations is that which all or most Nations agree in, either by a mutual, declared, or yet by a tacite assent. And therefore we may truly say that by the Law of Nations before Christianity shone over the World, Prisoners of War might be used as the Victor pleased, that is, either made slaves, or put to death. In this Discourse I shall only speak how the Ancients used their Prisoners, and of their Parleys, Treaties, and Articles before the Promulgation of the Gospel, reserving the Discourse of Christian Prisoners till towards the end of my Essays of the Modern Art of War. The condition of Prisoners of War.

We are told by *Xenophon*, that after the Great *Cyrus* had taken *Babylon*, he told his Captains that it was a perpetual Law through the whole World that those who stood out in arms till they were overcome, might be disposed of, either as to their estates and goods, or their lives and persons, at the Victors pleasure. And if you will consider all the Wars that were managed either before or after his time, you will find he spoke truth; for if it was not a perpetual Law, it was a perpetual custom to do all that he said. This speech of his was confirmed by the *Athenian* Embassadors, whom *Thucydides* introduceth, telling the Inhabitants of *Melus* (whom they had besieged both by Sea and Land), "That Nature her self had put a necessity on all Conquerours and Victors in "War to have the absolute dominion and power over those who were vanquished to be disposed of as the Victors pleased; which Law, said they, we "did not make, nor are we the first who have made use of it, neither will we "hinder it to be a perpetual Law to ages to come, being assuredly confident, "said they, that if you had that power over us, that we probably may shortly have over you, you would not fail to put this Law in execution against us. So you see that both *Cyrus* and the *Athenians* thought Prisoners of War might be put to death if the Victor pleased, not only by the Law of War, but by the Law of both Nations and Nature. *Cyrus* his sense of Prisoners. The *Athenians.*

Before I go further, I shall premise one thing, at which perhaps many of my own Profession scruple, which is that notwithstanding any quarter granted in the field in time of Battel or skirmish, or at the assaults of Towns or Castles, he who commands in chief over the Victorious army may put all or any of the Prisoners to death that he pleaseth, without doing any wrong to the Law of War, because they had no quarter promised them by him either by word, or in writing, which we ordinarily call Parol. What quarter is given by any Officer who is inferior for the time, or by any Soldier, is but till the General or Commander in chief judg of the Prisoners, and then he may do with them as he pleaseth. But observe on the other hand, that though *Jure Belli* he may do so, yet when he puts Prisoners to death in cold blood, he may be justly branded with inhumanity and cruelty, unless those Prisoners have been Traytors, Rebels, Runaways, or Fugitives, or that Quarter had been promised contrary to the express command of the General; any of these alters the case. Such was that act of *Saul* King of *Israel*, who gave quarter to *Agag*, contrary to the express command of the Lord of Hosts, who had ordained him to die. How a General may use his Prisoners of War, *Jure Belli.*

Let us take a short view how this perpetual Law, whereof *Cyrus* and the *Athenian* Embassadors spoke, was executed in ancient times; and I believe we shall see that all Prisoners of War were either ransom'd, exchang'd, put to death, or made slaves. The *Jews* differ'd a little from other Nations in the matter of Slavery, for *Deut.* 23. they had a Political Law, which order'd a refuge to their Slaves. Slaves certainly who came to that calamity by none of their own fault, and that is mostly to be understood of Captives of War. *Cyrus* found the Law he spoke of practised against himself, by *Tomiris* Queen of *Scythia*, who put him to death in cold blood, if the Historian tell us truth. How the *Assyrian* Monarchs used their Prisoners, though prophane story were silent, the Sacred Writ would inform us; by it we know how *Tiglath Pileser* took away the Ten Tribes of *Israel*, and *Nebuchadnezzar* the other two to *Babylon*, and *Jewish* slaves.

How the *Israelites* used their Prisoners.

how this last put most of the Chiefs and Princes of the people to Death, after they were Prisoners, and caused the Children of King *Zedekiah* to be cut in pieces before his face; that after having seen so sad a spectacle, he might have his eyes put out, that so thereafter (as Sir *Walter Raleigh* observes well) he might never see any thing to comfort him. The Captains of Gods chosen people of *Israel* and *Judah*, thought not that their hands were bound up by any quarter that was given by their inferiour Commanders and Souldiers, but pass'd very ordinarily a Sentence of Death upon most of their Prisoners of War. *Joshua* hang'd most of those Kings whom he took in the Land of *Canaan*. *Adonibesek* had his Thumbs and great Toes cut off, for so he had used seventy two Kings before. *Zebah* and *Zalmunnah*, Kings of *Midian*, after they had quarter given them, were killed in cold blood by *Gideon*; perhaps by no other inspiration, than that of Revenge, because they had killed his Brethren. And by the way, I observe, that the *Israelites*, in their Civil Wars among themselves, gave very bad quarter: As for example, after the rest of the Tribes had killed in one Battel eighteen thousand *Benjamites*, they put five thousand of them to the Sword in the chace, who no doubt, called for quarter: The Text saith, they gleaned them; that is, killed them one by one in the way, and after that, two thousand of them were put to death at *Gidom*, who I make no question, yielded themselves Prisoners. How many thousand *Ephraimites* were put to death by the *Gileadites*, when they bewrayed what they were by the wrong pronunciation of *Sibboleth*. *David*, King of *Israel*, not only slaughtered those *Ammonites* whom he had taken Prisoners in the War, but tortured them, and put them to cruel deaths: Whether he did this for any other reason, than to be revenged for the disgrace done to his Embassadours, by *Hanan* King of the *Ammonites*, I shall not offer to determine. But certainly the Prophet *Elisha* gave a contrary advice to *Jehoram* King of *Israel*, who asking the man of God, what he should do with those *Syrians*, who were miraculously brought into *Samaria*, in these words, *Shall I smite them, my Father, shall I smite them?* Was answered, *Wilt thou smite those whom thou hast taken with thy Bow and thy Spear; nay, set Bread and Water before them, and send them back to their Master.* I confess, this was very fair quarter, but it was not to be imitated in all its points.

David very severe to his Prisoners.

Elisha adviseth to give fair quarter.

An occasion of bad quarter.

The obstinate keeping out of Towns, Forts, and Castles, when there was neither hope nor probability of succours, hath been often the reason why the Besieged, after they have rendered, have been butchered to death, that is, after they had yielded to the discretion of the Conqueror, who, having granted no Articles or Conditions, may put them all to death, without any stain of perfidy: He may do it *Jure belli*, but he may be taxed with severity, if not cruelty for it, yet generous Princes have practised it. *Titus*, a merciful Prince, cast the *Jews*, who were his Prisoners, both men and women, by hundreds to be torn and devoured by Wild Beasts. The Great *Alexander* caused some thousands of the *Tirians* to be Scourged and Crucified after they were Prisoners, because in defence of their City they had so long put a stop to the course of his Victories. But I think he cannot be vindicated from extream inhumanity used to the Noble Governour of *Gaza*, who kept out that place couragiously against him, till the never-failing Fortune of that daring Prince put the woful Governour into his hands, whose Feet he caused to be bored, and through the holes he put Cords, and tying these to Horse-tails, in that manner caused him to be dragg'd about the City, in imitation, perhaps, of what *Homer* saith *Achilles* (of whom *Alexander* derived his Pedegree) did to the dead body of the Valiant *Hector*. The *Veneti*, a people in *Gaule*, were overcome by *Cæsar* in a Naval Battel, yielded to his mercy; but because they had before given hostages, and yet had rebelled, and contrary to the Law of Nations, had imprisoned his Embassadours, he put the chief men of them to death, and sold the rest for Slaves. And at *Uxellodunum*, he cut off the hands of all those who had maintained the siege against him, and had yielded to his mercy, because they had rebelled before; yet the same *Cæsar* was known to be very merciful.

Inhumanity of *Alexander*.

Severity of *Cæsar*.

Xenophon in the first Chapter of his Third Book says, that Prisoners of War may be used without form of Law, or Process of Justice, at the Victors pleasure: This is true, if there be no previous Articles or Treaty, for that alters the

the case. The *Grecians* were cruel enough to their Prisoners: In that Naval Battel, wherein the *Lacedæmonian Lisander* gained the Soveraignty of the Sea from the *Athenians*, he put three thousand Prisoners to the Sword in cold Blood. Those who yielded to their discretions made but a bad bargain of it. Take a few Examples: *Mitilene*, which was tributary to *Athens*, rebelled, the Inhabitants, after a long resistance, yielded to mercy; the first Sentence of that popular State was, that all the men above fourteen years of age, should dye, and all under it, with all the women, should be sold for Slaves: The next days Verdict was more favourable, which gave life and liberty to all, except the Ring-leaders of the Sedition, but these the *Athenians* made not to be so few as a thousand. The *Plateans*, a free people of *Greece*, after a long Siege, yielded to the mercy of the *Lacedæmonians*, who put every one of them to death, and sold the Women for Slaves. The Inhabitants of the Isle of *Melus*, of whom I spoke a little before, after a long Siege, yielded to the mercy of the *Athenians*; but they exercised that perpetual Law of the Conquerour over the Vanquished, (whereof their Embassadours had told them) and though they had no pretext of other power over them, but that of the sharpest Sword, yet they killed all the men that were above fourteen years old, and sold all the Women and Male children for Slaves.

The *Grecians* generally gave bad quarter.

But the *Romans* were the most mercileſs Conquerours of any Nation, (except the *Cannibals*, who feed their Prisoners to kill and eat them) for those Prisoners whom they killed not, they reserved for worse uses than drudgery and slavery: Some were kept to adorn their Pompous Triumphs, and when the Triumphers Chariot turned towards the Capitol, then the woful Captives were taken to the place of Execution, and there butchered to death; and if any of them had their lives spared at that time, it was a cruel mercy, to make them dye a worse death afterward; which was the fortune of *Perseus*, the last King of *Macedon*; for after he, with his Children all in Chains, had been made spectacles at *Æmilius* his Triumphant Chariot, they were left to dye in prison for want of either Food or Sleep, the two great supporters of mans life. Others of their Prisoners were forced to fight and fence at Sharps on the Amphitheatres, till they killed one another, and all to make sport to that inhumane people: And which was worse, they were forced many times to satiate the cruelty of the Spectators by fighting for their lives with Lyons, Bears, and Tygers, kept purposely from Meat, to make them more eager to devour those miserable wretches: And thus they used women as well as men. I told you also how *Titus* (who was so meek a Prince, that he was called *The Delight of Mankind*) used the Infatuated *Jews*, after the destruction of *Jerusalem*. So unlimited a power did those Ancient Conquerours assume to themselves over the persons and lives of their Prisoners, which by the Law of War, and the Law of Nations they had acquired.

The *Romans* generally most mercileſs to Prisoners.

Yet the *Roman* Senate very often either really were, or seemed to be dissatisfied with some of their Consuls, and other Supreme Commanders of their Armies, who were cruel to those who yielded to mercy. So when *Sergius Galba* had sold in *Spain* all those *Portugueses* who had submitted themselves, a Law was made at *Rome* to restore them to their liberty, but it had no effect; and this imported juggling. But the Senate went further, for they punished some of their Generals for using cruelty to those who yielded to mercy, as the Pro-Consul *Plicinius*, *Crassus*, and two Admirals were judicially condemned at *Rome* for their inhumanities of that nature in *Greece*. The Consul *M. Popilius* having by sundry Victories well near ruined the *Ligurians*, ten thousand of them submitted to his Discretion, and observe what that was; he first disarmed them, next he razed their Town; thirdly, he sold all their goods and substance; and fourthly, he sold themselves for Slaves. A most detestable action, and as such, resented by the Senate, who ordered the Consul to pay back the price to the Buyers, restore the poor *Ligurians* to their liberty, and return to them, as much of their goods, and as many of their Arms as could be recovered: But the half of this was not performed by the Consul; yet the reason on which the Senate grounded this order, is very observable: Because, said they, Victory doth not consist in exercising Cruelty on those who yield to Mercy, but in vanquishing the obsti-

Roman Cruelty to Prisoners often restrained by the Senate.

nate and Contumacious. Most of the *Capuans* (who stood for *Hannibal*) after a long Siege, yielded themselves and City to the mercy of the two *Roman* Consuls; one whereof was wounded, and inclined to be merciful, but the other, *Q. Fulvius*, caused eighty of the principal Citizens, first to be whipt with Rods, and then beheaded with Axes, and he used all the rest very inhumanely.

Fear of bad quarter produceth desperate effects.

And assuredly the fear of mercileſs usage, and bad quarter, hath forced many to make an unlooked for resistance, to the great prejudice of the prevailing party; for Despair produceth the most horrid and desperate effects. Most of the *Saguntines* saved *Hannibal* a labour to kill them, by killing themselves. The Citizens of *Astapa* in *Spain*, detesting the *Roman* Cruelty, made a great pile of Wood within their Town, set it on fire, threw first their Wives and Children into it, and then themselves. When *Philip*, the last King of *Macedon* except one, would grant no other conditions to the Inhabitants of *Abydos*, but to yield to his Mercy, which they knew was the extreamest of Cruelties; after many desperate resolutions, and vigorous oppositions, when the *Macedonians* entered, it was a ruthful sight to see the poor *Abydens* destroying one another promiscuously, men and women, young and old, some hanging their Wives first, and then themselves; others cutting the Throats of their Children, and then their own; others casting their neareſt relations in Wells, and over the tops of Houses, and themselves after them. *Philip* being astonished and appalled at so terrible a sight, by Proclamation gave them three days to live, before their death should be resolved on by him: But in vain, for all of them dispatched themselves, except such as were by force, bonds, and chains compelled to live. You may read their lamentable Tragedy in *Polybius* his sixteenth Book, and in the thirty first of *Titus Livius*.

Romans cruel to Prisoners in their Civil Wars.

Nor did the *Romans* in their Civil Wars give better quarter one to another (except *Cæsar*) than they did to strangers: *Petreius* killed those Souldiers of *Cæsar*'s whom he found in his Camp, though *Cæsar* spared those of *Petreius*, and sent them back to him. *Scipio*, *Pompey*'s Father-in-law, put all those of *Cæsar*'s party to death, whom he took Prisoners. *Sylla*, after all his Victories, very cruelly put eight thousand *Romans* to the Sword in the great hostelery, near the City, after they had yielded to his Mercy. Not did *Augustus* keep himself within the limits of Mercy, when he thought it fit at one time to sacrifice three hundred *Roman* Knights to appease the incensed Ghost of his Great Unkle *Julius Cæsar*. But it may be said, these had that pretence which all Civil War carries along with it, and that is, that all who oppose either of the two parties, are Rebels to the State, whether the party be for the lawful and supreme authority, or against it. And therefore, to say no more of their Civil Wars, I find them extream cruel in their Wars with *Hannibal*, to their own Souldiers, which that great *Carthaginian* had taken Prisoners. *Fabius* the Dictator (who saved the *Roman* State) made an agreement with *Hannibal* for the exchange and ransome of Prisoners of a like quality, and for every one of those who (after the exchange was made) were supernumerary, they were to pay neat eight pounds, Sterling. At one exchange there were two hundred forty seven more *Romans* than *Carthaginians*; *Hannibal* demands their ransome, *Fabius* sent to the Senate for it, who basely refused the money, and disowned the agreement; what could the good old man *Fabius* do, but send his Son to *Rome*, and sell a part of his Patrimony, and pay the money to *Hannibal*, which was near two thousand pound Sterling? a vast summ in those days. But they dealt worse with those of their own men who were taken Prisoners at *Canna*, whom they would neither ransome out of the publick Purse, nor suffer the Prisoners themselves, or their Friends to ransome out of their private fortunes and estates. And though the Senate flattered themselves, by calling this act of their own, Magnanimous; yet since there was no Justice in it, it could carry no generosity along with it; for if these Captive *Romans* misbehaved themselves in the Battel, the Senate was bound in honour to ransome them, and punish them themselves, and not suffer them to rot in prison with their capital Enemy. Assuredly this Action wanted for neither Avarice nor Cruelty; for strange it was thus to punish common Souldiers, and yet to send out some principal Senators to meet and complement their hair-brain'd Consul, *Terentius Varo*, and thank him,

Roman Senates Avarice.

Its Cruelty and Injustice.

him, that he had not deſpaired of the Common-wealth; and yet by his obſtinate and inexcuſable folly he had brought the Common-wealth to the very brink of Deſtruction.

And why might not *Hannibal* have uſed theſe *Roman* Priſoners, as *Livy* in his ſeventh Book tells us, the *Romans* uſed ſome thouſands of the *Tarquinian* Priſoners, of whom they choſe 358 of the prime Noblemen and Gentlemen, all theſe they firſt whipped well with Rods, and then ſtruck off their Heads in the great Market-place of *Rome*, and preſently after put all the reſt of the Priſoners to the Sword in cold blood? Though this was a very mercileſs act, yet by the law of War they might do it, and ſo might *Hannibal* have done to their Priſoners; and truly, I do not ſee how he could be obliged to feed thoſe whom their own Maſters would not ranſome. A mercileſs act of the *Romans*, yet not unjuſt.

Let us hear what opinion *Polybius* had of Priſoners of War, who was a grave Hiſtorian, a great States-man, and a good Captain. In his ſecond Book, ſpeaking of *Ariſtomachus*, who being a Priſoner of War, was tortured to death: He ſaith on that ſubject, that neither *Antigonus* King of *Macedon*, nor *Aratus* Prætor of the *Achæans*, could be called cruel, for putting a Captive to death with torments; for, though *Ariſtomachus* had not deſerved that uſage otherwiſe, yet they might have done all to him that was done, *Jure Belli*; for the Law of Nations and War give the Conquerour power to uſe his Priſoners at his pleaſure. And the ſame Author ſpeaking of the *Mantineans*, who were juſtly puniſhed for their abominable perfidy and ingratitude, in ſlaughtering thoſe *Achæans* who were ſent to preſerve them; he ſaith expreſsly, That though they had committed no ſuch wickedneſs, nor any other crime at all, yet the Victor in War, *Jure Belli*, might have either kill'd them, their Wives, and Children, or ſold them for Slaves at his pleaſure. Thus far he. *Polybius* his opinion how Priſoners of War may be uſed.

But this power of Victorious Princes or Generals over the Goods, Perſons, and Lives of their Priſoners, is limited and reſtrained by Treaties, Parleys, Capitulations, and Articles; to the ſtrict obſervance whereof ſimply, and without fraud or ambiguity, all men of what Station, Rank, or Quality whatſoever, or of what Religion or Perſwaſion ſoever, be he *Jew* or *Gentile*, *Grecian* or *Barbarian*, *Chriſtian* or *Mahometan*, are tyed; becauſe Faith and Promiſes are the Sacred and Indiſſoluble Bonds, which maintain Humane Society, and whoſoever breaks them on any pretence, ſhould be look'd on as a Monſter, and not as a Man. Treaties. Articles and Promiſes ſhould be faithfully kept.

In the time of Treaty, both parties who treat, ought to be careful, that a Ceſſation of Arms be agreed on, and ſign'd by the Commanders in Chief, of both Forces, whether it be in Field, Town, Caſtle, or Garriſon; and not only ſo, but they ought to be on their guard, for fear of foul play, or ſome unexpected rupture of the Treaty: For both in Ancient and Modern times, Cities and Forts have been ſurpriz'd, when thoſe within thought themſelves ſecure by a Treaty and Ceſſation, as Hiſtories of all ages bear witneſs: And many times theſe Surprizes have been made without either the conſent or connivence of either the Commander in chief, or his Subordinate Officers, meerly by the common Souldiers, who frequently think themſelves defrauded by Treaties, of that which they conceive is the price of their Sweat and Blood; to wit, the ſpoil and booty of the place beſieged, or of the perſons of thoſe almoſt beaten and overcome in the Field. Nor ſhould any Treaty give the leaſt interruption to the conſtant keeping of ſtrict Guards, and careful Watches; nor ſhould thoſe who treat, have liberty to view Guards, Camps, Magazines, or Parades, unleſs they be ſo ſtrong, and in ſo good order and poſture, that the ſight of them may ſerve to terrifie an Enemy. *Scipio* the *African*, in time of a Treaty with *Syphax* and *Aſdrubal*, having by his Commiſſion ſufficiently ſpy'd the poſture of their Guards, and weakneſs of their Camps, ſuddenly breaks off the Treaty, ſets upon them, burns their Leaguer, and deſtroys forty thouſand of their men. In this the *Roman* General made no breach of Faith nor Promiſe, but made a more prudent uſe of the Treaty than the Enemy did. Treaties, Promiſes, and Articles ſhould be religiouſly obſerv'd, but yet there is a prudent miſtruſt often neceſſary, for the heart of man is deſperately wicked, and deceitful above all things, who can know it? And here the old leſſon, *Diſce diffidere*, is very often neceſſary to be remember'd. *Trebonius*, No Enemy to be truſted in time of Treaty.

Cæſars Legate cheated by a Treaty at *Marſeilles.*

bonius, *Cæſars* Legate, had very long beſieged *Marſeilles*, and had granted the Defendants truce till *Cæſars* coming; this rendered the Beſiegers negligent; which the *Marſillians* perceiving, and having a high and fair wind for their purpoſe, ſallied, and in a moment burnt his Ambulatory Tower, his Rams, Muſcles, and other Machines of War, which had been the works of many months. In one of my Diſcourſes of the Modern Art of War, I ſhall ſpeak more fully of the ſad effects of negligence in time of Parleys and Treaties. Some of the Ancient *Gauls* were in Treaty with *Cæſar*, and had a Ceſſation of Arms with him, they perfidiouſly break it, and kill many of his people; he marches againſt them, they ſend Embaſſadours to him, without any previous liberty demanded, or granted by him for thoſe Embaſſadours, and therefore he keeps them in reſtraint, till he had utterly undone their Army: Here they broke with *Cæſar*, not *Cæſar* with them, for after their breach, he neither granted them Treaty nor Ceſſation, nor Paſsports for their Embaſſadours; yet *Cato*, in full Senate, avouched this act of his to be Perfidy, and a breach of the Law of Nations, and pleaded that he ought to be delivered up to the *Gauls*, whom he had offended, as a Sacrifice, to appeaſe the wrath of the Immortal Gods.

Cæſars reputation queſtioned by *Cato.*

Articles broke.

The Ancient *Greeks*, who accounted all other Nations *Barbarians*, broke frequently their Treaties, Conventions, and Articles very barbarouſly. Thoſe who commanded the *Corcyrian* Army articled with the Inhabitants of *Epidamnus*, that they ſhould deliver up their Town, and that till the pleaſure of the populace of *Corcyra* were known, all the *Corinthians* ſhould be kept in Chains, and all ſtrangers ſold for Slaves: A bad enough agreement at beſt, and yet the half of it was but kept by the *Corcyrians*, for all the *Corinthians* were indeed kept in Fetters, but the ſtrangers were all put to death. In that total rout given to the *Athenians* in the Iſle of *Sicily*, by the *Syracuſians*, aſſiſted by *Gilippus* a *Lacedæmonian* Captain, *Demoſthenes*, one of the Generals for *Athens*, had Articles granted him for his own life, and ſix thouſand men that were with him, and ſo they yielded themſelves Priſoners; and ſhortly after *Nicias*, the other *Athenian* General, ſubmitted himſelf without conditions, to *Gilippus* his diſcretion: Both of them were put to death. And though no Articles were broke to *Nicias*, yet it was inhumanity to kill him in cold blood; but in the death of *Demoſthenes*, Perfidy was added to Cruelty. The bloody Dictator *Sylla* made Articles with three thouſand *Romans* at *Antenna*, and gave them their lives, on condition that they ſhould kill ſome of their own party within the Town, who were his Enemies: They performed their part, but ſo did not he, for he put them all to the Sword; a perfidious act of his part, though indeed they met with that which they well deſerved.

Perfidious and cruel uſage.

No quarrel to be pick'd out of Articles.

Treaties ought to be concluded, and Agreements and Articles ſubſcribed, without any deſign to pick quarrels, or to lay hold on any ſmall emergent that may ſeem to give the contracting parties any ombrage or occaſion of breaking: This hath been too often practiſed in our Modern Wars, nor did ſome of the Ancients fail to help themſelves with baſe fetches. Take two or three inſtances: At *Pilos*, the *Lacedæmonians* are beaten at Sea by the *Athenians*, and four hundred of them ſhut up in a barren Iſland, likely to be ſtarved: An agreement is made, the *Lacedæmonians* are to deliver up their Ships, a final Peace is to be concluded, and thoſe in the Iſland were to be ſet at liberty, but if any one Article happened to be infringed, then all of them were to be void; and if the people of *Athens* (who had the Soveraignty) did not ratifie this agreement, the Truce was to end, the war to begin, and all the Gallies were to be reſtored. The *Athenian* State rejects the Treaty, the Ceſſation is given up, the War is commenced, but the Fleet was not reſtored, becauſe, ſaid the *Athenian* Captains, in time of the Truce, ſome of the *Lacedæmonians* endeavour'd to get out of the barren Iſle into *Pilos*: A moſt deteſtable Perfidy. And what better was the uſage the *Samnites* got from the *Romans* in that Treaty, wherein they gave the *Roman* Army liberty to depart and go home, after they had made every man of them paſs under the Gallows at *Caudium*? the Senate refuſed to ratifie the Treaty, prepared for War, and ſent the Conſuls who had ſign'd the Articles, priſoners to the *Samnites*; a ſubterfuge which did not quadrate with the Juſtice to which they pretended. Yet

Thucydides.

Livius.

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it was ſuch uſage as was foretold to the *Samnites* by their old General *Herennius*. A conſiderable number of *Corcyrians* (who ſeditiouſly had left the Town, taken arms and ſpoil'd the adjacent Country) are routed by the *Athenians*, they come to a Parley, and it is agreed firſt they ſhould deliver up all their Arms: Secondly, all their Auxiliaries: and thirdly they ſhould remain faithful Priſoners till the people of *Athens* gave judgment, what ſhould be done with them, but ſtill provided they ſhould not be deliver'd to their mercileſs Countrymen the *Corcyrians*; but this was the *Athenians* grand deſign, and therefore an article is ſhuffled in, that if any one of theſe conditions were broke, all of them ſhould be void. Then were ſome *Corcyrians* ſent to the Priſoners, who counterfeiting themſelves friends, adviſe them to eſcape, and to that purpoſe offer them a Ship; the infatuated people lays hold on the offer, and ſails away, but being way-laid, are eaſily retaken, and then delivered to their capital enemies, who put them all to cruel deaths. An execrable act of the *Athenians*, and that the rather becauſe their City was famous for Schools, wherein were taught the Moral Vertues. I will not ſpeak here of *Hannibals* breaking *Maharbals* Capitulation with ſix thouſand *Romans* at *Thraſimenus*, but ſhall reſerve it till I ſpeak of the power that ſubordinate Officers have to give Conditions and Articles, which you may find in the Twenty ſixth Chapter of the *Modern Art of War*.

Perfidy of the *Athenians*.

I know not whether *Amilcar*, *Hannibals* father dealt candidly when he Treated and Capitulated with *Spendius* and *Antaritus*, the Ring-leaders of the *Carthaginian* revolted Mercenaries, and made it an Article that it ſhould be in the power of the Senate of *Carthage* to chuſe any ten of the Rebels they pleaſed, and to diſpoſe of them as they thought good; and when this was agreed to, he immediately ſeized on them two as two of theſe ten. Sure if they had thought they had been in that danger, they had never ſign'd a paper tending ſo directly to their own deſtruction; and therefore that Article was ſign'd againſt the intention of the Capitulators, and ſo perhaps was void in Law. *Amilcar* made alſo choice of the Ten himſelf, and not the Senate which was againſt the Letter of the Capitulation.

Amilcar taxed.

The *Athenian* General *Paches* had beſieged *Notium*, and invited *Hippias* (who was Commander in chief within the Town) to come out and ſpeak with him, promiſing faithfully (if they did not agree at the Treaty) to ſend him back in ſafety, but did not tell him when. The fooliſh Governour came out, *Paches* immediately ſtorms the ſecure City, takes it, and puts moſt that were within it to the ſword, but would needs keep his word to *Hippias*, and therefore ſends him back to the Town, where he was no ſooner arrived but by order of the execrable *Paches* he is ſhot to death with Arrows. This treachery in ſeeking and laying hold on occaſion to break Treaties and Articles was, is, and ever will be a monſtrous crime crying to Heaven for vengeance. The Sons of *Saul* paid dear for their fathers breach to the *Gibeanites*, who with mouldy bread and clouted ſhooes had cunningly cheated *Joſhuah* to treat with them, and give them conditions, which notwithſtanding he reſolved for his Oaths ſake Religiouſly to obſerve.

An execrable Villany.

Joſhuah his Piety.

But theſe examples of *Spendius*, and *Antaritus* of *Carthage*, and *Hippias* of *Notium*, ſhould teach all Generals and Commanders in chief of whatever quality they are, whether in field or Town, not to parley in perſon; for if contrary to Parol, promiſe, faith, Oath, or Hoſtages, they be either kill'd or made Priſoners; then the Army, Town, or Caſtle which they commanded, ſtand for a time amazed, which gives a fair opportunity to the deceitful enemy (who hath prepar'd himſelf for it) to fall upon them, and put them in a fearful confuſion, if not totally to rout them before they can recollect themſelves. *Julius Caſar*, I confeſs, had an advantage in his perſonal parley in *Spain*, with *Afranius* and *Petreius*, becauſe by his preſence, and the juſtifying his cauſe in his own excellent language, and his promiſes not only of fair quarter, but of entertainment, he debaucht moſt of their Army. But theſe very reaſons which made his parley with them juſtifiable, render'd their meeting with him, in preſence of the Soldiers of both Armies (which *Caſar* would needs have) altogether inexcuſable. And indeed *Pompey* refuſed on good grounds all parley with *Caſar* at *Dirrachium*. But there was no ſuch cauſe of *Caſars* Perſonal parley with *Arioviſtus* King of *Germany*, at which I ſuppoſe he was made ſenſible of his error; for though he thought he had made the meeting cock-ſure, on a little hill ſituated in the midſt of a large Plain,

No Commanders in chief ſhould Parley in perſon.

Plain, (where no ambuſhes could be laid) and none were to approach that Plain, but himſelf and the barbarous King, each of them accompanied with ten Horſemen, and he had made choice of ten of the gallanteſt of his Legionaries to be with himſelf all mounted on good *Gallick* Horſes; but notwithſtanding all theſe cautions, the Treaty and parley was broke of, not without viſible ſigns of treachery. And the ſame *Cæſar* gives a Caveat to all Commanders in chief, either of Armies, or parts of Armies, or of Cities, or Caſtles, not to parley in perſon, when he tells us the ſad ſtory how he loſt one full Legion, and five Cohorts of another, by the ſimple folly of his Legate *Sabinus*, firſt in believing the Intelligence of *Ambiorix* a profeſt enemy; and next in going in perſon with his principal Officers, to treat and parley with the ſame *Ambiorix*, upon the bare word or parol of a faithleſs Barbarian, by whom he and his Officers were immediately kill'd, and then their forces preſently after put to the Sword. And take here a perfidious trick of a *Roman* at a Parley. *Comius* a *Gallick* Prince had not been very faithful to *Rome*, *Cæſars* Legate *Labienus* appoints one *Voluſenus* to Parley with *Comius*; the *Gaul* having got the accuſtom'd aſſurances, came to the place where *Voluſenus* (by order from *Labienus*) as out of friendſhip took him by the hand, but held it faſt till one of his Centurions gave him a deep wound on the head; but it not proving mortal, *Comius* eſcaped, and ſwore thereafter never to truſt a *Roman*. If *Cæſar* had either cut off his Legates head, or (according to the *Roman* cuſtom uſed in ſuch caſes) deliver'd him over to the incenſed *Gauls* for this treacherous act, then the ſame *Labienus* had not afterward perfidiouſly deſerted himſelf, and run over to *Pompey*. *Sempronius Gracchus* being betray'd by his Hoſt, left his command, and being Proconſul, went in perſon to Parley with ſome *Carthaginians*, from the reſult whereof he expected great matters, but he never return'd, for he was environ'd and kill'd with all his retinue. *Scipio* the *African*, though an accompliſht Captain, no doubt, forgot his duty when he left his charge in *Spain*, and went to *Africk* to treat with *Syphax* in the midſt of an Army, and at that time accompanied by *Aſdrubal* a profeſt enemy to the *Roman* name and Nation, having no aſſurance for his ſafety but the word of a Prince, whom *Scipio* himſelf accounted barbarous. And though he eſcaped that hazard, yet did he not eſcape the ſevere reproof of Great *Fabius*, who to his face, and in full Senate charged him with this inexcuſable overſight in very rough and bitter language, as you may read in *Livies* Thirtieth Book. Nor do I look on the perſonal Parley between the ſame *Scipio*, and the famous *Hannibal* before their laſt Battel at *Zama*, but as an extravagant action of two ſuch renowned Chieftains. The Enterviews of Kings and Soveraign Princes have ſeldom prov'd fortunate, or gain'd thoſe advantages to either party that were expected. But this Diſcourſe belongs to another Chapter.

Cæſars danger by it.

His great loſs by it.

Perfidy of a *Roman* Legat.

Gracchus kill'd at a Parley.

Scipio the *African* queſtion'd for his Parley with *Syphax*.

To conclude, the apprehenſion of bad quarter, and the fear of the breach of Promiſes and Articles, and the ſuſpicion of ill uſage, hath made many refuſe all quarter, reject all Treaties, and diſtruſt all Articles and Agreements, and by a voluntary death rid themſelves from all fears and dangers, and rob their enemies of the glory of their Captivity. Thus *Saul* King of *Iſrael* deſired his Armour-bearer to kill him; and becauſe he would not, he did it himſelf, that he might not fall into the hands of the uncircumciſed. Thus *Virius Vibius* perſwaded ſeventy *Capuan* Senators to ſup with him, and every one of them to drink a draught of Poyſon to ſhun the Rods and Axes of the *Roman* Conquerours. Thus the Great *Hannibal* poyſoned himſelf, that the Treacherous King of *Pruſſia* might not deliver him into the hands of his implacable enemies the *Romans*. Thus *Brutus* and *Caſſius* diſpatched themſelves, that they might not be grateful and welcome ſpectacles to *Anthony* and *Octavius Cæſar*. Thus *Cato* made *Utica* famous by pulling out his own Bowels, that he might not be beholding for his life to merciful *Cæſar*. Thus *Scapula* to ſhun the ſame *Cæſars* juſt reſentment, for his ſedition, cauſed a huge pile of burnt-wood to be heaped up, ſupped plentifully, took Nard, or Spikenard, and Roſin inwardly, and then commanded a ſlave to kindle the fire, and to throw him in it, after his freed ſervant had at his intreaty cut his Throat. Thus *Mark Anthony* and his beautiful and beloved *Cleopatra*, opened to themſelves two ſeveral doors of death, that they might not aſſiſt at *Auguſtus* his Triumphal Entrance into *Rome*. Thus *Vaodicea* Queen of the *Britons* choſe rather to poyſon her ſelf, than be the ob-

Deſperate ways to prevent bad Quarter.

Victrix cauſa Diis placuit, ſed Victa Catoni.

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ject of the *Romans* contempt, to whom in reſtoring to liberty her oppreſſed Country, ſhe had done much miſchief. What ſome others, who were not Heathens, have done like this in latter times, moved by the fearful examples of the calamities and inhumane uſage of thoſe who have been Priſoners of War before them, ſhall be ſpoken to in its own place.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Military Puniſhments, and Rewards of the Romans, *and other Ancients.*

AS in all well order'd Commonwealths the Vertuous ſhould be cheriſhed, and the wicked chaſtiſed, ſo in Armies, (which both in Oeconomy and Policy, do not only repreſent, but are indeed either well or ill govern'd Republicks) thoſe who in ancient times did ſignal ſervices, were rewarded, and thoſe who tranſgreſſed Military Laws were puniſhed. And if Martial Animadverſions be more ſevere than the Civil ones, there is reaſon for it, becauſe on the right or wrong managing the War, depends the ſafety or ruin of the State, and upon the leaſt miſtake of one Military order, may follow the loſs of that Army, to which is intruſted the management of that War. The great Maſter of War, *Cæſar* ſays, *Fortuna quum in reliquis rebus, tum precipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas commutationes efficit*: "Fortune, ſaith he, as in other affairs, "ſo more eſpecially in War, makes inconſiderable accidents produce vaſt chan-"ges and alterations. Military Laws ſhould be ſevere, and ſeverely executed.

That which *Lamachus* in *Plutarch* ſays is now common, *Non licet bis in bello peccare.* In War one cannot do wrong twice; that is, *in ſumma rei*, in the principal points of War; as in the loſs of an army, the ill Marſhalling of it, the ill fighting a Battel, the loſs of a conſiderable Town or Paſs, by negligence, ſloth, treachery, or cowardiſe. *Vegetius* in the Thirteenth Chapter of his firſt Book, ſays, *Præliorum delicta emendationem non recipiunt.* The errors committed in fighting Battels are not capable of amendment. And in the fifth Chapter of his Third Book he tells us, *Siquidem nulla ſit negligentiæ venia, ubi de ſalute certatur*: "There is no pardon for a neglect, where men fight for the common "ſafety.

Now though it be an unqueſtionable truth, that when ſubjects do their Prince and Country ſervice, they do but their duty; and when they do either of them diſſervice, or tranſgreſs Laws, they deſerve puniſhment: yet it is as true, that men naturally are much encouraged to vertue, by ſeeing rewards liberally beſtow'd on thoſe who are faithful and loyal, as they are frighted or terrified from vice by the puniſhments they ſee inflicted on the wicked and diſloyal. I think it was no flaſh, but a remarkable ſaying of a Noble *Engliſh* General, who by an exemplary hanging of ſome Plunderers in his Army, did encourage the Country Gentlemen to intreat him to hang ſome more for taking Geeſe and Hens, and yet they were making no great haſte to bring in either meat or money for the entertainment of the Army: Nay, Gentlemen, (ſaid the General) all hanging, and no money will not keep any Army together, a little hanging, and a little money will do better. And indeed it is ſo, all puniſhment, and no reward, proves but one ſupport, inſtead of two to the continuance of either Commonwealth or Armies. Rewards encourage as well as puniſhments deter.

Many of the ancient Governours of Republicks, and Commanders of Armies knew very well how to diſpence both rewards and puniſhments. Some Nations whom both *Greeks* and *Romans* qualified with the title of Barbarous, were extreamly

Some ancient Nations inhumane in their punishments.

extreamly inhumane in their punishments. So we read that he who came last to the Rendezvouz of the ancient *Gauls*, was either cut in pieces, or thrown quick into a fire. And *Cæsar* in his Seventh Book of the *Gallick* War, says, that for petty faults, *Vercingetorix* caused noses, ears and hands to be cut off, and the eyes of Delinquents to be put out, and in that manner sent them home to their friends; but for greater crimes he caused them to be burnt quick, or put them to death by some more lingring torture.

Grecian punishments.

Though the *Grecians* were severe in their punishments, yet we find them not ordinarily cruel in them, their Animadversions being for most part rather Ignominious than Capital. It is said of the *Lacedemonians* (from whom others had their breeding in the Military Art) that they punisht a Coward by clothing him in a Womans apparel, and making him stand every third day in their Markets, or other publick places, which was lookt on by men of spirit as worse than death. We find the ordinary death to which the *Grecian* Delinquents in Armies were put, was that of stoning, which perhaps they learned from a more ancient people than themselves, the *Israelites*, it being a custom with them to take their Malefactors without the Camp, and there stone them to death. This punishment was no new invented one in the time of *Alexander*, for *Q. Curtius* speaking of the Conspiracy against the King, says, all that were named by *Nicomachus*, so soon as the sign was given, were stoned to death, *More patrio*, after the custom of the Country. Punishments of another sort were inflicted by the Great *Alexander*, after his great Soul began to deviate from the path of Vertue; such was his inhumane torturing to death the noble *Philotas*, perhaps with that same justice that he caused his father *Parmenio* to be murthered, whose Conduct had so much contributed to most of his Conquests.

I much wonder why *Stenechius* will reckon stoning to be a *Roman* punishment, for we find nothing of it so far as I know in History. He tells us, as he saith, out of *Florus*, he might have said out of *Livius* too, that *Posthumius* a *Roman* General was kill'd with stones by his own Soldiers. But that which was done by a Mutinous Army to their Commander in chief, is not to be reckoned a punishment authorized by Law, for he confesseth it was done in a Mutiny, *Seditione facta*. I have spoken of this Mutiny in another place.

Roman punishments.

What punishments were legally inflicted on the *Roman* Officers and Soldiers, we are left to glean out of History, for *Polybius* speaks but of few, and *Vegetius* of none that I remember, except in the Fourteenth Chapter of his first Book, where he saith, the *Tirones* who either did not willingly learn their Exercises, or made no great proficiency in them, were fed with Barley instead of Wheat. But we find that manner of punishment imposed on the *Veterans* as well as the *Novitiates*, and for other faults. *Livy* in his Thirty seventh Book, says, that some Companies who had lost their Colours were appointed to be fed with Barley. *Polybius* tells us that the Tribunes had power to Fine, to take Pledges, and to whip with Rods; and a Centurion had power to whip with Vines, for a twig of a Vine was his Badg, whereby he was known. *Tacitus* says, that one *Lucilius* a Centurion was nick nam'd, *Cedo alteram*, because when he had broke one twig on the back of a Soldier, he called for a second, and a third. Observe by the way that a Soldier might not resist his Centurion when he was chastising him, for if he but held the Rod, he was cashiered, and if he broke it, he died for it: and this will prove what I asserted in another place, that the *Roman* Centurions were sometimes Hangmen; yet in these days they were looked upon as such no more than *Benajah*, *Solomons* Captain General, was thought a Hangman, for killing his Predecessor *Joab*, *Adonijah*, and *Shimei*, with his own hand, at his great Masters command. *Scipio* the *Numantine*, caused every Soldier to be whipt severely that went ever so little out of his rank, or fell behind; if he was a *Roman* Soldier he was whipt with Vines, if one of the Allies with Birches. The Tribunes, says *Polybius*, for neglect of Guards, had power to punish with death; but he adds, not without the Councel; but there is no doubt the Consul had power without advice or counsel of any whatsoever, to put any under his command to death, either for crimes forbidden by the Laws, Constitutions and Customs of their former Discipline, or for transgressing any new Commands or Edicts. As *Manlius* struck the head from his own Son, for Combating with one of the *Latines* contrary to a late order; and for some such emergent

Feeding with Barley.

Whipping with Vines and Birches.

Beheading their own Sons.

gent transgression, some think *Posthumius* did as much to his Son, as I told you before. *Caius Matienus* for deserting his Army in *Spain*, was first cruelly whipped with Rods, and then sold for a slave in open Market for a piece of money, not worth an *English* Groat.

Desertion of a Post was death, but the punishment I last spoke of was worse than death. By their Law it was death to leave their Officers or Colours in the Field; to lose Arms, or go from their Guards, to commit theft, to bear false witness, or commit any one crime, how small so ever, three several times; yet this was not always, yea but seldom put in execution. Some Cohorts that were chaced into their Camp by the *Tuscans*, and with loss of their Colours, did not die for it, but were ordered only to lye without the Camp, without shelter of either Hut or Tent, till they recovered their reputation. Those that fled from *Cannæ* were ordered by the Senate to be carried to *Sicily*, and to remain there till the end of the Punick War, though most of them had served out their time. At *Canusium*, *Marcellus* ordered those Maniples that had lost their Ensigns to be fed with Barley instead of Wheat, and the Centurions to have their swords taken from them, and turned out of the Camp.

Crimes punisht alike by death.

Sodomy was a capital crime when publickly known. A young Soldier not only refused to suffer one of his Tribunes to abuse him, but in defending himself from force, killed the Tribune, and was acquitted by the Consul. The manner of death inflicted by the *Romans* on Criminals was ordinarily twofold, Beheading, and Battoning, both very cruel as they made them, for heads were seldom struck off, but after a severe scourging with Rods. Battoning, or the *Fustuarium*, is thus described by *Polybius* in his Sixth Book, The party who was to suffer, was brought publickly, (he tells us not to what place of the Camp) and then the Tribune touched him with his Battoon, immediately after (he having liberty to run, as at our *Gatlaupe*) he was cudgel'd and fell'd to death by the Soldiers in any place of the Camp he fortun'd to come; and if he had the luck to escape, he was nothing the better for it, home he durst not go, none of his friends or acquaintances durst harbour him, and it was lawful for any man to kill him. Sometimes the Delinquents were punisht after death, as much as man could punish, for we read of some who after they had been cruelly whipped, and their heads cut off, had burial denied them, yea their friends were forbid to mourn for them. But though I confess that for giving terrour, horrid crimes deserve horrid punishments, yet I think the consideration of humane frailty should teach man to be shie in inflicting inhumane pains on the living, and be very sparing to meddle with the dead; for *Sævire in manes*, is an assured token of a monstrously cruel nature.

Sodomy a capital crime.

Beheading after severe whipping.

Battoning or *Fustuarium*.

Punishment after death.

Several transgressions were punished by diminishing the offenders wages, by making them march with the Baggage, winter in the field, both out of Town and Camp, to dig Ditches, more than their Companions did, to stand a whole day before the Generals Pavilion, and sometimes with turfs on their heads; and as I observed before, it was no small punishment for a Horseman to have his Horse taken from him, and be made to serve on foot, and this was called *Militiæ mutatio*.

Lesser punishments.

After the Emperours had invested themselves with the Soveraignty of *Rome*, many of them inflicted punishments, not *pro ratione delicti*, or according to the quality of the crime, but according to their own boundless power, more to satisfie their cruel and inhumane natures than to give Justice its due course. Among none of the most unjust you may reckon this, that the Emperour *Alexander* (who did well deserve the Sirname that was given him of *Severus*) hearing that a young Soldier had injured a poor old woman in spoiling her of some goods, disarmed him, declared him a slave, and gave him to the woman, that by his work and drudgery he might gain her a livelihood. But these I will speak of, had not so much of justice in them. *Aurelian* put one of his Soldiers to a horrible death for Adultery, by causing his feet to be tyed to the tops of two Trees branches, bowed down, which being let suddenly fly up, tore the woful wretch in two pieces. The Emperour *Macrinus* caused a Tribune to be tyed (who had suffered his Guards to desert a Post) to the wheel of a Cart, and carried him so a days march. The same Monster of an Emperour being told that two Soldiers had deflowred their Hosts serving Maid, caused immediately the bellies of two

Abominable cruelties.

Cows to be open'd, out of which the Tripes were taken, and then the Soldiers were ſowed alive in them, but the heads of the Cows were cut off, that ſo the woful couple might ſpeak one to another ſo long as their cruel agony ſuffered them to breath. The Emperour *Avidius Caſſius* cauſed a Pole of the height of one hundred foot to be erected, and cauſed Delinquent Soldiers to be tyed all along to it from the top to the foot of it, and then ſet fire to the loweſt part, in that manner conſuming the miſerable wretches with fire and ſmoke. In our Modern Diſcipline of War, there have been and are yet ſome Nations, who for the ſubtle inventions of atrocious puniſhments, need borrow nothing from the ancient Tyrants, having not only equalized, but far out-reach'd them, as ſhall be told you in its proper place.

To return to the ancient *Romans* before the times of the Emperours, when many were found guilty of one Capital crime, all were not put to death, but ſometimes one of five, one of eight, for moſt part one of ten, as *Polybius* tells us in his Sixth Book; and this was called Decimation: he on whom the lot fell, died certainly by Battoning as the ſame Author informs us; the reſt had ſome ſmall puniſhment inflicted upon them, that ſo as the Hiſtorian ſays, there might be *Pœna ad paucos, terror ad omnes.* This Decimation is uſed in the Modern Wars, the Soldiers caſting the Dice, upon which one is hang'd, and the reſt are ſometimes whipt, and ſometimes pardon'd.

Decimation.

An Ignominious Diſmiſſion was alſo a *Roman* puniſhment, for with them there were four kinds of Caſhiering or Diſmiſſion: The firſt was when Soldiers had ſerved out their time appointed by Law, and this was called *Juſta miſſio*, a Legal diſmiſſion. The ſecond was for juſt and ſufficient reaſons, as when the party was lame, mutilated, or ſo infirm that he could not ſerve longer, and this they called *Miſſio cauſſaria*, an occaſion'd diſmiſſion. The third was when a General or a Tribune (for ſometimes he had the power to do it) gave a Soldier his Diſmiſſion out of grace and favour, and too often for money, and this was termed *Miſſio gratuita.* The fourth was, when men were put out of the Armies for crimes, and this they called *Miſſio Ignominioſa*, a ſhameful Diſmiſſion, by which *Cæſar* uſed two of his Tribunes in *Africk*, *Avienus* and *Fonteius*, to which ſeverity they had too much provoked him.

Diſmiſſions.

The Ancients propoſed and gave rewards to thoſe who carried themſelves ſignally and valorouſly in any Military occaſion; and to invite them to theſe, the Harangues and publick Orations of their Generals contributed much. *Ageſilaus* rewarded thoſe who in their Drillings or Exerciſes carried themſelves better than their Neighbours. The *Athenians* and ſeveral other *Grecians* gave Golden Chains, and other teſtimonies of honour and reſpect to thoſe who had done any notable exploit. And ſo did the *Carthaginians* as well as the *Romans*; for *Livius* ſaith in his Twenty third Book, that *Hannibal* at the ſiege of *Canuſium*, offered a Mural Crown to him, who at the aſſault ſhould firſt get to the top of the wall.

Grecian Rewards.

Though *Polybius* in his Sixth Book, ſpeaks more largely of the *Roman* Rewards, than of their Puniſhments, yet he is not full enough in them. But in the firſt place (as indeed it deſerves the firſt place) he tells us, that after the performance of any gallant action, the actors were publickly thanked and praiſed by the General in a publick Harangue; and aſſuredly this commendation in ſuch an Audience did not only hugely ſatisfie him or them, in whoſe praiſe it was ſpoke, but ſtirred up in others a vertuous emulation to do, or endeavour to do ſuch things as might deſerve the like honour. After thanks, ſaith our Author, the Conſul gave a Spear, a Lance, or a Javelin to him who had overthrown an enemy in a private Encounter or Combat, fighting man to man, for ſo he reſtricts the gift. And to him, ſays he, who had overcome and ſpoil'd an enemy, was given (if he were a Horſeman) a Phalera, or ſome Capariſon for a Horſe; and if a Footman, a Diſh, a Platter, or a Viol, for the Interpreter calls it *Phiala*, which *Lipſius* conjectures very rationally to be a miſtake, and thinks it ſhould be *Armilla*, Bracelets, for we read in ſeverall Authors of theſe gifts, but not of the other.

Roman Rewards:

Thanks.

Spears.

Capariſons.

Bracelets.

It is ſtrange that *Polybius* ſpeaks not one word of Triumphs and Ovations, the firſt being the greateſt reward of Valour and Conduct, both for the honour, magnificence and quality of it, and the laſt next to it. I ſhall

ſpeak

ſpeak a little of both. The manner of the Triumph was, that he to whom it was granted, was carried into the City in a Chariot richly accoutred, drawn ordinarily with white Steeds; and when the *Romans* had over-maſtered *Aſia* and *Africk*, with Lions, Tygers, and other wild beaſts that were tamed. He was convoy'd by his Army, who follow'd the Chariot, ſinging Verſes and Rhimes of their own making to the praiſe of the Triumphant. Upon his head he wore a garland of Laurel, the Symbol of Victory; the Soldiers and people cried with loud acclamations, *Io Triumphe.* Before him were carried the rich Spoils, Money and Gold, coined or uncoined, deſtined for the publick Treaſury. At firſt the Triumphs were granted by the Senate, thereafter by the people, and then reſumed by the Senate, and ſometimes the Conſuls Triumphed in ſpite of both Senate and people; which might have taught them to fear that ſome time or other that hodg podg of their State divided between Senate and Commons would be eaten up by ſome daring Conſul. *Livy* in his Fourth Book ſays, that Triumphs were only granted to Dictators and Conſuls; and yet in his Twenty eight Book he tells us, that *Scipio* the *African* had the moſt magnificent Triumph that ever was ſeen in *Rome*, and he was but Proconſul; and indeed after him, Proconſuls, Prætors aud Proprætors had Triumphs granted them. In that ſame place he tells us of the Conditions on which a Triumph was granted, which were theſe, He muſt have kill'd five thouſand Enemies at leaſt, won much ſpoil, and augmented the *Roman* Dominions and Eſtates. Yet the ſame *Livy* tells us in his Fortieth Book, that *P. Cornelius*, and *M. Babius* Triumphed over the *Ligurians*, who had yielded themſelves without fighting; ſo here was Triumph without bloodſhed. Triumphs were not granted to thoſe who had prevail'd over a *Roman* Army; this render'd *Cæſar* odious to the Populacy, becauſe he would needs Triumph for his Victory in *Spain* over young *Pompey*; neither did that Invincible Captain out-live that Triumph ſix Months.

Triumph. By whom granted. To whom granted.

Ovations were granted to meaner perſons, and for leſſer Victories; he who entered ovant, either went on foot, or on Horſeback, but had not his Army to follow him, he carried a branch of Mirtle in his hand, and the people in their Acclamations cried, *Ohe*, or *Oho*; and by this it would ſeem it was *Ohatio*, and not *Ovatio*; ſome think it had its denomination *ab ove*, becauſe the Victor Sacrificed a ſheep. The Priſoners were led before the Triumphant Chariot, and ſo ſoon as it turned towards the Capitol, they were taken to the place of execution, and put to death; ſo you may be ſure that all were not merry in that day of joy. This certainly was a moſt barbarous and inhumane cuſtom, wherewith the Enemy of Mankind inſpir'd that Warlike Nation. Chains of Gold were likewiſe given to deſerving perſons by moſt of the Ancients, and were looked upon as rewards proper to Militaty perſons, as in ſome places they are uſed yet.

Ovation. Chains of Gold.

To him, ſaith *Polybius*, who firſt mounted to the Wall of an aſſaulted City, was given a Crown of Gold, as alſo to him who ſaved a *Roman* Citizen, or Ally from being kill'd by an enemy, upon whom the party who was ſaved, was obliged to look as his Saviour, and was compell'd to ſet the Crown on his head if he did not do it willingly. The firſt Crown was called *Corona Muralis*, or a Wall-Crown; the ſecond, *Corona Civica*, or the Citizen-Crown. This is all that we have from *Polybius* of Rewards, except that he tells us that thoſe who received theſe gifts when they returned to *Rome*, might make ſhew of them at ſolemn Games and Aſſemblies, which indeed was no ſmall honour for them, ſince none were permitted to wear them, but thoſe who had deſerved them; and theſe badges of honour they had liberty to place at the poſts of the doors of their houſes, or in the moſt conſpicuous places of their dwellings, to be ſeen by all who paſt by, or came in to viſit them, *In conſpectiſſima adium parte*, ſaith our Author.

Mural Crown. Citizen-Crown.

But I find in other ſtories that the Crown which was given to him who ſav'd a *Roman*, was of Oak, it may be the Golden one was given to him who ſaved a Citizen without the death of the enemy, and the Oaken Crown to him who both ſaved him and kill'd the enemy, who had endanger'd the *Roman*. A Crown of Gold was given to him who firſt entered the enemies Camp, and was called *Corona Caſtrenſis*. A Crown of Gold was given to him who in a Naval Battel firſt entered an enemies Ship, and was called *Corona Navalis*. A Crown of Gold was

Oaken Crown. Campal Crown. Naval-Crown.

Olive-Crown.

Obſidional Crown.

was given to any Commander for doing any gallant piece of ſervice. An Olive-Crown was given to him who carried himſelf eminently in Battel. But the moſt honourable Crown of all was the Obſidional one, which was given to him who ſuccoured, or relieved a beſieged City, Caſtle, or Camp; for if he who ſaved one Citizens life deſerved a Crown, much more he who ſaved a City, wherein the lives of ſo many Citizens were concerned. This Crown of relieving the beſieged was of graſs or flowers, becauſe in theſe times it was a cuſtom, that theſe who were vanquiſhed and reduced to obedience, preſented their Conquerours with graſs, herbs, or flowers. Neither do I think it was bad policy (beſides the humanity of it) after the loſs of a Battel, or ſome other diſaſter, to comfort the Soldiers, by laying the blame on fortune, ſome miſtake, or accident, imputing no blame to the Soldiers, thereby encouraging them to wipe away the ſtain of their miſhap by ſome gallant and glorious atchievement. This was excellently practiſed by *Cæſar* after his Army was baſled at the ſtorm of *Pompeys* Camp; and to the propoſal of rewards to thoſe who fought well, and comfort to thoſe who were overcome, doth *Virgil* allude in the fifth of his *Æneids:*

To comfort the Vanquiſh'd.

Sic ait, & geminum pugnæ proponit honorem
Victori, velatum auro vittiſque juvencum,
Enſem, atque inſignem galeam, ſolatia victo.

A Combats twofold prize he doth propone,
A Bull with gilded horns he gives to one,
To others he preſents fair Helms and Swords,
And to the vanquiſh'd comfortable words.

Thus you ſee the *Romans* at beſt were ſevere enough in their puniſhments, and in their rewards frugal, many times exorbitant in the firſt, and Parſimonious in the ſecond; yet as the Proverb goes, *Better half a loaf than no bread:* Better ſmall rewards than no rewards at all.

CHAP. XXV.

Polybius *his Compariſon of the* Macedonian *Phalanx, and the* Roman *Legion, review'd.*

IT is a common ſaying, he who wins, plays beſt; yet it is not univerſally true, for very often the experteſt Gameſters are loſers, and ſo we find in all ages that great Captains, and well train'd Armies, have not always been victorious: yet I am not of the opinion that the ſucceſs of the *Roman* Armies under the Conduct of *Flaminius* and *Æmilius*, againſt the two *Macedonian* Kings, *Philip* and *Perſeus*, moved *Polybius* to give the Palm and Garland to the Legion, when he compared it with the Phalange towards the end of the Seventeenth Book of his excellent Hiſtory; for to attribute either the juſtneſs of a cauſe, or yet the good or bad order of an Army to contingent events, were to ſtint the power of Heaven, (which both the Author and all Pagans then did acknowledg to be in their gods) and leave nothing to that Eternal Providence which we adore, by the direction whereof the actions of Mortals are govern'd, and is in nothing more viſible than in the ſucceſſes and routs of Armies. And therefore the Soveraign Lord of the World takes to himſelf the Title of *Lord of Hoſts*, the ſmalleſt and moſt inconſiderable accidents in War, (which are all appointed by the finger of the Almighty) being able to produce moſt unexpected changes, as *Cæſar* well obſerved. There hath been therefore other reaſons that

Careat ſucceſſibus opto, Quiſquis ab eventu facta notanda putat.

that mov'd ſo rational and judicious an Author as *Polybius* was both famed and known to be, to prefer the Legion to the Phalange; other reaſons, I ſay, than ſucceſs, and if I gueſs right at his meaning, you may take them to be theſe which follow, in his obſervation of the advantages and diſadvantages of both.

The Phalanx being compos'd of ſixteen Ranks, and of one thouſand twenty four Files of luſty well armed men, and at its cloſeſt Order or Conſtipation, ſo long as it is able to preſerve its force, it bears down all before it, for at that poſture every Combatant takes up but one foot and a half of ground; and ſuppoſe their Pikes but eighteen foot long (whereas the *Sariſſas* were twenty one of length) you may eaſily compute the points of the fifth Rank (or if you will of the ſixth Rank) to extend three foot before the firſt Rank, of all which I have ſpoken enough in my Diſcourſes of the *Gracian* Militia. Now though all the Ranks behind the ſixth are uſeleſs as to the preſenting their Pikes, or wounding an Enemy, yet by the weight and ſtrength of their Bodies they aſſiſt the impreſſion of the firſt ſix Ranks, help the charge to be more forcible, and take away all poſſibility from thoſe that are before them, to turn their backs upon the Enemy. But this Phalange muſt have ſuch a ground, that it may open and cloſe at pleaſure, and that ground muſt be plain and even, without the encumbrances of Woods, Trees, Buſhes, Hedges, Ditches, Encloſures, riſing Hills, and hollow grounds; for any of theſe is ſufficient to diſorder it in its parts, and that being once done, an Enemy with little or no danger, may enter at the void places of that great Body, when it is disjoyned, and Sword-men being once within the points of the Pikes, the Pike-men are a prey to them, eſpecially to the *Roman* Legionaries, who beſides ſhort Swords, carried likewiſe *Semiſpathæ*, which I *Engliſh*, Daggers. Now, ſaith *Polybius*, ſuch a Champaign, ſuch a Field, as we have deſcribed, not being to be found every where, the Phalange muſt of neceſſity ſtay where it hath met with ſuch a ground, and march from it, and accept of ſuch as time, place, or occaſion offers, as all Armies muſt do. If the firſt, then hath an Enemy free liberty to make himſelf Maſter of the Countrey, to beſiege and force Towns, and take all other manner of advantages. If the ſecond, and that the Field prove improper for the Phalange, then the Enemy takes the advantage of the ground, enters at the void places, and having ſo diſ-array'd it, quickly overthrows it. Next *Polybius* grants, that the Phalange hath the advantage of the Legion in this, that three foot being allowed between two Legionaries (whereof I have ſpoke in my diſcourſe of Intervals) and but half ſo much to two Phalangites: When they are both to fight, it follows, that every Legionary had two Phalangites in front of him, and conſequently twelve Pikes preſented to him; for it is already granted, that the points of the Pikes of the ſixth Rank might be extended before the firſt Rank; ſo by this account, there were twelve men againſt one, an advantage in nature irreſiſtible. But on the other part, the Phalangites could not fight in Maniples, Cohorts, or ſmall Bodies, for being ſeparated or divided, they were quickly broken. The Legionaries were ſo Armed and Trained, that they could fight any way, either in a great or ſmall Body, or Man to Man, at any time, or in any place, let the incumbrances be what they will.

First advantage of the Phalange.

Its firſt diſadvantage.

Its ſecond advantage.

Its ſecond diſadvantage.

Let us reſume all this, and ſay in one word *Polybius* prefers the Legion to the Phalange, becauſe the eſſential propriety of the Phalange was to fight cloſe together, and ſo long as it was able to keep ſo, it was able to bear down the Legion; but ſure it could but ſeldome keep in one entire body, the Legion, by its order and conſtitution, being apt to fight in ſmall or little Bodies, and to divide according to opportunities and emergencies, could readily enter at the void places of the Phalange, whether theſe were in the Van, Rear or Flanks, and overthrow it, as often it did.

I ſhall preſume to add two other advantages that I think the Legion had of the Phalange, which *Polybius* hath not mentioned. The firſt: The Phalange fought all in one Body, the Legion in three Bodies ſucceſſively, one after another; ſo that if the *Haſtati* charged briskly, they might put the great Body of the Phalange in ſome diſorder; and they retiring, the *Principes* finding

A Legions third advantage over the Phalange.

ing it in ſome diſcompoſure, might diſorder it ſo, that the *Triarii* coming freſh to the charge, might have a very cheap market of it.

A Legions fourth advantrge.

The ſecond advantage which I conceive the Legion had of the Phalange, was in its larger Front, which I offer to make appear thus: The great Phalange conſiſted of ſixteen thouſand three hundred eighty four heavy armed, theſe marſhall'd ſixteen deep, and ſo their Front conſiſted of one thouſand twenty four men, to whom you are to allow one thouſand twenty four foot, for them to ſtand on, when they were to fight; they had no more but one foot and a half allow'd between Files, and therefore for one thouſand twenty four Files, allow one thouſand twenty three diſtances, and for theſe fifteen hundred thirty four foot and a half, add theſe, the aggregate is two thouſand five hundred fifty eight foot and a half; thus much ground, and no more, did the Phalange take up in its Longitude, when it was to fight. The Legion was compoſed of three Bodies, who were marſhall'd one behind another: The *Haſtati* had the firſt Batallion, and were divided into ten Maniples, in every one of which were one hundred and twenty men, theſe were marſhall'd ten deep, and ſo each Maniple was twelve men in Front, for whom allow twelve foot to ſtand on, and, as both *Polybius* and *Vegetius* do, allow three foot between Files, twelve Files have eleven diſtances, and for them you muſt have thirty three foot, add thirty three to twelve, makes forty five; ſo much ground did every Maniple poſſeſs in Front: In every Batallion were ten Maniples, multiply then forty five by ten, the product will be four hundred and fifty. You may remember that I have elſewhere demonſtrated, that theſe ten Maniples had nine Intervals, and every Interval muſt have as much ground allowed to it as the Maniple, that was forty five foot; multiply forty five by nine, the product is four hundred and five, add four hundred and five to four hundred and fifty, the aggregate is eight hundred fifty five foot; and ſo much ground did the *Haſtati* of one Legion poſſeſs. In a Conſular Army there were four Legions, then you are to multiply eight hundred fifty five by four, and the product will prove to be three thouſand four hundred and twenty; and ſo much ground did the *Haſtati* of a Conſular Army take up in Front. Now here the *Haſtati* are reckon'd to be but twelve hundred, the Legion according to *Polybius* being ſuppos'd to be but four thouſand two hundred. But in *Æmilius* his Army againſt the *Macedonian* Phalanx, the Legions were of ſix thouſand, whereof the *Triarii* (according to *Polybius*) being only ſix hundred, the *Haſtati* and *Principes* muſt have conſiſted each of two thouſand, and the *Velites* muſt have been fourteen hundred. And by this account, *Æmilius* his *Haſtati* would have poſſeſt in Front above five thouſand foot of ground; ſo it is clear, that the *Haſtati* of the weakeſt Conſular Army outwing'd the *Macedonian* Phalange, and thereby was able to fall upon its Flanks; ſuppoſing ſtill, which cannot be deny'd me, that the *Roman* Cavalry gave the *Grecian* Horſe work enough; and they carrying ſhort managable Arms, might eaſily diſorder the Phalangites, being once enter'd within their great Body, ſo that the *Principes* and *Triarii* coming up freſh to the medley, would not find much difficulty to make that great bulk a prey. Obſerve likewiſe, if you conſider the great Intervals of the *Roman* Maniples, all the Phalangites who in Battel met with theſe Intervals were uſeleſs, for they had no Enemy to fight with. Theſe conjectures of mine I have preſum'd to add to *Polybius* his weightier conſiderations.

Reaſons why a Phalanx rightly order'd, had the advantage of a Legion.

But notwithſtanding all that is ſaid for the Legions advantage over the Phalange, I am bold (with ſubmiſſion to *Polybius*) to ſay, If the Phalange be order'd, as I ſpoke of in my Diſcourſes of the *Grecian* Art of War, that is, not ſo deep as ſixteen, and conſequently of a larger Front, and thereby not ſo apt to be ſurrounded or out-wing'd, and with Reſerves, I conceive, not only thoſe conjectures of mine, but all *Polybius* his reaſons will come to nothing, or ſignifie little. Neither indeed can I at all be perſwaded to believe, that ſo ſoon as the Legionaries were enter'd at the void places within the Ranks of the Phalanx, that preſently they were Maſters of it; for though the points of thoſe Pikes within which the *Romans* were come, were indeed uſeleſs, yet ſo were not the points of all thoſe Pikes that were at a convenient diſtance from them; beſides, I hope it will be granted, that a Legionaries offenſive weapon, the Sword,

Sword was no more ſervicable to him at that cloſe fight, than the Sword of a Phalangite was to him that carried it; for it is not imaginable, that he was bound to keep his Pike longer in his hand than it was uſeful for him, nor his Sword in its ſheath, longer than it was time to draw it, in defence of his life. And what I now ſpeak of a Phalange not ſo deep as ſixteen, and conſequently of a greater Front, among the *Grecians*, and of Reſerves, which the *Romans* call'd *Subſidia*, is no vain ſpeculation of mine; for I have formerly demonſtrated the truth of it out of good Authors, though I confeſs, I am convinced ſuch Phalanges were not at *Cinecephala*, where *Q. Flaminius* beat *Philip* the Father, nor at *Pidna*, where *L. Æmilius* beat *Perſeus* the Son, both Kings of *Macedon*.

Roman Army beat by *Xantippus* a *Grecian*,

To confirm my opinion that the Legion by its conſtitution, had no advantage over a Phalange rightly order'd, I ſhall uſe the authority of *Polybius* againſt *Polybius*; for he in his firſt Book relates to us, how the *Carthaginians* in the firſt Punick War were brought ſo low, that they were ready to accept any reaſonable conditions of Peace, till they gave the command of their forces to *Zantippus*, a *Lacedæmonian*, that had come out of *Greece* with ſome mercenary *Laconians*, and was one of thoſe, who in this age are called Souldiers of Fortune, who making uſe of the *Grecian* Rules, which he had learn'd in his own Countrey, marſhall'd the *Carthaginian* Army in ſeveral Bodies of Horſe and Foot, each to ſecond another; adding the help of his Elephants, and chuſing the moſt Champaign grounds he could, extended his Front to ſo great a length, that the *Romans* uſing their accuſtom'd order, were outwing'd, ſurrounded, and totally routed by him; and the Conſul, *Attilius Regulus*, with five hundred more *Romans*, were led Captive into *Carthage*. Here *Xantippus* meerly by the *Grecian* Art of War, worſted the *Romans*, who made uſe of their own Art.

And by *Amilcar* and *Hannibal*, who followed *Xantippus* his Art,

But I will go a greater length, may not we imagine, that *Amilcar* in the purſuance of that firſt Punick War, and his Son *Hannibal* in the beginning of the ſecond, imitated *Xantippus*, and manag'd the War according to that pattern he had left behind him? I ſuppoſe we may believe it. If this do not prove that the difference between the *Grecian* and *Roman* Art of War did not always make the one Nation victorious over the other, then take more Inſtances.

And by *Pyrrhus*.

Pyrrhus King of *Epirus*, at his firſt coming into *Italy* with a *Grecian* Army, *Grecian* Arms, and Art of War, did beat the *Romans* in Battel, ſo did he the ſecond time. A fancy took him to arm his Souldiers after the *Roman* faſhion, and then he was beaten by the *Romans*. *Hannibal*, when he came firſt to *Italy*, beat the *Romans* in ſet Battel, and I believe with theſe kind of Arms, and that order of War which *Xantippus* uſed in *Africk*, and conſequently *Grecian*. But *Polybius* tells us in his ſeventeenth Book, that the ſame *Hannibal* armed all his *Carthaginians* after the *Roman* manner, no doubt, with thoſe Arms that he had taken from them; now as he had beaten them formerly with *Carthaginian* and *Grecian* Arms, ſo he beat them frequently afterward with *Roman* Arms. Therefore this noble Hiſtorian in that place doth not attribute *Hannibals* Victories to any advantage his Souldiers had, either in Arms or Art over the *Romans*, but to his own ſingular Prudence, his Courage and Conduct, and extraordinary Qualifications, and to uſe *Polybius* his own expreſſion, *His Capital Engine*. But when, ſaith he, a *Roman* General, equal in abilities to him, came to command the *Roman* Armies, then Victory flew from *Hannibal* over to *Scipio*. But let us ask the queſtion, Why ſo? Since both Captains were equal in Valour and Conduct, and if there was any odds, the *Carthaginian* no queſtion, had it, becauſe of his long experience, and almoſt matchleſs policy in feats of Arms, and that there was but little difference in their Arms, or manner of Militia. Here *Polybius* is at a ſtand, and gives no reaſon for it, but that Fortune would have it ſo. What Fortune was to him, that is Providence to us. He was ignorant of what the wiſeſt of men ſaid long before the foundation of *Rome* was laid, *That there is a time for every purpoſe under Heaven, a time to kill, and a time to heal, a time to gain, and a time to loſe.* And in another place, *That the race is not to the ſwift, nor the battel to the ſtrong, nor favour to the men of skill, but time and chance happeneth to them*

To what *Polybius* attributes Victory.

Eccleſ. Ch. 3. and Ch. 9.

them all. And indeed that happeneth to all, and to every one, what the eternal hath ordain'd for them. Nor did *Polybius* know what was reveal'd to *Nebuchadnezzar* in that dream which *Daniel* interpreted to him, that the *Persians* ſhould ſubdue the *Aſſyrians*, the *Grecians* ſhould ruine the *Perſians*, and the *Romans* ſhould put a period to the *Macedonian* Monarchy. There was no ſtop to be made to the current of the Victories of the *Romans* whom the Almighty had pre-ordain'd to become Maſters of the World. That there is ſuch an All-ruling Providence was not unknown to the wiſer Heathens, though they, being in a miſt, did not ſee with ſo clear eyes, as we who are illuminated by the brighter rays of Gods own word; and for all that, I think few Divines can expreſs in fewer words the omnipotency and unbounded power of the moſt high, than a Pagan Poet did, when he wrote,

Daniel Ch. 2.

Ovid's Met.

Sic ait, immenſa eſt, finemque potentia cœli
Non habet, & quicquid ſuperi voluere, peractum eſt.

Heav'ns power hath no limits, hence we ſee
All done infallibly, what Gods decree.

If *Polybius* had liv'd in our days, he might have ſeen the hand of Heaven diſtributing Victory (to ſpeak with reverence and ſubmiſſion to the Almighties pleaſure) more partially, than he either heard it was awarded in the *Hannibalian*, or ſaw it given in the third Punick War: of the firſt whereof he writes, when he falls upon this diſcourſe with us, He might have ſeen men of one Nation, arm'd alike, following one and the ſame method of War, and for any thing I know, of equal Courage, both parties inflam'd, the one with Loyal zeal, the other with rebellious rage, acting their parts very highly on the bloody ſtage of War: he might have ſeen, I ſay, the beſt of Soveraign Kings loſe his Crown and Life, and have his head chopp'd off with an Ax, when the worſt of Subjects and greateſt of Rebels had his deck'd with Bays.

King *Charles* the Firſt.

Or if *Polybius* had liv'd but one age longer than he did, he might have ſeen the *Roman* Legions, (which he ſo much commends) cutting one anothers Throats, all Countrey-men, all men of equal Courage and Conduct, arm'd alike, uſing one and the ſame Art and Diſcipline of War, embruing their hands in one anothers blood; and thoſe who fought for the State and Liberty of their Countrey, overthrown, kill'd, murther'd, and maſſacred, and their Enemies almoſt ador'd for their ſucceſs in a bad cauſe: and he might have either ſeen or heard of *Pompeys* Head ignominiouſly ſtruck off, and *Cæſars* crown'd with Laurels.

Cæſar and *Pompey.*

And if *Polybius* had been an eye-witneſs of the prodigious ſucceſs *Guſtavus Adolphus* the Great King of *Sweden* had in *Germany* in the year 1630. when he invaded the *Roman* Empire, and how he took Cities, Forts and Caſtles, more for their number, and more conſiderable for their Strength, Beauty, and Riches, in the ſpace of ſix months; and made a greater progreſs in his Conqueſts in leſs than two years time, than *Hannibal* did in *Italy* the whole eighteen years he ſtay'd in it: If, I ſay, he had ſeen this, he had never attributed Victory to the goodneſs of Arms, the cunning of the Art or exactneſs of the Diſcipline of War, for he would have ſeen the Emperour *Ferdinand* the Seconds Generals, wiſe, couragious, experienced, vigilant as well, and as much as either the King himſelf, or any of his great Captains. Beſides, both *Wallenſtein* Duke of *Friedland*, and Count *Tili*, had that which *Polybius* himſelf requires in a General, that was, they were fortunate: Their great Victories over the Kings of *Bohemia* and *Denmark*, *Bethlem Gabor*, the Duke of *Brunſwick*, the Marqueſſes of *Baden* and *Durlach*, and the famous Earl of *Mansfield*, being yet freſh in memory. And if *Polybius* had ſeen any diſparity of Arms, or Armour, or of Horſes, either for their number or their goodneſs, in this *German* War, he had ſeen the Emperours Armies have the odds by much; neither was the difference of the manner of their War, or *Ratio Belli*, ſo conſiderable, as to caſt the Scales ſo far, as that Martial King did in ſo ſhort a time. Nor was *Hannibals* diſcent into *Italy* with few more than twenty thouſand men, more hazardous than the Kings landing in *Germany* with eight or ten thouſand at moſt, was juſtly thought to be. What was it then, would

Emperour *Ferdinand* the Second,

And his Generals.

Polybius

Polybius have ſaid, that carried Victory (whoſe wings *Ferdinands* Generals and Armies thought they had clipp'd) over to the *Sweed*, what elſe but the hand of the Almighty, who when that Emperour was very fair to have reduced *Germany* to an abſolute Monarchy, ſaid to him and the whole houſe of *Auſtria*, *Non plus ultra*, Go no further.

Titus Livius had read without all queſtion, this compariſon of *Polybius*, whereof I have ſpoken enough, and it may be, hath taken from it a hint to ſtart another queſtion, which is this: If the great *Alexander* after his return from *India*, and his ſubduing ſo many Nations in little more than ten years time, had made a ſtep over to *Italy*, what the iſſue of the War between him and the *Romans* would have been? And gives his Sentence, that infallibly his Countrey men would have beaten that Great Conquerour. *Paola Paruta*, a Noble *Venetian*, and a Procurator of St. *Mark*, refutes *Livius* his arguments, and concludes, that the *Macedonian* would have over-maſter'd the *Romans*. But in ſteps a third, an Author of no ſmall reputation, the renown'd Sir *Walter Raleigh*, who will give the prize to neither *Macedonian* nor *Roman*, but to his own *Engliſh*. It will not be denied, but the *Engliſh* Nation did admirable feats in *France* (which was indeed the Stage on which *Cæſar* acted his moſt martial exploits) under *Edward* the Third, King of *England*, and his Son the Black Prince, as alſo under *Henry* the Fifth while he liv'd, and after his death, under his Valiant Brothers. But *Paruta* refutes *Livius*, yet I have ſeen none that oppoſeth Sir *Walter*, and I am ſure I ſhall not, becauſe I am not ſo much beholding to the *Grecians* and *Romans*, as to the *Engliſh*. But thoſe who are curious to read the reaſons of all the three, may find thoſe of *Livy* in his ninth Book of his firſt Decad; thoſe of *Paruta* in the ſecond Chapter of his Political Diſcourſes; and thoſe of *Raleigh* in the firſt Chapter of the fifth Book of the firſt part of his Hiſtory of the World.

Another compariſon of *Titus Livius*,

Voided by himſelf.

Paruta not ſatisfied with *Livius*,

Nor Sir *Walter Raleigh*.

But to return to *Livy*'s queſtion, I ſhall tell my opinion, and that is lawful enough for me to do, and it is this: Since *Hannibal*, as *Polybius* confeſſeth, carried not much above twenty thouſand men over the *Alps*, of all that great Army that he brought out of *Spain*, and with them durſt invade the *Roman* Seignories in *Italy* it ſelf, when *Rome* was Miſtreſs of *Sicily* and *Sardinia*, and of the Sea too; when *Hannibal*, I ſay, notwithſtanding the *Roman* power, and all the obſtructions that *Hanno* and his party made againſt him within *Carthage*, durſt fight, and did beat the *Romans* ſo often, that if he had purſued one of his Victories, he had gone fair to have ſet up his Trophies in the Capitol. When with ſuch a ſtock *Hannibal* could do ſo great things, I think, in all humane probability, *Alexander*, who was maſter of the beſt and richeſt places of the World, who was an abſolute Soveraign Monarch (and ſo not liable or accountable to a Senate) not in fear or jealouſie of any Competitor, a great and an experienced Warriour, of an Invincible Courage, Maſter of prodigious Forces both at Sea and Land, his power almoſt boundleſs, and yet his Ambition more unlimited than his Power; If he, I ſay, had enter'd *Italy*, and invaded the *Roman* State (then but in its Infancy, and ſhouldering for more room with its neighbour Cities) he had made it ſubmit to his uncontrollable pleaſure, or drown'd the very *Roman* name in the pit of eternal Oblivion.

Strong preſumptions againſt *Livius* his opinion.

XUM

PALLAS ARMATA.

Military Eſſays OF THE MODERN ART of WAR.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Modern Militia in General.

HE who will rightly ſhape or form that monſtrous Beaſt that *Bellua*, that wild Boar of the Foreſt, that plucketh up all Vineyards by the roots, War; muſt begin, ſaith *Themiſtocles*, with the Belly: meaning, Proviſions and Victuals muſt be prepared to maintain the Armies of thoſe Princes and States, who wage War. And becauſe meat in an orderly way coſts money, they ſay money is the ſinews of War; yet we have ſeen and known Armies rais'd and maintain'd with little or no money, prepared by thoſe who levied them, but ſome exceptions take not away an univerſal rule.

War the wild Boar of the Forteſt.

How the ancient Nations, as well *Grecians*, *Romans*, as others ſhap'd this Beaſt of War, how they compoſed his members, and how they entertain'd and fed him, both for their own defence, and to offend others, I have ſhew'd to my Reader in my former Diſcourſes, as far at leaſt as by conjectures rationally grounded on the authority of approved Authors, (beſides *Ælian*, *Æneas*, *Polybius*,

lybius, and *Vegetius*) it was possible for me to reach. But coming now to speak of the *Modern Art of War*, I find my self more embarrassed than in the delineation of the rest; for besides the differences of the manner of War used by several Nations (which perhaps might all be digested in one form with some exceptions not very essential) I know not of what date, age, years, or Centuries of years, I shall make the Modern Militia. If I shall date its Birth from the time the *Roman* Art of War began to be corrupted, I should perhaps make it too old; for *Vegetius* complains that the substance of that was well near spent, and no more but a shadow of it left long before his time; which mov'd the Emperour *Valentinian* to command him to compose a Systeme of the ancient *Roman* Constitutions of War, which had been needless if they had been then in vigor: and how *Vegetius* hath acquitted himself of that undertaking, I have already told you. But if I should date the age of the Modern Art of War from the time that Gunpowder was invented, I might perhaps hit right enough at its age, because no doubt Gunpowder made a great alteration on the whole face and body of War. But I am sure I have but few, or rather no helps to write the Series of its History, either from the decay of the *Roman* Militia, or from the time that Gunpowder was heard to make so loud and so fearful a noise in the World.

Modern Militia of an uncertain date.

The Militia of several ages forgot;

Though we are told that the ancient *Roman* customs of War were worn out of use, yet none tell us when either they were restor'd, or yet what others were brought in their room. Neither do we find that those who wrote Histories after the decadency of the *Roman* Empire give us light in it; or yet what kind of Militia was used by those Nations who had the confidence with their sharp swords to cut out to themselves very large portions of the great bulk of that almost Universal Monarchy. From History we know that the *Goths*, the *Vandals*, the *Huns*, and the *Longobards*, invaded the Empire, and fought many successful Battels with some *Roman* Emperours, and their Lieutenants, and that they conquer'd Kingdoms by feats of War, and got them confirm'd to them by articles of peace. But what order these Nations kept in Modelling their Armies, what Discipline to preserve them, how they arm'd them, what art they us'd in Embatelling, fighting, or taking Towns, none of the *Roman* Writers that I know of, hath either told us, or given us ground to conjecture, except a few things of one of the *Theodoricks* King of the *Goths*. And from those Nations who were Barbarians, who it may be knew not what it was to read or write, we are not in reason to expect any significant account.

As that of the *Goths*, *Vandals* and *Huns*.

That of the ancient *Germans* and *Batavians*.

That of the *Saracens*.

As little do we know what manner of Militia was used in *France*, *Germany*, *Batavia*, and *England*, when they first emancipated themselves from the subjection of the *Roman* Empire. The Victories the *Saracens* had in all the three known parts of the World, the whole power of the Emperours of *Greece* in the East, with almost innumerable Armies from the West to recover the Holy Land from those *Saracens* (long before the name of a *Turk* was heard of) not being able to keep *Jerusalem* long from them, demonstrate that they were well arm'd, well train'd, and had a Discipline of War, and that a very exquisite one; but what it was, we are yet to seek, for any thing we find in History, and yet those Expeditions are very famous, and stand authentically recorded. We read that *Charles Martel* Major of the Palace in *France*, made War with the *Saracens*, and in one Battel which he fought in *Provence*, laid one hundred thousand of them in the dust. His Son *Pepin* made a successful War against the *Lombards* in *Italy* at the instance of Pope *Zachary*; so did his Son *Charles* the Great, against both them, the Pagan *Saxons* in *Germany*, and the Moors in *Spain*; but how the Armies of either the one party or the other were arm'd, model'd, marshall'd, or Embattel'd, is wrapt up in the abyss of dark oblivion.

That of *Charles Martel*.

Pepin and *Charles* the Great.

What shall we say since Fire-guns alter'd many of the ancient customs of War, and by piecemeal hath obtained the pre-eminence over almost all offensive weapons, and challenges the Prerogative even before and over the Sword, the Lance, and the Pike, much more over the Bow, the Arrow, Dart, Javelin and Sling: and yet from History we are no more acquainted with the manner of War since they came in use, than we were before their invention; of the truth whereof take a short view.

What vast Provinces and goodly Countries the *Turk* since the birth of Gunpowder, hath acquired in *Asia*, *Africk*, and *Europe*, is obvious to our sight, though the

the Hiſtories of all Nations were ſilent. And though in the general we are told that his order is good, the Government and Diſcipline obſerv'd in his numerous Armies is ſtrict and excellent, yet the particulars have been hitherto related to us but very confuſedly: neither doth Mr. *Rycaut* in his Book of the preſent ſtate of the *Ottoman* Empire, Printed a few years ago, help us much, but rather gives us occaſion to think that the *Turks* have loſt their ancient Art of War; or if they ſtill retain it, we muſt wonder how theſe Unbelievers have triumph'd over ſo many both Chriſtian and *Mahometan* people, with ſo undiſciplin'd and diſorderly multitudes, as his relation makes them to be; for he ſaith, their principal Foot which are the *Janizaries* (reputed to have been the ſtrength and ſupport of that great Monarchy) fight confuſedly; and the *Spahies* (who are the beſt of their Cavalry) fight likewiſe in little good order; he ſays, that ſometimes they charge thrice, and if they then break not the enemy, they fly; and withal he makes their Artillery very inſignificant, in regard that as he writes, they have no Gunners but ſuch as either they take Priſoners, or are ſold to them for Slaves, who ſtay no longer with them than any fair opportunity is offer'd them to run away.

We have but confuſed notions of the *Turkiſh* Militia,

Though perhaps the Victories which the great *Tamberlan* obtain'd, and the celerity he uſed in making theſe Conqueſts, which have render'd him ſo famous, be not ſo vaſt as Stories make them; yet we may believe his Atchievements to have been extraordinary, in regard the Great *Mogul* of *India* derives his Pedigree in a lineal deſcent from him, and at this day poſſeſſeth a vaſt and a Great Empire, which is but a remnant of a far greater acquir'd by *Tamberlan*, whoſe Diſcipline is cry'd up to have been exceeding ſtrict, his Art of War ſo exact and orderly, that he never went out of the Field without Victory, or from a beſieged Town without either its ſubmiſſion or deſtruction. It is written of him that the day he fought with *Bajazet* at Mount *Stella*, his Army conſiſted of a Million of men, and yet he made uſe of them all in the time of the Battel. If this be all true, is it not pity that the manner of his Encamping, Beſieging, Embattelling, and fighting is not left on record to poſterity?

And of *Tamberlans* order of War;

And to come home, the *Scottiſh*, the *Engliſh*, and the *French* Hiſtories tell us, what bloody Engagements have been among them, and what Battels have been fought with various ſucceſs: but except that we are told that the *French Gens de Armes* were numerous, beſides their other Cavalry; that the *Engliſh* uſed the Bow and the Bill, and had men of Arms likewiſe; and that the *Scots* fought on Horſeback with Lances and Jacks of Mail, and on foot with long Pikes, Battel-axes, Bows, and two-handed Swords; what know we more of the Art of War that any of all the three practis'd, of the order they kept, how ſtrong their ſeveral Bodies and Batallions were, or what names they gave them, how deep they Marſhal'd either their Horſe or Foot, how they Embattell'd, how they Encamped, and how they form'd their Sieges? for all theſe we have nothing but ill grounded conjectures, and very confuſed notions.

As alſo of the *Scotiſh*, *French* and *Engliſh*.

I know not whom we ſhall juſtly blame for this great defect, but the ſeveral Generals of ſeveral Armies, belonging to ſeveral Nations, and in ſeveral ages, who if either they could not, or would not write the Hiſtory of their own or others actions, (as *Xenophon* and *Thucydides* among the *Grecians*, *Julius Cæſar* and *Cato* among the *Romans*, *Monluc*, and a few others in our Modern times), yet I think they were obliged to cauſe their Secretaries to keep exact accounts of the manner of theſe Sieges, and thoſe Battels which under their Command were either form'd or fought, that ſo they might have been tranſmitted to poſterity. Some have done ſo, but moſt have neglected it, thinking it enough if their actions were generally remember'd, recommending the particulars to the information of Hiſtorians, which many times is ſuch that it looks rather like a Romance than a true ſtory. But I had rather you ſhould hear *Monluc* that famous Marſhal of *France* upon this Subject, who in the Third Book of his firſt Tome, ſays, That Hiſtorians who write the feats of War, deſcribe ſeldom or never the Particularities of the action, as how ſuch a Caſtle was ſurprized, in what order ſuch a Town was aſſaulted, or in what manner defended, how ſuch two Armies were Marſhal'd before they join'd in Battel, how the Horſemen were arm'd, and how the Foot, with many more circumſtances neceſſary to be known by thoſe who in time coming deſire to be inſtructed, and eſpecially ſuch as intend to

Many Hiſtoriographers defective.

Monluc his Complaint of them.

to ſerve their Prince and Country in Military Employments, that from thence they may learn how to demean themſelves in the like occaſions. But, ſays he, the whole multitude of Hiſtoriographers conceive they do enough if they tell us ſuch a Battel was fought, ſuch a Prince or General gain'd the Victory, ſuch a City was beſieged and yielded, and ſuch a one was taken by aſſault. For himſelf, he profeſſeth he wrote his Commentaries to be regiſters of the actions of his time, the particulars whereof might ſerve to inform thoſe who were to come after him, how to carry themſelves either in Sieges, Aſſaults, Skirmiſhes, Rancounter, or Battel; for thoſe, ſaith he, who think they know not ſo much as I, will be glad to learn of me, but thoſe who fancy they know enough already, need no Maſter. In another place he ſays, Hiſtorians are to be blam'd for not writing particular things, and of particular men: they think, ſays he, they do enough if they name Princes, or Captain-Generals, and paſs over with ſilence all other perſons that are not of ſo large a Stature. Thus far *Monluc* Marſhal of *France*.

Polybius his complaint of them.

To this ſame purpoſe you may ſee *Polybius* his complaint in his Twelfth Book, where he ſays, Hiſtorians firſt err, in not writing things truly, and as they were done; and next that they give no particular account of the manner of Battels, Skirmiſhes, Surpriſals, and Sieges: and this he attributeth to their want of skill, and therefore wiſheth that all great Captains would write the Hiſtories of their own actions themſelves.

The Authors complaint of ſome of them.

Theſe Complaints of *Polybius* and *Monluc* are juſt: but I complain of another kind of Hiſtorians, who take upon them to give us deſcriptions of all thoſe Particularities without having receiv'd particular relations from the principal actors, and this they do either upon hear ſay, regiſtring the fables of vain and ignorant Soldiers (who either have been, or pretend to have been in the action) for truths; or write according to their own apprehenſions of things, which many times are ſo pitifully weak, that their extravagancies put knowing Readers on the rack, and force them to caſt their Books away from them. And indeed I have read the deſcriptions of ſome Battels in Books writ by no mean Authors, wherein both Armies were Marſhal'd in ſuch order that I could not fancy it could be done by any except *Amadis de Gaul*, or the Knight of the Sun.

Noble Hiſtorians.

Let us except from theſe, of Modern Hiſtorians, *Paolo Giovio*, *d' Avila*, and the other unknown Author of the Hiſtory of the Civil Wars of *France*, *Philip de Comines*, Cardinal *Bentivoglio*, *Strada*, *John Petit*, *Edward Philips* his late Hiſtory of *England*, *Chemnitius* his Hiſtory of the *Swediſh* Expedition, *Theatrum Europæum*, theſe two laſt written in high *Dutch*, and *Di Siri* who hath written the Hiſtory of theſe times very Voluminouſly in *Italian*. Theſe having either been Actors themſelves, or having got their relations from thoſe Emperours, Kings, Princes, or Generals who manag'd the Wars, have given us Hiſtories well worth the reading. To theſe we may add *Guicciardini*, though for his prolixity he be uſed very ſcurrilouſly by *Boccalini*, who tells us that in *Parnaſſus* a *Laconian* (who had expreſt his thoughts in three words which he might have done in two) was order'd for his puniſhment to read *Guicciardini*. The poor fellow beg'd rather to be fley'd alive, than be tortur'd with reading an Hiſtorian who in the relation of the War between the *Florentines* and *Piſans*, made longer diſcourſes of the taking a Pigeon-houſe than he needed to have made of the beſt fortified Caſtle.

Guicciardini taxed by *Boccalini*.

Yet thus much moſt, if not all Hiſtorians agree on, when they ſpeak of Armies, they mention Van, Battel, and Reer; which ſhews that the *Roman* method of Marſhalling their Armies in three Bodies, one behind another, was obſerved by moſt Nations, till of later years ſome Maſters of the Military Art, for ſome good reaſons, thought it convenient to reduce them to two.

We have but few Tacticks.

It is pity ſo few ſince *Vegetius* his time have ſhewn themſelves Tacticks, that is to teach us the Art of War uſed in their own time, for ſo we ſhould have known the Military Cuſtoms of ſeveral Nations, and of ſeveral ages. I have heard that *Gonſalvo di Corduba* (who by his gallant Conduct recover'd the Kingdom of *Naples* from the *French* for the Houſe of *Arragon*) wrote in *Spaniſh*, *Trattado de re Militari*; if it be extant, it muſt be well worth the peruſal, as the work of one who by his great actions had acquir'd to himſelf the Title of *Il Gran Capitano*, the Great Captain.

Il Gran Capitano.

In

In the laſt year of the Reign of *Henry* the Fourth of *France*, about ſixty years ago, *Louis de Montgomery* Lord of *Carbouſin*, wrote a little Book, *De la Milice Francoiſe*, of the *French* Militia; it ſhows him to have been very much a Soldier, but the marrow of that piece lyeth in his deſcriptions of ſome Artificial Fire-works, the knowledg whereof lyes not in every mans way, nor is it neceſſary for every Soldier, though it add to his perfection. The *Sieur de Preiſſac* wrote a little Treatiſe in *French* of Military Queſtions and Reſolves, very well *Engliſhed* by Mr. *Cruſo*, an underſtanding Captain, who I ſuppoſe wrote himſelf in *Engliſh* a Book of Cavalry, well worth the reading. *Bockler* a *German* Engineer, hath not many years ago written in his own language a piece wherein he gives us a pretty good account of the Military Cuſtoms of his own Country in his own time, which may be from the year 1630, till the year 1664, or thereabout. Lieutenant Colonel *Elton*, his Compleat Body of the Military Art, with the Supplement added to it by Captain *Rud*, (without which it is not a Compleat Body) is a piece well worth the peruſal. There are certainly others who have writ of this Subject, whom I have neither ſeen nor read.

Louis de Montgomery.

Preiſſac.

Captain *Cruſo.*

Bockler.

Lieutenant Colonel *Elton.*

Some again there are who inſtead of informing us what method or ordinances of War, Princes and States uſed in their time, (the want whereof I ſo much lament) give us Models of their own framing, either in whole, or in part; for my part I think any new mould of a Militia, or the reformation of an old one, is the work of a Prince or State, who are able to bring together perſons experienc'd in all kind of Military affairs to give their advices, out of which the Prince or State may frame ſuch Conſtitutions as are thought moſt conducible to carry on a War, and then by their authority impoſe a neceſſity of obedience to thoſe Conſtitutions; and therefore they ſhould not be the work of any private perſon. *Brancatio* an *Italian* peremptorily condemns the uſe of the Pike; and in imitation of him Mr. *Lupton* an *Engliſh* man writes a Book, wherein he endeavours to prove the uſeleſneſs of that ancient weapon, but I ſhall meet with his arguments in another place.

Princes and States only to mould new Militia's.

Machiavelli goes a greater length, and preſents the world with a Milice of his own, the birth of his own brain, a hodg podg of ſome of the Ancient, and ſome of the Modern Militia, with a mixture of many of his own inventions. In his Books of that Subject, he fathers moſt of his notions on *Fabritio Coloma*, an excellent Captain, who no doubt, if ever he had ſeen them, had rejected them as ſpurious. Some of his miſtakes I have touch'd in my Diſcourſes of the *Roman* Art of War, I ſhall only in this place trouble my Reader with two or three Animadverſions that will ſhew his skill in Martial affairs.

Machiavelli his Books of War.

In his fourth Book, he makes it one of his Maxims, that all good Captains ſhould rather receive than give the charge; of this I ſpoke in the Nineteenth Chapter of my Eſſays of the *Roman* Art of War, here I ſhall tell you the reaſon he gives for his opinion. The firſt fury, ſaith he, is eaſily ſuſtained by firm and experienc'd Soldiers, and then it vaniſheth in ſmoke. But I ask firſt, what if they who are charged be neither firm nor experienced, for all Armies are not compoſed of Veterans? next I ask, what if they be both firm and experienc'd, and yet do not ſuſtain the charge in thoſe two caſes, the firſt charge vaniſheth not in ſmoke? *Pompey* his Soldiers were firm and experienc'd, yet did not ſuſtain *Caſars* Charge at *Pharſalia*: but of this I ſpoke enough in another place.

First obſervation of them.

In that ſame Fourth Book this Author ſhews us how an enemy may be ſurrounded in time of Battel, and I pray you obſerve the Leſſon he gives how to do it: Firſt, ſaith he, let the front of your Army be Marſhal'd equal with that of your enemy; then, ſays he, let your front retire by little and little, and your flanks ſtanding ſtill ſhall environ your enemy. I doubt not but *Machiavel* thought this a ſquint device, but it is a fancy only beſeeming a Gentleman of the long robe. If he had ſaid, let your Battel ſtand, and your wings extend themſelves, he had ſpoke ſome ſenſe; but a front to retire is an improper ſpeech, and unintelligible in the Art of War: for in ſtrict and proper language a Front and a Reer conſiſts but each of them of one rank, whether that be of ten, a hundred, a thouſand, ten thouſand, or twenty thouſand Men, or Horſe; ſo the firſt rank which is the Front cannot retire further than ſix or three foot allowed to be between it and the ſecond rank, unleſs all the ranks, and conſequently the whole Batallion re-

Second.

tire. I grant there be ſome who will have the half of the ranks to be the Front, and the other half the Reer, as in our Foot Batallions, which are ſix deep, the three firſt ranks make the Front, the other three the Reer; but this, as I think, is not proper language, neither will it help *Machiavel*; for his Front of the three firſt ranks cannot retire till the three laſt ranks (that are behind them) retire firſt.

Third. Beſides all this, I doubt if in *Machiavels* time, Captains might well hazard more than now, to command a Batallion of men to retire, for fear they could not get them to advance again, at leaſt not ſo readily.

Fourth. *Juſtus Lipſius* had reaſon to accuſe *Machiavel* of groſs ignorance for denying the right ordering of a Militia to be an Art, and certainly his conceit to do ſo was very extravagant; beſides he contradicts himſelf, for he calls his Treatiſe of War, *I ſette libri del' arte della guerra di Nicolo Machiavelli*, Seven Books of the Art of War of *Nicol Machiavell*.

Indeed Soldiers are very little bound to him; for he ſays, neither Prince nor State ſhould ſuffer any of thoſe who profeſs to live by the Art of War, to dwell under them; nor doth, ſaith he, any vertuous or good man uſe it as an art; and adds, that thoſe who do ſo, muſt of neceſſity be falſe, fraudulent, treacherous, and violent, for they muſt (ſaith this Doctor) either obſtruct all peace, that the War continuing, they may thereby be maintained, or they muſt pill, plunder, and make ſpoil of other mens goods in the time of War, that thereby they may maintain themſelves in the time of peace. This is bad enough if it be all true.

Fifth Obſervation. Theſe are his goodly arguments which are but his own idle dreams, for it is no difficil matter to keep men who make profeſſion of Arms within the bounds of their duty, even when they but ſeldom receive their wages; and this in this age is viſible to the whole world. Nor can many Inſtances be given where men of War obſtructed that peace which their Maſters deſir'd, or which both parties were contented to make. And if after the concluſion of a peace, and disbanding of Armies, any exorbitancies chance to be committed by the Soldiers (as ſeldom any ſuch thing falls out) they have been occaſion'd by too great a defalcation of their pay, with the half or moity whereof all Modern Soldiers will be heartily well contented, ſo perfectly have they learn'd the *Baptiſts* Leſſon in the Goſpel, to be content with their wages.

Corollary. But to conclude, I know not whether I ſhall more cry up the lowlineſs of ſpirit of thoſe great Stateſmen who are pleaſed to deſcend from their high Spheres to learn their Politicks from *Machiavell*, or commend the generoſity of thoſe Captains who diſdain to ſtoop ſo low as to receive their Leſſons of the Military Art from the Town Clerk of *Florence*.

What the Author promiſeth to do. I ſuppoſe all that can be expected from me in the following Diſcourſes, is in ſome places to ſet down wherein the ordinances and cuſtoms of War in all or moſt of the ſeveral points or parts of it, in divers Countries agree or diſagree, with the practice of the preſent times, and when I give my own opinion, it ſhall be ſparingly, and with ſubmiſſion: neither ſhall I decline to go as far back in the Inveſtigation of the Cuſtoms and Conſtitutions of War in former times, as I have either probable grounds for conjecture, or any glimpſe of light to conduct me.

Since I wrote this Chapter, I have ſeen ſome *Frenchmen* who having been Soldiers themſelves, have given us an account of the preſent *French* art and order of War, as *De la Valiere*, *Monſieur Louis de la Saya*, and ſome others.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Levies, the manner of ſeveral Nations in making them. Duties of Soldiers when they are levied, their age, and how long they are bound to ſerve.

ARmies are properly the members of the great Body of War, and men are the ſinews of Armies. The beſt choice, election, or levy of men is of the ſubjects of that Prince or State who maketh the War, where the Law of the Land impoſeth a neceſſity on men fit for ſervice, to enroll themſelves according to their ſeveral ranks and qualities. And this Levy alters its nature according to the nature of the War, for if that be a Defenſive one, the Levy is Voluntary, for ordinarily men riſe willingly in arms for the defence of their Country, Lives, Wives and Children. But if the War be an Offenſive one, intended to invade a ſtranger, and ſuch as leads Natives from their Countries and Homes, and carries them to foreign lands; it is not univerſally voluntary, and very oft gets the name of a Preſs. In this kind of Levy moſt Nations followed the cuſtom of the *Grecians* and *Romans*, and choſe moſt of their Cavalry out of the Gentlemen, or the better ſort, and the Infantry out of the Commons; but the ſubſtance of that cuſtom is now vaniſhed, and we have ſcarce the ſhadow of it left with us.

Voluntary Levy.

Preſs.

The Emperours of the High *Dutch* Nation, the *German* Princes, and Imperial Towns, by the old Conſtitutions of the Empire, made an Election or Levy of their Subjects according to their Laws, ſometimes the tenth, ſometimes the ſixth, or fifth man, or according to their Eſtates, in all their Wars, both ſince the *Turk* became their unwelcome neighbour, and before he had footing in *Europe*. It is not above fourſcore and ten years ſince in the raign of *Maximilian* the Second, all that were Enrolled in the *German* Cavalry were by birth Gentlemen; it is true they brought ſome of them one, ſome two, and ſome three with them, who waited on them, well horſed and armed, for whom they receiv'd wages, and were ſubject to articles of War; but theſe were called in their language *Einſpanneers*, to diſtinguiſh them from the Maſters, who were of neceſſity to be all Gentlemen, a cuſtom worn clear out, moſt of *German* Troops being now compoſed of *Einſpanneers*, without Gentlemen, unleſs it be the Officers, and not all of them neither.

Manner of the ancient Levy in *Germany*.

The Commiſſion of array in *England* is an excellent order, by which an Army Royal may be brought together either for defence, or invaſion in a very ſhort time.

In *England*.

The ancient cuſtom of Levy in *Scotland*, as we are told, was to command all between ſixteen and ſixty years of age to appear in every Shire, and you need not doubt but out of theſe an Election was made of ſuch a number as the Kings Lieutenants thought fit. But in latter times a far better and more expedient way was found out, and that was to impoſe the raiſing ſuch a number of Horſe and Foot on every Shire proportionably according to the true valuation of the Eſtates of the Heritors and Proprietaries. Aſſuredly a way very orderly, methodical, and juſt, provided it never be made uſe of in an unjuſt cauſe.

In *Scotland*.

The Kings of *Sweden* have conſtantly ſtanding forces within the Kingdom to prevent both Invaſions and Inſurrections; they conſiſt of Regiments and Troops, which have their denominations from the Provinces where they are raiſed, and where they reſide, they have their Officers and Colours, and are appointed at ſeveral times to meet, muſter and exerciſe, but are not in pay, only ſome ſmall thing is given to the Captain and the Enſign, who ordinarily are their Drill-maſters, and upon that account get wages. But theſe Troops and Regiments are ſometimes carried out of *Sweden* to foreign Wars, and that in great numbers,

In *Sweden*.

and others appointed to be raiſed in their rooms. As in the time of *Charles* the Ninth they were carried to *Lieſland*, againſt both *Pole* and *Muſcovy*; in the time of *Guſtavus Adolphus*, and his Daughter Queen *Chriſtina*, to *Livonia*, *Pruſſia*, and *Germany*, and more lately by *Charles Guſtavus* to *Pruſſia*, *Livonia*, *Pole*, *Germany*, and *Denmark*.

In *Denmark*. The Kings of *Denmark* have their Countrey Militia for defence of the Kingdome, but are neither ſo orderly nor ſo numerous as thoſe of *Sweden*, neither do they take them ſo frequently to foreign expeditions as of old they did, when by their mighty Armies they invaded many places of *Germany*, *Scotland*, and *England*, and made an entire conqueſt of *Normandy*. But theſe were like the inundations of the *Huns*, *Lombards*, *Goths* and *Vandals* (which two laſt, both the *Sweedes* and *Danes* pretend to be their Anceſtors) on the *Roman* Empire.

In *Spain*. The like of ſuch an Election or Levy hath been in former times uſed in *Spain*, and may be yet. But when we conſider, that it hath been often drain'd of men, in the days of *Philip* the Second, for the maintenance of his Wars in *Italy*, and the *Low Countreys*, but more eſpecially for his Plantations in *America*, which began in his Father *Charles* the Fifth's time, and continued during the Reigns of *Philip* the Third, and the Fourth; we muſt conclude, that all the *Spaniſh* Levies made within that Kingdome, neither were, nor could be voluntary.

In *France*. The *French* Levies of old were all made of the Natives, the Cavalry conſiſting of the Nobility, and in the number and ſtrength of a Cavalry, *France* ſurpaſſed any other *European* Nation. *Charles* the Seventh took the aſſiſtance of *Scottiſh* Foot, who joyn'd with his own in his long Wars with *England*. But his Son *Lewis* the Eleventh, beſide the *Scots*, made uſe of the *Switzers*, who had at that time acquir'd the reputation of a ſtout and warlike people, not only in maintaining their liberties againſt the houſe of *Auſtria*, but in a bloody War againſt *Charles* the Warlike Duke of *Burgundy*, whom they defeated in three great Battels, in the laſt whereof they kill'd himſelf, if he be not yet on his Pilgrimage to *Jeruſalem*. Theſe *Switzers* were ſo much the more highly eſteem'd of by *Lewis*, becauſe they had routed and undone his capital Enemy; of them his Infantry was moſtly compos'd; and he appointed ſome thouſands of them to guard his perſon, as his Father had appointed the *Scots* to guard his; but *Lewis* kept the *Scots* likewiſe, and it was well for him that he did ſo, for they defended his life valiantly at the Siege of *Liege*, when the Inhabitants by a deſperate Sally had pierced through the *Burgundian* Army even to his lodging, as *Philip* of *Comines* relates the ſtory. Not only while he liv'd, but in the reigns of his Son *Charles* the Eight, and of his ſucceſſor *Lewis* the Twelfth, did the *French* Infantry conſiſt of *Switzers*; but *Francis* the firſt having had ſome bloody trials of the Infidelity of theſe Mercenary Soldiers put on a reſolution to ſtand thereafter on his own legs, and not on thoſe of ſtrangers. In order to which in the year 1534, in imitation of the *Romans* he appointed to be levied and enrolled ſeven Legions of *French* Foot, which made up a gallant Infantry of two and forty thouſand men; how theſe were arm'd, ſhall be told you in its own place. This Ordinance fell out to be made in the days of Marſhal *Monluc*, who ſeems in his Commentaries rather to diſapprove than approve of it; but gives not his reaſons. I ſuppoſe theſe Legions were kept up in the reigns of this *Francis*, who was the inſtituter of them, and of his Son *Henry* the Second. But if I have obſerved right, they began to wear out in the reigns of his Grand-children, *Charles* the Ninth, and *Henry* the Third, who in the time of their Civil Wars, made uſe again of the *Switzers*, as alſo of *Germans*; and ſo did likewiſe the Proteſtants take the aſſiſtance of both Horſe and Foot of the *German* Nation, as you may find them ordinarily deſign'd in the *French* Hiſtories under the name of *Reuters*, and *Landtsknechts*, the firſt in the *German* Language ſignifying Riders, or Horſemen, the ſecond, Country fellows. For as I told you the *Germans* compoſed their Cavalry of Gentlemen, and their Infantry, except the Officers, of Peaſants.

French Legions ſix thouſand each.

In the *Low-Countries*. In the Seventeen Provinces, both before they became all ſubject to the Dukes of *Burgundy*, (when they were under ſeveral Dukes and Earls) and after the Levy of their Foot was impoſed on the Commons to be made of the ſixth, fourth or tenth

tenth man, according to the danger of the Country, or for moſt part the pleaſure of the Prince. The Cavalry was made up of the Nobility, according to their ſeveral qualities and abilities; and they were obliged to keep ſuch a number of ſerviceable Horſes and Arms in the time of peace on their own charges, having for that ſome exemptions and priviledges, of no great conſideration; and in time of War they were paid with ſome ſmall wages, appointed at the firſt forming their Militia. Which Cavalry (ſaith *Bentivoglio*) uſed to be of a high repute and eſtimation: but now, ſaith he, not being compoſed of the Nobleſt, as formerly it was; but of common and ignoble perſons it is fallen extreamly from its ancient honour and dignity. And obſerve that this Cardinal wrote this long ago, to wit, in the year 1610. and therefore we may conclude that the whole Militia of theſe Provinces belonging to the King of *Spain*, is now much more degenerated, whereof our eyes can bear witneſs.

In *Turky.*

The Great *Turks* Levies are ſoon made, for the raiſing his Armies is but as the Randezvouzing of ours, all the members of his forces by land being one way or other in his pay, before he wage War: his Foot, I mean the *Janizaries*, being bred in their ſeveral Serails and Seminaries, and in his pay. His *Spahies* and *Timariots*, which compoſe his Cavalry, either poſſeſſing Lands, for which they are bound to ſerve; or receiving weekly wages in time of peace out of the ſeveral Treaſuries through his Empire.

In *Perſia.*

His Neighbour the *Sophi* of *Perſia*, his Militia conſiſts of Cavalry, moſt whereof, if not all, are Gentlemen, excellently well Horſed and Armed, with which he hath oft grapled with the *Turks* Armies, conſiſting of a more numerous Cavalry, beſides vaſt numbers of Foot, and a great Train of Artillery, of the two laſt whereof the *Sophi* is deſtitute, unleſs it be of very late years.

Second kind of Levy.

The ſecond kind of Levy is when Princes and States impoſe no neceſſity on their Subjects to riſe, but for making up their Armies, invite by Trumpet and Drum all to take imployment, whom either the deſire of honour, riches, booty, pay or wages may encourage to undergo their ſervice. And this is that kind of Election which now is univerſally and properly enough called a Levy. It is certainly the only Voluntary Election, becauſe the parties elect themſelves without the conſtraint of any Law, none being preſt to the ſervice but ſuch who of their own inclinations engage themſelves, and give their names to be Enrolled.

A Voluntary Levy deſcribed.

By this kind of Levy have moſt foreign Princes and States in our days raiſed their Armies, the manner of it is ſhortly this: The Prince or State makes choice of Colonels both for Horſe and Foot, to whom they give Commiſſions or Patents to raiſe Regiments of ſuch a number of Companies, and ſuch a number of men in each Company or Troop as the Prince or State thinks fit; to this purpoſe they give every Colonel a ſum of money, ſo much for every Horſeman, every Dragoon, and every Footman, as they and that Colonel can agree. And theſe ſums vary oft according to the fewneſs of Soldiers, the numbers of Armies and Leviers, and the danger of the War, or good or bad pay of him who wageth it; ſo that I have known ten Crowns not ſufficient for a Foot ſoldier, where four would have ſerv'd the turn three or four years before. The Colonels are limited ordinarily to ſuch a time to have their Regiments ready, and for that purpoſe have a place of Rendezvouz appointed to them. The Colonels themſelves give Patents to their Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, Ritmaſters, and Captains, and they to their Lieutenants, Enſigns, Cornets, Quarter maſters, Serjeants, and Corporals, immediately after Trumpets are ſounded, and Drums beaten, and thoſe who preſent themſelves, receive levy-moneys, and thereafter are entertain'd, and their names being Enrolled they are no more free, but bound to ſerve. Obſerve here that the Prince or State make choice of ſuch Colonels as they think moſt proper to raiſe men for their ſervice, either in their own Countries, or foreign ones, where Levies are permitted to be made for them, by their friends, Confederates and Allies.

Made uſe of by moſt of Princes in later times.

The Emperors *Ferdinand* the Second and the Third, and this Emperour *Leopold* levied all their great Armies in the time of their long and bloody Wars by ſound of Trumpet, and beat of Drum. So have all the *German* Princes, and moſtly the Kings of *France* and *Spain*. The great King of *Sweden*, *Guſtavus Adolphus*, his Daughter *Chriſtina*, and the late *Swediſh* King *Charles Guſtavus* made up moſt of their Armies, and ſo did *Chriſtian* the fourth King of *Denmark* (except

cept ſome Regiments of their native *Swedes* and *Danes*) of *Dutch*, *Scots*, and *Engliſh*, raiſed all by this manner of Levy. But hereby you may eaſily fancy that the ancient diſtinction and difference between the Cavalry and Infantry, as to their birth and breeding, is wholly taken away, mens qualities and extractions, being little or rather juſt nothing either regarded or inquired after; the moſt of the Horſemen, as well as of the Foot, being compoſed of the very ſcum of the Commons.

Abuſes and Inconveniences of this Voluntary Levy.

But there is worſe than that, for where a War is of any long continuance, that Armies mouldring away, either new Regiments muſt be levied, or the old recruited; this kind of Levy is groſly abuſed, and many there are who make a trade of it, taking money from one, and preſently running over to another. As I ſaid before, ſcarceneſs of Soldiers is the cauſe why Princes are the more liberal of their Levy-moneys, he who carries the heavieſt purſe ordinarily being maſter of moſt men; and this procures another great inconvenience and miſchief; the deſire to be fingering a beneficial new Levy-money, inticeth many to run from their Colours, and deſert their Maſters ſervice. In the long *German* War I have known in one Imperial Town ſix or ſeven Captains (whereof my ſelf was one) all levying for ſeveral Maſters, and ſome Rogues receive money from moſt of us, and yet go out of Town with none of us.

Safeſt way of Levy.

If theſe and many other inconveniences be conſider'd, we may conclude the ſureſt and the ſafeſt way of Levy, is that a Prince or State makes of their own Subjects, or of thoſe whom they receive as Auxiliaries from their Allies. as the great ſtock of the forces of the Eſtates of the United Provinces of the *Netherlands*, was of Regiments of *Scots*, *Engliſh*, *Germans*, and *French*, moſt whereof continue in their ſervice to this day, yet have theſe Eſtates been many times forced to make uſe of this Levy by Trumpet and Drum, and never more than in this year 1672, being neceſſitated to levy not ſo few as fifty thouſand Foot and Horſe.

Levies of the Eſtates of the *united Provinces.*

What Souldiers ſhould be elected.

In all kinds of Levies ſuch Officers ſhould be choſen as are men of underſtanding, and of ſome experience in Military matters. As to the Soldiers, whether ther they be to ſerve on Horſe or Foot, the ſtature is not to be look'd to ſo much (whether it be tall, mean, or indifferent) as the proportionable and cleanly connection of all the members of the body, which muſt be compact and ſtrong, a manly face, with lively, vigorous eyes, which denote the quickneſs and vivacity of the mind, apt to learn what belongs to his Art. If the Souldier be to ſerve on Foot, he ought to be ſuch as hath been inur'd to toil and hardſhip; for which purpoſe, as the *Roman* cuſtome was, choice ſhould be made of ſuch young fellows who have had their breeding rather in the Countrey, than in Towns, unleſs they be Mechanicks, that are not of a Sedentary Trade. If he be to ſerve on Horſe, and that the Levy be not made by the Trumpet, but where a right Election may be got, only ſuch ſhould be choſen, as are of an honeſt birth, for their reputation will make them undergo any fatigue, and a little time will inure them to toil, though they have been bred with eaſe and plenty.

Souldiers age.

I have formerly ſhown you what years made a man capable to be enroll'd a Souldier, among the Ancients. I ſhall tell you now, that though it be not generally look'd to by many, yet I find, that in our Modern Wars, moſt Captains conceive ſixteen years to be too young, and if ſo, I ſwear ſixty is too old; they need not be twenty, for if they be of ſuch Bodies as I have deſcrib'd, they may paſs muſter of eighteen; and if they be not infirm, wounded or mutilated, they may well enough continue Souldiers till they be fifty and upwards; though, ſome think, they ſhould not ſerve after the forty ſixth year of their age. So upon this account of mine, thoſe who levy, may enrol ſuch as are not under eighteen, nor above fifty: And this may be eaſily obſerved in Countrey Elections, where there is choice, yet very often it is not done, for which the Officers are to be blam'd. But in that other Voluntary Levy made by the Drum, where Souldiers are hired for Moneys, the age is ſeldome look'd to, old and young, being promiſcuouſly enroll'd, which is an intrinſecal defect of that kind of Levy. If men may not be enroll'd after the forty ſixth or fiftieth year of their age, it follows, they ſhould then have their diſmiſſion, yet that is but ſeldome practis'd, Neceſſity (which is limited

limited by no Law) detaining them very often many years beyond that time, which is no new thing, having been often practis'd by the *Romans*, and other Ancients, as I have ſhown before. Some limit the time of a Souldiers ſervice from his Enrolling, which is juſt. The *Sweedes* order their Foot Souldiers of their own Countrey to ſerve twenty five years, ſtrangers fifteen; but if they followed the *Roman* way, the Horſe-men ſhould ſerve but half that time. The *French* King is more gracious to Souldiers, eſpecially to ſtrangers, whom he orders to get their Diſmiſſions (if they require them) after they have ſerved four or five years.

How long they ſhould ſerve.

But for all I have ſaid, I know not why all Kings, Princes, and Free States, in their Election and Levy of Souldiers, ſhould not follow the example of the Great King of kings, and Lord of lords, who (as you may read in the firſt Chapter of *Numbers*) order'd his Servant *Moſes* to muſter all Males fit for the War, of twenty years old and upwards, and therefore we may conclude, he thought all under that age unfit to go to the Wars.

As to the duties and qualifications of Souldiers, whether of Horſe or Foot, there be ſome who make ſo many of them, that if Princes keep none in their ſervice but ſuch as quadrate with all their properties, they will make but very thin muſters. But you may take all the duties of a Souldier (as the *Lacedæmonians* did) to be three. Firſt, To give exact and perfect obedience to all the lawful commands of Superiours. Secondly, To endure the fatigue, travel, and diſcommodities of War, whether it be in Marching, or working at Trenches, Approaches, and Sieges, Hunger, thirſt, and cold, with an exemplary patience. Thirdly, In time of Battel, Skirmiſh or Aſſault, to reſolve either to overcome, or dye. But Reader, do not you ſeek all theſe in every Souldier, do not ſeek any of theſe exactly in every Souldier, nay nor in any Souldier, for you will not find them; let it be enough, if they have ſome of them in ſome degree, though not in perfection. And why may you not comprehend the two laſt Duties under the firſt of Obedience? For he who can obey his Superiour exactly, will, when he is commanded, endure any fatigue, and in any rencounter reſolve to be victorious, or periſh. And indeed, Obedience is the very life of an Army. A *Lacedæmonian* in a Skirmiſh, having overthrown an Enemy, was ready to have run him through with his Sword; but hearing the Trumpet ſound a Retreat, he left him lying, and alive. Being ask'd, Why he did not diſpatch him? Anſwer'd, He was more ſerviceable to his Countrey by his Obedience, than by either his Valour, or his Revenge. The Sacred Oracles tell us, that Obedience is better than Sacrifice.

Duties of Souldiers.

Not to be expected to be perfectly in any one.

All comprehended under Obedience.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of Armour, or Defensive Arms, used by several Nations, both for their Cavalry, and their Infantry.

WHat odds there is between a Man, arm'd both for Offence and Defence, and him who only hath Offensive Weapons, may soon be understood, though the practice had never been seen. Why the same care is not taken now to defend mens Bodies in the time of fight, as well, and as much as of old there was; since the Offensive Weapons of later times, by the help of Fire, pierce more deeply and more deadly, than any of the former ages did, before Gun-powder, I suppose cannot well be told. If the neglect be imputed to Great Commanders, it were well done of Soveraign Princes and States, by their authority to order the reformation of so hurtful an oversight. But perhaps this reason will be given for it, because the long and continuated marches of our Modern Armies, not only for many days, but for many weeks and months, both in the extream heat of Summer, and rainy and tempestuous weather of winter, require that the Souldiers should be eased of the weight and trouble of their Defensive Arms, that with less toyl they may endure and undergo those marches. To which I shall answer, first, that we have no such Marches now adays, as the Ancients, especially the *Romans* had, and if we consider that they in their Ambulatory March, walk'd twenty miles in five hours; and in their cursory one, twenty five; and what a vast deal of ground, what large and long Countreys and Regions, they traced in compleat Arms, and burthen'd otherwise, as if they had been Beasts of Carriage, we must either blame our selves for not imitating them, or look upon most of their stories as pure Fables. And if our Souldiers from the time of their first Levy were habituated to wear at their Exercises and Drillings constantly their Armour, and accustom'd twice a week to march a good many miles in Arms, I mean Defensive as well as Offensive; suppose the first week five or six, the second seven, and so continue till they can march fifteen or sixteen miles in one day, they would find it then an easie matter to march every day in Armour, for custome is another nature; but this point of Exercising is generally neglected. But Secondly, I say, if *Ratio belli*, or the present necessity of affairs requires such a speedy and continuated March, then such an Army, as ordinarily we call a flying one, should be made use of, consisting of light Horse, Dragoons, and Musqueteers; and the heavy armed Horse and Foot should be left to march after, with as much haste as conveniently they can; to whom the light armed in case of necessity, may easily make their Retreat; for to bring these heavy armed forward (as I told you the *Romans*, and ~~*Grecians* did~~) and then permit them to cast away their Defensive Arms, is to denude your self of the strength of your Forces and Army.

Defensive Arms neglected:

The Reasons why, answered.

Our Modern Armies, as the ancient ones, consist of heavy and light armed, as well Horse as Foot. In the Cavalry, the Cuirassier is the heavy armed, and the Pike-man in the Infantry. The strength of all Armies ever was, and is the Infantry, and the strength of it is the heavy armed. He who is in good Armour fights with courage, as fearing no wounds, and frightens him with whom he fights, that is not so well armed. Pikemen then composing the Body of the Infantry, and the men of Arms the Body of the Cavalry, should be armed so that they may appear to an Enemy (when they come to the shock) as a Brazen or Iron Wall. It is true, a Batallion of Pikes, without Defensive Arms, may, being serr'd together, hinder a Troop of Horse from getting in among them; but their Heads and Bodies being naked, and having nothing on either of them to resist the force of a Carabine or Pistol-ball, (except it be a Buff-coat, and for most part, not that) it is not to be fancied, but a Volley of shot from a Body

Pike men the Body of the Infantry, and it of the Army.

dy of Horſe ſtanding without the danger of the points of Pikes, will make many of the Pikemen fall, which will ſo diſorder their Body, that a ſudden Charge of Horſe will eaſily break it. This is a great defect of our Modern Militia, of which moſt Nations are now guilty; for though in all their Conſtitutions of War there is an appointment for heavy armed Horſe and Foot, yet when we ſee Batallions of Pikes, we ſee them every where naked, unleſs it be in the *Netherlands*, where ſome, and but ſome Companies repreſent the ancient Militia; and we find an Univerſal defect in the Cavalry, as to the heavy armed, there being but few Curiaſſiers in many Armies, and in very many none of them at all to be ſeen.

Since the invention of Guns we find till theſe latter times all Nations did allow defenſive Arms to both Horſe and Foot, according to the nature of the ſervice that was to be required of them. The Cavalry was ordinarily divided into Curiaſſiers, and Harquebuſiers, but I ſhall ſpeak of that more fully afterward. The firſt was to be compleatly armed, Man and Horſe, and thoſe we call Men at Arms, and the *French*, *Gens d' Arms*, which is the ſame thing. The Harquebuſiers had a Head-piece, back and breaſt, their Horſes no arms at all. But now for moſt part the caſe is alter'd, and inſtead of Curiaſſiers we have *Harquebuſiers*, and inſtead of *Harquebuſiers*, we have *Horſemen*, only arm'd offenſively. *Here* I muſt anſwer an Objection, which is this, if the armour for *Horſemen* be not Musket-proof, either the Bullet pierceth through, or beats the Iron into the *Horſemans* body, which is equally dangerous; and if it be proof, it is exceeding troubleſome to both man and horſe; but I anſwer that there hath been, and are at this day Arms made that are proof, and of no conſiderable weight, and it is ſuppoſed a Curiaſſier ſhould be of a ſtrong body, and ſhould ride a horſe that for heighth and ſtrength ſhould be fit for that ſervice, wherein both he and his rider are to be employed, as I ſhall tell you afterward. Defenſive Arms for Horſemen.

The heavy armed Foot-ſoldier, or Pikeman, ſhould have a *Head*-piece, a Back and Breaſt, a Belly-piece, Taſſets for their Thighs, and Greeves for their Arms, the Armour for their *Heads*, Breaſts and Bellies, ſhould be Carrabine-proof, and that for their Backs, Piſtol-proof. But we ſhall rarely ſee a Batallion of Pikes in ſuch harneſs, and no wonder, ſince the Pike it ſelf is not now uſed ſo much as it hath been, and ſtill ſhould be, of which I ſhall ſpeak at length in its proper place. But here it will be fit that I ſpeak of the ſupine careleſneſs and inexcuſable inadvertency of Officers and Commanders, in their Levies, who take no notice to make a difference of thoſe who are to carry Muskets and Pikes, diſtributing them promiſcuouſly to the ſtronger and the weaker; whereas, without all queſtion, the talleſt, biggeſt, and ſtrongeſt ſhould be order'd to carry Pikes, that they may the better endure the weight of their defenſive Arms; nay, which is worſe, I have known Muskets given to thoſe of the biggeſt ſtature, and Pikes to the unworthieſt and ſillieſt of the Company, as if he who is not worthy to carry a Musket were ſufficient to carry a Pike, neither have I ſeen this abuſe redreſſed, though often complain'd of to Generals; ſo much have I ſeen a Pike, the Prince of Weapons, diſparaged. For Pikemen.

Many have thought it fit to give Musketeers ſome defenſive Arms, as a Head, Back and Breaſt-piece, and truly I wiſh that cuſtom were continued; for though moſt of the ordinary Armour that is given them be little better than Piſtol-proof, if it be ſo good, yet it encourages them who wear it; and if, as I ſaid before, they be exercis'd, train'd, and accuſtom'd with it, it will not at all be troubleſome to them, either in their march, or on ſervice; for we find the ancient light armed, eſpecially among the *Romans*, pretty well arm'd for defence, and from thence they had the name of light armed to diſtinguiſh them from the heavy armed Legionaries. For Musketeers.

I think I may in this place reckon the *Swediſh* Feather among the defenſive Arms, though it doth participate of both defence and offence: It is a Stake five or ſix foot long, and about four finger thick, with a piece of ſharp Iron nail'd to each end of it; by the one it is made faſt in the ground in ſuch a manner that the other end lyeth out ſo that it may meet with the breaſt of a Horſe, whereby a Body of Musketeers is defended as with a Palliſado, againſt the rude charge of *Swediſh* Feather.

a Squadron of Horſe, which in the mean time they gall and diſorder with their ſhot. I have ſeen them made uſe of in *Germany*, and before I left that War, ſaw them likewiſe worn out of uſe. When the Infantry by ſeveral Regiments or Brigades are drawn up in Battel, and the Pikes and thoſe Stakes fixed in the ground, they make a delightful ſhow, repreſenting a Wood, the Pikes reſembling the tall trees, and the Stakes the ſhrubs. *Guſtavus Adolphus* was the firſt *Swediſh* King that uſed them, and it is ſaid he invented them in his Wars in *Liefland* againſt the *Polonians*, who far overpowered him in Horſe. I believe he uſed them firſt there, but the invention of them is of a far older date than the *Swedes* would have them to be; for *Henry* the Fifth, King of *England*, the night before the Battel of *Agencourt* fearing to be born down by the *French* Kings numerous Cavalry, cauſed each of his Bowmen to provide one of theſe Stakes (whereof the Vines there afforded him plenty) and being made ſharp at both ends, though they were not pointed with Iron, they did his buſineſs well enough, and contributed not a little to the gaining of that Victory which gave him ſo great footing in *France*.

Uſed by *Henry* the Fifth at *Agen-court*.

Rangons frame of Defence.

To this kind of defenſive Arms may be reduced that invention of *Rangon* in the *French* Army, in the Reign of *Francis* the firſt, which was a great frame of Timber that could be taken in pieces, and carried on Carts, and eaſily join'd together, whereby Batallions were barricado'd, and ſerv'd but to little purpoſe. As alſo that frame which (as I have heard from ſome Commanders) the Great Duke of *Muſcovia* uſeth, with which the *Ruſſians* are ſo well acquainted, that they can very ſuddenly piece it together, and ſhroud themſelves within it, from the charge of Horſe, and as nimbly take it down and march away with it.

Muſcovian Barricado.

French Defenſive Arms.

In my laſt Chapter of the *Grecian* Militia, I ſpoke of the *French* defenſive Arms, both for their Horſe and Foot in the Reign of *Henry* the Second, far different from thoſe that are uſed now.

Turks.

The *Turk* uſeth defenſive Arms, but neither ſo good or ſo many as other Nations do.

Perſian.

The *Perſian* Curiaſſiers are arm'd all over their Bodies, men and horſe, and this perhaps helps them to over-maſter the *Turk* in Cavalry. Their Head-pieces are deckt with fair and large Plumes of Feathers, and their Targets (which they likewiſe uſe) are gilded, they have likewiſe light Horſemen, who carry Head-pieces and Corſlets.

Mamalucks.

When the *Mamalucks* had the Soveraignty of *Egypt*, *Syria*, and *Paleſtine*, the better ſort of them (for all were Horſemen) were arm'd for the Defenſive, from head to foot, man and horſe; the ſecond ſort carried large Targets wherewith they defended their Bodies in the ſhock, but before they came to it, they threw theſe Targets over their backs, till they made uſe of their Bows and Arrows.

Abyſſens.

The *Abyſſens* or *Æthiopians* one hundred and forty years ago, arm'd their Horſemen with Coats of Male, which cover'd their whole bodies to their knees; Morrions for their heads, and in their hands round Targets.

Bohemians.

In the days of *Charles* the Fifth the *Bohemians* had great Targets or Shields, wherewith they cover'd their whole bodies. Before that time, and ſince too,

Hungarians.

the *Hungarians*, *Walachians*, and *Tranſylvanians* uſed Head pieces, Corſlets, and Targets.

Engliſh.

Since Gunpowder, the *Engliſhmen* at Arms, or Curiaſſiers, were arm'd at all pieces, their light Horſemen with Morrions, Jacks, and Sleeves of Male.

Scottiſh.

So were our *Scots*, who uſed alſo Steel-caps, or Bonnets.

Hollanders.

John Petyt in his Hiſtory of the *Netherlands* tells us, that in the year 1599, when the Eſtates of the *United Provinces* were making vaſt preparations for the proſecution of the War againſt *Spain*, and to that purpoſe were levying both Foot and Horſe, they made an Ordnance for the Arms that both their Horſemen and Footmen ſhould carry: of the Defenſive he gives us this account, The *Reuters* or Horſemen (ſuppoſe Curiaſſiers) were to have a Head-piece, a Gorget, a Breaſt and a Back, two Poldrons, a Gantlet for his left hand, belly and thigh, and Knee-pieces, and Culots, (which, ſaith he, were pieces of Armour to defend the reins.) The Carabiners were to have a Head-piece, a Gorget, a Back and a Breaſt. The Pikemen, Head-pieces, Gorgets, Backs and Breaſts. The Muske-

teers,

tiers, Head-pieces. What Offenſive Arms, or Weapons all theſe Nations uſed I am to tell you juſt now.

CHAP. IV.

Of Offenſive Arms, or Weapons uſed by the Cavalry of ſeveral Nations.

THat there is no new thing under the Sun, and that what is, hath been, may admit of a favourable Interpretation; for time was when neither Piſtol nor Carrabine were known in the world; neither did Antiquity know Gunpowder, which is the Mother of them both, and many other Engines of fire. The Sword is a weapon that is never out of faſhion, uſed in all ages, and by all Nations of the world; though the difference be that ſome Horſemen uſe long, and ſome ſhort Swords. But this ſhould not be left to the choice of the Horſemen, for the length of their Swords ſhould be limited to them by the Prince or State they ſerve. Few tell us whether the Swords of the Horſemen they write of, were for cutting, or for thruſting, or for both, as the *Roman* Swords were. The *Perſians*, *Turks*, *Ruſſians*, *Polonians*, and *Hungarians*, for moſt part wear Scimiters and Shables, which being crooked, ſerve only for ſhearing, and not at all for ſtabbing. The Sword.

Monluc in the firſt Book of his firſt Tome, ſays, that in the Reign of *Francis* the firſt, about a hundred and forty years ago, the *French Gens d' Arms* carried broad Swords, which were ſo well edged, that they could cut through Sleeves and Caps of Male. The *Scots* and *Engliſh* uſed conſtantly broad Swords, for if we believe ſome of the *Engliſh* Hiſtories, a Rapier is ſo new a Weapon in *England*, that it is not yet above one hundred years old. In the time of the late Troubles in *England* long Rapiers were uſed for a while, and then laid aſide. The *German* Horſemen uſe Swords fit both to ſlaſh and thruſt. *John Petyt* in that place mention'd in the laſt Chapter, ſays, The Eſtates of *Holland* order'd their Horſemen to carry ſhort Swords according to ſuch a length appointed for that purpoſe. It were to be wiſh'd that if Horſemen be obliged by their capitulation to furniſh themſelves with Swords, that their Officers would ſee them provided of better than ordinarily moſt of them carry, which are ſuch as may be well enough reſiſted by either a good Felt, or a Buff-coat.

A Mace is an ancient weapon for a Horſeman, neither was it out of uſe long after the invention of Hand-guns for we read of them frequently uſed by moſt Nations an hundred years ago. And certainly in a Medley they may be more ſerviceable than Swords; for when they were guided by a ſtrong arm, we find the party ſtruck with them, was either fell'd from his horſe, or having his Head-piece beat cloſe to his head, was made reel in his Saddle, with his blood running plentifully out of his noſe. The Mace.

The Lance was the Horſemans weapon, wherewith he charged; neither do I find that any Nation wanted it, long after the invention of the Piſtol. Whether the Lance be laid aſide as uſeleſs in *Germany*, *England*, *Scotland*, *France*, *Denmark*, and *Sweden*, by the command of ſeveral Princes, or only worn out by time, I know not; but that it is not uſed in theſe places, is certain enough. And truly I wonder why it ſhould not now rather be uſed when the nakedneſs of mens breaſts without defenſive Arms, renders them more obnoxious to the ſtroke or puſh of a Lance than in former times, when few or no Horſemen were to be ſeen without a Corſlet. I ſhall not doubt but there be ſtrong reaſons (though I know them not) why our *European* Generals for moſt part have abandon'd the uſe of the Lance, yet it will not be deny'd but it hath been a ſerviceable weapon hereto- The Lance.

The Lance made uſeleſs by many Nations.

fore, even ſince Gun-powder, and all manner of Guns were found out. I ſhall give but one inſtance; at that memorable Battel of *Dreux* fought about an hundred years ago, the Prince of *Conde*, and Admiral *Chaſtillon*, who conducted the Proteſtant Army by the reiterated Charges of their men of Arms with Lances, after ſtrong oppoſition broke the great Batallion of the *Switzers*, which was compoſed of Pikemen, and was thought Invincible, and kill'd on the place ſeventeen of their Captains. After the death of the Marſhal St. *Andre*, and the taking of the great Conſtable *Montmorancy*, two of the *French* Kings Generals; the Prince of *Conde* was likewiſe made Priſoner by the Royal party, and the Admiral forced out of the field by the Duke of *Guiſe* and his Cavalry.

A very remarkable paſſage.

The Admiral rallies, and that night propoſed to his *German Reuters*, (who had each of them a Caſe of Piſtols, and many of them Carrabines) to march back and fall on the Duke of *Guiſe*, then both weary and ſecure. But though that *German* Body of *H*orſe was whole and intire, yet did the Commanders of it remonſtrate to the Admiral, that it was impoſſible for them to break the *French* Batallion of Foot which had kept the Field with the Duke; and I pray you obſerve the reaſon they gave for it, Becauſe, ſaid they, we have no Lances, which are only proper for that, for the *French* men at Arms who had with Lances broke the *Switzers*, were then diſſipated, or over-wearied, and all their Lances broken. If this be true, it would ſeem that the manner of the Milice then, and the Milice now, are very different, though both Modern. A Cavalry then arm'd with Lances acknowledged to be able to break an arm'd Batallion of Foot, whereof it gave a perfect demonſtration; and a Cavalry then arm'd offenſively with Carrabine, Piſtol and Sword, and not without defenſive Arms, declares it ſelf uncapable for it. And now the Carrabiners or *H*arquebuſiers are thought only proper for Rencounters, and the Lanciers are laid aſide as uſeleſs.

Hungarians uſe the Lance. And the *Abyſſens*, As alſo the *Perſians*.

But the Lance meets with better uſage from other Nations, even to this hour. The *Polonians* and *Hungarians* uſe it, and ſo doth the *Turk*. The *Abyſſens* on horſeback uſe ſtrong Lances, pointed at both ends, and great Maces of Iron. The *Perſians* (accounted the beſt *H*orſemen in the world) carry Lances very ſtrong, they are pointed at both ends, they carry them in the middle, and manage them with great ſtrength and dexterity. *Giovio* tells us that at *Scyrus* a great City of *Meſopotamia*, the *Perſians* had many Shops, wherein the beſt Arms of the World were to be ſold, and that not far from it at *Charmaum*, were Swords and Points of Lances made of ſo well temper'd Steel, that our *European* Corſlets and *H*ead-pieces could hardly reſiſt the ſtroke of the firſt, and puſh of the other; and that all Arms either for man or horſe, whether offenſive or defenſive were of Steel and Iron, well boil'd with the juice of certain herbs only known to the forgers, which made them ſo excellent. *He* adds, that theſe Arms are bought by the *Turks* at exceſſive rates: but truly I think it was no good policy to ſuffer them to be ſold at any rate to ſo dangerous an enemy, and ſo malignant a neighbour; but perhaps no inhibition would ſerve the turn, for *Auri ſacra fames* hearkens to no Law.

Perſian Arms excellent.

The *Hollander* rejects the Lance.

John Petyt tells us in the foremention'd place that the General Eſtates of the United Provinces in the year 1599, forbad their Cavalry to make uſe any more of the Lance; but I find in *Bentivoglio*, the uſe of it was retain'd in the *Spaniſh* Armies by Archduke *Albert*, and Marquis *Spinola*, in the year 1612, after the Truce with the *Hollanders*. But the States commanded their *H*orſemen to wear Coats above their Armour; theſe Coats according to the quality of him or them who wore them, were fine, rich, and gliſtering, and are ordinarily called Coats of Arms. The *Grecians* call'd them *Epheſtries*, and the *Romans*, *Chlamides*. But now ſince few men are armed for the Defenſive, few need Coats of Arms.

Archers on Horſeback.

The Ancients made uſe of Bow and Arrow on horſeback, and ſo in later times have the *Walachians* and *Tranſylvanians*, and ſo did the *French* till the practice of *H*and guns made them uſeleſs, and yet with them *H*orſemen arm'd with Piſtols, are ſtill called Archers.

French Arms.

An hundred years ago the *French* Archers who attended the *Gens d' Armes*, carried in their hand a half Lance, and one Piſtol at their Saddle, and a Sword at their ſide; the Arms of the light *H*orſemen differ'd little from theſe. The *H*arquebuſiers had Swords at their ſides, and *H*arquebuſſes at their Saddles, the Barrels

Barrels whereof were three foot long. About ſeventy years ago the Eſtates of *Holland* order'd theſe Horſe-men, whom they called Carabiners, to carry each of them a Piece three foot long, and their other Horſe-men Piſtols at their Saddles, the Barrels whereof were two foot long. Generally now all Horſe-men, whether Cuiraſſiers or Harquebuſiers, carry Swords at their ſides, and a caſe of Piſtols at their Saddles; and theſe are moſtly all their Offenſive Weapons, except that ſome carry Carabines, ſome whereof have Barrels of four foot long, but ordinarily only three. *Hollanders Arms for Horſe.*

The Piſtol was invented firſt by *Camillo Vitelli*, an *Italian*, when *Ferdinand* of *Arragon* reign'd in *Spain*, *Charles* the Eighth, and *Lewis* the Twelfth in *France*, *Henry* the Eighth in *England*, and *James* the Fifth in *Scotland*, not above one hundred and fifty years ago, and conſequently more than two hundred years after the *German* Monk had found out Gun-powder. The Harquebuſs is of an older date. The bore of the Piſtol long ago was made for twenty Bullets in one pound of Lead, but it being found that the Ball enter'd not eaſily, generally they caſt one pound of Lead in four and twenty Piſtol-ball: The half of the weight of powder ſerves, if it be good; if not, they take two thirds; as for one pound and a half of Lead, one pound of Powder; but if it be fine, half will ſerve, as for two pounds of Lead, one pound of Powder. The Barrel of the Piſtol may be two foot for the longeſt, ſixteen inches for the ſhorteſt. The *French* uſe Locks with half-bends, and ſo do for moſt part the *Engliſh* and the *Scots*; the *Germans*, Rore or Wheel-works: The *Hollander* makes uſe of both. If the Chamber of a Piſtol be loaden three times the Diameter of her bore with Powder (which is eaſily meaſur'd by her Rammer) ſhe hath her due charge. But all Horſe-men ſhould always have the charges of their Piſtols ready in Patrows, the Powder made up compactly in Paper, and the Ball tyed to it with a piece of Packthred. *The Piſtol when invented.* *Its Bore.* *Its Barrel.* *Its charge of Powder.*

The Carabiners carry their Carabines in Bandileers of Leather about their neck, a far eaſier way than long ago, when they hung them at their Saddles. Some inſtead of Carabines carry Blunderbuſſes, which are ſhort Hand-guns of a great bore, wherein they may put ſeveral Piſtol or Carabine-Balls, or ſmall Slugs of Iron. I do believe the word is corrupted, for I gueſs it is a *German* term, and ſhould be *Donnerbuchs*; and that is, Thundering Guns; *Donner* ſignifying Thunder, and *Buchs* a Gun. *Blunderbuſs.*

CHAP. V.

Of Offenſive Arms or Weapons, uſed by the Infantry of ſeveral Nations.

I Have ſaid before, that the Foot is the body and ſtrength of an Army; the Horſe being placed on its ſides or flanks, are called Wings. The Infantry was by all the Ancient, and is ſtill by all Modern Warriours divided into heavy and light armed. In former times, as I have told you, the *Velites*, or light armed, were ſometimes order'd to fight in the Rear, ſometimes on the Flanks, but for moſt part in the Van of the heavy armed. Now they are almoſt conſtantly embattel'd on the Flanks. Both of them have their denominations from the Arms they carry. The Defenſive Arms of the Foot, ſince the Invention of Guns, and long before it, were near upon the matter the ſame among moſt Nations, but the Offenſive hath not been conſtantly alike, ſince the noiſe of Powder, ſcarce in any Nation.

The

Long Weapons.

The heavy armed carried univerſally in all Modern Armies, beſides Swords and Daggers, long Weapons, ſuch as Pikes, Half-Pikes, long Javelines, Partizans and Halberds, all comprehended by the *French* under the name of long *Bois*, or long Staves. And, as I have told you in another place, with all theſe were the Foot Batallions of *Henry* the Second of *France* provided, when he march'd into *Germany* againſt *Charles* the Fifth, one hundred and twenty years ago, moſt of all which had Piſtols at their girdles. His Predeceſſor *Charles* the Seventh, having had a ſad experience how pitifully the *Engliſh* Bow-men had diſorder'd both his Foot and his Horſe, inſtituted alſo Archers; but thoſe, after the uſe of the Harquebuſs came to be known, threw away their Bows and Arrows.

Bow.

But the *Engliſh* retain'd the uſe of the Bow much longer; and no wonder, they were loth to part with a Weapon, which had done them ſo great ſervice. For we find that *Henry* the Eighth made good uſe of his Bow-men in his Wars in *France*, when he beſieged firſt *Terouenne*, and thereafter *Bulloigne*; and though Marſhal *Monluc*, ſpeaking of this laſt Siege, in his Commentaries, ſeems to make a ſmall account of the Bow, yet he might have remember'd, how much miſchief his Countrey-men had received in former times from it.

The long Bow.

The Bow is diſtinguiſhed in the Long-bow, and the Croſs-bow, the firſt requireth a ſtrong arm either ſo by nature, or made ſo by habit, and long practice. It is, without doubt, a very ancient Weapon, and univerſally uſed by moſt, if not all Nations. Maſter *Norton* in his practice of Artillery thinks it was uſed before the general Deluge; his reaſon is, becauſe the Almighty gave the Rain-bow as a ſign, that he would not deſtroy mankind again with Rain, and he calls it his Bow, to diſtinguiſh it from that of Men. Since the Flood, we read of it in all Hiſtories, both Sacred and Prophane: The *Romans* of all Nations uſed it leaſt, for it came not in requeſt with them, till the reigns of the Emperours, and before that time Bows were uſed only by their Auxiliaries, and not by themſelves, or their Allies, whatever *Vegetius* ſeems to ſay to the contrary, whereof I have ſpoken in another place. The Bow is now in *Europe* uſeleſs, and why I cannot tell, ſince it is certain enough, Arrows would do more miſchief now, than formerly they did; ſince neither Men nor Horſes are ſo well arm'd now to reſiſt them, as in former ages they uſed to be. There are ſome who bring reaſons, for bringing the Bow again into uſe, ſuch as theſe. Firſt, Arrows exceedingly gall Horſes, and conſequently diſorder their Squadrons, becauſe being ſo hurt, they will not be manag'd by their Riders. Secondly, A Bow-man can ſhoot many more Arrows than a Musketeer Bullets. Thirdly, All the Ranks of Archers, though twenty, may ſhoot their Arrows over their Leaders heads, with equal miſchief to an Enemy, whereas Musketeers can conveniently but deliver their ſhot by one Rank after another, or by three Ranks at moſt, by kneeling, ſtooping, and ſtanding, ſeldome practis'd, and only at a dead lift. Theſe reaſons to me are unanſwerable, and I think might weigh much with Princes, to make the half, or at leaſt a third of their *Velites* to be Archers, and by the bargain they might ſave much money expended on Powder and Lead: but to them and Free States belongs only the Reformation of abuſes in the Militia. And therefore I ſhall ſay no more of the Long-bow, than that it hath been an Offenſive Weapon ſince Hand-guns were uſed, as well as before.

Reaſons for bringing back the uſe of the Bow.

The Croſs-bow.

The Croſs-bow requireth but little ſtrength to manage it, a Weapon much uſed in *France*, when Fire-guns were rare. *Monluc* (whom I look upon as an unqueſtionable Author) informs us, that in the beginning of the raign of *Francis* the Firſt, in a Company of two hundred *French* Foot, moſt of the light armed were Croſs-bow men, and there were not above ſix or ſeven Harquebuſſes among them all, and all along in his Commentaries he frequently mentions Croſs-bows: In his firſt Book he tells us, how he made a Retreat, when he was but a private Captain, from ſome *Imperialiſts*; and he ſays, when his Croſs Bow-men had ſpent all their miſſiles, he cauſed them to draw their Swords, and hold them in their right hands, and their Croſs-bows in their left, ſo to uſe them as Targets, and in that poſture of defence, he ſays, he got off, though with ſome loſs; whereat we need not wonder.

I do

I do not directly find the time of the Harquebuſſes invention, but you may ſuppoſe (ſince they were ſo rare in *France* a hundred and fifty years ago, as appears by *Monluc*'s relation, they were not known a hundred and ſixty years after their mother Gunpowders birth. But long before the death of that ſame King *Francis* the firſt, mention'd by *Monluc*, the Harquebuſs was become more common in *France*, and the number of the Harquebuſſiers was mightily increaſed; for of thoſe ſeven *French* Legions which I told you were inſtituted by that King, and which conſiſted of forty and two thouſand Combatants, twelve thouſand were appointed to be Harquebuſſiers, and ſo in proceſs of time the Harquebuſs encroach'd ſo faſt on both the Long and Croſs-bow, that it chac'd them both out of all our *European* Armies. The Harquebuſs. Baniſheth Bows.

About that time when the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth and his Brother *Ferdinand* Encamped with a numerous Army of Chriſtians neer *Vienna* in *Auſtria* on the banks of the River *Danube*, expecting the coming of *Sultan Soliman*, the Chriſtian Infantry conſiſted of eighty thouſand, ſixty thouſand whereof were Pikemen, or thoſe who carried long Staves, and twenty thouſand were Harquebuſſiers.

Among the heavy armed, the *Bohemians* were obſerv'd to carry Javelins, at the one end of which was tyed faſt a Mace of Iron (it was tyed with a ſhort chain of Iron) the Mace was one foot and a half long, wherewith (ſaith *Paolo Giovio*) theſe *Bohemians* could give ſo ſtrong blows that they could fell men (though in never ſo ſtrong Armour) ſtark dead. Our Author was an eye-witneſs, but the *Turks* were wiſer at that time than to come within their reach, for *Soliman* march'd back. *Bohemian* Offenſive Arms.

Now room for the Musket, and room it hath largely gotten, for it hath baniſh'd from the light armed Foot, Darts, Slings, Long-bows, Croſs-bows, and the *Harquebuſſes* too: Our preſent Militia acknowledging no other Weapon for the light armed Infantry, but the Musket and the Sword; and this laſt I have ſeen ſometimes laid aſide for a time, that it might not impede the managing the Musket by its Embarras. And indeed when Musketeers have ſpent their Powder, and come to blows, the Butt-end of their Musket may do an enemy more hurt than theſe deſpicable Swords, which moſt Musketeers wear at their ſides. In ſuch Medleys Knives whoſe blades are one foot long, made both for cutting and thruſting, (the haft being made to fill the bore of the Musket) will do more execution than either Sword, or Butt of Musket. Musket baniſheth the Harquebuſs;

Moſt think that this *Hand-gun* of a Musket was never uſed till the Siege of *Rhegium*, in the year 1520, little more than a hundred and fifty years ago, and I doubt much, if it be ſo old, and aſſuredly if it be, it hath ſpent forty years of its age before it learned to ſpeak, for about the year 1560, ſome Muskets were mixed with *Harquebuſſes*, and but a few of them too, till practice made them ſo numerous, that no other Guns were uſed by the Foot. The longer a Musket is (ſo it be manageable) the better, for ſhe ſhoots the further, and the ſtronger, her Chamber being able to contain the more Powder; and experience daily teacheth what advantage a long Musket hath of a ſhort one. Fifty years ago the Calibre of the Musket was ordain'd by moſt Princes, particularly by the Eſtates of *Holland* to receive a Bullet, whereof ten were to be caſt of one pound of Lead; that hath not been thought convenient ſince, and therefore moſt allow twelve balls of one pound of Lead for a Musket. In the year 1657, the King of *Denmark* agreed with five Colonels of us to furniſh our Regiments with Muskets of a bore to receive a ball, whereof fourteen ſhould go to one pound of Lead. I confeſs this bore was too ſmall for a Musket. A Musket requires the half weight of her ball in fine Powder, and two thirds of common Powder, that is one pound of fine Powder to two pounds of Lead, and two pounds of ordinary powder for three pounds of Lead. When firſt uſed. Its length. Its Bore. Its Charge of Powder.

Musket-Reſts were uſed a long time, and in ſome places are yet, to eaſe the Musketeers in diſcharging their Guns, and when they ſtood Centinel. But in the late Expeditions in moſt places of *Chriſtendom*, they have been found more troubleſome than helpful, a Musketeer in any ſudden occaſion not being well able to do his duty with Musket, Sword, and Reſt, eſpecially if you give him a *Swediſh* Feather to manage with them. *Bockler* the Engineer ſpeaks of an Inſtrument that might ſerve for both Reſt and Feather, and ſuch perhaps would be very uſeful Musket-Reſts are worn out.

An Inſtrument both a Reſt and a Palliſado.

uſeful and convenient. He would have it at the top, as all Reſts are, like a Fork, on the one ſide whereof, he would have an Iron of one foot and a half long ſticking out ſharply pointed; theſe planted in the Van or Flanks, where you expect the Charge, as the *Swediſh* Feathers uſe to be, will ſufficiently Palliſado and defend a Body of Musketeers from Horſe, and upon them they may lean their Muskets when they give fire. To a Musketeer belongs alſo a Bandelier of Leather, at which he ſhould have hanging eleven or twelve ſhot of Powder, a bag for his ball, a primer, and a cleanſer. But it is thirty years ago ſince I ſaw theſe laid aſide in ſome *German* Armies; for it is impoſſible for Soldiers, eſpecially wanting Cloaks (and more want Cloaks than have any) to keep theſe flasks (though well and ſtrongly made) from ſnow and rain, which ſoon ſpoils them, and ſo makes the Powder altogether uſeleſs. Beſides, the noiſe of them betray thoſe who carry them in all Surprizals, Anſlachts, and ſudden enterprizes. Inſtead of thoſe let Patrons be made, ſuch as Horſemen uſe, whereof each Musketeer ſhould be provided of a dozen; theſe ſhould be kept in a bag of ſtrong leather, or the skin of ſome beaſt well ſow'd, that it be proof againſt rain, this bag he may carry about his neck in a Bandelier, or if the weather be extreamly rainy, in one of his Pockets, and in the other a horn with Priming Powder, and his Cleanſer tyed to it. By this a Musketeer hath theſe advantages, he ſhall be ſure to charge with dry Powder, and that is no ſmall advantage; next, it is a more ready way to charge than the other, for he hath no more to do but to bite off a little of the Paper of his Patron, and put his Charge of Powder and Ball in at once, and then ram both home. Thirdly, his Musket ſhall have her full Charge, for it is impoſſible to loſe any of the Powder, unleſs he loſe it all, and a full Charge makes a ſtrong and a ſure ſhot. If this were try'd at home with us, as it is by ſome abroad, our Powder flasks would be ſold cheap.

Powder-flasks inconvenient.

Musket-Patrons better.

Burning Matches bewray Enterprizes

It is impoſſible to hide burning Matches ſo well in the night-time, eſpecially if there is any wind, (though there be covers made of white Iron, like extinguiſhers purpoſely for that end) but that ſome of them will be ſeen by a vigilant enemy, and thereby many ſecret enterprizes are loſt. It were therefore good, that for the half of the Muskets (if not for them all) flint-locks were made and kept carefully by the Captain of Arms of each Company, that upon any ſuch occaſion or party, the half or more of the other Locks might be immediately taken off, and the flint-ones clapt on by the Gunſmith of the Company, and then there would be no danger of ſeeing burning Matches, the ſight whereof hath ruin'd many good deſigns: I ſhall give you but one inſtance for all. Not long after the invention of the Musket, ſome *Spaniards* were almoſt ſtarved to death in *Coron*, by a Blockade of the *Turks*, they hazarded deſperately and ſallied out, and though they had ſome miles to march, yet they did it with great courage, and all imaginable induſtry and ſilence, and had aſſuredly taken the Infidels napping if their burning Matches had not bewray'd their approach, and this only marr'd the atchievement of a noble exploit. It is true, they made a handſome retreat, but with great loſs, and with the death of their chief Commander, one *Machichao*, a Noble and ſtout Gentleman. I ſhould have told you that all the Muskets of one Army, yea under one Prince or State ſhould be of one *Calibre*, or bore.

Inſtanced.

Other Weapons for Foot.

There are beſides theſe I have mention'd, other Weapons for the Foot, ſuch as long Rapiers and Touks, Shables, two handed Swords, Hangmens Swords, Javelins, Morning ſtars, but moſt of theſe are rather for the defence of Towns, Forts, Trenches, Batteries and Approaches, than for the Field. And as our light armed Foot are now for moſt part armed with Sword and Musket, ſo our heavy arm'd offenſively are with Sword and Pike.

A Pike

As I told you of the Musket, ſo I tell you of the Pike, the longer it is (ſo it be manageable) the more advantage it hath. In our Modern Wars it is order'd by moſt Princes and States to be eighteen foot long, yet few exceed fifteen; and if Officers be not careful to prevent it, many baſe Soldiers will cut ſome off the length of that, as I have oft ſeen it done: It were fit therefore that every Pike had the Captains name or mark at each end of it. The *Grecians* knew very well what advantage the longeſt Pike had: the *Macedonians* (as I ſaid before) made their Pikes three foot longer than the other *Grecians* did. Nor hath this advantage been unknown in our Modern Wars, whereof *Giovio* gives us a remarkable

markable inſtance: Pope *Alexander* the Sixth waged a War with a Veteran Army conducted by experimented Captains, his Foot conſiſted of *Germans* arm'd offenſively with Pikes. The *Urſines* levy new and raw Soldiers, moſt conſiſting of their own Vaſſals and Peaſants, theſe they arm with Pikes, but each of them two Foot at leaſt longer than thoſe the Popes *Germans* carried. The two Armies meet in a plain Field at *Suriano* in the Papacy, and fight; the *Urſine* Peaſants led by ſtout Commanders, kill'd moſt of the firſt ranks of the Popiſh Pikemen by the length of their Pikes, and immediately after routed the whole Body, not ſuffering one *German* to eſcape; upon this the Popes Cavalry fled, and the *Urſines* keeping the Field, forc'd his Holineſs to grant them againſt his will, an advantageous Peace.

The longer, the better.

I ſhall not here ſpeak of the number of Pikemen allow'd to each Company, I ſhall do that in its due place, but it ſeems ſtrange to me there ſhould be ſo little eſteem made of the Pike in moſt places, it being ſo uſeful and ſo neceſſary a weapon. Thirty years ago when the War was very hot in the *German* Empire, between the Emperour *Ferdinand* and the Catholick League (as it was called) on the one part, and the *Swede* and the Evangelick Union (as they call'd it) on the other, I ſaw ſuch an univerſal contempt of the Pike that I could not admire it enough; for though after *Guſtavus Adolphus* King of *Sweden* entred *Germany*, Squadrons and Batallions of Pikes were to be ſeen in all Regiments and Brigades of both parties, and that Pikemen were ſtill accounted the Body of the Infantry, yet after his Victory at *Leipſick* over the Imperial forces under *Tily*, the Kings Marches were ſo quick in purſuance of his ſucceſſes, which followed one on the heels of another, and the retreats alſo of other Armies from him, were ſo ſpeedy, that firſt the Pikemans defenſive Arms were caſt away, and after them the Pike it ſelf, inſomuch that all who hereafter were levied and enrolled, called for Muskets. But notwithſtanding this, when new Regiments were levied after that great Kings death, Colonels and Captains were ever order'd to levy and arm Pikemen proportionably to the Muſquetiers; yet after they had endur'd ſome fatigue, the Pike was again caſt away, and no Soldiers but Muſquetiers were to be ſeen. Whether this was done by the ſupine negligence of the Officers, eſpecially the Colonels, or for the contempt they had of the Pike, I know not. But I am ſure that for ſome years together I have ſeen many weak Regiments compoſed meerly of Muſquetiers, without one Pikeman in any of them, and ſurely they were ſo much the weaker for that. Nor did I find long after that, that the Pike got better entertainment in other places than in *Germany*; for in the year 1657, after the late King of *Denmark* had loſt his beſt Army, he gave as I ſaid in this ſame Chapter, Commiſſions to five of us to raiſe each of us a Regiment of men of one thouſand apiece, all ſtrangers. We were bound by the Capitulation to arm our Regiments our ſelves out of the moneys we had agreed for, and expreſly with Muſquets, neither would thoſe of the Privy Council, who were order'd to treat with us, ſuffer one word to be mention'd of a Pike in our Commiſſions, though the conveniency, and ſometimes the neceſſity of that weapon was ſufficiently remonſtrated by us.

The Pike very much neglected,

In *Germany*,

In *Denmark*.

But there are two who write down right againſt the uſe of the Pike, theſe are *Brancatio* an *Italian* Commander, and one Maſter *Daniel Lupton* an *Engliſhman*, who I think traceth *Brancatio* his ſteps; for though I have not ſeen that *Italian* piece, yet I have ſeen a Countryman of the Authors, *Achilles Terduzzi*, who tells me he hath read it every word. Maſter *Luptons* Book I have ſeen, and will preſume by his leave in the next Chapter to examine his arguments and reaſons.

Declar'd uſeleſs by Two, an *Italian*, and an *Engliſhman*.

CHAP. VI.

Master Lupton's *Book againſt the uſe of the Pike examined.*

The Book Dedicated to the Earl of *Eſſex.*

THIS Gentleman Printed his Book in the year 1642, and preſented it to the Earl of *Eſſex*, who was declar'd General of the Parliaments forces that very year; but it ſeems he had not got his Commiſſion when this Book was writ, for the Author gives him not that Title in his Epiſtle Dedicatory.

This Author doth not ſeem to condemn the uſe of the Pike before the invention of Fire guns, but only ſince, and magiſterially takes upon him to paſs ſentence againſt all Princes or States who in later times have compoſed the Bodies of their Infantries of Pikemen. I ſhall relate to you the ſtrongeſt of his Arguguments (as they lye in order) whereby he endeavours to get Proſelytes to this new fancy, and ſhall give ſuch anſwers to them as I conceive to be pertinent, but ſhall not flatter my ſelf with an opinion, that they will be ſatisfactory to all.

His firſt Argument,

In the firſt place he ſays, Officers chuſe the talleſt and ableſt men to carry Pikes, becauſe they muſt be ſtrong to carry both them and their defenſive Arms; and this, ſays he, is a loſs to the Army to give uſeleſs Arms to men, who could uſe the Musket with more advantage; for Pikemen, ſays he, can only receive the meſſengers of death (Bullets he means) but Muſquetiers can ſend them.

Anſwered.

Firſt, I anſwer, he begs the queſtion, he declares the Pike uſeleſs, and that was the thing he undertook to prove. Secondly, I have already complain'd that Officers chuſe not ſo oft as they ſhould, the ableſt men for Pikes, and ſo they are very ill uſed by Mr. *Lupton* and me, for he complains of them for doing it, and I complain of them for omitting it. Thirdly, whereas he ſays, Pikemen can only receive but not ſend the meſſengers of Death, it ſeems he thinks when Pikemen fight, they are to ſtand fixed in one place; but he ſhould have remember'd that in time of action they are no more obliged to ſtand ſtill than Muſquetiers, who are ever in action and motion; for let us ſuppoſe that in Battel a Body of Muſquetiers is to fight with a Batallion of Pikes, he will grant me that both the one and the other advanceth. Now he ſaith, a Muſquet kills at the diſtance of four hundred yards, ſo doth not the Pike; let it be ſo, what then, I will grant him more, that in the advance many Pikemen fall, and no Muſquetiers; yet I hope he will grant me that theſe four hundred yards (if ſo many) may be ſoon traced by men who make haſte to come to the Charge, and even before ten ranks can orderly and ſucceſſively one after another give fire, and after that I aver, If the Muſquetiers ſtand to endure the puſh of the Pike, they are inevitably ruin'd; and if they fly, then the Pikemen have the victory. I ſtill ſuppoſe that which cannot be deny'd me, that is, that the Pikemen and Muſquetiers are of equal courage; now in a cloſe encounter what can a Muſquet do againſt a Pike, or a naked man with a Sword againſt one in Armour? If then the Pikemen fly before they come up to the Muſquetiers, they are Cowards, and the fault is in their courage, not their weapons, if they loſe the Field; and if the Muſquetiers ſtay till the Pikemen come to them, they will find that points of Pikes bring as inexorable meſſengers of Death as Bullets do.

Second Argument,

Secondly, he tells us that nothing more diſheartens Soldiers than the certain knowledg of diſproportionable and unequal Arms; this I grant to be true, but from hence he and I draw two very different Inferences; mine is, that Muſquetiers will be ſore afraid to buckle with armed Pikemen, if the Pikemen have the courage to ſtand out a Volley or two, and it is like the Muſquetiers will be afraid that the Pikemen will ſtand it out. But he makes another Inference, and it is this, that the Pikemen will be afraid, becauſe they know their Pikes are of no effect, and can do no execution.

Cer-

Certainly he tells me news, for I thought the *Grecian*, *German*, and *Switz* Batallions of Pikes had very frequently born down all before them, and ſo had done execution; and is not this again to beg the queſtion, for he is bound to prove that the Pike can do no execution? I aſſure him I will not take his word for it. But if he mean when an enemy is put to the rout, the Pikemen being heavly armed, cannot follow the execution, I ſhall readily grant it to him; and *Vegetius* will tell him, that the heavy armed are like an Iron wall, which can neither run away from a Victorious enemy, nor purſue a flying one, for that is left to the Horſe and light armed Foot. But he offers to prove that Pikes can do no execution by an inſtance, which I pray you hear and obſerve. There happen'd a tumult between the *Engliſh* and *Switzers* in the Prince of *Orange* his Leaguer, when he lay before *Schenckſconce*, the *Switzers* went to arms, and being in Battel preſented their Pikes; here our Author is not aſham'd to ſay, that two *Engliſh* men with Swords only, enter'd among the *Switzers* Pikes, and cut off (ſaith he) ſeveral of their heads (of the Pikes, I hope, not of the *Switzers*) and brought them away with them, the two *Engliſh* unhurt. If this be all true, what will it evince, but the great modeſty and patience of the *Switzers*, and the prudence of the Officers of both Nations in appeaſing the tumult, for our Author was mad if he thought that any rational Creature would be perſwaded by him to believe, that two men with Swords could affront a Body of Pikemen in ſuch a manner, and go away ſo eaſily if the others had been pleaſed to reſent it. Anſwered.

Thirdly, he ſays only three ranks of Pikes can do hurt, the reſt are uſeleſs; then he adds, that what with the terror of the alarm, the confuſion of ranks by the death of ſome of their number, the time of night when the enemy may fall on, the hazard of wounding their own Commanders and Camerades, it appears ſufficiently that the Pike can do no feats. I muſt take this argument in pieces, and anſwer it ſo. And firſt I ſay, if only three ranks of Pikes can do hurt, then Pikes can do hurt, and this contradicts his ſecond argument. Third Argument,

Next his aſſertion cannot be true, if what I have ſaid at length in another place be true, that ſix ranks of Pikes can do hurt, or as he call it, execution. His argument, if true, would be ſtrong againſt the *Grecian* Embattelling ſixteen deep, and againſt his Maſters too, for I find by his Book he hath had his breeding in *Holland* and *Denmark*, where in his time the Foot were Marſhal'd ten deep. As to what he ſpeaks of the terror of an Alarm, I ask if that muſt frighten a Pikeman more than either a Horſeman or a Muſqueteer; I think leſs, becauſe he is better arm'd, but he ſpeaks ſtill of Pikemen as of Cowards, for what reaſon I cannot imagin. For his confuſion of ranks occaſion'd by thoſe who fall dead, he knows thoſe behind them ſhould fill up their places, and this Muſqueteers are bound to do likewiſe. Fear indeed occaſions confuſion, and he will ſtill have Pikemen more fearful than other men. Beſides, he will have them to be ill train'd, as if they durſt not hazard to charge with their Pikes, for fear of hurting either their Commanders, or their Companions. As to the time of night, when the enemy may fall on, I know not well what he means by it, unleſs it be that he thinks the darkneſs or horrour of the night ſhould put a Pikeman in greater danger than a Muſqueteer, and this I would gladly hear him or any other for him demonſtrate. Anſwered.

His fourth argument is, that Pikes are unfit and unſerviceable for Convoys. Fourth Argument,

In anſwer to this, I ask, admit it were ſo, is it therefore not uſeful at all? Next I ſay he is miſtaken, for many Convoys have made uſe of them, and many Convoys muſt make uſe of Pikes, according to the nature of the ground they are to traverſe, open Heath, and Champain Country, or as the enemies ſtrength is fancied to be either in Foot or Horſe. Many great Convoys are compoſed only of Firelocks, or Fuſees, I hope Maſter *Lupton* will not thence infer that Muſquets are uſeleſs. Anſwered.

Fifthly, he ſays, The Muſqueteer is overtoil'd and diſcourag'd when he ſees he muſt do the whole duty in Sallies, Skirmiſhes, Convoys, and Onſlachts (as he calls them) ſuppoſe Infalls or Surpriſals, from all which the Pikeman is exempted. In anſwer to which I ask who exempted him? Truly none that I know but *Brancatio*, and Maſter *Lupton*, who exempts him from all other duties, and makes him unneceſſary, nor can I divine where our Author hath learn'd this Fifth Argument, Anſwered.

Diſcipline, that he offers to teach us. I have ſhewn the Pikeman is neceſſary for ſome Convoys, in all Sallies he is ſerviceable, ſometimes with his Pike, or ſometimes with a half Pike, or a Halbert, ſometimes a Morning Star, and ſometimes Hand granado's, with all which the Muſqueteer many times muſt do ſervice; for in the medley of a Salley his Muſquet is often an unneceſſary Weapon, unleſs he be within a Parapet. As for Surprizals and Anſlachts, the Pikeman many times may be very uſeful, and more than the Muſqueteer, unleſs he change the Lock of his Muſquet, as I told you in the laſt Chapter. As to Skirmiſhes it will be eaſily granted him, that neither the heavy armed Footman, who ſhould be the Pikeman, nor the heavy armed Horſeman, who is the Curiaſſier, are proper for them. Theſe ſervices were performed in ancient times by the *Velites*, and now by Muſquets, Fuſees, Fire-locks, and light Horſemen; the heavy armed ſtanding ready to ſuſtain them, and either to give or receive the Charge. Nor did I ever hear Muſqueteers make any ſuch complaints as theſe our Author is pleaſed to charge them with.

Sixth Argument, Sixthly, he tells us, That in Outworks before or beſides an enemy, the Pikeman is uſeleſs, unleſs it be to ſtand Centinel; for, ſays he, the Muſqueteers defend the works, and while they are furiouſly giving fire, the Pikeman is ſitting in the Trenches taking Tabaco, or telling Tales.

For anſwer, I do not remember that ever I heard a Soldier tell ſuch a tale as this of Mr. *Luptons*; but I know not where this man is, he is juſt now in Outworks, and immediately in Trenches. It ſeems they are all one with him; but becauſe they are not ſo, I muſt divide his argument into two parts, and give an anſwer to both. If it be in Trenches or Approaches to a beſieged Fort, that the Muſqueteers are giving fire furiouſly, it muſt be either at a Sally of the enemy, and then ſure the Pikeman is neither ſitting, nor idle; or it is when a Battery is a making near the Counterſcarp, or that the Zap is begun there, and then indeed both Cannon and Muſquet ſhould fire furiouſly upon both Curtains and flanks of the Wall, that from thence thoſe who work may be as little diſturbed as may be, and at that time the Pikeman is buſie working with a Spade, Shovel, or Mattock in his hand, or is carefully attending to give obedience to what elſe he is commanded to do; perhaps to receive the Sally of an enemy.

Subdivided, And anſwered.

In the next place I come to Mr. *Luptons* Outworks, and he muſt mean the Pike is uſeleſs, either when an Outwork is ſtorm'd, or when it is defended from a Storm. If the firſt, the Pike is more neceſſary than any Fire-gun, after thoſe who carry them, come to the aſcending or mounting the work, and this is obvious to ſenſe. If the ſecond, when an enemy is coming on to the Storm, it is the Muſqueteers part to give fire to keep him off, and chace him away, but the enemy being already at the foot of the work, and mounting, the Muſquet is uſeleſs except from flanks, and the Pikeman then with ſtones, and Hand-granado's doth the ſervice till the enemy be within puſh of Pike, and then ſure the Pike is not uſeleſs. But he ſays a Pike is too long a weapon for this ſervice. To anſwer which I ſhall tell you, that Outworks (whereof Mr. *Lupton* ſpeaks confuſedly) are Tenailles, Ravelines, Half-moons, Crown-works, and Horn-works, and for the defence of theſe, ordinarily there are other weapons than either Pike or Muſquet, ſuch are Hand-granado's, Stones, Halberts, Partiſans, Morning Stars, two handed and hangmans Swords, which are ſtanding ready within the work, that when the Pike cannot be made uſe of, the Pikeman and Muſqueteer both may make uſe of them, or any of them. And if none of theſe weapons be in the work, a Pikeman may very ſoon make a Half-Pike of his long Pike, which is a weapon much commended by Mr. *Lupton*. But there is no neceſſity for that either, for in theſe Outworks I have ſpoke of, a Pikeman may with much eaſe ſtand on the Rampart, and griping his Pike either at half or quarter-length, tumble down an enemy dead or alive from the top of the Parapet, and not cut his Pike at all. And becauſe our Author may mean Redoubts and Batteries which are made at Sieges, (for truly I do not well know where to find him) I ſay the Muſqueteers ſtanding on the foot-banks of theſe, and doing their work, the Pikemen may ſtand in the body of the Redoubt or Battery, and kill or throw over any enemy that is on the head of the Parapet. As a Corollary to this ſixth argument, our Author tells us of a Scout that was loſt at the Siege of *Stoad*, where the half of the Soldiers were Pikemen, to whom he attributes the

the loſs, I ſuppoſe he means by Scout, ſome Poſt, and why may not I ſay, the other half of the Defendants, who were Musketeers occaſion'd the loſs, and not the Pike-men; but becauſe I know not what he means, I ſhall grant him all he ſays, and yet aver, that the particular overſight of Pike-men, will never conclude the Pike univerſally uſeleſs.

Seventhly, he ſays, Pike-men cannot make a Retreat, for, ſaith he, an Enemy will ſend Horſe-men and Musketeers againſt them, who will kill them all, and never come near them. To anſwer this I muſt tell him, that here, and in moſt of his arguments he preſuppoſeth ſtill a Body of Pikes ſubſiſting of it ſelf, without either Horſe-men or Fire-men; which alters the queſtion, and this is a ſpeculative notion of his; for that which I defend is, that Pike-men are neceſſary in an Army, and the ſtrength and body of an Army, not that they are the only neceſſary members of an Army; I never meant that, and that which he undertook to prove is, that they are not at all neceſſary. And here he mentions General *Morgans* Retreat with ſome *Engliſh* Regiments, from the long line in the Biſhoprick of *Verdun*, in which, he informs us, that the buſineſs was not perform'd by the Pikes. I ſhall not here ſpeak of the nature of Retreats, reſerving that Diſcourſe to another place; but becauſe I have travers'd moſt of that ground oftner than once, I ſhall tell my Reader, that *Chriſtian* the Fourth, King of *Denmark*, having made an unproſperous War againſt *Ferdinand* the Second, retir'd himſelf to his Dutchy of *Holſtein*. General *Morgan* was forc'd by the Imperial Lieutenant General *Tili*, to retire from the long line, to a place called *Burg*, within four *Engliſh* miles of *Bremen*; this place being but pitifully fortified, gave him only time to breath, and leaving ſome men in it, (who were given for loſt) the *Engliſh* General marched towards *Bremerford*, a ſtrong Caſtle, and a Paſs, twelve *Engliſh* miles from *Burg*: *Tili* purſues, and in the purſuit kills and takes many *Engliſh*. At *Bremerford*, *Morgan* reſts but little, yet it being a Paſs, it caſt *Tili* ſo far behind, that *Morgan* with ſome more loſs, got into the Town of *Stoad* with the groſs of his Army: Here he is beſieg'd by *Tili*, which he gallantly defended, till for want of ſuccours, he yielded the place on honourable conditions. Now what doth all this militate againſt the uſe of the Pike? Nothing that I know of. Mr. *Lupton* ſays, the Pikes perform'd not the Retreat; I grant, not alone; neither did the Musketeers, but both did together; and in moſt of that ground the Pikes could not but be very ſerviceable againſt the Imperial Horſe. He ſays, many Musketeers were loſt, I believe him, and ſo were many Pike-men, and who knows not, that in Retreats, both Pike-men and Musketeers muſt be left behind, and given for loſt; for they are the true *Enfans perdus*? There is no wiſe Patient, but will chuſe rather to ſuffer his Arm or Leg to be cut off, rather than loſe his whole Body, and better ſave a part of an Army than loſe all. And in that place our Author takes occaſion to inſtance ſome (as he thinks) diſadvantages that *Morgan* had by his Pike-men; I ſhall not contradict him, but ſhall tell him for all that, that when that General return'd to *Holland*, to the ſervice of his old Maſters the Eſtates, I never heard that he offer'd to adviſe the then Prince of *Orange*, to baniſh the Pike, as an unneceſſary Weapon out of his Army; or if he did, he prevail'd as little with him, as Mr. *Lupton* did with the Earl of *Eſſex* to do the like, to whom he dedicated this Book, which I now endeavour to examine.

Seventh Argument, Anſwer'd.

Morgan's Retreat.

Eighthly, he ſays, Pike-men are not able to reſiſt a charge of Horſe. And why ſo? Truly, if they cannot do that, I agree they are uſeleſs. Becauſe, ſaith he, the Horſe-men may ſtand one hundred and twenty yards diſtance from them, and beſtow both their Piſtol and Carabine ſhot upon them, and be in no danger of their Pikes: I anſwer, firſt, If Horſe-men come no nearer Pike-men than one hundred and twenty yards, their Piſtols will do them little hurt. Secondly, This argument preſuppoſeth once more a Batallion of Pikes, without either Fire-men or Horſe-men, and therefore it is of no force. Thirdly, It preſuppoſeth that the Pike-men are obliged to ſtand ſtill, and receive all the Horſe-mens ſhot, and never move. But I muſt add, that while the Horſe-men are firing, if the Pike-men advance upon them, it will undeniably produce one of theſe three effects, either it will neceſſitate the Horſe-men to charge through the Foot, which they cannot do without loſs, if they do it at all,

Eighth Argument, Anſwered.

all, and ſo they will neither kill, nor rout the Pike-men at one hundred and twenty yards diſtance; or it will force the Horſe-men to ſtand ſtill, which will be a greater danger and loſs; or it will make them quit the field, the greateſt loſs of all. By quitting the Field, I mean, the Horſe men muſt either fly or caragol, by either of which the Pike men are maſters of that ground the Horſe ſtood on, till another Squadron of Horſe advance againſt them, and endeavour to remove them from it, who perhaps may have the ſame ſucceſs.

Ninth Argument,

Ninthly, he ſays, The arming a Pike-man (he ſuppoſeth with Defenſive as well as Offenſive Arms) is a great deal more expenſive to the Prince or State, than the arming a Musketeer; for he ſaith, a Musketeer may be compleatly armed for twenty two or twenty four ſhilling Sterling, a Pike-man not under thirty five. But this is a ſuperfluous argument, for if he once demonſtrate the uſeleſneſs of the Pike, it ſhall be readily granted him, that neither Prince nor State ſhould beſtow any thing for arming a Pike-man. But if a Pike be ſtill found neceſſary, then it will be an ill piece of frugality in either Prince or State to ſave that money that ſhould arm Pike-men.

Anſwered.

Tenth Argument,

His tenth argument he frames, by telling us how exceedingly troubleſome and burthenſome a Pike with Defenſive Arms are, and how in time of exceſſive heat, a Pike-man on a march, is impriſon'd in his Arms, whereas a Musketeer with a great deal of liberty is free and open to the air. In anſwer to which, firſt obſerve, that the Musketeer hath not always reaſon to complain for doing all the duty (as Mr. *Lupton* maintain'd in his fifth argument) for here the Pike-man endureth the heat of the day. Secondly, If this Gentleman had liv'd with the Ancient *Grecians* and *Romans*, and with many Princes ſince their time, he had (if they would have been rul'd by him) ſav'd them a great deal of money, and had given their beſt Souldiers a great deal of eaſe, for he had made all their Infantries to conſiſt of *Velites*, or light-armed.

Anſwered.

Brancatio.

After all theſe arguments, Mr. *Lupton* ſhews us, that one *Brancatio*, a famous Warriour (as he calls him) gives his Judgement for the uſeleſneſs of the Pike, which (ſays *Lupton*) with all wiſe Commanders ſhould be of great Authority. But unleſs *Brancatio* give better reaſon for his opinion than Mr. *Lupton* hath done, his judgement ſhall be of no authority with me, and therefore, I muſt confeſs, that I am none of his wiſe Commanders. I told you before, that I have not ſeen *Brancatio*, but *Terduzzi* his Countrey-man, (for they were both *Italians*) in his Book of Machines, ſays, he hath read him. Now if he value neither his opinion, nor his reaſons, I think none ſhould, for *Terduzzi* himſelf was ſo little a friend to the Pike, that he writes, he would have it broken, if he knew what better Weapon to put in its room. Out of him I ſhall give you this ſhort deſcription of *Brancatio*, and his Book.

His Book deſcrib'd.

The Title of his Book is this, "Of the true Art of War, whereby any Prince "may not only reſiſt another in the Field only with his own forces, and with "little charge, but alſo overcome any Nation. A very glorious Title. I think, we need expect ſmall performances from ſo vain promiſes. This man will prove an Alchimiſt, who promiſeth to give us mountains of Gold, and hath not a ſix-pence to buy his own dinner. His Preface makes up the fourth part of his Book, wherein he tells oftner than once, that he ſtudied the Theory of the Military Art fifteen years, and practis'd it forty, ſo he hath been no young man when he wrote his Book: But he concludes (and I pray you mark it) that in all theſe fifteen years he had read no Authors but *Ceſar*'s Commentaries: And thereafter he laughs and ſcoffs at all thoſe *Roman* Authors and Hiſtories, which mention diſtinct Maniples in the *Roman* Legions, becauſe he had read no ſuch thing in *Ceſar*. Not only in this Preface of his, but all along in his Book, he deſpiſeth the Pike, and calls it the enervation, the weakening, and ruine of War. I ſhall for a while leave *Brancatio*, and return to Mr. *Lupton*'s citations out of this great *Italian* Tactick, that I may anſwer them. And in the firſt place, as it was a reflection on *Brancatio*, firſt to cite Hiſtories which he had either not read or not underſtood, and next not to be acquainted with the cuſtomes of War in his own time, ſo Mr. *Lupton*'s credulity is inexcuſable, for taking things on *Brancatio* his report, the truth whereof he might have found in Books, of which many private

Himſelf a great undertaker.

Mr. *Lupton*'s citations out of *Brancatio*,

Anſwered.

Gentlemen

Gentlemen are Maſters. I ſhall very briefly run through the quotations he cites out of this *Italian* man of War.

The King of *Portugal* (ſays he) was ruin'd and overthrown in *Africk*, becauſe he had Squadrons of Pikes. But by his favour he was overthrown, becauſe neither his Pike-men nor Harquebuſiers were rightly Order'd, Train'd, nor Commanded. First.

Next, he ſays, *Charles* the Eighth of *France* was the firſt that brought Pikes into *Italy*. Indeed, there were Pikes in *Italy* before *France* was called *France*, and if that *French* King brought them firſt there, what loſt he by it? He travers'd it, took and conquer'd the Kingdome of *Naples*, and return'd to *France*, and made his paſſage good at *Fornuovo*, in ſpite of all *Italy* then bandied againſt him, and, no doubt, his *Switzers* did him good ſervice, and *Brancatio* knew they were armed with Pikes, as to their Offenſive Arms. Second.

Thirdly, he ſays, The *Turk* theſe forty years by paſt (reckon them to begin at the year 1540, and to continue till 1580) hath been Victorious over the *Chriſtians*, *Sempre in Ongaria* (ſo writes Mr. *Lupton*) only becauſe great Batallions of Pikes, both of the *Switzer* and *High Dutch* Nation were oppos'd to the *Turkiſh* Troops of Horſe, well arm'd with Piſtol and Harquebuſs. I anſwer, firſt *Brancatio* his aſſertion is falſe, for the *Turk* was ſometimes beaten in *Hungary* in the time of theſe forty years, and this Mr. *Lupton* might have learned, by peruſing *Knolles* his Hiſtory, if he could light upon no better. Next I ſay, If Pikes could not reſiſt the *Turks* Cavalry, Harquebuſiers on foot (of which *Brancatio* would have all his Infantry to conſiſt) would have done it much leſs. But what a ridiculous thing is it to impute the loſs of all Battels to one cauſe, ſince Armies may be undone and overthrown by a thouſand ſeveral occaſions? What can either *Brancatio* or Mr. *Lupton* ſay againſt it, if I aver, that when ever the *Turks* were beaten (and beaten ſometimes they were) it was, becauſe they had no Pike men to reſiſt the charge of a ſtout and hardy Cavalry? Third.

Fourthly, he avers, That *John Frederick* Duke of *Saxe* in *Germany*, and *Piter Strozzi* in *Tuſcany*, were both beaten, becauſe of the multitude of their Pike-men. To the firſt I anſwer, I do not remember that *Sleidan* gives any ſuch reaſon for his misfortune, neither did ever that Prince fight a juſt Battel with the Emperour *Charles* the fifth, moſt of whoſe Infantry conſiſted of Pike-men, as well as that of the Elector of *Saxe* did. To the ſecond of *Strozzi*, I ſay, he was routed, becauſe he made his Retreat in the day time, in view of a powerful Enemy, contrary to the advice given him by Marſhal *Monluc*. Fourth.

Finally, he ſays, The Battel of *Cereſole* gives a good proof of the weakneſs of the Pike-mens ſervice, and the Battels of *Dreux* and *Moncounter* prov'd fatal (ſays he) to their Leaders, who were deſpis'd by their Enemies, becauſe their Foot conſiſted moſt of Pikes. Here Mr. *Lupton* does himſelf an injury, to inſert ſuch three ignorant and unadviſed citations out of *Brancatio*, which I will clear. Fifth.

At *Cereſole*, the famous *Alphonſo Davalo*, Marqueſs of *Guaſt*, commanded the Imperial Army, and the Duke of *Anguien* the *French*. The *Imperialiſts* were beaten by the cowardiſe of a Batallion of their own Horſe, which fled without fighting, which a great Batallion of Imperial Pikes ſeeing, open'd, and gave them way, the *French* follow the chace through that ſame lane, they being paſt, the Pikes (who were no fewer than five thouſand) cloſed again and kept their ground. Another Imperial Batallion of Pikes, ſome *Spaniards*, ſome *Germans*, fought with a great Body of *Griſons* belonging to the *French*, and beat it out of the Field, and thereafter fought with the *Gaſcone* Batallion of Pikes, where both parties ſtood to it valiantly, inſomuch that the *Duc d' Anguien*, the *French* General, ſeeing his *Griſons* overthrown, and his *Gaſcons* ſo ſhrewdly put to it, deſpair'd of the Victory. In this charge of the Imperial Pikes and the *Gaſcons*, almoſt all the Leaders fell at the firſt ſhock, but in the mean time there came a Batallion of *Switzer* Pikes, and charged the Imperial Pikes in the flank, and notwithſtanding they had to do with two ſtout and redoubted Enemies; one in the Van, and another in the Flank, yet did they keep their Ranks, and the Field too, after all the Harquebuſiers on foot, and all their Cavalry, with *Guaſt* himſelf (wounded as he was) had Battel of *Ceriſole*.

fled:

fled; and then, (and not till then) they caſt down their Arms, and cry'd for Quarter, which the *Switzers* gave them ſparingly enough. At this Charge was Marſhal *Monluc* on foot in the Head of the *Gaſcons* with a Pike in his hand, and he it is that gives us this relation. Will any man ſay that the Imperial Pikemen loſt this Battel to the Emperour? I ſuppoſe none but *Brancatio* and Maſter *Lupton*.

Battel of *Dreux*.

Moncounter was loſt for many reaſons too tedious to inſert here, whereof the great number of Pikes was none. And what a madneſs is it in theſe two Antipike-men to ſpeak of *Dreux*, for there they who loſt the honour of the day, that is the Prince of *Conde*, and the Admiral of *France*, had few or no Pikes at all, and ſucceeded accordingly; for the Duke of *Guiſe* after a long and doubtful fight, (Marſhal St. *Andre* being kill'd, and the Conſtable taken) routed their Foot with his Cavalry, ſo the having Pikes gain'd the Royaliſts the honour of the day, (for the *Switzers*, though with huge loſs kept the field) and the want of Pikes loſt it to the Proteſtants.

Theſe are *Brancatio* his Inſtances to prove the inſufficiency of the Pike, and what little reaſon Mr. *Lupton* had to make uſe of them upon the others authority, is cleared, I hope by my anſwers, which I thought fit to give, leſt I might have ſeem'd to have undervalued Mr. *Lupton*, as *Terduzzi* hath done his Countryman *Brancatio*, who deigns not almoſt to afford one of his Arguments a reply.

Want of Pikes in the *Turks* Army a defect.

Inſtanced.

It reſts now that I give an anſwer to both of them, who draw an argument againſt the Pike, becauſe the *Turk* uſeth it not, but rejecteth it as unſerviceable. To this firſt I ſay, that the *Turk* glories that his Batallions reſemble the *Macedonian* Phalanges, and therefore by this aſſertion he approves of the Pike, which was the *Macedonian* weapon. But I confeſs it is his vanity to ſay ſo, for the ſtaff which many of his men carry is rather a Javelin than a Pike. But next I aver, that the Grand Signiors want of Pikes is a defect in his Militia, which no Prince or State is bound to imitate. And aſſuredly if *Selimus* his Cannon had not terrified the *Perſian* Horſes in the *Calderan* Plains, he would have repented that he had no Batallions of Pikes to withſtand the furious and reiterated Charges of *Sophi Iſmael*, and his reſolute Cavalry. And if the Treaſon of ſome *Mamaluck* Captains had not aſſiſted that ſame *Turk* againſt *Campſon Gaurus* Sultan of *Egypt*, where he was almoſt born down by the fury of the *Mamaluck* Horſemen, the want of Pikes had loſt him his Army, and it may be a great part of his Empire. But I will let theſe two Gentlemen ſee, the *Turk* beaten with Pikemen in *Aſia*, two ſeveral times. *Techel*, ſirnamed *Cuſelbas*, or Redhead, by Nation a *Perſian*, having but very few Horſe, armed all his Foot (who were but Country-people, and newly levied) with long Pikes. One of *Bajazets* Beglerbegs, Baſha *Taragio* meets him at the River *Sangar*, where *Techel* beat back and broke the *Turks* Horſe with his long Pikes, and obtain'd the victory. Not long after that *Techel* meets with *Hali Baſha* at Mount *Oliga*, with whom he fought long, and at length by the couragious managing of his long Pikes, he forced the *Turkiſh* Horſe to run out of the field, in which skuffle the Baſha himſelf was kill'd.

Turk beaten with Pikemen.

Great Actions of the *Switzers* arm'd with Pikes.

Charles Duke of *Burgundy*.

Beſide *Milan*.

I am afraid it hath been pure malice in theſe two Gentlemen to conceive the great Victories obtain'd by the *Switzers* by no other weapon than the Pike. Ignorance it could not be in *Brancatio*, ſince ſome of them were the actions of his own time, nor in *Lupton*, who might have read them in Modern Hiſtory. They overthrew *Charles* of *Burgundy* in three ſeveral Battels, and he was a very Warlike Prince. They marched three miles out of *Millain* to attack a Martial King, *Francis* the firſt, lodg'd in a well fortified Camp, environ'd with a well order'd Infantry, a numerous Cavalry, and a huge Train of Artillery, they ſtormed his Retrenchment, took ſome of his Cannon, fought till night parted them, renewed the Battel next morning very betimes, fought long with doubtful ſucceſs, the event whereof might have prov'd fatal to the *French* King, if the ſtout *Venetian* General *Alviano* had not come upon the Spur with three thouſand Horſe to the reſcue, and then the *Switzers* retir'd in good order back to *Milan* in ſpite of both *French* and *Venetians*. At *Novara* they forc'd the *French* to retire two miles from the Town, ten thouſand of them follow the next day, and fight with the *French* two hours; and obſerve it, that they were principally reſiſted

At *Novara*.

by

by the *German* Batallions of Pikes, who ſtoutly fighting, were kill'd every man of them; the *Switzers* obtain'd an abſolute Victory, they kill'd many of the *French* and *Gaſcon* Foot in their flight, for they did not fight; they chaced the *French* Cavalry out of the field, (who could not be detain'd by the Duke of *Trimoville* and *Trivultio*, both of them great Captains) theſe the *Switzers* for want of Horſe could not purſue, but they took two and twenty pieces of Artillery, with an infinite Booty, and ſo returned to *Novara*. An Action even in the Heroick times, almoſt beyond belief. You may read theſe ſtories at large both in *Guicciardini*, and *Giovio*.

At *Meaux* on the River *Marne*, the Prince of *Conde* and the Admiral of *France* had well near ſurpriz'd *Charles* the Ninth King of *France*, and his Mother *Catherine de Medici*, great were the fears of the Court, where there were none to defend it, but eight or nine hundred Gentlemen, arm'd only with Swords. But there arrived in a good time ſix thouſand *Switzers*, who had come from their own Country, and they after three hours refreſhment couragiouſly undertook to bring the King and Queen in ſafety to the *Louvre*, which was ten Leagues diſtant from thence, and performed it; in their march they choſe the moſt open and Champain fields, preſenting their Pikes on all Quarters, where ever the enemy offer'd to Charge, and came to *Paris*, with the loſs only of thirty men, who being weary, had fallen behind. At *Meaux* on the River *Marne*.

Let now Maſter *Lupton* tell us out of *Brancatio*, that Pikemen cannot make way or purſue an enemy, that they cannot force a Guard, Street, or Paſſage, and cannot make an aſſault, or uſe diligence on a March, or do other feats of War. All theſe great and memorable actions were performed by the *Switzers*, arm'd offenſively only with Pikes and Swords, without Harquebuſſes, Muskets, or any Fire-guns, without Cavalry or Artillery, which is enough, though nothing more could be ſaid, to confute both *Brancatio* and *Lupton*.

They both knew that it is a capricious humour to take away a thing that hath been uſed, unleſs there be reaſons given either againſt the thing it ſelf, or the bad uſe of it, and this both of them think they have done, how ſufficiently, let the Reader judg; yet they have not done all, unleſs they give us ſomething in the room of the Pike, ſince they have taken it from us. And this both of them promiſe to do, and you ſhall ſee how they perform it.

Brancatio admits no Foot but Harquebuſiers, Muſquets being rare when he wrote, I doubt not but (if he were alive now) he would call them Muſqueteers, as Mr. *Lupton* doth, and by that name we ſhall call them hereafter. *Terduzzi* tells us that his Countryman *Brancatio* undertakes to teach Princes an invention how their Muſqueteers ſhall march in an open field, or a razed Champain, either in Squadrons, or man by man, without running any hazard to be routed or over-run by any Cavalry, be it never ſo ſtrong, much leſs ſhall they be in danger of any Batallions of Pikes. But *Brancatio* tells us not in his whole Book what this invention is, but keeps it up as a ſecret, as that (to uſe his own words) which deſerves only to be whiſper'd in the ear of ſome great Prince. I am afraid he never met with that Prince in his life-time who courted him for that ſecret, and therefore it is more than probable, the ſecret hath dy'd with him. *Terduzzi* tells us that after he had read this in *Brancatio* his Book, he troubled his brain two or three nights in conjecturing what this invention or ſecret might be. At firſt he imagin'd it muſt be a Machine, made with flanks for defence of the Muſqueteer, and to move ſome way or other, as the Muſqueteers advanced or retired, and ſo to his thinking ſhould be a moving, or ambulatory Citadel. But he found he had not hit right when he read in *Brancatio* that the invention is a moſt eaſie thing to make, but moſt difficult to imitate, unleſs the order of it be explain'd by the Author himſelf; and withal he calls it in the ſingular Number a piece of Armour; now *Brancatio* acknowledgeth no Arms but Sword or Harquebuſſe for Foot, hence *Terduzzi* concludes, the invention muſt be ſome kind of Defenſive arms, and yet no great Engine or Machine. While *Terduzzi* is thus puzled, an *Italian* Gentleman told him, that *Brancatio* had ſhow'd him one of them, and ſaid it was a Pike with a certain Iron-triangle in the middle of it, which being caſt on the ground any way, always one of the angles ſhould ſtand up, but when the Pike was fix'd, all the three angles ſtood in the air; which when *Terduzzi* had learned, he look'd on it as ſo frivolous a piece of folly,

Brancatio his Engin inſtead of the Pike,

Cannot be well conjectured.

that he neither troubled himſelf nor us, with any further diſcourſe about it. Could this Triangle (be it never ſo great) be any thing elſe than one of our Calthrops; with theſe it ſeems *Brancatio* was to environ his Firemen, for he ſays his invention was only to defend the circumference: whether the Muſqueteers were to carry it, or ſome other appointed for it, we know not, and many more Particularities of that great ſecret muſt we want.

Mr. *Luptons* Muſquet and Half-Pike, one weapon,

Maſter *Lupton* is not altogether ſo ſqueamiſh as *Brancatio*, (though we ſhall preſently find him reſerv'd enough) for he tells us that inſtead of both Muſquet and Pike he would have a thing which is both a Muſquet and half Pike ſerve the Infantry. He much commends this piece, and praiſeth the Inventer of it exceſſively, but he gives us no perfect deſcription of it, at leaſt not ſuch a one as can make me who never ſaw it, apprehend it aright. He calls it a Muſquet and Half-pike; if ſo, then two weapons: but for moſt part he calls it a weapon in the ſingular number, and therefore not two weapons. He tells us, by this weapon the Muſqueteers are ſafe within the Barricado of their Steel-Palliſado's, for ſo he calls it. By this the weapon ſhould be ſharp at both ends, and ſhould be uſed as the *Swediſh* Feather; and if ſo, it will make but one weapon, and the Muſquet will make another. He ſays, this weapon may be uſed as a Muſquet-Reſt; but if it have no more uſe than that, experience will make it uſeleſs. And at length he aſſures us, that this weapon, the Muſquet-half-Pike, will ſave a great deal of Treaſure ſpent by Princes on Pikes, Head-pieces, Backs and Breaſts. He told us of ſuch ſtuff before. But good God! can a Barricado of Half-pikes defend a mans head and body ſo well from a ſhot, as a Head-piece, or a Corſlet can? And to conclude, he directs all who deſire to know this new weapon to go to the Artillery-Garden at *London*, where they may be ſatisfied in all their Curioſities. But I humbly conceive the knowledg of a weapon, which he crys up to be of ſo general a good, and can bring ſo univerſal an advantage to Princes and States, ſhould not have been confin'd within ſo narrow a plot of ground as the Artillery or Military Garden. And truly I think that either the Author of that invention, or at leaſt Maſter *Lupton* was oblig'd in charity to have communicated it to the *Hungarians*, *Tranſylvanians*, *Polonians*, and *Croatians*, to defend themſelves by it from the Hereditary Enemy of *Chriſtendom*, and particularly to the *Germans* to obviate thereby the inconveniences and diſadvantages which follow the great number of their Pikes, the uſe whereof Maſter *Lupton* hath condemned.

Should not be made a Secret.

Soldiers ſhould be exerciſed and train'd with both Muſquet and Pike.

Now, though all along this Chapter I have ſhewn but ſmall inclination to agree with Mr. *Lupton*, for the laying aſide the Pike, yet in the cloſe of his Book, and this diſcourſe, we ſhall be good friends; for he deſires if the Pike be not altogether abandon'd, that all who carry it may be taught the uſe of the Muſquet likewiſe: and this ſhall be my hearty deſire likewiſe, provided that all Muſqueteers may be taught the uſe of the Pike alſo, for I conceive it to be very fit, that every Soldier be ſo train'd, that he may as occaſion offers, be ready to make uſe of both weapons. And for this I hope no diſcreet Commander will fall out with either Maſter *Lupton*, or me.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Gunpowder, Artillery, its General, and Train.

IF the *Chinois* had the use of Guns twelve or thirteen hundred years before the *Europeans* knew what a thing a Gun was, as some fancy; then they had Gunpowder also at that time, for without this, Guns were useless. They talk of a King of *China*, who being a great Enchanter, had a familiar Spirit, by whose help he invented Gunpowder and Artillery, by the help of which he defeated the *Tartars*, who had grievously afflicted him; and this King, they say, liv'd not long after our Saviours Incarnation. If the use of Artillery in that Country be of so old a date, I think the Natives should long e're now have attain'd to such a perfection of Gunnery, that thereby they might have defended themselves in their late Wars with these same *Tartarians*, better than to have let them make a full conquest of their Kingdom; neither do I remember that the Jesuit who writes the History of that War, speaks much of Ordnance. *Curtius* in his History of the Great *Alexander*, gives occasion to some to imagin that in his time (and that was some ages before the days of the Enchanting King of *China*) some of the *Indians* knew the use of Fire-guns; for he says that that daring Prince was disswaded from the Siege of a Town in *India*, because the Inhabitants of it defended themselves against their enemies with Thunder and Lightning from Heaven. And indeed nothing resembles these more than the fire and noise of Powder from a Gun. But how soon soever men had the knowledg of this Art in those remote Countries, it is the general opinion that in *Europe* it was neither known nor heard of till in the year of God 1300, a Monk in *Germany*, one *Barthold Swarts* (which in that language signifies Black) having for some use or other mixt some Sulphur and Niter together in a Mortar, a spark of fire falling accidentally in the mixture, blew it up with a crack immediately; the curious Friar searching narrowly into the cause thereof, by little and little found out Gunpowder, the Mother of all Fire-Engines and Works. To the Monks Invention infinite additions have been made since.

Guns in *China*,

And in *India*,

The Inventer of Gunpowder in *Europe*.

I will not at all amuse my self here with the needless disputes of some, whether this invention be destructive to mankind or not, since we read of many more men kill'd in Battels and Sieges before the noise of it was heard, than have been since. I shall only say that never any thing was invented before it that offer'd so great violence to Nature, and yet is a ready servant and agent of Nature, it being able to make the heaviest bodies, stones, houses, and walls ascend in an instant, and waters suddenly to leave their habitations in the bowels of the earth, and appear on the surface of it; and all this perhaps, to avoid something which nature doth more abhor. Those Fire-ships which the *Sieur d' Aldegond* sent down from *Antwerp* to destroy the great and stupendious Bridg which the Duke of *Parma* had made over the River of the *Scheld*, to obstruct the *Hollanders* assistance to the besieged City, can witness the truth of Gunpowders force, tho' it wrought not the intended effect. Some of the Stockads of the Bridg (tho' fastned with all the art the wit of man could invent) were broke down in an instant, the River forc'd to forsake his Channel, yea to give an unwelcome visit to some of the *Spaniards* Sconces, out of which the stoutest of them run, being in such a consternation, that they thought the Elements were to be dissolved, and the day of Doom was come. At *Delft* in *Holland* in the year 1654 (if I mistake not) by some mischance or inadvertency (as was conjectur'd) of him who was intrusted with a Magazine of Ammunition in a Tower upon the wall, the Powder was fired, which in the twinckling of an eye blew the Tower into the air, from the very foundation, level'd all the houses of the neareſt streets with the ground, kill'd many people, and mutilated more; the place where the Tower stood was not to be known, nor one stone to be seen of it, but in their

Its admirable force.

Instanced,

On the river of the *Scheld*.

At *Delft*.

room a Pool full of water ſuddenly ſummon'd from the bowels of the Earth. This blaſt made many houſes at *Rotterdam* (where I then was) ſhake fearfully, and that is ſix *Engliſh* miles from *Delft*. But *John Petyt* in his Hiſtory of the *Netherlands*, writes, that a Magazine of Powder having been blown up at *Mechline*, in the time of the Duke of *Alva*'s Government, made a whole Town ſhake, which was four *Dutch* Leagues, that is twelve *Engliſh* miles diſtant from *Mechline*.

At *Mechline*.

Materials of Powder.

The materials of which Powder is compoſed, are three, Saltpeter, Coal, and Sulphur. The firſt is called by Gunners, the Soul; the ſecond, the Body; and the third, the life of Powder. I ſhall not trouble my Reader with a Diſcourſe of Saltpeter, or of its nature, which is the ſubject of ſome Philoſophical contemplation, as having exactly the qualities of all the four Elements in it, and that it is the Quinteſſence of qualities. It is hot and dry, and ſo eaſie to be fired. It can be made up to a hard ſtone, ſo it is earth; yet diſſolve it, (which is eaſily done) and put it in a veſſel, it will cool Wine in the heat of Summer, ſo it is water. It grows in Subterraneous places, Caves, Caverns, Vaults, and old ruinous walls, ſo it ſeems a ſullen, dull, and humid air is the father of it. But this natural Niter would not make ſo generally a loud noiſe over all the world, if it were not mightily helped by art, and therefore it is cultivated, nouriſhed, and invited to grow in Mud-walls, Loom-floors, Cellars, Dove-houſes, and Stables, the dung of Beaſts, eſpecially that of Hogs (if the floor be rightly water'd with Saltpeter, well order'd, produceth good Saltpeter. How theſe floors ſhould be prepar'd, preſerv'd, and uſed, and how oft pared, how the Saltpeter ſhould be put in half-tubs, one above another, the one (wherein the Saltpeter is) fill'd with water, the other without water, and after that how it ſhould be boil'd and skim'd, and put in Braſs-pans and coolers till it congeal, and how thereafter it is refined, is ſuperfluous here to ſet down; it is neither my work, nor is it neceſſary for every Soldier to learn, but thoſe who will, may read it in ſeveral Authors. The ſecond material of Powder is Brimſtone, which muſt be well cleanſed and purged; and the third is Charcoal, of wood made firſt clean from the bark and knots; the wood that is ſaid to be propereſt for it, is that of young Hazel, Elder, Willow, and Birch. Theſe three Materials muſt be throughly mixed and incorporated, for therein conſiſts much of the eſſence and force of Powder. Theſe three muſt be wrought together in a Horſe or Water-mill, or in a Mortar with Peſtles, and while it is a working, care muſt be taken to keep it moiſt.

Natural Saltpeter.

Artificial Saltpeter.

Brimſtone.

Charcoal.

Though all agree that the mixture and incorporation of theſe three Materials makes Powder, yet all agree not of the quantity of each of theſe Materials. And for theſe diſagreeing opinions it is that Princes and States ſet down their own rules for the compoſition of Powder, and ſo it is fitting they ſhould. This is a general rule that the Powder is the fineſt, quickeſt, and of greateſt efficacy that hath moſt Saltpeter, and that Saltpeter which is moſt refined, gives the greateſt perfection. Gunners generally divide Powder into three kinds; firſt, that which hath the allowance of one pound of Brimſtone, and one pound of Coal for four or five pounds of Saltpeter, and that is ordinarily called Cannon-powder. The ſecond hath one pound of Brimſtone, and one pound of Coal for ſix pounds of Saltpeter, this they ſay is for Muſquets. The third is the fineſt, and hath ſeven or eight pounds of Niter for one pound of Sulphur, and one pound of Charcoal; this is for birding, for fowling-pieces, or if you will for Piſtols. Powder, for fear of its miſchief muſt be kept in upper rooms, but in dry and warm places; for age and moiſture corrupts it, and renders it improper for any uſe, but it may be again renewed by an addition of Saltpeter.

Several kinds of Powder.

The Gunners Art is a neceſſary Appendix of the Modern Art of War, but not neceſſary for every Soldier to learn, yet the more he knoweth of it, the perfecter Soldier he is. I ſhall ſpeak but of a few things of Artillery, which I think are convenient (for neceſſary I ſay they are not) for moſt Officers and Commanders in the War to know, leaving the Art in its intire compaſs to be taught by thoſe ingenious perſons, who profeſs it, wherein I have no skill, and profeſs as little.

Pieces of Ordnance that ſhoot in a direct line (for I ſpeak not of Pot-pieces or Mortars which caſt their ſhots in crooked and oblique lines) are either of Leather,

Three ſorts of Guns.

Leather, of Iron, or of Copper. Theſe Guns which are called Leather-Cannon, have Copper under the Leather, and are made with great art, and are light to carry, which is the greateſt advantage they have. Iron-Guns are accounted better than the Leather ones, but experience hath taught us that they are not ſo good for many uſes as thoſe of Copper. It is true, they are not ſo coſtly by far, neither do they burſt ſo readily; and ſome think the firing them, makes them firmer and faſter. Leather, Iron,

In the caſting Copper-Guns the Founders differ in the quantity of Bell-metal with it, ſome allowing more, ſome leſs; and *Bockler* the Engineer informs us, that now the *Germans* allow no Bell-metal at all, but for every eight pound of Copper, one pound of rough Tin; their reaſon for this is, they have found by experience, that Bell-metal makes the Piece brittle, and ſubject to breaking, and Tin makes it hard. The *Engliſh* and *French* allow both Bell-metal and Tin. And ſome allow alſo a mixture of Latten and Lead. Copper, Bell-metal.

Time and Art hath brought Powder to have a greater force than it had in its Infancy: The Saltpeter being more artificially refined, the Sulphur better purged, and the Coals of more proper wood, and better burnt, the Powder now being corned, which then it was not. This change of Powder hath occaſion'd a very great alteration in the fortification of Ordnance; for Powder having now a double or a treble force more than when it was firſt found out, a Piece requires a proportionable fortification of her metal, to reſiſt the violence of the Powder. As by example, an hundred and fifty years ago, and upward, or rather two hundred, Founders allowed for a Cannon, or Demi-Cannon, 80 pound of metal for every pound of their ſhot; by which account a Piece that ſhot a Bullet of 48 pound weight, did but weigh in mettal 3840 pound, whereas now, and ſixty years ago too, ſhe weighs with the *Germans* 9000 pound, which will be above 187 pound of metal for every pound of the Bullet. But in all the ſorts of Culverines there is a ſtronger fortification required than in Cannon, in regard they being of a greater length, they are able proportionably to receive in their Chambers more Powder than the Cannon, and therefore muſt be better fortified. After the firſt practice of Guns, a Culverine that ſhot 16 pound of Iron had but a 100 pound of metal allow'd for every pound of her ſhot, and ſo ſhe weighed but then 1600 pound but now and long before this, ſhe weighs 4300 pound, and conſequently hath the allowance of near 270 pound of metal, for every pound of her ſhot for ſmaller Ordnance in times of old, 150 pound of metal was allowed for every pound of their ſhot, now above 300, or near 400. Powder better now than a 150 or 200 years ago. Therefore the Fortification of Ordnance muſt be the ſtronger.

How the Moulds for founding Cannon ſhould be made, of what earth, what defects a Gun may receive from a faulty Mould, or from the melting the metal, and running it in the Moulds, what overplus of metal is allowed, which the *German* Founders call the Wolf; how a Gun in founding comes to be weaker of one ſide than the other; how ſhe gets chinks, flaws, and honeycombs, and how Gunners ought to be careful to try their Guns, if they have either theſe or any other defects, and how they ſhall mend them, belongs properly to Gunners to diſcourſe of, from whom the Courteous Reader may eaſily learn them. Gunners to look carefully to the defects of Guns.

There are three Fortifications of Ordnance, the ordinary fortified, the leſſened, that is leſs than the ordinary, and the re-inforced, which is the double fortified. All Pieces are to be more ſtrongly fortified at the Touch-hole and Muſle and Trunions, than in the other parts of them. The Trunions equiballance the Piece, and on them ſhe is mounted and imbaſed. The Bore which goeth from the Muſle to the Touch-hole, is called the Cylinder or Concave, it is alſo called the Soul of the Piece. And hence, when a Piece is equally bored, and hath no more metal on one ſide than another, Gunners uſe to ſay, her Soul lyeth right in her Body. So much of the Concave as containeth Powder, Bullet, and Wad, is called the Charged Cylinder, or Chamber, the Reſt, the vacant Cylinder, or guide of the ſhot. The Touch-hole at Sallies is often nail'd, and therefore Gunners ought to be skilful to know how to unnail them, and there be ſeveral ways for it, yet often none of them prevails, and therefore they are forc'd to bore a new Touch-hole, which will coſt them ſome hours labour. The reſt of the parts of a Piece not yet nam'd, are the Pommel, call'd alſo the Caſcabel, the Breech, the Viſier, or Baſe-ring, the Trunion-ring, the re-inforced Several Fortifications of Ordnance. The names of the ſeveral parts of a Piece.

forced-ring, the Coronice ring, which is alſo call'd the Aſtragal; the Neck, and the Muſle ring, which is alſo called the Freeze: Theſe denominations a Piece hath from a Column or Pillar, which a Piece reſembles, as Mr. *Norton* tells us in his practice of Artillery, and can be more eaſily demonſtrated by the Finger to the Reader, than intelligibly deſcrib'd.

Cannon, properly ſo called.

Great Guns, or pieces of Ordnance, take frequently their denominations from the Inventers, or from Beaſts and Birds, whom for their ſwiftneſs, rapacity, and cruelty, they ſeem to repreſent. And though the word *Cannon*, be generally now taken for all manner of Ordnance, yet properly it is that Piece which is ordain'd for battering of Walls, Towers, and Caſtles, and Ships; the *French* call them *Battemurs*, and the *Germans*, *Maurbrechern*, both which ſignifie Batter-walls. But there is a difference of founding this piece, among the *French*, *Germans*, and *Engliſh*.

The *French* Cannon.

The *Sieur de Preiſſac* allows no more weight of metal for a *French* whole Cannon, or *Battemur*, than five thouſand ſix hundred pound, the Bullet to weigh about thirty four pound (that will be one hundred ſixty four pound of Metal for every pound of the Bullet) ſhe muſt have eighteen pound of Powder, and is more than ten foot long. The *Germans* divide their whole Cannon (which they call *Carthaun*) into the Heavier and the Lighter. The firſt weighs in Metal nine thouſand pound, and ſhoots a Bullet of forty eight pound of Iron, for which ſhe takes twenty four pound of fine, and thirty two pound of common Powder. The lighter *Carthaun* weighs ſix thouſand four hundred in Metal, and ſhoots about forty two or forty three pound of Iron, the half of fine, and two thirds of common Powder. They both ſhoot alike far, to wit, one thouſand ordinary paces point blank, and at random ſix thouſand ſteps: Three *Italian* miles, ſays *Bockler*, which ſeems to be very far, eſpecially the firſt. But the *Germans* of a long time have forborn the uſe of the heavier *Carthaun*, and have founded none of them, they being found too chargeable and expenſive, too heavy and troubleſome to draw, and more deſtructive to Batteries, Bulwarks, and Walls, on which they ſtand, than uſeful, being ſhe breaks, tears, and ſhakes in pieces the ſtrongeſt Vaumures, Defences, and Embraſures, that can be made for her: And therefore they are now thought more fit to ſtand on Walls, or in Arſenals for ornament, than for uſe: The lighter *Carthaun* either for Offence or Defence, at Sieges doing as much ſervice, and not ſo much hurt as the greater. And if this be true, we may eaſily obſerve, what great trouble and almoſt inſurmountable difficulties the Great Turk's Gunners meet with in managing theſe exceſſively heavy pieces of his, the Metal whereof he carries about with him on Camels backs, or in his Souldiers Knapſacks. And though I believe many of his Cannon be of an extraordinary wide bore, yet I cannot be perſwaded to believe, that at the Siege of *Scodra* he had two pieces which ſhot twelve hundred pound Bullets, and one whoſe Bullet weigh'd thirteen hundred pound of Iron; I ſuppoſe Mr. *Knolles* hath been too credulous both in that particular and many others, as many more Hiſtorians are. The *Germans* have their half *Carthaun*, which ſhoot twenty four pound of Bullets, their quarter *Carthaun* of twelve, and their Demi-quarter *Carthaun*, which ſhoot ſix pound of Iron. And for moſt part that Nation gives the denomination of their Guns from the weight of the Bullet they ſhoot, as a four and twentieth pounder, a twelfth, a ſixth, and a three pounder: The Cannon, or Battering Ordnance, is divided by the *Engliſh* into Cannon Royal, whole Cannon, and Demi-Cannon. The firſt is likewiſe called the Double Cannon, ſhe weighs eight thouſand pound of Metal, ſhoots a Bullet of ſixty, ſixty two, or ſixty three pound weight. The whole Cannon weighs ſeven thouſand pound of Metal, and ſhoots a Bullet of thirty eight, thirty nine, or forty pound. The Demi-Cannon weighs about ſix thouſand pound, and ſhoots a Bullet of twenty eight or thirty pound. All of them will take the half of the weight of their Bullet of fine, and two parts of ordinary Powder, and may take much more, if they be reinforced. Theſe three ſeveral Guns are called Cannons of eight, Cannons of ſeven, and Cannons of ſix; ſuppoſe Inches, as being ſo many Inches high of the Diameter of their Bores. For moſt part all Cannon, properly ſo called, are not above eighteen or nineteen Diameters of their bores in length.

The *German* heavy whole Cannon laid aſide.

The Lighter ſtill uſed.

Turks Cannons.

Engliſh Cannon.

The

The *Engliſh* Gunners do accurately divide all kind of Ordnance into four kinds. Each whereof is ſub-divided into ſeveral ſorts, according to their ſeveral bores. The four kinds are, the Cannon, the Culverine, the Pierior, and the Mortar. Of the Cannon I have ſpoke already: Of the other three I ſhall ſpeak a little. *Engliſh* Diviſion of all Ordnance.

The Culverin is longer in her chaſe than the Cannon, and therefore ſhoots further, becauſe ſhe is able to receive more Powder proportionably in her Chamber, I ſay, proportionably to her Bullet; as by example, a Cannon that ſhoots thirty two pound of Iron, will take but ſixteen pound of fine Powder, and that is but half the weight of her Bullet: But a Culverin that ſhoots a Bullet of ſixteen pound weight, will take eleven or twelve pound of fine Powder, and that is three parts of four of her ſhot: The reaſon is, becauſe the Cannon (as I ſaid before) is but about eighteen Diameters of her bore in her length, whereas the whole Culverin will be twenty eight, thirty, or thirty two diameters of her bore in length: And if a Culverin be reinforced, a Gunner may give her the full weight of her Bullet in fine Powder, and neither put himſelf nor her in hazard. The Culverine,

The Culverin is ſub-divided, into whole, and half, or Demi-Culverin, Saker, Minion, Falconet, Rabinet, and Baſe Culverine. How high every one of theſe are in their bores, how many Diameters of their bores in length, of what weight their Bullets are, what each of themſelves weigheth in Metal, belongs properly to Gunners, from whom thoſe who are deſirous, may learn theſe particulars, or may find them in ſeveral Authors. Only take theſe few general obſervations. Firſt, That all thoſe ſorts of Culverins take proportionably more Powder than the Cannon, becauſe their Chambers are proportionably longer; the reaſon whereof is, that their Chaſes are in length many more diameters of their bores, than the Cannon, and by that reaſon, ſhoot further. As by example, the Minion ſhoots but a Bullet of three pound and a half, ſhe takes two pound and a half of Powder, and ſhoots her Ball at random ſeven thouſand ordinary paces or ſteps, and that is one thouſand ſteps further than the Cannon can caſt her Bullet. Secondly obſerve, that no general rule can be given for the quantity of Powder for all Guns, but for all Guns of one ſort there may; ſome requiring half, ſome two thirds, ſome three parts, and ſome the full, or near the full weight of their Bullet. Thirdly, obſerve, that all theſe ſorts of Culverines muſt be more ſtrongly fortified in their Metals, than the Cannon or Battering-pieces are, ſome of them having two hundred and fifty, ſome three hundred, and ſome of them three hundred and fifty pound of Metal for every pound weight of their Bullet. Whereas the Cannon takes but ſome one hundred and thirty, ſome one hundred and forty, ſome one hundred and ſixty, or at moſt one hundred and eighty pound in their Metal for every pound of their ſhot; the reaſon is, becauſe they proportionably take more Powder than the Cannon, and that is now double and treble of more ſtrength and efficacy, than it was in the Infancy of Gunnery. Fourthly, obſerve, the more ponderous and heavy the Bullet is, ſo it be expell'd with a due proportion of Powder, it ſhakes the more the batter'd place, provided that place be within the range of the Piece, and therefore the Cannon ſhakes more than the Culverine, though it pierce not ſo deep, if the Culverine have her due loading: Hence it is, that in Batteries Culverins and Demi-Culverins are uſed to ſhoot croſs wiſe, or to flank, to cut away that which the Cannon hath ſhaken. Subdivided into ſeveral ſorts. Obſervations concerning them all. Firſt. Second. Third. Fourth.

The Third kind of Ordnance is the Stone-caſter, which the *French* call *Pierrieros*, or *Pierrieras*, from *Pierre*, which in that language ſignifieth a Stone. The *Germans* call them *Steinbuchſen*, which is to ſay Stone-Guns. They are caſt and ordain'd to ſhoot Stones, yet may ſhoot either Lead or iron, if ſparingly charged with Powder. They are handſome Pieces, and very like Cannon, or Pieces of Battery, the longeſt of them will be but eight diameters of the heighth of their bore; they are not ſtrongly fortified in their Metal, neither need they be, for they require not much Powder, and hence they are light to carry: Being duly loaden, they ſerve well enough to defend a breach, or the Port of a Town; they are good againſt Troops or Companies in the Field, and can commit Murther enough with ſmall expence, for they ſave abundance of Iron, and very much Powder. Stone-caſter.

The

Mortar. The fourth kind of Ordnance, is the Mortar, under which comprehend Pot-pieces, Square Murtherers, Tortles, and Petards. The Pot-piece ſhoots Granado's, Fireballs, and Stones. Theſe Mortars are of ſeveral and very far different greatneſſes, for ſome of them ſhoot but five, ſome ſix, ſome eight pounds, others 300, 350, and 400 pound. They are only uſeful at Sieges, and at them they can ſerve both the Aſſailants and Defendants. The beſieged uſe them for ſhooting in the Batteries and Approaches of the Enemy, to ruin their Works, deſtroy their Men, burn their Ammunition; and by their Comet-like light, while they are in the air to diſcern where they are working. The Beſiegers uſe them to terrifie and annoy the Defendants, to burn their Houſes and Magazines with Granado's, or break them down with ſtones, which ſometimes will be of that huge weight that ſcarce a double Vault can reſiſt them. The operation of the Mortar is (as I ſaid before) altogether in oblique and crooked lines. Thoſe Gunners that are appointed to overſee them, had need to be skilful (the Art being difficult) for Granado's are very expenſive, and therefore muſt not be caſt away, yet I have ſeen as many (yea a great deal more) miſs, than hit the mark.

Its Uſe.

Silver Bullets. Bullets for any kind of Ordnance or Fire-Guns, may be of any metal you pleaſe, yea of Gold or Silver; the firſt is too coſtly; the ſecond ſome fancy to be able to pierce ſuch as are (by ſome black art or other) hard, or Bullet-proof. But to charge a perſon that is Bullet-proof, with a Silver-ball, to me ſeems to be like the Aſſaulting an Inchanted Caſtle. The Bullets which are ordinarily uſed, are threefold, Stone, Lead, and Iron. Of the Stone I have ſpoke; Lead-Bullets are for all Hand-guns, but are not fit for Ordnance, except in caſe of neceſſity, which ſeldom arriveth. They weigh a third more than Iron, and ſo are coſtlier; they pierce not ſo far into an Earthen-wall as the Iron ones, and in ſtone-walls they batter themſelves out in breadth, without doing much hurt to the wall. Iron-bullets are of two kinds, maſſie ones, and thoſe that are empty or hollow within. The empty are called Granado's, and are filled with ſuch ſtuff as the Engineer or Gunner thinks effectual for the buſineſs or errand on which he intends to ſend them. The maſſie Iron-bullet ſhould be exactly round, and Gunners ought to be ſure that they fit the bores of their ſeveral Pieces, for if the Bullet be too great, and ſtick in the vacant Cylinder, it hazards in the diſcharge, the burſting the Piece; and if too little, it is impoſſible for any Cannoneer to make a juſt ſhot with it, they uſe to help the ſmallneſs of the Bullet by tying Hemp, Flax, Hay, or Straw about it, for all Bullets muſt be a little leſs than the bore of the Piece, for which they are made. And therefore it was long a general rule to make all Bullets for Ordnance one fourth part of an inch lower in its Diameter, than the height of the bore of the Piece. But this is now condemned by Gunners as an error, becauſe they think for a Falcon, or other ſmall Pieces, the fourth part of an Inch is too great an abatement, and for either a Culverine or Cannon, it is too little. *Bockler* tells me that they agree now that the twentieth part of the Diameter of the bore of all Pieces, is a reaſonable abatement for their Bullets. There be alſo Chains, Chained Bullets, and Cartridges ſhot out of Pieces of Ordnance. The firſt at Sea-ſervice, and all of the other two in the fields againſt Troops, or Companies either of Horſe or Foot.

Leaden Bullets.

Iron Bullets.

Hollow Iron Bullets, or Granado's.

Maſſie Bullets of Iron.

I ſhall forbear to ſay any more of great Ordnance, leaving the reſt to the Gunners art, which all Soldiers are not obliged to learn: Only I cannot omit to tell my Reader, that notwithſtanding all I have ſaid, there is an Hiſtory extant of that Siege which the famous Marquis *Spinola* form'd and maintain'd at *Breda* in the years 1625, and 1626, written originally in *Latin*, and approv'd by the ſaid Marquis, and thereafter tranſlated into ſeveral Languages; in which we are told that during the time of the Siege, *Philip* Count of *Mansfield* went to *Bruſſels*, and there by his great art and induſtry founded forty Brass-Guns, and twenty three Murtherers, for ſo our Hiſtorian calls them; thirty of theſe ſhot Iron Bullets of ſix pound weight, all the reſt ſhot twenty five pound. The metal of every one of the ſix pounders weighed no more but a 180 pound, and thoſe of twenty five Bullet, weighed no more but 750 pound. If you will calculate this, you will find that theſe Pieces had juſt thirty pound of metal (and no more) allow'd for every pound of their Bullet: this was a weak fortification; for we muſt ſup-

Count *Mansfield* his rare Invention of Guns, at the Siege of *Breda*.

poſe

poſe *Spinola* wanted not for Powder of the beſt ſort. The Author adds that theſe new Pieces ſhot their Bullets further than the old ones did, and required but the third part of Powder formerly allowed for Pieces of their Bores. He adds alſo, which he needed not, that the leſſer new Guns were drawn by two Horſes, and the greater by four; for it is certain, the lighter the Piece is, the fewer Horſes, Men or Oxen it will need to draw it. This Invention of Count *Mansfield* hath been aſſuredly as to Ordnance, the beſt and moſt profitable theſe three by-paſt ages could boaſt of, both to ſave expence, and to further expedition. But this good man tells us not how the Earl did all this, only he informs us, that he knew ſo well to boil the melted metal in the fire, that though it had leſs thickneſs, yet it had equal hardneſs with the greater Guns; but I thought that not only the hardneſs, but the thickneſs of the metal ſhould reſiſt the violence of the Powder, and therefore Pieces are more fortified at the Touch-hole, Trunions, and Muſle, than at any place elſe. But not having heard that this rare Invention was practiſed afterward in all theſe long and bloody Wars, which have been in *Chriſtendom* ſince that famous Siege, nor read any thing of it in thoſe who write of that Art, I ſhall ſuſpend my belief of the thing till I hear that it is approv'd by Judicious Gunners.

The great trouble and retardment a Train of Artillery brings to an Army,

An indifferent Train of Artillery, eſpecially if there be battering Guns in it, their Carriages, Powder and Bullets, with all fitting Inſtruments, will require very many Horſes to draw it, which may the more eaſily be conceived if we caſt up an account how many one Piece will need. Let us ſuppoſe this Piece to be a *French* Cannon, or an *Engliſh* Demi-Cannon, any of them weighing 6000 pound of metal, let her Bullet be thirty pound of Iron, for which ſhe requires twenty pound of common Powder. This Piece may be diſcharged ſafely ten times in one hour, and conſequently in twelve hours 120 times; 120 being multiplied by thirty, (which is the weight of the Bullet) the product is 3600. You are to multiply again a 120 by 20, which (is the weight of the Powder) produceth 2400. Add 3600, and 2400 to 6000, the aggregate is 12000 pound. In the next place let every Horſe be bound to draw 272 pound weight, and divide 12000 by 272, you will find the Quotient 44, with a Fraction of 32; ſo you ſee forty four Horſes neceſſary to draw one Piece with Powder and Bullets needful for the ſervice of one day, without the addition of the Carriage, or of Waggons and Carts. Hence you may conclude, that a numerous Train muſt of neceſſity retard the march of an Army either in purſuing or retiring. In the firſt caſe all or moſt of it may be left with conveniency to follow; but in the ſecond, there is very great difficulty, and many times the endeavouring to ſave it, hath occaſion'd the loſs of Armies.

Demonſtrated by what is requiſite for one piece of Cannon,

For one day only.

There is no doubt but Artillery ſerves to good purpoſe to make an Enemy either remove his Camp (if it be within the range of the Ordnance) or come out and fight. That it forceth Towns and Forts to yield we know; but we muſt confeſs (for all that) that few Battels have been won by Artillery; for as *Monluc* ſays of the Cannon, *Il fait plus de peur, que du mal:* It frightens more than it hurts. The loſs of a Train of Artillery is of exceeding great conſequence to a Prince or a State, therefore the leſs the Train is, the expence will be the leſs, and the expedition the greater. There are ſome who in their Writings of Trains of Artillery, and other eſſential members of Armies, inſtance the Princes of *Orange*. But I ſay other Princes and States are not to take up their meaſures either in their Trains of Artillery, or other points of War by the Eſtates of the *United Provinces*, in regard few or none of them (that I know) have ſuch advantages of the Situation of their Country, as thoſe Eſtates have, who by water for moſt part may tranſport their Ordnance, their Proviſions, their Munitions, their Inſtruments, and ſometimes their Soldiers, which other Princes muſt carry all by land with Horſes and Waggons, (except the men) unleſs they have the benefit of ſome Navigable River, which ſeldom falls out.

Artillery very expenſive.

It is not every Army that either is or can be allowed either a full Train, or yet a General of Artillery. Many of theſe called flying Armies have no Guns at all with them, and many of them have only ſome Field-pieces, which being drawn with very few Horſes, need not much obſtruct the ſpeedy march of an Army. I have known divers Armies at one time in *Germany* under *Chriſtina* Queen of *Sweden*, each one whereof had but a petty Train, and that order'd

by a Colonel, or a Lieutenant-Colonel, but there was only one General of the Artillery, who had the ſupreme Command of all the Ordnance in all the Armies; and he ſtaid conſtantly with the Felt Marſhal of the principal Army. I knew the late King of *Denmark* in the year 1657, have two brave Armies (tho' both unſucceſsful) the one ordain'd for the defence of *Holſtein* and *Jutland*, the other for *Schonen*, the Train appointed for each of them was order'd by a Colonel, and there was neither General, nor Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance with either of them. Whether it be fit for a Prince or a free State to keep one General of the Artillery to have inſpection over all the Ordnance, all the Munitions of War, and all the Armes within that Kingdom, or Republick, or rather to intruſt ſeveral perſons with the ſeveral Magazines, ſhall not be the ſubject of this Diſcourſe. But that all Princes and States ſhould have Store-houſes, Arſenals, and Magazines, well ſtuft with all manner of Arms offenſive and defenſive, with great and ſmall Ordnance, with Powder, Match, and Ball, and all the ſeveral Materials of their Compoſition, with Mortars, Pot pieces, Petards and Granado's of all kinds, is, as I ſuppoſe a thing which will be granted as neceſſary beyond all Controverſie.

A great Train not neceſſary with every Army.

In ſuch an Army as paſſeth under the name of an Army Royal (which ſome think ſhould conſiſt of eighteen thouſand Foot, and ſix thouſand Horſe) that takes the Field with a deſign to fight with any that oppoſe it, and a reſolution to do that for which it was levied, whether that be to fight Battels, paſs Rivers, or take in Towns and Forts; in ſuch an Army, I ſay, there ſhould be ſo great a Train of Artillery, as is ſuitable with the greatneſs of the attempt, wherein nothing muſt be wanting, that can help to carry on the deſign. In it there ſhould be Cannons for Battery, Culverines of all ſorts, Field-pieces, Mortars, great abundance of Powder, Match, and Ball, and Granado's, with all Inſtruments and Neceſſaries for all manner of Ordnance; for this Train are required a great many expert and ready Gunners and Conſtables, beſides the Gentlemen, Captains and Conductors, as alſo a huge number of Horſes and Oxen, Waggons and Carts to draw and tranſport it from place to place.

Army Royal.

Its Train.

The *Swediſh* Trains of Artillery ſince their firſt footing in *Germany* have had the reputation to be the moſt exactly compoſed, and conducted by the moſt experimented Artiſts of any in *Chriſtendom*. And no doubt but their Artillery helpt them much to take ſo deep a footing in *Germany*, that they have not been ſince expell'd out of it, though that hath been much endeavour'd. When the late King of *Sweden* invaded *Poland* in the year 1655, the perfidy of the *Polonians* was ſuch that they deliver'd almoſt that whole Kingdom into his hands. But after they had returned to their Duties, and that the *Swede* was at *Zamoiskie* in the year 1657. it was by the help of his Artillery (whereof *John Caſimir* was deſtitute) that the *Swediſh* King traverſed much of the length of *Poland* in ſpite of eighty thouſand *Polonians*; croſt the *Weichſell*, and join'd with *Ragoski*; and after he was forc'd to part with the *Tranſylvanian* (being invited to come nearer home by the King of *Denmarks* unſeaſonable declaration of a War againſt him) he came out of *Poland* and *Pruſſia* too with a very inconſiderable, ill appointed, and haraſs'd Army, without any loſs at all, meerly by the advantage he had of his Train of Artillery.

Swediſh Train of Artillery.

Sweden furniſheth abundance of both Copper and Iron, whereof great Guns and Hand-guns are made, and by art and induſtry that Country hath as much Saltpeter as any Kingdom can have; and it being full of Woods, it cannot want Coal for making Powder, whereof they make ſuch abundance, as they are able not only to ſerve themſelves, but to help their neighbours and friends. They alſo make within the Kingdom, greater ſtore of Arms both for offence and defence, than they have uſe for. I have ſeen ſome little Towns in *Sweden*, wherein few other Artificers were to be found, but Armourers and Gunſmiths. Theſe advantages encourage them to entertain full and well appointed Trains of Artillery.

Sweden abounds in all things neceſſary for a Train.

He who commands in chief over the Artillery is called by the *Engliſh*, General, or Maſter of the Ordnance; by the *French*, *Grand Maiſtre del Artillerie*, Great Maſter of the Artillery; by the *Germans*, *General fetz. Eugmeiſter*, which is General Overſeer and Maſter of the Munitions for the Field, a term very proper, becauſe he hath not only the inſpection of the Ordnance, but of the Muniti-

Munitions of War, such are the Guns, greater and lesser, all manner of Arms and Weapons, all Materials belonging to Smiths and Carpenters, Powder, Match, Bullets, Granado's for Pot-pieces, and to be cast by the hand, store of Instruments and Utensils for Artificers Shops, Bridges or Materials for them, Boats or Materials for them, to be made and join'd quickly, for passing unfordable waters, all kind of Instruments for working in Fortification or Approaches, such as Spades, Mattocks, Pickaxes, and Shovels. In *Scotland* we call this great Officer, the General of the Artillery. The Ancients, though they wanted Fire-guns, yet they had their great Artillery; those were their great Machines and Engines whereof I have formerly spoken; and they had likewise a Master of their Artillery, who had the inspection of it, which I have also made appear in the fourth Chapter of the *Roman* Militia. But since the Invention of Gunpowder, the Charge of General of the Artillery hath been look'd on as most honourable, as it indeed deserves to be, and with none more than with us in *Scotland*, and was always confer'd by our Kings on persons of eminent note and quality. *James* the Fifth King of *Scotland*, made the Gentleman who had married his Mother *Margaret* Daughter to *Henry* the Seventh King of *England*, Lord of *Meffen*, and General of the Artillery of *Scotland*. As *Lesly* Bishop of *Rosse* (that active and loyal servant to his Mistress Queen *Mary*) tells us in the Ninth Book of his History, in these words, *In hisce Comitiis Rex Henricum Stuartum Reginæ Maritum confirmavit Dominum Meffensem, ac eundem omnium bellicorum Tormentorum præfectum (quod munus apud nos est longe honorificum) munifice constituit.* The King, saith he, in this Parliament confirmed *Henry Stuart* the Queens Husband, Lord *Meffen*, and bountifully made him General of the Artillery, which Charge with us is most honourable.

A General of the Artillery.

His Trust.

His Charge honourable in *Scotland.*

He who bears this Office in either Kingdom, Republick, or Army, ought to be a person of good Endowments; but if you take his description from some notional writers, you may justly conclude, there is not such a man below the Moon. Indeed I shall tell you there are two qualifications absolutely necessary for him, these are to be a good Mathematician, and to be something, if not right much, experimented in all the points of the Gunners Art, he must be of a good judgment, and a very ready dispatch. The rest of his parts and abilities (which some require in him alone) I think he may divide among those who are under his command and authority, who truly are right many; as the Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance, two Colonels, if not more, Lieutenant-Colonels, Captains, and Gentlemen of the Ordnance, Master Gunner, and all inferior Gunners, Conductors, and Comptrollers, Engineers, the Clerk of the Fortification, Master of the Mines, and Mineers under him, Master of the Artificial Fires, and his Conductors and Petardeers, those who have a care of the Tools for Fortification, for intrenching and approaching, the Master of the Pioneers (in some Armies) and all his Pioneers; the Master of the Batteries, and all under him, for to the General of the Artilleries direction and inspection belongs the Entrenching the Camp, the making the Approaches, Redoubts, Batteries, Zaps, Galleries, and Mines, and other works at Sieges of Towns and Castles. He hath also his own Commissary, Quarter-master, Waggon-master, Minister, and Chyrurgeon. If then you will consider that he and all those under him are to have pay and wages, and what a vast sum of money is spent in maintenance of this Train, and how much Powder, match and Ball, may be spent in an active War; you may conclude that *Achilles Terduzzi* the *Italian* Engineer (whom I have often mention'd) spoke within bounds, and but modestly enough, when he said he conceiv'd the fourth part of the Treasure of an Army, was spent on the Train of Artillery.

His Qualifications.

His great Command.

The vast expence of a Train.

I think it something strange to read in *Bockler* the *German* Architect, that it is of late condescended on by the greatest Practitioners of Artillery in *Germany*, that for an Army of forty thousand men (whereof thirty two thousand should be foot, and eight thousand Horse) thirty Pieces of Ordnance are enough, either to besiege a strong place, or to attack an enemy, though never so advantageously lodged. For the last I shall be easily induced to believe it, but for the first part of his affirmative I know not how to reconcile it with the opinion of those knowing Gunners, and experimented Captains, who formerly thought eight Cannon, six Culverines, and four Demi-Culverines, no more than ne-

Thirty Pieces of Ordnance thought lately a sufficient Train for an Army of forty thousand men.

ceſſary to make one ſufficient Breſch, whether in Courtine, or Baſtion, whereof I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more in my Diſcourſe of Sieges. His thirty Pieces of Artillery he divides thus: Eight whole Cannon (which he calls *Carthaun*) nine Demi-Cannon, ſix Quarter-Cannon, and ſeven Field pieces. The whole Cannon (for I ſuppoſe he means the lighter ſort) ſhoots a Bullet of forty pound, the Demi-Cannon twenty four pound, the Quarter Cannon ſix pound, and I ſhall be contented, that each of the ſeven Field-Pieces ſhall ſhoot three pound. But if the former opinion hold, of eighteen Guns for one Breſch, and that the Town beſieged have five Baſtions or more, as moſtly they have, *Bockler* furniſheth us not with Guns enough to Braſch two of them. But let us ſee what Powder and Iron his thirty Guns will ſpend in one artificial day, that is twelve hours time; you may allow his eight whole Cannon to fire eight times in one hour, and at every time twenty pound of Powder for the forty pound Bullet of Iron. Multiply twelve (the number of the hours) by eight (the number of the whole Cannon) the Product is ninety ſix. Now every whole Cannon firing eight times in the hour, makes ninety ſix ſhot in twelve hours, and therefore ſpends three thouſand eight hundred and forty pound of Iron; for ninety ſix multiplied by forty, produceth three thouſand eight hundred and forty, for every pound of the Bullet, I allow but half Powder; to wit, for forty pound Bullet, twenty pound Powder. The whole Cannon then diſcharged eight times every hour ſpends a hundred and ſixty pound, multiply a hundred and ſixty by eight, (the number of the whole Cannon) the Product is a thouſand two hundred and eighty. Thus much Powder eight Cannons ſpend in one hour; multiply a thouſand two hundred and eighty by twelve (the number of the hours) the Product is fifteen thouſand three hundred and ſixty, ſo much Powder muſt be allowed for eight whole Cannon to play twelve hours, and twice as much Iron, to wit, thirty thouſand ſeven hundred and twenty.

What Powder and Bullets thirty Guns may ſhoot in twelve hours.

The nine Demi-Cannons ſhall fire ten times every hour, this will make ninety ſhot in one hour, multiply ninety by twelve (the number of the hours) the Product is one thouſand and eighty. You may remember we allow twenty four pound of Iron for every ſhot of a Demi-Cannon, then for one thouſand and eighty ſhot, twenty five thouſand nine hundred and twenty pound of Iron; for multiply one thouſand and eighty by twenty four, the Product is twenty five thouſand nine hundred and twenty; ſo much Iron doth the Demi-Cannon ſpend in twelve hours, and the half ſo much Powder, is twelve thouſand nine hundred and ſixty.

The ſix Quarter-Cannon ſhouts ſeventy two pound of Iron, (to wit, each of them twelve) they may be diſcharged twelve times in one hour, and therefore the ſix are diſcharged ſeventy two times in twelve hours, and all ſix make in twelve hours time eight hundred ſixty four ſhot, multiply eight hundred ſixty four by twelve (the weight of the Bullet) the Product is ten thouſand three hundred and ſixty eight; ſo much Iron doth theſe ſix Quarter-Cannon ſhoot in twelve times, for that you are to reckon the moiety of Powder, which is five thouſand one hundred and eighty four.

The ſeven Field Pieces (each of them ſhooting a Bullet of three pound) ſhoot at one time twenty one pound of Iron, this they may do ſafely fifteen times in one hour; multiply then twenty one by fifteen, the Product is three hundred and fifteen. Multiply three hundred & fifteen by twelve (the number of the hours they are to play) the Product is three thouſand ſeven hundred and eighty, ſo much Iron do theſe ſeven Field Pieces ſhoot in twelve hours time, and the half of that in Powder, which is one thouſand eight hundred and ninety.

By this account which will be granted to be rational enough, *Bocklers* thirty Pieces (though far fewer than other Trains) in twelve hours time will ſpend ſeventy thouſand ſeven hundred eighty eight pound of Iron, and of Powder thirty five thouſand three hundred and ninety four. By this you may make a reaſonable good conjecture of the expence of Ammunition for great Guns.

Milton in his Poetry plays with this matter, and makes the uſe of Cannon very old, as being practiſed by *Lucifer* againſt the Omnipotent. See his *Paradiſe Loſt*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Muſters, and Muſter-maſters, Pay, Proviant, and Service, of Treaſurers, Commiſſaries, and Proviant-maſters, and of the Military Oath.

AFTER Foot-Soldiers are levied and armed, and Horſemen arm'd and mounted, it is fit they be Muſter'd, that it may be known whether the Colonels and Captains have raiſed their full numbers of ſufficient men, according to the ſeveral Capitulations made with the Prince or State whom they ſerve. This word Muſter, or *Monſtre*, ſignifieth a Show which is made by thoſe Officers who are appointed to view the Soldiery; thoſe with us are called Muſter-maſters, and are either General or particular. The General Muſter-maſter hath the inſpection of the particular ones, and to him they are bound to give a particular account of their deportments, and from him they receive their directions. In all Muſters the Colonels and Captains are bound to deal uprightly and honeſtly, and to make a ſhow of none but ſuch as are really in their Regiments and Companies. The Muſter-maſters duty is to take a ſtrict account, and a particular view of every mans perſon and name, (having Liſts and Rolls in his hand) of his age, of his Arms and Equipage; and if he muſter Horſemen, he is to ſee that the Horſe be ſerviceable, and of ſuch a height, as is appointed by the Prince or States order, and ſuch as the ſervice requires, whether he be a Curiaſſier, or Harquebuſſier. In ſome places, eſpecially in *Italy*, the Muſter-maſters inquire the names of the Soldiers Parents, the Country and place of their birth, and write down the complections of their faces, and colours of their hair, and ſome private mark which the Muſter-maſter obſerveth. It is, and indeed ſhould be infamy to any Captain to make a falſe Muſter either of borrowed men, Horſes or Arms; and the ſame puniſhment doth the Muſter-maſter deſerve, if he either ſubſcribe to, allow of, or connive at any ſuch jugling, for thereby the Prince is not only cheated of his money, but groſly abuſed to his great diſadvantage, when he is made believe that he hath either more men, or more ſufficient men than really and effectively he hath. For this reaſon, and that the Captains may be hired to be honeſt, ſome allow Paſſevolants, that is, for ſuch a number of real and viſible men, ſuch a number of inviſible men, as the *Swedes* uſed to allow to every Company of Foot, *d'en Paſvolants*, whereof ſix belong'd to the Captain, two for the Lieutenant, and two for the Enſign. Every one of theſe had the allowance of half a *Rix-dollar* every ten days, but this cuſtom wore out, and there was reaſon for it, becauſe many Captains notwithſtanding that Indulgence, endeavour'd ſtill to keep void places in their Companies, as a mean to make their Purſes full.

Muſter-maſters.

Muſters.

Paſſevolants, what.

Theſe Muſter-maſters by the *Dutch*, *Danes*, and *Swedes* are called Commiſſaries, over whom the Commiſſary General of the Army hath the ſuperintendance. This difference there is, that thoſe Commiſſaries keep the Purſe, and ſo are Pay-maſters; but our Muſter-maſters are not ſo, the paying belonging to our Treaſurers, as among the *Romans* it belong'd to the Queſtors. They have power to muſter as oft as they pleaſe, acquainting him firſt who commands in chief, either in Field or Garriſon: And indeed in thoſe Countreys they muſter oftner than they pay.

Commiſſaries.

After the firſt Muſter, the Troops and Companies get their Standards and Enſigns, and then take the Military Oath, which we call to Swear to the Colours. I have ſpoken of the *Roman* Military Sacrament: This Oath we now ſpeak of is the ſame for Officers. Troopers and Souldiers ſwear, with hands lifted up to Heaven, "To be faithful and loyal to their Prince, or his Gene-
"rals, never to deſert or leave the Service without permiſſion of their Supe-
"riors,

Military Oath.

"riors, to be ſtout in time of Battel, Rencounter, Skirmiſh, or Aſſault, and "rather to chuſe to dye, than deſert their Standards or Colours, never to turn "their backs on an Enemy, and to reveal all Conſpiracies, Treaſons, and "Mutinies, intended againſt the Prince or State, or their Generals, and other "Commanders: So help them God in the great day. If this Oath were punctually kept, all Battels would be ſo well fought, that there would not be ſuch a thing, as the flight of an Army to be ſeen or heard of in the World. After this Oath, the Articles and Laws of War ſhould be publickly and diſtinctly read, that they may know what puniſhments (for moſt Articles ſpeak more of them, than of rewards) they may expect, if they commit ſuch crimes as are there mention'd. This is a thing moſt neceſſary to be done, that none may pretend Ignorance; for where there is no Law, there can be no Tranſgreſſion: Of theſe Articles I ſhall ſpeak in the next Chapter.

Being that moſt men who follow the Wars over all the World, receive wages, they juſtly deſerve the name of Mercenaries; but if you will conſider how their wages are paid, I ſuppoſe, you will rather think them Voluntaries, at leaſt very generous, for doing the greateſt part of their ſervice for nothing. It is ſaid of the *Switzers*, that they will not fight, unleſs they be paid duly. If other Nations were of their humour, Princes and States would be neceſſitated to agree better than they do, becauſe ſeldome would their Armies fight for them, becauſe ſeldome they are paid by them. The *Baptiſt* inſinuates, that Souldiers ſhould be paid their wages, becauſe he bids them *be contented with their wages, and do violence to no man.* But few or no Evangelick Precepts are obeyed, and this as little as any; Souldiers get not their wages, and violence is done to many men. At the firſt view, it would ſeem ſtrange, why Princes pay their Souldiery very well and duly in the time of Peace, when they have little or nothing to do with them, and very ill and very ſeldome in the time of War, when they have moſt to do with them. But the reaſon is ſoon found, they need far greater numbers in time of War than Peace, and many are not paid with ſo little money as a few are. In the Wars of *Europe* theſe laſt fourſcore years and upwards (wherein his Majeſties Dominions were free, except in the late unhappy Civil War) we find that the Eſtates of the *United Provinces* have payed their Armies better than any other Prince or State; this makes the Mercenary Souldier run to their Service, and capacitates them to make great levies in a very ſhort time. The effects of the bad payment of the *Spaniards* appeared, when their King ſtood moſt in need of their ſervice ſeventy years ago and a little upwards; and many times ſince; for that gave a riſe to thoſe terrible Mutinies, in which they poſſeſs'd themſelves of Towns, and treated with their Generals and Superiours, as if they had been Free Eſtates. This incapacitated the *Spaniſh* Miniſters to proſecute the War againſt the new Eſtates, in which time, it is not to be thought, that either they, or the Prince of *Orange* were idle Spectators. The moſt conſiderable Army the *Sweeds* had in the year after the death of their Victorious King *Guſtavus Adolphus*, lay idle at *Donaverth*, loſing the time of Action, and treating for their pay. *Boccalini* informs us, that once the Gardiners complain'd to *Apollo*, that they had no Inſtruments to make all the weeds of their Gardens run and dance after them, as Princes and Free States, who could make all the idle and unprofitable members of their Principalities go out of the Gardens of their Common-wealths, with the rattling of a Drum, and the ſound of a Trumpet. But I think, Princes and States are to be much more admired for another ſecret art of their own, whereby they get theſe Drones to do them both laborious and hazardous ſervice, for very little Money, and at a low expence. The Pay and Wages for Officers and Souldiers of both Horſe and Foot, are different according to the eſtabliſhments of ſeveral Princes and States. I ſhall ſpeak a little of ſome of them; for to ſpeak of all, though I could, were needleſs.

Armies univerſally ill paid.

Boccalini his *Ragguagli*.

The *German* Emperours eſtabliſhment during the time of the long War, was fair enough, for there was promiſed to every Colonel of Horſe 300 Dollars, to a Lieutenant-Colonel one hundred and eighty, to a Major one hundred and twenty, to a Ritmaſter one hundred, to a Lieutenant ſixty, to a Cornet fifty, beſides allowances of fodderage for ſo many Horſes, proportionably according to

German Emperour his Pay.

to their qualities, monthly: To a Quartermaſter twenty four Dollars, to a Corporal twenty two, to a Clerk fifteen, to a Trumpeter as much, and to an Einſpanneer or Trooper twelve. The Pay for the Officers and Souldiers of Foot was much leſs: But they got not three months Pay of twelve in a whole year. But *Bockler* tells us, that in the year 1658. at *Frankford on the Maine*, the Electors and Princes of the Empire, who had joyn'd in a League, (whereof there are many made in that Countrey) had unanimouſly agreed upon a Pay to be given to their forces, ſo long as the League continued, (moſt of their Leagues are broke in ſhorter time than they are a making) and it was this. A Rit-maſter was to have for himſelf every month ſixty Dollars, and allowance for ſix Horſes, which amounted to forty eight Dollars, ſo he had in all one hundred and eight Dollars monthly. But becauſe all the Officers of Horſe had allowance for ſome Horſes, beſide their own Pay, I ſhall for brevity ſet down the allowance for themſelves and Horſes together. A Lieutenant had monthly forty four Dollars, a Cornet as much; a Quarter-maſter twenty three; a Corporal twenty one; the Clerk, Trumpeter, and Chirurgeon each of them eleven; and the Smith as much; a common Trooper eight. Before I ſpeak of the Foot-pay, I ſhall premiſe, that the Kings of *Denmark* and *Sweden*, and moſt of the *German* Princes allow a Waggon with four Horſes, and two Saddle-Horſes for a Captain of Foot, and the like number between the Lieutenant and Enſign. The Princes then of this *German* League allowed for a Foot-Captain, himſelf and Horſes monthly forty eight Dollars; for a Lieutenant twenty one; for an Enſign-bearear as much; for a Serjeant ſix; for a Fourier, Furer, Captain at Arms, Clerk, Drummer, Piper, and Gentleman of the Company, each of them two Dollars, and the fourth part of one; for the common Soldier every month two Dollars.

Pay of the Confederated *German* Princes, *An.* 1658.

I ſhall not ſpeak here either of the *Daniſh* or the *Swediſh* pay; they being much about one with this agreement, except that their allowance is a little more and greater both for the Under-officers, and the common Soldiers. The *French* Pay will be much about one with the *Swediſh*: And therefore, my Reader, if he know any thing of his Majeſties eſtabliſhment, will quickly perceive, that his Pay is greater than any of thoſe I have ſpoke of, and is better paid than all of them.

Swediſh, *Daniſh* and *French* Pay.

All far ſhort of his Majeſties.

How the *German* Princes paid their Souldiery in their laſt ſhort War, I know not, but in the long one, I am ſure, they paid very ill, and ſo did the *Sweed*. Thoſe who were in Garriſon got ſometimes three, but for moſt part but two Lendings in the month, every Lending being but a little more than half a Rix-dollar, to which was added the aſſiſtance of ſome proviant Bread. Why they call this a Lending, I know not, unleſs it be to make the Souldiers believe they lend them money, when they are but paying them a part of their own. But the pooreſt witted Souldier knows well enough, that his Pay-maſters, under the notion of lending them a third part, borrow from them to a very long day, all the reſt of their Pay. This is for their Garriſons. In the Fields, they may happily deceive themſelves, whether they be Officers or Souldiers, that expect any Money, but muſt be contented with Commis Bread, till by ſome Victory, any of their Generals be enabled to quarter his Army in a plentiful Countrey, and there it is, where the common Souldiers may put themſelves in Clothes, the Officers in good equippage, and the Colonels make themſelves rich; for the *German*, *Daniſh*, and *Swediſh* Colonels play too often the Roytelets, and petty Kings in their ſeveral Regiments. But ſome Officers there be, who never meet with ſuch opportunities, and ſome are not dextrous enough to lay hold on ſuch occaſions when they offer themſelves; for at ſuch times, there is ſomething elſe required, than to receive Pay from the Clerk of the Company. I remember, a Countrey-man of mine told me once, that he had ſerved the Crown of *Sweden* eight years, whereof he had been a Captain three, and that in all thoſe years he had never been Maſter of fourſcore Crowns at one time.

Bad Pay in the long *German* War.

One hundred years ago, Armies were better paid than now they are, and Officers and Souldiers could tollerably well ſubſiſt, great care was then taken, by a ſeaſonable diſtribution of money to prevent Mutinies, and deſertion of the ſervice; why it is not ſo yet, perhaps want of Money may be the cauſe, though

though there is now much greater ſtore of money, than was then; if Princes and States have other reaſons for it, they are not to communicate them to Soldiers, who are very improper Judges of them. I thought it ſtrange to ſee ſixteen or ſeventeen years ago, the native *Spaniards* to whoſe keeping the ſtrong Citadel of *Antwerp* was intruſted, begging publickly in the ſtreets of that City. But I thought it a more lamentable ſight to ſee both there, and in *Germany*, and elſewhere, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, and Captains begging an Alms. In former times Regiments were thrice, four, or five times ſtronger than now they are, and conſequently Troops and Companies were for their numbers as ſtrong if not ſtronger, than now half Regiments are. Hence it is, that I believe there are hundreds of old men yet living, who have ſeen private Captains in higher eſteem than Colonels are now. And I ſuppoſe if Princes and States thought it fit to follow the old way, and make their Troops and Companies three times ſtronger than now they are at their firſt levy, they might be as well ſerv'd, and ſave a vaſt expence of Treaſure. If an army of twenty four thouſand men were to be raiſed, whereof eighteen thouſand were to be Foot, and ſix thouſand Horſe, ſix Colonels might as well now command the 18000 Foot divided into ſix Regiments, as ſix Colonels did the like fifty years ago, and four Colonels might command the ſix thouſand Horſe, divided into four Regiments, allowing to each one thouſand five hundred Horſe. The expence that would be ſaved here of the pay of compleat Officers of twelve Regiments of Foot, and two of Horſe, would exceedingly help to pay the other eight.

Too many weak Regiments cauſe of bad pay.

Be pleaſed to ſee the truth of this inſtanced by an obſervation I made in the year 1649, after the Peace of *Munſter*, *Chriſtina* Queen of *Sweden* had in her pay in *Germany*, (beſides her forces in the reſt of her Dominions) four hundred and twenty Troops of Horſe and Dragoons, and threeſcore Regiments of Foot. In ſome Regiments there were twenty Companies, in ſome twelve, in ſome ten, and in ſome eight. All the Companies in the whole ſixty Foot Regiments were reckon'd to be ſix hundred and thirty. Her Confederate the *Landtgrave* of *Heſſen*, had a hundred and eight Troops of Horſe, and a hundred and eighty Companies of Foot; all the Horſe-Troops ſhould have been at their firſt levy eighty Riders apiece; every Foot-Company a hundred and twenty ſix at leaſt; therefore the Queens four hundred and twenty Troops of Cavalry, ſhould have been at their firſt levy thirty three thouſand ſix hundred, and her ſix hundred and thirty Companies ſhould have been at their firſt levy ſeventy nine thouſand three hundred and eighty men. The *Landtgrave*'s a hundred and eight Troops of Cavalry ſhould have been eight thouſand ſix hundred and forty Horſe. His hundred and eight Companies of Foot ſhould have been (at a hundred and twenty ſix men a piece) twenty two thouſand ſix hundred and eighty men. Be pleaſed to add the *Landtgrave*'s eight thouſand ſix hundred and forty Horſe to the Queens thirty three thouſand ſix hundred, the aggregate is forty four thouſand two hundred and forty. Add the *Landtgrave*'s twenty two thouſand ſix hundred and eighty Foot, to the Queens ſeventy nine thouſand three hundred and eighty, both the Infantries amounted to a hundred and two thouſand and ſixty. Now it is well known that when their Armies were Caſſed, they did not exceed, nay nor come near the half of theſe numbers; for if you add the number of the Infantry to that of the Cavalry, the Aggregate will be a hundred forty ſix thouſand three hundred. Now I conceive thirty Colonels might have commanded all the Cavalry, and thirty three Colonels all the Infantry, theſe would have been in all but ſixty three Regiments. And I am very ſure there were not ſo few Colonels as a hundred and forty. So there might have been ſav'd the expence of the Officers of eighty Regiments, both in the time of War, and at that time too when they were to give their Officers a little ſatisfaction-money (for ſo it was called) in lieu of all their Arrears, when they diſbanded them.

Numbers of *Swediſh* and *Heſſick* Regiments, after the Peace of *Munſter*.

And truly I ſhould think that unleſs ſome new emergency, or ſome unlook'd for diſaſter ſeemed to require it, the conſtant recruiting old Troops and Companies might advance a Princes ſervice as much, and ſave his Treaſure much more than the levying new Regiments doth, which ſtill draws both trouble and expence along with it. But it is time for me to forbear, for perhaps I have gone too far.

Recruits better than Levies.

Since

Since Money is generally ſcarce in the Wars, in ſo much that Soldiers cannot receive their Wages duly, let us ſee what allowance of Meat and Drink (ordinarily called Proviant) Princes allow their Soldiery, to furniſh which every Army ſhould have a General Proviant-maſter; and truly I conceive him to be an Officer as neceſſary and uſeful, if not more, in the fields, where moſtly our Modern Armies are entertain'd with Proviant, as either a General Commiſſary, or a Treaſurer. His Charge is to provide Victuals, Corn, Fleſh, Wine, Bread and Beer; he hath the inſpection of them, and ſhould ſee them equally and proportionably divided to the Regiments according to their ſeveral ſtrengths; for which purpoſe he ſhould have all the Rolls and Liſts by him, which his Secretaries ſhould carefully keep. He hath no power to ſell any Proviant under what pretence ſoever, without the Generals expreſs Warrant. All Mills where the Army comes are under his protection, and he is obliged to protect them. He hath the ordering of all the Magazines for Victuals, and to him belongs the care of ſeeing the Garriſons, and fortified places ſufficiently provided with ſuch Meats and Drinks as are moſt fit to preſerve; theſe are Corn, Grain, and Meal of ſeveral kinds, Stock-fiſh, Herrings, and all other Salted-fiſhes, Salted and Hung-fleſhes, eſpecially Beef and Bacon, Cheeſe, Butter, Almonds, Cheſnuts, and Hazel-nuts, Wine, Beer, Malt, Honey, Vinegar, Oyl, Tabaco, Wood and Coal for Firing, and as many living Oxen, Cows, Sheep, and Swine, Hens and Turkies as can be conveniently fed; for which purpoſe as alſo for Horſes, he is to provide Straw, Hay and Oats. This General Proviant-maſter hath under him a Lieutenant, a Secretary, a Clerk, a Smith, a Waggon-maſter, and a Waggon-maker, a Quarter-maſter, and ſome Officers who are called Directors.

A Proviant-maſter General, his Duties.

Proviſions for fortified places.

There are few Princes who have not their particular eſtabliſhment for their Proviant both in Field and Garriſon, as well as for Money; the order whereof commonly is this, they allow ſo much Bread, Fleſh, Wine or Beer to every Trooper and Foot-Soldier, which ordinarily is alike to both; then they allow to the Officers according to their dignities and charges, double, triple, and quadruple portions; as to an Enſign four times more than to a common Soldier, a Colonel having commonly twelve portions allow'd him. The ordinary allowance for a Soldier in the field, is daily two pound of Bread, one pound of Fleſh, or in lieu of it, one pound of Cheeſe, one pottle of Wine, or in lieu of it, two pottles of Beer. It is enough, crys the Soldiers, we deſire no more, and it is enough in conſcience. But this allowance will not laſt very long, they muſt be contented to march ſometimes one whole week, and ſcarce get two pound of Bread all the while, and their Officers as little as they, who if they have no proviſions of their own carried about with them, muſt be ſatisfied with Commis-bread, and cold water, as well as the common Soldier, unleſs they have money to buy better entertainment from Sutlers. I have known Captains give a very great demonſtration of their patience, and their affection to their Maſters ſervice, by ſatisfying their appetites with water, and very coarſe bread, one whole Summer, and part of the next winter.

Allowance of Proviant.

But they will be refreſhed when I tell them of free Quarter which Princes and their Generals are many times forc'd for want of money to grant, where they can Quarter their Armies in Towns and Villages, and this proves oft the deſtruction of a Country: for though no exorbitancy be committed, and that every man both Officer and Soldier demand no other entertainment than what is allowed by the Prince or State where they ſerve; yet when an Army cannot be Quarter'd but cloſe and near together, to prevent Infalls, Anſlachts and Surprifal of an Enemy, it is an eaſie matter to imagin what a heavy burthen theſe places bear, whom in poor mens houſes, ſix, ſeven, eight, it may be fourteen or fifteen Soldiers are lodged, for in ſuch caſes it is ordinary to quarter two thouſand Foot, or a thouſand Horſe in a little Town, where perhaps there are not above three or four hundred houſes. And withal it is very hard to get Soldiers and Horſemen kept within the limits of their Duty in theſe Quarters, after they have endured hunger, thirſt, and other hardſhips in the field. It is true, all Princes who for

Free Quarter, very burdenſome to a Country, though never ſo well regulated.

preſervation of their Armies from extream ruin, and for want of Treaſure, are neceſſitated too often to make uſe of this free Quarter, do not only make ſtrict Laws and Ordinances, how many times a day Officers and Soldiers are to eat, and how many Diſhes every one according to his quality is to call for, but likewiſe ſet down the preciſe rates and values of the Diſhes, that the Hoſt be not obliged to do beyond thoſe limitations, yet the grievance continues heavy and great.

Ordinances for free Quarter.

The Ordinances concerning free Quarter of the Emperour, the Kings of *Denmark* and *Sweden*, and *German* Princes, are upon the matter with little difference all one, as thus: A Colonel is to have twelve diſhes of meat, each at the rate of the eighth part of a *Dollar*, ten pound of Bread, and ten meaſures of Wine. A Lieutenant Colonel, eight diſhes, eight pound of Bread, and ſix meaſures of Wine. A Major or Captain ſix diſhes of Meat, ſix pound of Bread, and ſix meaſures of Wine. A Lieutenant and Enſign, each of them four diſhes, four pound of Bread, and three meaſures of Wine. Every Serjeant three diſhes of Meat, two pound of Bread, and one meaſure and a half of Wine. Every Corporal, and every Drummer two diſhes of Meat, two pound of Bread, and one meaſure and a half of Wine. A common Soldier or Trooper ſo much Fleſh, Bread and Wine as I ſpoke of before, when I told you what Proviant was allow'd him. If the Army be not in a Wine-Country, then all thoſe I have ſpoke of, have a double allowance of Beer. This is beſides the Hay, Straw and Oats the Country is bound to furniſh to the Horſes, not only of the Cavalry, Artillery, and General Officers, but to thoſe Horſes likewiſe that belong to the Infantry. And this grievance of Foderage proves many times heavier than the free quarter, all being often eaten up in a ſhort time, wherewith the Inhabitants ſhould maintain their Horſes and Beaſts. In theſe Countries where the Country-people receive a little money for what the Soldiers ſpend on their Marches in their tranſient Quarters, as for moſt part in his Majeſties Dominions is more tollerable than where they receive no moneys at all, though the Hoſts of both Foot and Horſe muſt be conſiderable loſers, when they get but a Two-pence or a Groat for a nights entertainment.

Foderage.

Service.

Service is that which every Hoſt is bound to furniſh either in Town or Country to thoſe that are lodged with them, whether they be Officers, Troopers, or common Soldiers, whether they be on free quarter, or to pay for their Diet. Service comprehends a Bed, Lodging, Table, and Table-linnen, Fire, Salt and Vinegar. It is a grievance likewiſe, becauſe many times the Soldiers are extreamly extravagant in demanding more of thoſe than they need. I find in ſome Hiſtories of *France*, that ninety years ago or thereby, this Service was called *Uſtence*, and when they got pay, they were to ſeek no other *Uſtence* or Service but a Bed, a Table, and a Table-cloth, and liberty to dreſs their Meat at the Hoſts fire. Nor might they invite one another to their Quarters, becauſe that prov'd troubleſome to their Landlords. But when moneys were wanting, then the Soldiers were to have free Quarter, which was ſo well regulated, that none might demand any other entertainment than what the Hoſt was pleaſed to give them, provided that was ſufficient to ſatisfie nature. And withal, five Shillings *ſterling* in money every month, wherewith to buy ſhoos, or other ſmall Neceſſaries. And truly this was a better order for free Quarter than any I have yet ſpoken of. A very eſpecial care was taken to puniſh all ſuch who tranſgreſt any of theſe Ordinances. And about that ſame time I find that the Proteſtants pay was very frugal, the Foot was paid thus: A Captain had every Month a hundred *French* Livers, the Lieutenant had fifty, the Enſign thirty, the Serjeant fifteen, every Corporal, Piper, and Drummer twelve, and the common Soldier had nine.

French Service.

Proteſtant pay eighty or ninety years ago.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of Military Laws and Articles, of Courts of War, of the Judg-Marshal, and Provost-Marshal-General.

THE Laws of God and Nature would not be sufficient to keep wicked man within the bounds of his duty, if the Municipal Laws of the Land were not superadded, and those would signifie but little too, if the punitive execution of them did not follow the transgressors of them. I know not indeed why Souldiers should not be governed by those same Laws whereby other subjects of that same Prince and State are, if it be not for two reasons: First, an Army being in the field, and making no long abode in one place, Criminals and other guilty persons cannot be so formally and legally conven'd before the ordinary Judges of the Land, as the constant Inhabitants may, especially when an Army is out of a Prince his own Dominions, as many times it is. Secondly it is found not only fit but necessary, that more severe Laws be made in Camps than in Cities, for I know not by what authority, for what reason, or by what instinct men who follow the War, assume to themselves a greater liberty to sin than other Mortals do, as if the entering themselves in a Militia, did let them loose from all Civil bonds and tyes of humane Society, and that which in a Commonwealth is a Capital crime, were but a venial *Peccadillo* in an Army. That some Armies are better govern'd than others, is easily granted, and that fewer gross crimes are committed in some, than in others, will not be denied, being some Generals are more just, more exact, and more severe than others are; and which is more than that, some Armies are better paid than others be; for *Theoderick* King of the *Goths* said well, *Disciplinam non servat jejunus exercitus*: A hungry Army observes no Discipline. But that the *Roman* Armies in ancient times, and some since their decay, were so well govern'd, and all the members of them so orderly, is but a dream; their terrible disorders and extravagant deportments are to be seen in History, and some of them I have touched in the beginning of my Discourses of the *Roman* Militia. And if in an Army some offences be not instantly punisht, it will be found peradventure within a few hours impossible to punish them at all. Hence it is that a Commander in the War is not only permitted to do that which the Civil Judg may not do, but is lyable to censure if he does it not, as to inflict present death, either by his particular order, or with his own hand without formal process, as in the case of mutiny, to kill one in the beginning of it, and so to terrifie others from prosecuting it, or in the case of disobedience, when the appearance or pursuit of an enemy, will not suffer the Delinquent to be legally proceeded against, or upon a march when an enemy is either in Van, reer or flank; a Marshal-General may be order'd to hang all without process, whom he finds at such a distance from the Army without his Colonels Pass; and in this last case Officers may kill those Soldiers that straggle or lag behind. But I should advise all Commanders not to make themselves *Boureaus*, and to be very sparing to kill with their own hands, except in extraordinary cases.

Reasons for the severity of Military Laws.

Soldiers in some cases may be put to death without process.

These reasons have given a just rise to Military Laws, which ordinarily are called Articles of War, there are, or at least, should be as many several Military Constitutions as there are Princes or States, who wage War, for every one of them hath his several Laws and Statutes, yet all or most agree in these following particulars.

Articles of War.

First, strict Laws are made for the observance of Religious Duties, a submission to Church-Discipline, and a due respect to be given to all Ecclesiastical persons, against Atheism, Blasphemy, Perjury, and the prophanation of

For Religion.

For Loyalty. the name of God. Secondly for the maintenance of the Majeſty and Authority of the Prince or State, in whoſe ſervice the Army is, that nothing be done or ſpoke to the diſparagement of himſelf, his Government, his Undertakings, or the Juſtice of any of his actions, under all higheſt pains. Thirdly for honour, reſpect, and obedience to be given to all ſuperior Commanders from the higheſt to the loweſt of them, and none of their Commands are to be diſputed, much leſs are they themſelves to be affronted, either by geſtures, words, or actions. But this is to be underſtood that the command be not diametrically contrary, and prejudicial to the Prince his ſervice; but indeed ſuch commands would be ſo clear that they need no canvaſing, otherwiſe any diſobedience opens a door to reſiſtance, that uſhereth in ſedition, which often is ſupported by open rebellion. To clear which, ſuppoſe what frequently falls out, that the Governour of a well fortified, and a well provided place offers to deliver it up to an enemy without oppoſition, thoſe under him may reſiſt ſo unjuſt and ſo baſe a command; and they not only may, but ought to reſiſt him, for the diſobedience in ſuch a caſe of the ſubaltern Officers and Soldiers is a piece of excellent ſervice done to their Maſter; and if they do it not, they are lyable to thoſe Laws of War, which for giving over a Fort in that faſhion, ſentences the Governour to an Ignominious death, the inferiour Commanders to be ſhamefully caſheer'd, and the common Soldiers to be diſarm'd, and made ſerve as Pioneers to the Army; which were acts of great injuſtice, if Inferiors were bound to give a blind obedience to all the Commands of their Superiors, whatever they be, without exception. And ſuch a caſe it is, when an Officer commands thoſe under him to deſert their Poſt, whether that be in Town, Camp, Leaguer, or Field, and go over with him to the Enemy. If they do ſo, and are ever retaken, he is puniſht for his treachery, and they for their obedience to ſo illegal a command.

For Obedience.

Diſobedience to unlawful Commands, lawful.

For keeping ſtrict Guards, and Watches. Fourthly, Articles of War are made for due and ſtrict keeping of Guards and Watches; and here (as in many other points) obſerve the ſeverity of Military Law, for he who after tap-too diſchargeth any Hand gun, be it Piſtol, Musket, Fuſee, or Carrabine (unleſs againſt an enemy) or he who ſleeps on his Centinel, or deſerts it, or he who is drunk on his Watch, are all to die; theſe be crimes which the Municipal Laws of moſt Nations do not puniſh with death, yet in the Laws of War this ſeverity is thought no more than neceſſary.

Againſt ſtraglers. Fifthly, Laws are made againſt thoſe who ſtay behind, or ſtraggle in ordinary or extraordinary Marches.

Againſt Runnaways. Sixthly, Againſt Fugitives and Runnaways, either ſuch as leave their Colours when they are in Garriſons or Quarters, and deſert the Service under any pretence, without a Paſs, or ſuch as run away from their Colours, or their Officers in the field, in time of Skirmiſh or Battel, or ſuch who in ſtorms and aſſaults deſert their Poſts, till either they are wounded, or have made uſe of their Swords, all theſe are lyable to death, and thoſe who wound or kill any of them in their flight, in their going or running away, are not to be accountable for it.

Againſt Treaties with an Enemy. Seventhly, Againſt thoſe who make any Treaty or agreement in the field with an enemy, without the command or conſent of him who commands in chief. And here again obſerve another caſe wherein Inferiors are to refuſe obedience; the Military Law condemns a Colonel for ſuch a Treaty, and every tenth Soldier of his Regiment to die with him, for giving obedience to ſo unjuſt a command.

Againſt needleſs Surrender of Forts, and ſeveral other crimes. Eighthly, Againſt thoſe who ſurrender fortified places, unleſs extream neceſſity require it, of which I ſhall ſpeak in a more proper place.

Ninthly, Againſt thoſe who mutiny, burn houſes, without the Generals command, commit robbery, murther, theft, or violence to thoſe who have the Generals ſafeguards, and againſt thoſe who keep private correſpondence, unleſs order'd to do it by the General; all theſe crimes by moſt Military Laws are puniſht with death.

Againſt Duels. Tenthly, Againſt private Combats or Duels, the Combatants and their Seconds are to die; and if ſuperior Officers knew of the Combat, and did not hinder it, they are to be caſheer'd with Ignominy; a neceſſary Law enough, yet ſeldom put in execution.

Eleventh-

Eleventhly, Againſt thoſe who ſell, play, or pawn, or change their Arms either defenſive or offenſive, whether he be a Horſeman, or a Foot-Soldier; he who doth any of theſe, is not only puniſhable, but likewiſe he who bought, won, or took them in pawn. Againſt ſellers or pawners of Arms.

Twelfthly, Againſt falſe Muſters, whether it be of Men, Horſes, Arms, Saddles, or other Furniture, by theſe Articles not only thoſe who make the falſe Muſter, but all thoſe who help to make it, are puniſhable. Againſt falſe Muſters.

Thirteenthly, Againſt thoſe who detain the pay of either Horſemen, or Foot-Soldiers, any Officer guilty of this deſerves to die. Neither if an Officer have lent money to a Soldier, may he pay himſelf, or retain in his hand what he pleaſeth, but muſt give him as much of his pay as can entertain him to do his Maſters ſervice. Againſt thoſe who detain the Princes Pay.

Fourteenthly, Againſt thoſe Officers whatſoever they be (except the General) who give Paſſes. The *Swediſh* Articles order a Colonel (who preſumes to give a Paſs) to loſe his life, and to loſe his charge if he permit any under his command to go home without the Felt-marſhals knowledg. Againſt thoſe who give Paſſes.

Other abominable crimes, ſuch as Adultery, Inceſt, Sodomy, Beaſtiality, Parricide, are examin'd, try'd and puniſht according to the Municipal Laws of the Prince or State who is Maſter of the Army. And many ſmaller faults are left to the cognizance, diſcretion and arbitrament of a Court of War. Greater Crimes. Smaller faults.

A Council of War, and a Court of War, are commonly by ordinary Soldiers confounded, as if they were one thing, whereas they are very different; the firſt being compoſed of thoſe perſons whom the Prince or his General calls to conſult with concerning the managing the War, and theſe are indeed but Counſellors, and have in moſt Armies their Preſident, who is nominated by the Prince or State, they do but adviſe for the Prince or his Captain-General, have a negative voice, and retain a power to themſelves to do what they pleaſe. A Court of War conſiſts of thoſe Officers who are call'd together to be a Jury in the examining, proceſſing, and ſentencing Delinquents; and it is twofold, a General or high Court of War, and a Regiment, or a low Court of War. A Council of War.

The Cauſes belonging to the General Court of Wars cognizance, are matters of Treaſon againſt the Prince or State, injuries and affronts done or offer'd to the perſon or honour of their General; differences between the Cavalry and Infantry, between one Regiment and another, between Officers of one Regiment, or between Officers and Soldiers of one Regiment. To the deciſion of a General Court of War belong all Civil affairs and buſineſs, though they have been determined in the lower Courts; for in theſe caſes Appeals are permitted to the higher Court; neither can the ſentence of the lower Court be executed, till the proceſs be fully heard in the ſuperior, if the parties concerned have appealed to it. When the buſineſs concerns the Prince or State, or that any General perſon or Colonel is criminally accuſed, the General or Commander in chief of the Army is obliged to preſide himſelf. But in thoſe other caſes which I have mention'd, He may appoint a Lieutenant-General, or a Major-General to preſide. I know the *Swedes* give the Preſidency in General Courts of War, conſtantly to the Auditor-General, or Judg-Marſhal, in the General or Felt-Marſhals abſence. But truly I think this is not done without ſome derogation to thoſe General Officers who aſſiſt; for though upon the matter the Auditor-General orders the proceedings of the Martial Court, yet in point of honour he ſhould not preſide in a high Court of War no more than a Regiment-Auditor (in the Diſcipline of theſe ſame *Swedes*) preſides in a lower Court. The Aſſeſſors ſhould be twelve in number at leaſt, (for they may be, and ordinarily are more) beſides the Preſident, and in ſome places fourteen beſides the Preſident. Theſe be the General of the Artillery, the Lieutenant-General of the Army, the Generals of the Cavalry and Infantry, the Lieutenant-Generals, and Major-Generals of Horſe and Foot, the Quarter-maſter General, and ſuch Colonels as the General, or Auditor-General thinks fit to appoint. After they are conven'd, they take their places thus: At the head of the Table, the Preſident ſits alone, upon his right hand at the A General Court of War. Caſes to be determined by it. The Preſident of it. The Aſſeſſors.

the ſide of the Table, ſits the General of the Artillery, and under him the General of the Cavalry. Upon the Preſidents left hand at the ſide of the Table, ſits the Lieutenant-General of the Army, and under him the General of the Foot. Under the General of the Cavalry ſits the Lieutenant-General of the Cavalry, and under the General of the Foot, ſits the Lieutenant-General of the Foot; and in that ſame order the Major-Generals, and next them the General Commiſſary, and General Quarter-maſter. Next them, all the Colonels who are called there, take their places according to the time they have ſerved as Colonels in that Prince or States ſervice; the right ſide of the Table (which is that on the Preſidents right hand) being more honourable than the other. After they have all taken their ſeats, they riſe again, and hear an Oath read, wherein they ſwear with hands up, to be free from all malice, envy, hatred, revenge, fear, and affection, and that they ſhall judg righteouſly and impartially, according to the Laws, Conſtitutions, and Articles of War, and their own beſt judgment, and conſcience. So help them God in the great day. The Provoſt-Marſhal General is to be the Accuſer, with the help of the Princes Prolocutor-fiſcal, and to him belongs alſo the execution of the ſentence.

Their Precedency.

Their Oath.

The Accuſer.

The lower Court of War is that which is kept in the ſeveral Regiments, whether Horſe or Foot, which the Colonels, and in their abſence the Lieutenant-Colonels may call, when ever they think the neceſſity of their affairs require it. A Regiment Court-Marſhal may judg and determine in all cauſes, both Civil and Criminal, and of all perſons (except the three Field-Officers) within that Regiment. The Colonel preſides, in his abſence the Lieutenant-Colonel, and in his the Major; or if none of theſe be preſent, the oldeſt Captain, but the Regiment-Auditor, never, nay not in the *Swediſh* Armies. In the Regiments of Horſe, the Colonels Aſſeſſors are his Lieutenant-Colonel, and Major, three Rit-maſters, as many Lieutenants, as many Cornets, and as many Corporals, or more, if the Colonel pleaſeth. In a Regiment of Foot, two Captains, two Lieutenants, two Enſigns, two Serjeants, two Furers, and two Fouriers, where ſuch Officers are allowed; where not, more of the Serjeants, and two Corporals. They may be in all more than thirteen, but fewer they may not be. The Regiments Provoſt-Marſhal preſents the accuſed party with a Guard to the Court of War, after the members have ſworn as the General Court of War uſeth to do, and formally delivers his accuſation; from this Court, there may be (as I told you before) appellation, in Civil affairs, but not in Criminals, yet no ſentence of death paſt by a lower Court of War can be executed, till the General approves of it, and ſometimes he remits the examination of it to a ſuperior Court; eſpecially when he hath ground to believe that the Regiment-Court hath paſt either too rigorous, or too mild and favourable a ſentence. And this ſuperior Court call'd in ſuch caſes, is commonly call'd a Court of Error, becauſe it cognoſceth of the Errors of the inferior ones. The Prince or State ſtill retains power to moderate and mitigate the ſentence of either of the Courts, or graciouſly to remit and pardon the offence; and in their abſence their Generals may do the like, except in the caſes of *Les Majeſty*. But after the ſentence of either the one Court, or the other, is pronounced, no man that bears charge or office in the Army is permitted to ſpeak for pardon or mitigation, unleſs it be Enſigns (to whom ſomething of that nature by cuſtom is indulged) and in ſome places Officers who tranſgreſs in this point are puniſht with the loſs of their places, and ſuch as have done ſo, may be ſure none will be ſo kind as to plead for their reſtoration.

A Regiment Court of War.

The Preſident.

His Aſſeſſors.

Their Number.

The Accuſer.

The ſentence to be approved by the General.

Court of Error.

Theſe Laws, Ordinances, and Courts of War, the ſentences of theſe Courts, and execution of theſe ſentences, makes up that part of a Militia which ordinarily is called the Diſcipline of War; for the right ordering and regulating whereof, an Auditor-General, Inferior Auditors, a Marſhal-General, Inferior Provoſts, Marſhals, and their Lieutenants, with Executioners, or Hangmen, are abſolutely neceſſary members in all Armies.

Diſcipline of War.

The Auditor-General is he whom we call Judg Marſhal, and whom ſome call Judg-Advocate. He ought to be a grave and judicious perſon, who fears God, and hates vice, eſpecially bribery. A Lawyer he ſhould be, in regard moſt

Judg Marſhal.

moſt Articles of War have their riſe from Law, and many caſes chance to be voided in Courts of War, where no Military article is clear, but muſt be determin'd by the Civil, or by the Municipal Law of the Prince, to whom the Army belongs, and the Judg-Marſhals duty is to inform the Court what either of theſe Laws provides in ſuch caſes. Some Princes remit the whole Juſtice of the Army ſo abſolutely to the Judg-Marſhal, that they give him power to puniſh Soldiers who tranſgreſs publick Proclamations, of himſelf, without the Colonels conſent, yea, whether he will or not. The Provoſt-Marſhal General, and all Officers of Juſtice of the Army, whatever name they bear, are to obey the Judg-Marſhals directions and orders. He may cauſe Delinquents to be apprehended, and ſend them to the Regiments to which they belong, with direction to the Colonels to call Regiment Courts of War, at which he may appoint the Provoſt-Marſhal, or his Lieutenant to be preſent, and to appeal from it in caſe any unjuſt or partial ſentence be pronounced. All complaints whether in matters Civil or Criminal uſe to be brought before him; and in many of them he hath power to give judgment himſelf without any Court, and in others he hath authority to oblige Colonels to do Juſtice, wherein if they fail, he may bring them before a General Court, to anſwer for their partiality. All differences that are among Merchants, Tradeſmen, Mark-tenters and Sutlers, who are permitted to frequent the Army, or that happen between any of them, and the Officers and Soldiers, are brought before him, and in them all (after due examination of the whole fact, and witneſſes) he hath power to judg and give ſentence. He hath power to call together a General Court of War, and to call ſuch Colonels to it as he thinks fit, but herein he ſeldom acts till the General or Feltmarſhal adviſe the matter with him. Such Colonels as he cites to be Aſſeſſors, and do not appear, he may fine, and by the Fiſcal exact the Fines he hath impoſed. He is bound to examine all Priſoners of War, as alſo all ſuch as frequent the Army, and may be ſuſpected to be ſpies. All Teſtaments, Contracts, and Obligations between party and party, are judged to be in force when they are ſigned and atteſted by him. He hath power of the Meaſures and Weights within the Army, and may order the Marſhals to ſet fitting Prices on all vendible things that are for Back or Belly. And he is to have a care that the Provoſt-Marſhals neither wrong the Soldiers, nor the Merchants, Victualers or Sutlers, and he is Judg in any difference that may ariſe between any of them.

His Qualifications, and Duty.

His Power very great.

A Provoſt-Marſhal General is by thoſe who do not well underſtand his Office, taken at beſt to be but a Jaylor, but by ſome to be a Hangman. But no Jaylor ever durſt aſſume the power which all Military Laws and Cuſtoms give a Marſhal, for he may by vertue of his Office, without any command or permiſſion of his Superiors apprehend thoſe he finds actually tranſgreſſing the Articles of War, or in any other groſs miſdemeanor, and according to the quality of the fault, either detain them Priſoners with a Guard, or yet clap them in Irons. But he may neither diſmiſs them, nor yet impoſe further puniſhment on them without order from either the Commander in chief of the Army, or the Judg-Marſhal General. At ſome times, and in ſome occaſions he is permitted, yea commanded to hang or ſhoot to death ſuch as he finds (in contempt of late Proclamations) ſtragling, robbing, burning, or Plundering. And for that reaſon a Guard of Horſe is allow'd him, theſe the *French* call Archers. Whoſoever offers to oppoſe him in the exerciſe of his charge, be what he will, is to die for it. All Provoſt-Marſhals of Regiments, Troops, or Companies, whether of Horſe or Foot, are to ſwear obedience to the Commands of this Marſhal-General; and whoever pays it not, is by the command of the Auditor-General turn'd out of the Army, with the conſent of the Colonel or Captain, according as he is a Regiment or Companies Marſhal. All Marſhals of Regiments are bound when they are in the field every morning and evening to wait on the Marſhal-General to receive his directions according to Emergencies, and he who fails in either attendance or obedience, is puniſhable according to the quality of the fact. I have told you that in General Courts of War, he is the Accuſer, and is to ſee the ſentence put in execution. He is to have a ſtrict eye over his inferior Marſhals that they do their Duties uprightly and impartially, and that they permit not the Soldiers to wrong the Victualers and Sutlers, nor thoſe to wrong the Soldiers, by taking greater

A Provoſt-Marſhal-General,

His Power in an Army.

His Duty. greater Prices, or ſelling with leſs meaſures or weights than thoſe appointed by the Auditor-General. He ought to take pains to learn what the Prices of things are in theſe Towns where the Mark-tenters buy their Wine, Beer, Tobaco, Vinegar, Oyl, Bread, Bacon, and other Proviſions, that accordingly the General Auditor may know with the greater juſtice to impoſe the Prices. But the truth is, the Buyers are too often abuſed, and the Prices ſet too high by the colluſion of the Provoſt-Marſhal with Sutlers, and the Sutlers bribing the Judg Marſhal.

His Jaylor. The Provoſt-Marſhal General hath a Jaylor under him, who muſt be paid by every Priſoner his Jail-money, and if Irons be clapt on him, he muſt pay for them beſides. He is to have a pottle of Wine or Beer of every Hogſhead that is brought to the Camp by the Sutlers, and the Tongue of every Beaſt that is ſlaughter'd in it, and for theſe he agrees with the Regiment-Marſhals. The ſame power he hath in the field with an Army, the like he hath in all Garriſons, though he come to any of them but accidentally, or upon ſome emergency.

Under the Marſhal-General are Hangmen, and thoſe are the fellows who glory that all this great ſhow and parad of Juſtice, of Courts of War, of Judg-Marſhals, of Provoſt Marſhals, and Clerks, would be but a fanfare, and ſignifie nothing at all, if it were not for them. They avouch that they are the Pillars, the props, and ſupporters of Juſtice; for if, ſay they, the Executive part of the

Hangmen. Law, be the life of the Law, then Hangmen, who are the true and unqueſtionable Executioners of the Law, keep life in the Law, by taking away the lives of the Breakers, contemners, and tranſgreſſors of it.

I have known another high Juſtitiary in *Swediſh* Armies of equal power with the Marſhal-General, for what power this laſt hath in Quarters, Garriſon or Camp, the ſame hath the other in the field on a March; he is qualified with

Rumor-maſter General. the title of Rumor-maſter General, whether he be made uſe of in other places, is more than I have learned. His charge is to ride with a Guard of Horſe, and ſome Hangmen on the Van and Flanks of the Army, and in a Retreat; in the Reer, to ſave all the ſeveral Quarters and Country from being pillaged or plunder'd, and the Country people from being wrong'd; and many times he is commanded to uſe Summary Juſtice and execution on the offenders, in the place where they are taken, but for moſt part only to apprehend them, and deliver them over to the Marſhal General.

The Laws and Articles of War of every Prince and State ought to be promulgated to all the Armies, and read over to every particular Regiment, Troop, and Company every month, or at leaſt every quarter of a year that none may have reaſon to pretend ignorance. In all Courts of War, higher or lower Offi-

How the members of a Court of War give their ſentence. cers of equal quality, as Major-Generals, Colonels, Majors, Captains, Serjeants and Corporals, (after a full examination, and hearing of parties, and witneſſes) go apart by themſelves, and after ſome debate agree upon the ſentence, which he who hath the Precedency among them, whiſpers in the ear of the Clerk, who after he hath written all the ſeveral ſentences, gives them to the Auditor, whether General, or Particular of a Regiment; and he obſerving wherein moſt agree, makes that the ſentence of the Court which is ſign'd by the Preſident, and ſo ſent to the General. if he have not preſided himſelf. In Regiment-Courts of War ſuch inferior Officers, ſuppoſe Serjeants and Corporals ought to be choſen to ſit, as know in ſome meaſure what it is to judg according to equity and reaſon: for I have ſeen many of them in ſeveral places of the world, who thought they gave their verdict like wiſe men, and gallant fellows, (even when Articles of War were clear) when by their ſentence they refer'd an offender guilty of a Capital crime, to the mercy of the Lord General, or the Colonel. The *French* Councils of War now may conſiſt of ſeven Officers, and in them Lieutenants, ſub-Lieutenants, and Enſigns muſt only ſtand with their hats off, but give no ſentence.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Of Exerciſing, Drilling, and Training the ſeveral Bodies of the Cavalry, and the Infantry.

HAving levied and arm'd our Soldiers both of Horſe and Foot, and ſufficiently entertain'd them with goodly promiſes of Pay, Proviant, Service, and free Quarter, and ſhown them under what Laws and Diſcipline they are to live, it will be time to teach them the Duties of Soldiers, and this is done by Exerciſing and Drilling them. What kinds of Exerciſe Officers and Soldiers were inur'd to in ancient times, hath been abundantly told you in my Diſcourſes of the *Gracian* and *Roman* Art of War. Wreſtling, Running, Leaping, Swimming, all which harden and enable a mans Body, and render the Soldier active and dexterous in Battel, at Storms and Aſſaults, in purſuit of his enemy, and ſometimes in flight to ſave his own life, were the duties impoſed in ancient times, and to them properly belongs the word of Exerciſe. But this kind of Exerciſe is now rather permitted than commanded. The uſing the Spade and Mattock in making Ramparts and Ditches, building Walls, Sconces, Forts, and Caſtles, conſtantly practiſed in time of peace by the Ancients, eſpecially the *Romans*, is not now at all thought of, till either the Siege or defence of a Town, or the neceſſity to fortifie a Camp render it neceſſary, and then ſix Soldiers (not accuſtom'd before to that manner of Exerciſe) are not able to work ſo much as one Country-fellow newly taken from the Plow. The cuſtom of ſhooting at Butts with Bow and Arrow in *Scotland* and *England* is much, if not wholly worn out. In foreign places their ſhooting with Firelocks and rifled Guns at Marks every Holy-day, may make them good Firemen, and good Markſmen, but doth not ſtrengthen the nerves and arms of men as the Bow did. But to bring theſe Exerciſes ſo much conducing to the health and ſtrength of an Army in faſhion again, muſt be the work of no private perſon, but of a Prince or State.

Exerciſes properly ſo called.

Another part of Military Exerciſe conſiſts in teaching the Soldiers both of Horſe and Foot to fight orderly and readily with an Enemy, and this is that which properly we call Training and Drilling. It conſiſts of two parts, the firſt is, to teach them to handle and manage their offenſive Arms (whatſoever they be) handſomely, readily and dexterouſly, and this is ordinarily called the Poſtures. The ſecond is to make them when they are in a Body, to caſt themſelves in ſuch a figure or order as ſhall be commanded them, and this is commonly called the Motions and Evolutions.

Training and Drilling divided into two parts,

Before I ſpeak any more on this Subject, I ſhall ſay that though this Drilling and Training, be not ſo much forgot as thoſe other Exerciſes are, whereof I have but juſt now ſpoken, yet it is too much neglected in many places, neither do I think it is ſo much uſed in any place of *Europe*, as in his Majeſties Dominions, in which the Ancients are well imitated who train'd their Armies very punctually in time of Peace, as well as in time of War. I wiſh all Companies who otherwiſe are well enough train'd, were accuſtom'd to make Marches when they are exerciſed, as I ſaid in my Diſcourſe of Defenſive Arms. For though I do not deſire they ſhould be made to run or walk twenty, or five and twenty miles in five or ſix hours time, and in full Arms as the *Romans* did; yet I think they would be much ſtrengthen'd, and made more healthful, and more able to endure fatigue, if they were made twice a week, march in a Summer-morning ſeven or eight miles and back again in the afternoon, and proportionably as far in the Winter. This being frequently practiſed in time of peace, would make long and ſpeedy

Much neglected.

Marching a neceſſary point of Military Exerciſe.

Marches (which often are neceſſary in the time of War) even with Defenſive Arms very eaſie, and it would accuſtom the Soldiers to keep their ranks and files punctually, provided Officers be attentive to ſee them do it on that March. This would be to ſome better purpoſe than for Commanders to march with Squads, with half or whole Regiments a half hour, it may be a whole one, up and down, to and again, upon one ſpot of ground; a right Mock-march, whereby ſome Officers contrary to their intention (for they think they are doing a very handſome feat) make themſelves ridiculous to both the ſpectators, and their own Soldiers. The *Grecians* and *Romans* in time of War drill'd their Armies in the Fields, but Training is lookt upon now as an unneceſſary thing, not only in the Field, but in Towns and Garriſons likewiſe. This is not the Prince or States fault, but is an inexcuſable neglect and careleſneſs of Colonels, who make not their Captains do their duty in ſo neceſſary a point of War. I have ſeen in *Germany* and *Denmark* Regiments newly raiſed, and ſome alſo ſent out of *Sweden* in the time of the long War before the Peace of *Munſter*, only exerciſed and drill'd three or four times, and that was enough for them for the whole time they were to ſerve; for a man would have made himſelf ridiculous if he had ſpoken of drilling old Soldiers, to keep them in mind of their Poſtures and Motions; this would have been lookt on as a diſparagement to them, for it would have been preſuppoſed that they ſtood in need of Exerciſeing, as in truth moſt of them did. It is a pity, and ſometimes matter of ſport, to hear men glory that they are old Soldiers, who either never have learned, or have forgot, what belongs to their profeſſion, and ſo upon the matter prove themſelves to be old fools. Nay, I have ſeen in theſe ſame Wars many new levied Companies, Troops and Regiments never Train'd or Exerciſed at all; nay, not ſo much as one leſſon given to a Soldier for the handling his Arms. It is true, moſt of thoſe who were levied in my time, had ſerv'd in thoſe Wars, which were before my time, but all had not, and therefore ſome were raw and unexperienced, and the oldeſt Soldiers of them needed exceedingly to have had their memories refreſht. This was the condition of five thouſand Foot, and three Troops of Horſe which the City of *Dantzick* levied and entertain'd in the time of the late *Swediſh* War againſt *Poland*, from the year 1656, till the year 1660. I have not ſeen braver men, nor better equipp'd in any Militia than theſe were; but in one whole Summer that I was there, I never ſaw one Company, or one man of a Company drill'd or exercis'd. Since the Eſtates of the *United Provinces* made their Peace with the King of *Spain*, their Officers have been negligent enough of this duty, which might have been eaſily obſerv'd in moſt of their Garriſons, wherein I have been. But I ſuppoſe their late alarms have made them reſume their ancient care and diligence.

A Mock-march.

Supine careleſneſs of Colonels.

Old Soldiers.

Theſe Military Exerciſes were ſo far worn out of uſe, that I knew Count *Koningſmark* in the year 1655, (when he raiſed ſome new Regiments for his Maſter the King of *Sweden*) take ſome old Officers to be Drill-maſters to the new levied Companies, which notwithſtanding were provided with all the Officers belonging to them, and theſe Drill-maſters he entertain'd with Monthly wages, which I thought was not done without ſome blemiſh to the reputation of all the Officers, eſpecially of the Colonels and Captains.

Drill-maſters.

That part of Training which teacheth the handling Arms is different, to wit, that which teacheth a Horſeman to manage handſomely and readly his Piſtol, Carbine, and Sword, whether he be a Curiaſſier, or Harquebuſier, and that which teacheth a Foot ſoldier to handle his Muſquet and Pike, and his *Swedes* Feather, if he have one. And as a Horſeman is obliged to learn to Saddle and Bridle his Horſe quickly and well, to mount and diſmount handſomely, to ride decently, and carry his body well, or as it is called to have a good ſeat in his Saddle, and how to uſe his voice, his hand, his leg, and his ſpur; ſo he is obliged to teach his Horſe to obey him, whether it be in trotting, galloping, running, ſtanding, ſtopping, turning, or wheeling. The Horſeman ought to be taught how to keep his Piſtols and Carbine fixt, and bright without ruſt, how to charge them quickly, and prime them, how to fire them, and readily charge again. And he muſt be eſpecially careful not to ride a ſhie-horſe, for ſuch a one may not only bring his Rider in danger and diſgrace, but diſorder the whole Troop; Exerciſe, and accuſtoming his Horſe to all feats of Horſemanſhip,

Drilling of Horſemen.

manſhip, eſpecially to ſee fire, to ſtand when a Piſtol or Carbine are diſcharg'd cloſe by him, and to hear the Trumpet, will by degrees baniſh ſhieneſs from him, and therefore frequent Drilling troops of Horſe, teacheth both man and horſe their duties. Troops ſhould in ſome points be exerciſed by ſound of Trumpet, that Horſemen may know the ſeveral points of War by their ſeveral names, as, to the Watch, to Saddle, to Horſe, to March, to Charge, to Retire. The particular words of command for Drilling a ſingle Horſeman, that is, to teach him the right and true uſe of his Arms, whether he be a Curiaſſier, Harquebuſier, or Carbiner, are too tedious to be ſet down here, and indeed needleſs, for they are vulgarly known, and ſo are thoſe for the Arms of the Infantry, whether for the Pike, or the Muſquet.

Motions, or Evolutions of Bodies both of Horſe and Foot.

To teach either Horſemen or Foot-Soldiers their Motions and Evolutions when they are in Bodies greater or ſmaller, is the ſecond part of Training or Drilling. The words of command for both Horſe and Foot in theſe Motions are the very ſame, only the Diſtances are different. Three Foot are allowed between files of Foot, and that is order, ſix is open order, and twelve is open open order, or double double diſtance; and theſe you may make uſe of in Exerciſing, Marching, or Fighting, as you think convenient. In Marches the length of the Pike requires ſix foot of diſtance between ranks. Some allow in exerciſing Bodies of Horſe, ſix foot for ſingle diſtance between ranks and files, and twelve for double diſtance. The *Germans* ordinarily allow ten for the one, and twenty for the other. All theſe Motions and Evolutions may be reduced to four kinds, theſe are Facings, Doublings, Countermarchings, and Wheelings. I do not intend to trouble either my Reader or my ſelf with the ſeveral words of command, ordinary Drill-maſters have moſt of them, though not all. But he who would have thoſe for Horſe exactly, may find them in the Supplement to the Compleat Body of the Art Military; and both for Foot and Horſe in the famous Earl of *Straffords* Inſtructions for the Diſcipline of his Army. And thoſe for the Foot alone, very well done by Sir *Thomas Kellie*, and compleatly indeed by Lieutenant Colonel *Elton*, in his compleat Body of the Art of War. Yet I ſhall deſire my Reader with me to obſerve in Exerciſes of Foot and Horſe theſe few Particulars.

Diſtances.

Obſervations concerning Training.

Firſt, That none of the three ordinary ways uſed for doubling of ranks in Bodies of Foot, can be made uſe of in exerciſing Bodies of Horſe, as now they are Marſhalled in moſt places of *Europe*, that is three deep, or three in file; nor can it be where they are five in file, as in ſome places they were all odd numbers, being improper for doublings either of ranks or files.

Firſt Obſervation.

Secondly, That the Facing of a great Body of Horſe to either right or left hand, or about by either right or left hand is a difficult work, (though with Bodies of Foot it is the eaſieſt motion of all the reſt) and cannot be ſuddenly done, and therefore is dangerous if an enemy be near to take advantage of the diſorder of the motion.

Second.

Thirdly, If all the three Countermarches, *Laconian*, *Macedonian*, and *Chorean*, be of very little uſe and great danger in the Infantry, (as I have endeavour'd to make appear in one of my Diſcourſes of the *Grecian* Militia) then I ſuppoſe it will be eaſily granted that the uſe of any of the three is as little, and the danger as great in Bodies of Cavalry.

Third.

Fourthly, That I conceive Wheeling a more proper motion, and more eaſie for the Horſe than for the Foot, it is a motion that hath been much uſed by Horſe in fight, for unleſs in wheeling they are charged in the flank (and if ſo they are ill ſeconded) they are quickly reduced to their firſt poſture, but it is not ſo with the Foot, for if the Body be but indifferently great, ſuppoſe fifteeen hundred men, ſtanding at three foot diſtance in files, and ſix in ranks, you muſt firſt make them come both ranks and files to their cloſe order before you can wheel your Battel, and that requires ſome time, for it is a motion of it ſelf; and the greater the Body be, the longer time it will have to make that firſt motion for great Bodies move ſlowly. Next, the motion it ſelf of wheeling the Battel, is not ſoon done if well done, for if it be not order'd diſcreetly, the Body is immediately in confuſion. Thirdly, when you have wheel'd this Body of fifteen hundred men, you muſt beg yet a Ceſſation of Arms from your Enemy, till you put your Battel in a fighting poſture, which you cannot do till you

Fourth.

reduce them to their first order; for at close order your Musqueteers cannot fight, and therefore you must cause your Battel to open; it is true, the ranks will quickly open backward, but the files being no less in a Body of fifteen hundred men than two hundred and fifty, must have such a time to open, (though they do it with all the haste imaginable) that a resolute Body of Horse will Charge thorough them before you end these three motions. But a Body of Horse being in rank and file at that distance at which it is to fight, needs no command to close ranks and files before it wheel, nor no command to open them after it hath wheel'd, being constantly in a posture to receive an enemy. And with submission to great Drill masters, I should think the motions of Facing and Countermarching of Bodies of Horse, whether greater or smaller, might be spared in their Exercise, because you may face an enemy with a Squadron of Horse either in flank or reer, by wheeling either to the right or left hand, or by either of the two about, a great deal sooner, with a great deal of more ease, and with a great deal of less danger than you can do by either Facing or Countermarching.

Fifth. *Fifthly*, Observe that no man can or will attain to a perfect understanding of either postures, motions or evolutions in the Training particular men, or yet Bodies of Horse and Foot by reading the words of command in a Book or Paper, or looking upon the figures of them, for the Military Art is practical, one shall understand what belongs to Drilling and Training, more by looking on the real practice of it three days, than by the contemplative study of it three years: when you see a Countermarch in the Field, you will quickly understand what an Evolution it is when you see the figure of it in a Book; but you will not so soon know what it signifies when you see the figure before the practice.

Sixth. And lastly, I avouch it to be the essential duty of a Captain to Exercise his Troop, or company himself, whether it be of Foot or Horse, nor should it be permitted that his Lieutenant should do it when he is present, much less a Serjeant (as I have often seen) for thereby he Uncaptains himself, and changeth places with his Lieutenant. And this is too ordinary a Military grievance, against which the Earl of *Strafford* guarded by an expres instruction that no Lieutenant should exercise a Company, unless the Captain were absent, which he might not be, without either sickness, or that Lords own permission; a very just command. And by the same reason all Colonels should exercise their Regiments, and in their absence their Lieutenant Colonels, but when either of them are present, the Major ought neither to be commanded, nor of himself offer to do it, and this is contrary to the opinion of many, who will impose so many duties on a Major, that they make thereby Colonels, and Lieutenant Colonels, Cyphers, or very insignificant Creatures.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of Companies, Regiments, and Brigades of Foot, what they have been, what they are, how they are Marſhal'd, of all their Officers, their Duties and Qualifications.

I Suppoſe moſt Military men acknowledg the Infantry to be the Body of an Army, with it the Artillery, Munitions, and Proviſions lodg, and ſo doth he who commands in chief. The members of this Body are Regiments, or Brigades, and the ſinews and arteries of theſe are Companies. A Company is a Band of armed men Marſhal'd in rank and file; a rank and file differ in this, that the firſt conſiſts of men, whether on horſeback or foot, ſtanding in one front ſide for ſide; the ſecond of men ſtanding in one row or lane, one behind another, ſo they may eaſily be converted, a file into a rank, and a rank into a file. The number of theſe ranks and files muſt be determined by the number of men appointed to be in each Company, for which there is no general rule, every Prince and State ordering that as they pleaſe, neither do they reſtrict themſelves conſtantly to one number, but appoint their Companies to be ſtronger and weaker as the emergency of affairs, or the preſent *Ratio Belli* ſeem to require it. A Rank and a File.

In former times ever ſince Gunpowder was invented, it has been ſo likewiſe, for ſometimes Companies were more numerous than at other times, yet never were the weakeſt of them of ſo ſmall a number, as generally now they be.

The firſt time I remember to have read of a Company of one hundred in the Modern War, was in the Civil Wars of *France* in the Reign of *Charles* the Ninth, about one hundred years ſince; in them I find that the Proteſtant Foot-Companies were but generally one hundred ſtrong; for which I can gueſs at no reaſon, unleſs it were that many Gentlemen who were forc'd to take Arms, and durſt not ſtay at home, might be inveſted with Charges and Imployments ſuitable to their qualities: yet methinks it had conduced more to the advancement and proſecution of the grand deſign that Troops and Companies of *Gens d' Armes*, or Curiaſſiers had been made up of thoſe numbers of Gentlemen, a ſervice very fitting for them, and ſuiting well with the *French* humour. Company of one hundred ſtrong.

But in thoſe Legions of *France* inſtituted by *Francis* the Firſt, (whereof I have ſpoken in my Diſcourſe of Levies) which conſiſted of ſix thouſand men a piece, every Legion had twenty Companies, and every Company three hundred men. And though theſe Legions fell a great decadency from their Primitive Inſtitution in *Charles* the Ninths Reign, yet the number of three hundred in a Company continued long after that; for I do not find in all *Monluc*'s Commentaries (which he continues till near the end of *Henry* the Third's Reign) mention made of any *French* Company of Foot under three hundred Combatants. The *Spaniſh* Companies were either four hundred, or three hundred, till our own time. In the days of the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth, the *German* Foot-Companies were for moſt part five hundred. *Paolo Giovio* writes that *Alphonſo Davalo* Marqueſs of *Guaſt*, related to him that when his Maſter the Emperour invaded *Provence*, and thought to have taken *Marſeilles*, he had in his pay fifty Companies of *Germans*, each Company of five hundred Foot-Soldiers, and mark what he adds, *according*, ſaith he, *to the cuſtom of Germany*. I find in *Maximilian* the Second's Reign, that in his Military Inſtitutions he order'd all his *German* Foot-Companies to be four hundred fighting men. And ſo ſtrong for moſt part did they continue in the Reigns of the Emperours *Rodolph*, and *Matthias*. *Ferdinand* the ſecond in all his Wars with the *Bohemians*, the Duke of *Brunſwick*, Marqueſs of *Baden*, Count *Mansfield* and *Bethlem Gabor*, the King of *Denmark*, and in the beginning alſo of his long War with the King of *Sweden*, Of three hundred: Of five hundred. Of four hundred.

Of three hundred.

den, had never fewer than three hundred men in a Foot-company at the first levying of it. But thereafter when the War was of a long continuance, his Companies were not levied so strong, and in end came to be but of one hundred. But it was not so neither in *Tily*, nor in *Wallenſteins* time. The Estates of the *United Provinces* in the beginning of their War with *Spain*, ordinarily gave

Of two hundred.

Commissions for raising Companies two hundred strong. *Christian* the fourth of *Denmark* his *German* Companies were all three hundred strong, but so were not his *Scots* and his *Engliſh*. Of what strength the *Swediſh* Companies were till the days of *Guſtavus Adolphus* I know not, the actions of that Kingdom, except with *Denmark*, and a little with *Sigiſmund* their Hereditary King, that was Elected King of *Poland*, having made no great noise in the World till that Glori-

Of one hundred twenty and six.

ous Kings Reign. He order'd each of his Foot-Companies to be of one hundred twenty and six men, these for their number resembled the *Grecian Taxiarchies*, which consisted of eight Files, every File being sixteen deep, and so the *Taxiarchy* consisted of one hundred twenty and eight men, as I have told you in my Discourses of the *Grecian* Militia. But some years after that Kings death, the

One of a hundred forty and four.

Swediſh Feltmarshals order'd every Company of Foot to consist of one hundred forty and four Soldiers besides Officers.

Assuredly, as I have said before in my Discourse of Levies, Princes found that by strong Regiments and Companies they sav'd much Treasure spent upon the Officers of weaker ones. But it seems they have in latter times found they were better serv'd by many Officers and weak Companies, than

Most Foot-Companies now are but a hundred strong.

by few Officers and strong Companies, since all are alike paid, and therefore almost universally in *Europe*, no Foot-Company at first levying is above one hundred Soldiers, unless in some places, especially in *Holland*, where the Colonels Company is allowed to be fifty stronger than those of private Captains. And though the *Swedes* in the long *German* War order'd every Foot-Company to consist of a hundred and forty four men, yet in their *Dutch* levies, when they invaded *Poland* in the year 1655, they appointed each to consist of one hundred Soldiers.

Formerly scarce the fourth part of a Company was arm'd with Fire-guns, whether Harquebusses, or Musquets. In every one of the seven Legions

How a Company was formerly armed in *France*.

which were ordain'd by *Francis* the First, to be a constant Infantry in *France*, there were at most (in the latter end of his Reign) but eighteen hundred Harquebusiers, all the rest of the six thousand were heavily armed, their offensive weapons being long Poles or Perches, most whereof were Pikes,

How in *Germany*.

to which were added Pistols and Swords. The Forces of the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth, and his Brother *Ferdinand* King of the *Romans* at *Vienna*, when they expected *Soliman*, were reckon'd to be at least one hundred and ten thousand Horse and Foot, whereof eighty thousand belong'd to the Infantry, and of these only twenty thousand were Harquebusiers, the other sixty thousand were heavy armed; and for the offensive they had such weapons as I have described in another place. *Maximilian* the Second order'd (as I told you before) his Companies to be four hundred strong, whereof one hundred and forty were appointed to be Harquebusiers (the Musquet not being then in request) with Headpieces and Rapiers, among whom ten of the lustiest and strongest were to carry each of them a Harquebuss, a Croc, the Calibre whereof was made to receive six Balls cast of one pound of Lead; all the rest of the Company were to carry Pikes, Halberts, and Partizans, and all of them were to be in full defensive arms, with Swords, and each of them a Pishol at his Girdle, or as it is called in the establishment, a short Fire-gun. In process of time when Soldiers became expert at the Musquet, Companies how strong or weak soever were divided into three parts, two thirds whereof were Pikemen, and one third Musqueteers; thereafter the Musquet crav'd the half of the Game, and got it, so that each

How for the present.

Company was equally divided into Pikemen and Musqueteers. But equality for most part is short liv'd, and so far'd it in this, for very soon the Musqueteers challeng'd the two thirds, and obtain'd them, leaving but one third for the Pikemen, which for most part yet they keep, though in several places (as I have said before) Pikes are sent to look for their fortune elsewhere.

Let

Let us then ſuppoſe that which is moſtly true, that every Foot-Company conſiſts now of one hundred men, before we can marſhal it, we muſt know how many men the Prince or State alloweth to be in one file, which makes that which we call the depth of the Battel; the *Latin* and high *Dutch* Languages call it the heighth; the files being known, the ranks are quickly found. I am not here to tell you of the Square-root, by which many have ſtudied to marſhal their Batallions, for I intend to ſpeak fully of that in a Diſcourſe a part. But I ſpeak in this place of the depth that every Prince appoints for his Foot.

Depth of Modern Bodies of Foot.

Before the Reign of the Great *Guſtavus Adolphus*, for any thing I could ever learn, Foot-Companies were marſhal'd ten deep almoſt univerſally, but he marſhal'd all his Infantry in ſix ranks. And after he had invaded *Germany*, the Emperour with moſt of the *European* Kings and Princes kept their Foot ſtill at ten deep; but before the end of that War which he began, all of them follow'd his way, and made the file of their Foot to conſiſt of ſix men, except the Prince of *Orange*, who ſtill kept ten in file: I ſhould except likewiſe the Earl of *Strafford*, who in his Inſtructions for the better Diſcipline of his Army, order'd every Captain of Foot to draw up his Company eight deep.

Ten deep.

Six deep.

Eight deep.

In a buſineſs of this nature, where there is difference, a man may tell his opinion without affectation of ſingularity; and therefore I ſuppoſe it will be granted me, that the more hands a Captain can bring to fight, the more ſhrewdly he will put his enemy to it, provided ſtill his Batallions be of that ſtrength as to receive the ſhock of a reſolute Impreſſion, and in caſe of the worſt, that he have Reſerves to come to his reſcue. Of Reſerves I ſhall ſpeak hereafter. Now I am hopeful it will not be deny'd me but that more hands are brought to fight by eight men in a file, than by ten, and more by ſix men in a file, than by eight. Take a ſecond argument, The more able you are to ſave your ſelf from being ſurrounded or out-wing'd by an enemy, or the more able you make your ſelf to ſurround and out-wing that enemy of yours, the greater advantage you have over him. Both theſe are done by a large front, now it is undeniable that eight in file enlarge the front more than ten, and ſix more than eight, and conſequently eight deep contributes more than ten, and ſix more than eight for gaining the victory.

Reaſons for ſix deep.

That more hands are brought to fight is very ſoon inſtanced, firſt by a Body of Muſqueteers, and next by a Body of Pikemen. Let us ſuppoſe a Body of fifteen hundred Muſqueteers marſhal'd ten deep is to fight with a Body of Muſqueteers of equal number, that is fifteen hundred, ſix deep, and that they are equally ſtout and experienced, and equally good Firemen. The fifteen hundred ten deep muſt give fire by ranks, as the fifteen hundred ſix deep muſt likewiſe do; now the fifteen hundred ten deep can make no more but a hundred and fifty in rank, for a hundred and fifty multiplied by ten, produceth fifteen hundred, but the fifteen hundred ſix deep make two hundred and fifty in rank, for two hundred and fifty multiplied by ſix, produceth fifteen hundred; ſo that the fifteen hundred ſix deep at every Volley pours one hundred Leaden Bullets more in the Enemies boſom, than the fifteen hundred ten deep; and conſequently when ſix ranks of both parties have fired, the fifteen hundred ten deep have received ſix hundred Ball more than the fifteen hundred ſix deep, which without all doubt hath made a great many men fall more of the one ſide than the other. Next one hundred and fifty files of the fifteen hundred ſix deep, take juſt as much ground up in front as the whole Body of the fifteen hundred ten deep, and therefore the other hundred files of the fifteen hundred ſix deep, may fall on the ſides of the fifteen hundred ten deep, if they be not flanked either with Pikes, or with Horſemen. It is the like caſe, *mutatis mutandis*, between fifteen hundred eight deep, and fifteen hundred ſix deep; for fifteen hundred eight deep will make but a hundred and eighty eight in rank, for a hundred eighty eight multiplied by eight produceth fifteen hundred and four; now the fifteen hundred ſix deep make two hundred and fifty ranks, and ſo ſhoots at every Volley ſixty two Bullets more than the fifteen hundred eight deep.

The great advantages 1500 Muſqueteers ſix deep have of 1500 Muſqueteers ten deep.

Make the like trial of two Batallions of Pikes, each of them fifteen hundred ſtrong, equally arm'd for the defenſive, and their Pikes of equal length, the hundred files wherewith the fifteen hundred ſix deep out-wings the fifteen hundred ten deep, will likewiſe enter on their ſides, and very ſoon ruin them if they be

The ſame advantages Pikemen alſo have.

be not flanked by their friends; and though they be, yet theſe hundred files of the fifteen hundred Pikemen ſix deep, being otherwiſe idle may happily give their flanks ſome work to do. Nor hath the fifteen hundred Pikemen ten deep any advantage of the fifteen hundred ſix deep, in the force of the impreſſion; for I have demonſtrated in one of my Diſcourſes of the *Grecian* Militia, that ſix ranks of Pikemen may either give or receive the charge abundantly, and therefore where Pikemen are ten deep at their charge, the laſt four ranks ſhould keep their Pikes ported, becauſe the preſenting the points of them is altogether uſeleſs. Neither was it the apprehenſion of the weakneſs of his Body of Muſqueteers drawn up ſix deep, that made the King of *Sweden* make uſe of his Feathers to defend his Muſqueteers againſt the *Polonian* Horſe; for theſe Feathers may ſerve a Body of Firemen drawn up ten deep as well as a Body of Firemen drawn up ſix deep; neither indeed is it the deepneſs of a Body of Muſqueteers that can reſiſt a reſolute charge of Horſe, it muſt be Pikes, Halberts, or theſe Feathers, or ſomething like them.

Reaſons for ten deep.

Nor do I think after the Invention of Gunpowder, that ten deep was thought fit for Foot, in imitation of the *Romans*, as ſome fancy, for I have ſhewn in another place, that *Vegetius* (who is lookt on by many as the Oracle of the old *Roman* Militia) doth make the *Roman* file to conſiſt of eleven men, but I think it was out of this conſideration, that after the firſt rank had fired their Guns, they could not be ready to fire again till the other nine ranks had all fired, and withal a Muſquet-reſt was taken to help; with ſo much warineſs did our Anceſtors walk when firſt they made uſe of the new found Engines of fire. We read of a Count of *Vaudemont*, who within thirty years after the Invention of Gunpowder, made uſe of two Culverines in his Wars with the Duke of *Bar*, and by their help defeated his enemy; but at every time the Pieces were diſcharged, the Count himſelf fell to the ground for fear. But as Great *Cæſar* ſays, *Uſus eſt rerum Magiſter*, Uſe and Cuſtom over-maſter things, and therefore the Cannon is not now ſo dreadful as it was, nor is the Muſquet ſo unmanageable as it was thought; daily experience lets us ſee, that the firſt rank of ſix can fire, make ready, and ſtay for the word of Command, before the other five have diſcharged their ſhot, even in the hotteſt Piece of ſervice, and without the help of Muſquet-reſts. And I ſuppoſe it needs be thought no Paradox in me to ſay that five ranks of Muſqueteers can fire one after another without intermiſſion, and the firſt of the five be ready to fire again, before the laſt have diſcharged; let any Commander try it with expert Firemen, he will find it will be done eaſily enough. And that you may ſee that this is no new conceit of mine, I ſhall tell you that *Giovio* informs us that at *Vienna* the twenty thouſand Harquebuſiers that were in the Chriſtian Army, were all marſhal'd five deep, and ſo made four thouſand files. It is without all peradventure that the beſt Commanders then in *Europe* were there, who would not have permitted this if they had not known that the firſt rank could have fired and made ready again, before all the other four had diſcharged; neither muſt you impute this to the ignorance of the Hiſtorian (as being a Churchman) for he is ſo punctual as to write nothing of any Military action but what he had from the relation of the greateſt Captains that were upon the place.

For ſix deep.

Five deep.

Reaſons for it.

And truly if you will conſider all I have ſaid, or all that may be ſaid on this ſubject, you may perhaps think with me that both Muſqueteers and Pikemen may be marſhal'd five deep with no inconvenience at all to the ſervice. I think I hear ſome ſpeculative perſons cry out, that this is againſt the rules of all Tacticks, who reject odd numbers as unfit for doubling. But ſtay, do you exerciſe for ſhew only, or for uſe. If only for ſhew, I grant you ſhould neither have odd ranks nor files; but if for uſe, I ſay, that five deep is better than ſix deep, for thoſe very reaſons that made ſix deep better than eight deep, and eight better than ten. You ſay you cannot double your ranks at five deep, what then? I ſay you need not, for I would have your ranks no fewer than five when you are ten deep; why double you your ranks, is it not to make them five? and thereby to enlarge your front, and why then may you not be five ranks at firſt, and thereby ſave your ſelf the labour of doubling? And as it is not at all neceſſary to double your ranks, when your Batallion conſiſts of no more but five ranks, ſo I conceive the doubling of ranks not neceſſary when your Battel is but ſix deep, for

Objections againſt it.

Anſwered.

three

three ranks of Pikes is not ſtrong enough either to give or receive a Charge, nor are they numerous enough for Muſqueteers to fire one rank after another without interruption, it not being feaſible for the firſt rank to fire, and be ready before the third rank have diſcharged, ſo that when ſix ranks are made three, it is only for a parting blow, for the Muſqueteers to fire kneeling, ſtooping, and ſtanding. Now you may order the firſt three ranks of five to fire in the ſame faſhion, kneeling, ſtooping, and ſtanding, and you have by the bargain two ranks in reſerve, till the firſt three recover, and thoſe two ranks may afterward fire, the firſt rank kneeling, and the ſecond ſtanding; and then all the five ranks have fired, and are as ready either with Buts of Muſquets or Swords to receive the enemy if he advance, as the ſix ranks doubled in three, and in far better order. Either then your doubling of ranks is unneceſſary in ſervice, or five deep at firſt is as good (if not better) as ten ranks to be doubled in five, or ſix ranks doubled in three. And though five ranks cannot be doubled, the inconvenience of that is not ſo great as the advantages it hath of a large front, and bringing many hands to fight; and if upon any emergency (which will fall out very ſeldom) you conceive your front too large, you may quickly help it, by cauſing your files to double, and then you are ten deep. But I ſhall quickly part with this opinion, when I hear a ſtronger argument againſt it than that, which ſays, that thereby ranks cannot be doubled; for the truth is, it is my private opinion that there be many ſuperfluous words in Exerciſe, and though I think doubling of ranks and files too, ſometimes convenient before the near approach of an enemy, yet I hope none will deny that both of them are very improper in the time of ſervice. But, *Loquendum cum vulgo*, is a Golden ſentence.

The Author's private opinion.

Well, we have our Foot-Company no ſtronger than one hundred men, and divided into three parts, whereof two are Muſqueteers, and Pikemen are glad to be admitted to make the third. Theſe muſt be marſhal'd ſix in one file, now ſeventeen times ſix is more than one hundred, and ſixteen times ſix is leſs than one hundred. Add therefore three Corporals to the hundred Soldiers, you ſhall have ſeventeen compleat files, and one man over, whom you may appoint to help the Enſign to carry his Colours, for a Furer is not allow'd him in all eſtabliſhments. A Company being thus marſhal'd in ſeventeen files, eleven muſt be Muſqueteers, and ſix Pikemen, to wit, on the right hand of the Pikemen, ſix files of Muſqueteers, and on the left hand five files.

Seventeen Files in a Company of one hundred men.

The Captain is to teach his Soldiers to keep their juſt diſtances between file and file, end between rank and rank. Diſtances are ordinarily threefold, Order, open Order, and cloſe Order. The firſt of three foot, the ſecond of ſix, the third of one foot and a half, to which in ſome caſe is added open open order, which is of twelve foot. At Exerciſings both ranks and files ſhould ſtand at open order, in Marches the files at order, but the ranks at open order, becauſe of the Pikes which muſt have more ground than Muſqueteers require, and in ſervice both the files and ranks of Muſqueteers muſt be at order, that is three foot diſtance, but the Pikemen both in file and rank at cloſe order, that is at the diſtance of one foot and a half. I muſt tell you in this place of a general miſtake, and is the very ſame I accuſed *Vegetius* of in the *Roman* Militia, and it is this: All ſay that the files when they ſtand in Battel, ſhould be at order, that is at the diſtance of three foot, as indeed they ſhould. But if you ask how many foot of ground ſeventeen files (whereof our Company conſiſts) poſſeſs in front, they will immediately anſwer you, fifty and one. And here there is a double error, firſt, no ground is allowed for the Combatants to ſtand on, for the diſtance of three foot between files, takes up that one and fifty foot, or very near it. Secondly, they make ſeventeen files to have ſeventeen diſtances, whereas they have but ſixteen. This overſight I have obſerv'd in moſt Tacticks, Lieutenant Colonel *Elton* is very clear in his definition of a diſtance, which (though I told you of it before) I ſhall again give you. Diſtance, ſays he, is a place or interval of ground between every rank and rank, and every file and file, as they ſtand. By this deſcription then, three foot of diſtance being allowed between every file and file, there are in ſeventeen files ſixteen diſtances or intervals, which make but forty and eight foot, then you are to allow ſeventeen foot to the Combatants, that is one foot for every man to ſtand on, ſeventeen being added to forty eight, make ſixty five, and ſo many foot of ground doth a Company poſ-

The ſeveral kinds of Diſtances.

Miſtakes in reckoning Diſtances.

Diſtance of Files.

ſeſs in front, if it conſiſt of ſeventeen files; for the ground of the ranks you are to compute it thus: Six ranks take ſix foot to ſtand on, and thirty foot for five intervals (ſix foot being allow'd for open order) in all ſix and thirty foot, which a Company, Regiment, Brigade, or Army of Foot, conſtantly poſſeſſeth from the toes of the Leaders to the heels of the Bringers up, unleſs you bring the ranks to ſtand at order, which you may frequently do with very good reaſon, and then the five Intervals take up but fifteen foot, which being added to the ſix foot on which the ranks ſtand, make but twenty one foot. And when Pikes are to give or receive a Charge, you may bring them to cloſe order, that is one foot and a half, and then the five Intervals take up but $7\frac{1}{2}$ foot, theſe being added to ſix, make $13\frac{1}{2}$ foot. Obſerve that in Exerciſing this Company of ſeventeen Files, you are to ſet aſide one of the Files, becauſe it is odd, and ſo will hinder the doubling the Files. The Colours of the Company are to be on the head of the Pikes, neither can they conveniently be between the ſecond and third rank in time of Battel, as ſome would have them to be, for you may eaſily conſider what room an Enſign can have with his Colours between ranks when they are at order, much leſs at cloſe order, as they ſhould be in the time of Battel.

Diſtance of Ranks.

The Colours.

It will be fitting before I go further, to meet with an objection concerning Diſtances, it is this: The three foot of diſtance allowed between Files, ſay they, muſt be reckoned from the Centers, that is from the two middle parts of the two File-leaders, as from the middle part of the right hand File-leader to the middle part of the File-leader, who ſtands on his left hand. I wonder at this notion, for hereby two File-leaders take up one foot of ground, and ſo doth the reſt of the File, and there are but two foot of Interval between the two files, and this cannot at all quadrate with the definition of diſtance, for that is an Interval between Files, and not betwixt the two middle parts of two mens Bodies. And the Authors of Tacticks ſhould have been clearer in their expreſſions, and have ſaid, two foot between Files which they knew was too little, and have added that every File ſhould have one foot of ground to ſtand on, for what language is this, a man ſhall have half a foot for his right middle part, and another half foot for his left middle part; for this way of their reckoning of the three foot of diſtance, amounts to juſt ſo much, and no better language, which I conceive is very improper? beſides, by this account the right and left hand Files, would have each of them one half foot of ground more than any of the reſt of the Files, the right hand Filemen hath it by the right middle parts of their bodies, and the left hand Filemen by the left middle parts of their Bodies, becauſe theſe two Files on theſe two hands have no Sidemen, which you may eaſily conceive if you pleaſe a little to conſider it.

Objection againſt my Diſtances of Files,

Anſwered.

Let us in the next place ſee what Officers are appointed to have the command and inſpection of this Company, and here we may find ſome difference in the ſeveral eſtabliſhments of Princes and States, yet in this we find all agree to have a Captain, a Lieutenant, an Enſign, Serjeants, Corporals and Drummers, except the *Spaniard* who rejects the Lieutenant as uſeleſs; ſome allow no more Officers than thoſe I have ſpoken of, ſome allow more, to wit, a Captain of Armies, a Furer, a Fourier, and a Clerk or Scrivener. And beſides, ſome allow Lancepeſats, or Lancpreſads (as they are commonly called) as alſo Reformado's, and Gentlemen of a Company. But neither Lancepeſats, Gentlemen of the Company, nor Reformado's are Officers, and though Corporals be, yet they carry Arms and march in rank and file. I ſhall deſcribe all theſe, and all the Officers of a Foot Company, beginning with the Reformado, and ending with the Captain.

Of Officers of a Company.

Thoſe are called Reformado's, or Reformed, who have been Officers (ſuppoſe Commiſſionated, and thoſe only) and are out of charge, and bear Arms, till they can be prefer'd. In ſome places they are permitted to be without Arms.

Reformed Officers.

A Gentleman of the Company is he who is ſomething more than an ordinary Souldier, hath a little more pay, and doth not ſtand Centinel. In *French* he is called *Appointe*, and with the *Germans* he is called *Gefreuter*. They march and watch with Arms, they go common Rounds and Patrouills; and near an Enemy they are to be the forlorn Centinels, whom the *French* call *Perdus*. Lancepeſate is a word deriv'd from the *Italian*, *Lance ſpeſata*, which ſignifies a broken

Gentleman of a Company.

ken or ſpent Lance. He is a Gentleman of no ancient ſtanding in the Militia, for he draws his Pedigree from the time of the Wars between *Francis* the Firſt, and his Son *Henry* the Second Kings of *France*, on the one part, and the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth, and his Brother-in-law the Duke of *Savoy* on the other part, in thoſe Wars when a Gentleman of a Troop of Horſe in any Skirmiſh, Battel, or Rencounter, had broke his Lance on his enemy, and loſt his Horſe in the Scuffle, he was entertain'd (under the name of a Broken-Lance) by a Captain of a Foot-Company as his Comerade, till he was again mounted. But as all good orders fall ſoon from their Primitive Inſtitution, ſo in a ſhort time our *Monſieur Lanceſpeſata* (for ſo he was called) was forc'd to deſcend from being the Captains Comerade, and became the Corporals Companion, and aſſiſted him in the Exerciſe of his Charge, and therefore was ſometimes called by the *French*, *Aide Caporal*. But when the *Caporal* grew weary of the Comradeſhip of his *Lanceſpeſata*, he made him officiate under him, and for that had ſome allowance of pay more than the common Soldier, which he enjoys in thoſe places where he is made uſe of, and ſtill keeps the noble Title of *Lanceſpeſata*, (though perhaps he was never on Horſeback in his life) corruptly *Lancepreſado*. The *Germans*, *Swedes*, and *Danes*, acknowledg Reformado's and Gentlemen of Companies, but reject the poor *Lanceſpeſat*. The *Hollander* in his Militia acknowledgeth all the three, and ſo I believe do the *French*. But to our eſtabliſhment at home, I believe they be all three ſtrangers, and ſo moſt of them are in other places. Companies of hundreds are divided into three Corporalſhips, two Corporals are Muſqueteers, and one is a Pikeman. His right Title is *Caporal*, an *Italian* word, deriv'd from *Capo*, which ſignifies a Head; this *Caporal* being the Head of his Squadron. And from the ſame word *Capo*, it would ſeem the Captain of a Company, or of an Army hath his denomination. A *Caporal* ought to be an experienc'd, vigilant, and a laborious Soldier; he hath an abſolute command of his Squadron, neither may any in it diſobey him, if any do, the *Caporal* may beat him with his Sword, and commit him to priſon; when a Muſquet-reſt was in faſhion, he was permitted to beat with it. He is to warn all his Squadron, or a part of it, (according as he receives order) to the watch, or to be ſent on party, or other duties. Upon the watch the Corporal (having got orders from his Superiors) appoints, when, where, and how long each of his men are to ſtand Centinel, and he is bound to teach them how they are to behave themſelves when they are Centinels, and is to viſit them frequently, but if he find any one of them aſleep, he muſt not leave him as he found him, as an *Athenian* Captain did, (who kill'd a ſleeping Centinel) but he muſt bring him to the *Corps de Guard*, and there make him Priſoner till further order. The *Caporal* is to receive the Rounds at his Court of Guard, and take the word from them. But of this I ſhall tell you more in another place. He is alſo obliged when he is not on the watch, to teach all that belong to his Squadron, their poſtures, and to handle their Arms. So you ſee this *Caporal* of ours hath work enough to do for all the pay or wages he gets.

Lanceſpeſata.

A Caporal, or Corporal.

The way of a *French* Caporals puniſhing Soldiers by making them ſtand long Centinel, is prejudicial to the ſervice.

His Duties.

In ſome places a Piper is allowed to each Company: the *Germans* have him, and I look upon their Pipe as a Warlike Inſtrument. The Bag-pipe is good enough Muſick for them who love it; but ſure it is not ſo good as the *Almain* Whiſtle. With us any Captain may keep a Piper in his Company, and maintain him too, for no pay is allowed him, perhaps juſt as much as he deſerveth.

A Piper.

Two Drummers are univerſally allowed in every Company of one hundred men, and more (as alſo of the *Caporals*) according as the Company is ſtrong. They ought to be skilful to beat a Gathering, a March, an Alarm, a Charge, Retreat, Travaille or Dian, and the Taptoo. If they can do that well, and carry a meſſage wittily to an enemy, they may be permitted to be Drolls; for to be graduated Doctors, is a thing not at all required at their hands.

Drummers.

The Officers of a Company who march not in rank and file are divided into Commiſſionated and Uncommiſſionated; the Captain, Lieutenant, and Enſign, are called Commiſſionated Officers; all the reſt are Uncommiſſionated, theſe are the Clerk, the Fourier, the Furer, and Captain of Arms; all theſe four where they are made uſe of are called under-Officers, and the laſt three of them are under the command of the Serjeant, who is alſo an Uncommiſſionated Officer.

Under Officers.

Clerk. The Clerk or Scrivener is he who keeps the Rolls of the Company, receives the Pay, and gives it out according to the directions of the Captain, to whose command he is only lyable, and to whom only he is accountable, and in his absence to the Lieutenant. He ought to have so much literature as to read and write fair, and to have some skill in Arithmetick; this under-Officer is allowed in all establishments.

Fourier. A Fourier is a *French* word used now in most Languages, it is he who makes Quarters for the Company in Towns and Villages by Billets, and in the Fields by a designation of a plot of ground appointed for the Quarter of a Company. He is to wait upon the Regiments Quarter-master, and what commands he receives from him, he is to communicate them first to his Captain, and then put them in execution. He is Quarter-master of the Company, and should have skill to give to every Soldier the ground allow'd him for his Hut, and to give to all alike; it is his duty to see all the Huts built of one length and breadth, that there may be an uniformity of them all; it is also his duty to receive the Companies Proviant by the Regiment Quarter-masters direction, whether it be at the Quarter-masters own lodging or Hut, or at that of the Proviant-master General. A Fourier is allow'd with the *French*, *Germans*, *Danes* and *Swedes*, but neither with the *Hollander*, nor with us at home.

Captain of Arms. A Captain of Arms is he who hath the oversight of the Arms, that they be fixt and bright; I think he should be a Gunsmith, that he may make them fixt and bright, he is a member necessary enough, though not allow'd in all establishments.

Furer. The Furer is he who is allowed to help the Ensign to carry the Colours, for which he hath pay; the *Germans* call him *Gefreuter Caporal*, which is, Corporal of the Gentlemen of the Company, for with them they are properly under his command. And both he, the Captain of Arms, and Fourier do duty with Halberts among the *Germans*, *Danes* and *Swedes*; we have no Furer with us.

A Serjeant. A Serjeant is a *French* word, for those who are appointed by the Justice to apprehend and imprison men for either Criminal or Civil matters, are called Serjeants; yet this word is now become universal, for that Officer of the Company who commands next the Ensign. In the high *Dutch* he was called *Feltwebell*, but now the word Serjeant hath prevailed over all. When Companies were three hundred strong, there were three Serjeants in it, now for most part all Companies have two. It is a charge of very much fatigue, for to him it belongs to see all his Captains commands obeyed, he gives all the Under-Officers (except the Clerk) their directions, what they are to do almost in every particular, and the like he doth to the *Caporals*. He receives the watch-word and all other Orders from the Major of the Regiment, carries them to his Captain, receives his, and delivers both to his Lieutenant, and Ensign, to his fellow Serjeant, to the *Caporals*, and when it is his turn, watcheth with his Halbert, either on a Post alone, or under a Commissionated Officer. Yet for all this his place in many parts of the world, is not thought creditable, (but sure it is not dishonourable.) I cannot conceive for what reason, unless it be that his title of Serjeant makes him be thought one of that Canaille who drag people to prison, and these indeed are of the very dregs of the Rascality.

His Fatigue and Duties.

His Charge too much undervalued. *Louis de Montgomery* says that in his time (and that was about sixty years ago) no man of an honest family in *France* would accept of a Serjeants place, which could have been for no other reason but that I have mention'd, the very name of a Serjeant deterring men from the charge; and it is so still in most places, especially in the *Low-countries*, and here at home. And I have wonder'd very oft to hear mean Gentlemen say, they scorn a Halbert, but if you will give them a Pike, they will gladly accept of it, for which they have not above the third of a Serjeants pay; and when they are Pikemen, they must punctually obey the Serjeants commands, or bear the weight of that Halbert over their Heads, which they scorn'd to carry on their shoulders; for a Serjeant hath power to beat both with his Halbert and his Sword. And sure if his Charge be not honourable, it is honest, and should not be so much vilipended, which superior Officers might soon help if they would cherish Serjeants more than many of them do. I encounter'd once with a Country man of my own at the *Busch*, who told me he had serv'd the Estates full forty years; I askt him if in all that time he had ever

ever got the preferment to be a Serjeant, he reply'd, he might have had a Halbert often, but ſcorn'd it: I enquir'd then if he had attain'd to any degree better than a Serjeants place? he told me, yes; for at that very time he ſaid, he was the oldeſt Gentleman of a Company in the Eſtates ſervice. To which dignity I could not chuſe but wiſh him much joy.

Enſign-bearer.

The Enſign is more properly called the Enſign bearer, than any other title we give him in *Engliſh*; for Ancient ſeems to be an improper and corrupt word. In the *French* Tongue he is called *Port enſign*. In the low *Dutch*, *Fandrager*, in high *Dutch*, *Fendrich*, all which ſignifie a Carrier of Colours. His title ſhews his Office, his principal charge (where Lieutenants are allowed) is to have a care of the Colours in time of action, whether it be Battel or Aſſault, he ought to be valiant, and rather die than loſe the Enſign recommended to his care. After he hath march'd a mile out of his Quarters, he may ride and give the Colours to another to carry, which other is ordinarily a Pikeman, (whoſe Pike his Companions are obliged to carry by turns) but at the ſight of a General Officer or his own Colonel, the Enſign-bearer is bound to alight and take his Colours in his own hand. In *France* in the time of *Henry* the Great, he was allow'd to have a young fellow to aſſiſt him to carry his Colours, who for that ſervice had half a Soldiers Pay. But I have ſhewn you that in other places a Furer is allow'd for that, who in Quarters or Camps doth the duty of an under-Officer with a Halbert.

In *France*, except in Regiments of Guards, there be now only two Enſigns, one of the Colonel, the other of the Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Lieutenant.

His Qualifications.

If you will have the deſcription of a Lieutenant, as ordinarily it is given, he ſhould be valourous, well experienc'd in matters of War, and who hath given proof of it, vigilant, and patient of fatigue ſhould know the wants of the Company, and ſhould endeavour to get them ſupply'd, ſhould know to exerciſe the Company in its poſtures, motions and evolutions, and ſhould be of ſuch a behaviour as to gain both love and reſpect from the Soldiers. But I ask, if he be all this, what hinders him to be Captain, or if he muſt ſtill keep the title of Lieutenant, what needs any Captain at all? It is anſwer'd, the Captain ſhould have all theſe qualifications, but when he is abſent, the Lieutenant repreſents him: true, but when the Captain is preſent, whom repreſents the Lieutenant then? I ſuppoſe no body, for his title ſhews him to be a Deputy, who is no more a Deputy when the perſon (whoſe Deputy he was) is preſent. Next it is ſaid the Lieutenant is in the reer, when the Captain is in the Van, and in the Van when the Captain is in the Reer; true, but ſo may the Enſign-bearer be, having his Colours carried by another, whoſe wages ſhall not be the fourth part of thoſe of a Lieutenant. And ſince in all Charges of an Army the inferior ſtill Officiates in the abſence of the ſuperior, why ſhould a Colonel have a Lieutenant-Colonel, and a Captain a Lieutenant, whoſe duty is only to officiate when the Colonel and Captain are abſent? for when they are preſent to ſpeak ſtrictly, the Lieutenant-Colonel, and Lieutenant, have not one word to ſay, no commands to give, nor puniſhment to inflict; and therefore when the Colonel is abſent, the Major may as well do his duty as the oldeſt Captain doth the Majors. I ſuppoſe for theſe reaſons the *Spaniards* (a warlike people) have ſtruck Lieutenants and Lieutenant-Colonels quite out of their Rolls in all their *Spaniſh* Regiments. I have heard that *Guſtavus Adolphus* intended to have done as much but that the *Swedes* would not part with their ancient cuſtom, nor would give way to bring *Spaniſh Abfero's* in their Armies; and therefore the King (who it ſeems thought not the Lieutenant very neceſſary) order'd the Enſign-bearer to have equal pay with the Lieutenant, and to do equal duty with him in Watches and Guards. It is hard to perſwade ſome people to part with an ancient cuſtom; and they ſay all Innovations though for the better, are dangerous; and therefore Lieutenants need not be angry with me for my private opinion, that they are none of the moſt neceſſary Officers in an Army, will do them but little hurt.

Whether needful, or not.

Innovations dangerous.

A Captain,

But the truth is, that which moſtly makes Lieutenants neceſſary is, that at firſt Levies, Captains are choſen who are unexperienc'd, yet becauſe of their birth and quality are thought fit to have the command of Companies to be raiſed in thoſe places where the authority of themſelves and their friends conduceth much to the furtherance of the Levy, whether it be made by the authority of the Prince, or by a voluntary Enrolling. And for this reaſon the Lord *Carbonſin* requires

requires a Captain to be a Gentleman of good birth, young, valiant, and liberal, and doth not at all require experience. But if you like not that, but will have another deſcription of a Captain, then I pray take that which I have given of a Lieutenant, and I ſuppoſe you will believe, it may ſerve them both. Having given you the deſcription of ſo many Officers of a Company of one hundred men, I think you will conclude that Company will in a very ſhort time conſiſt of able and well exercis'd Soldiers, I wiſh it may be ſo, and I am ſure it ſhould be ſo.

Captain and Lieutenant in Harneſs,

In former times a Captain march'd in the head of his Company with a Headpiece, a Corſlet, and a Gorge, all high Proof, and ſo did the Lieutenant in the Reer. But you may now travel over many places of *Chriſtendom* before you ſee many of thoſe Captains and Lieutenants. The difference of the Armour was none but that the Captains Helmet was decored with a Plume of Feathers, the Lieutenants not. The Feathers you may peradventure yet find, but the Headpiece for moſt part is laid aſide.

With Pikes.

The *Spaniſh* and *French* Captains and Lieutenants likewiſe carry Pikes, the *Spaniards* ſhoulder'd, the *French* comported: The *Germans*, *Swedes*, *Danes*, and almoſt generally all others carry nothing in their hands but Canes; but indeed beſides that it was not the cuſtom formerly to do ſo, I hope it will not be denied but that in time of action, Officers ſhould have ſome other offenſive Weapons in their hands than either Canes or Swords, and on a march their ſervants may carry theſe whether they be Pikes or Partiſans. The Marqueſs of *Guaſt*, *Alphonſo Davalo*, who had the command of ſeveral Imperial Armies, when his Maſter *Charles* the Fifth took a view of his numerous forces at *Vienna*, march'd in the head of the Infantry with a Pike in his hand. Marſhal *Monluc* at the Battel of *Cereſole* carried a Pike, becauſe he led a great Batallion of Pikes; but on all other occaſions he uſed a Halbert or Partiſan, as he tells us in ſeveral places of his Commentaries, in one whereof ſpeaking of the Halbert, he ſays, *Il a touſiours aymé, de me jouer de ce baſton là:* I lov'd always, ſays he, to play with that batton. And aſſuredly a Partiſan or Halbert is a more manageable weapon for an Officer, than a Pike. The Serjeant is diſtinguiſhed from the Captain and Lieutenant becauſe he ſhoulders his Halbert, they comport theirs. And I ſuppoſe it were fit the Captain and Lieutenants, Halberts or Partiſans ſhould be diverſified by ſeveral trimmings, that the one may be diſtinguiſht from the other.

An Halbert, or Partiſan.

Captain a general Title.

The word Captain is a general word for all Commanders, as Captains of fifties, of hundreds, and of thouſands; and he who commands over all the forces, is called very properly a Captain General, but now it is moſt ordinarily taken for him who commands a private Company or Troop, and ſo paſſeth current in all Languages that I underſtand.

A Regiment,

A Company being thus deſcrib'd with all its Officers, a Regiment is ſoon underſtood, which I ſhall define to be a certain number of Companies join'd in one body under one head. This definition agrees with all Regiments, of whatever ſtrength they be. There is not a definite number of Companies ordain'd for each Regiment, ſome conſiſting of ſix, ſome eight, ſome twelve, and ſome of twenty, but ten is now moſt ordinary, and formerly it was ſo when Regiments were three thouſand ſtrong, and each Company three hundred; yet I find that in every *French* Legion (which conſiſted of eighteen Companies) there were about three hundred three and thirty men in each Company, for every Legion was ſix thouſand ſtrong. Nor is this word [Regiment] one hundred year old, nor do I know of what Language it is; in the *French* and *Italian* Tongues it was called a Legion, and ſo it was in *Latin*, and he who commanded in chief over it was called Colonel, and *Colonello*. In *Spaniſh* it was called *Terzo*, and its Commander, *Maiſtro del Campo*. In high *Dutch* it was called *Faulein*, and he who commanded it, *Oberſter*, which ſignifies Superior, or Supreme. But Colonel is now underſtood in all Languages, and the word [Regiment] however barbarous it be in it ſelf, hath ſuppreſt all other names and titles, and is now only uſed in all *European* Tongues. The *Swedes* in my time order'd all their new levied Regiments to conſiſt of eight Companies, and each Company of one hundred and twenty ſix men, and this made the Regiment to be one thouſand and eight men; Regiments conſiſting of ten companies, and each company of one hundred men, wants but eight of the former number, and both of them reſemble the

A new word.

Grecian

Grecian Chiliarchy, which contain'd one thouſand and twenty four men; ſo that you may call our Modern Colonel, *Chiliarcha* in *Greek*, more properly than you can call him *Tribunus Militum* in *Latin*. *Chiliarcha* is a Colonel.

A Regiment thus compoſed of ten Companies hath Officers (beſides thoſe of Companies already deſcrib'd) whoſe charges belong equally to all the ten, thoſe are called Officers of the Staff, in high *Dutch* the Etymology of the word I cannot give you; theſe are the Colonel, the Lieutenant-Colonel, and the Major, theſe three are called likewiſe Officers of the Field. Beſides them there belongs to the Staff, a Preacher, a Chirurgeon, a Quarter-maſter, and a Provoſt-Marſhal; theſe four are entertain'd in all Regiments, by all States and Princes who maintain Armies, and ſome have alſo a Regiment-Scrivener, or Clerk, an Auditor, and a Hangman. The Scrivener receives the Pay according to the Muſter-rolls, whereof he is the Keeper, and gives it out to the particular Clerks of Companies, according to the directions of the Colonel, to whom when preſent the Scrivener is only accountable, and in his abſence to his Lieutenant-Colonel. The Auditor hath that ſame power in a Regiment that a General Auditor or Judg-Marſhal hath in an Army, and what that is I have told you in the ninth Chapter of our Modern Art of War. In ſome places to ſave expence, they make the Quarter-maſter ſupply this Scriveners place, nor do ſome Princes allow any Regiment-Auditor, though I think him a very neceſſary Officer, for without him our Regiment-Courts of War (eſpecially if the buſineſs be of any intricacy) are very diſorderly; nor do ſome allow wages to Regiment-hangmen, and where they are wanting, capital crimes muſt be puniſht by Harquebuſiers, and ſcourging muſt be converted into the Gatloupe. The Regiment Provoſt-Marſhal hath power to apprehend any Soldier whom he ſees tranſgreſſing the Laws and Articles of War, from doing whereof no Officer may hinder him; but he hath not power to ſet any Priſoner at liberty, no not thoſe whom himſelf hath impriſon'd. He is Gaoler, and keeps thoſe who are committed to him, either in Irons, or without Irons, for which he hath a Guard allow'd him. He is to preſent the Priſoners to the Court of War, and to deſire that Juſtice may be done on them for the crimes they have committed, which he is obliged to ſpecifie, and he is to be preſent at the execution of every ſentence; and when a Soldier is to run the Gatloupe, he is to give him the firſt laſh; he is to impoſe prices on Wine, Ale, Beer, Mead, Tabaco, and all manner of Meats, according as he receives directions from the Provoſt-Marſhal General. And if the Victuallers, Sutlers and Mark tenters tranſgreſs, he is to make price of thoſe Wares, in venting whereof any of them did fail, the half whereof belongs to the Judg-Marſhal, and the other moiety to the Princes Procurator Fiſcal, and he hath an allowance of every Hogſhead of Wine, Ale, Beer, and Brandy.

A Regiment-Staff.

Regiment-Scrivener.

Auditor.

Hangman.

Provoſt-Marſhal.

The Chirurgeon muſt be skilful in curing all manner of wounds (ſo they be not mortal) for many brave Gentlemen get their bones broken with Bullets, which would not ſo frequently prove deadly to the Patients if they were attended on by good and experienced Artiſts. The Chirurgeon ſhould be a ſober man, and ought to do his duty warily and carefully, ſince the lives of both Commanders and Soldiers are often in his hands. Beſides his monthly pay he ſhould have his Surgeons Cheſt furniſht with all manner of Neceſſaries for curing Wounds of all kinds; and this Cheſt is to be furniſht at the Princes charge, and all Wounds received in the Prince or States ſervice, he is obliged to cure (if he can) without demanding any thing from the Patients, but all other got accidentally, or by quarreling and Duels, he is not obliged to cure but for payment, in which the Officers are bound to aſſiſt him. Chirurgeon.

The Preacher be he Prieſt or Miniſter, whether *Lutheran*, Reformed, or *Roman* Catholick, his Office is well enough known, there is much reſpect to be paid him, and the Laws of War provide ſevere puniſhments to thoſe who offer any injury or offence to his perſon or charge. His duty is to have *Curam Animarum*, the care of Souls, and it is well if he meddle with no other buſineſs, but makes that only his care. Preacher.

The Quarter-maſter ſhould be an underſtanding man, he it is that ſhould receive proviſion from the Proviant-maſter General, and divide it proportionably out to the Fouriers of the ſeveral Companies according to their ſtrengths, having Quarter-maſter.

having first receiv'd orders for it from his Colonel, for properly his business is not with money. If the Regiment march alone, he is to go before and take the Fouriers along with him, and he makes Quarters, and gives the Billets of the

His Duties.

several Companies to these Fouriers, which they ought to draw by lot, but he is obliged to deliver out of his own hand the Billets to the Field and Staff-Officers. If the Regiment march with an Army, or a part of it, he is to receive such Quarters as the General Quarter-master assigns to him, and divide them proportionably to the Regiment. But if the Army be to encamp, he is to receive from the Quarter-master General such a proportion of ground as the strength of his Colonels-Regiment requires, which plot of ground he is immediately to mark at the four corners of it with four long staves, upon which should be some cognizance whereby to know for which Regiment that Quarter is design'd, and then the Quarter-master is to divide that piece of ground, taking first so much as ordinarily is allow'd for the Colonel and all his Regiment-staff, and then measuring to each Fourier as much ground as is allow'd for a Company with all its Officers; he is to see the Fouriers mark the ground assign'd to the particular Companies, with four lesser staves at the four corners of the design'd Quarter, and then subdivide that ground into so many parts for Huts, and to mark every Hut at its four corners with four little sticks or twigs, and for all this he and his Fouriers should have measures such as are appointed by the Quarter-master General, and approv'd by the General, all which shall be spoke to more fully in my Discourse of *Castrametation*. But the Regiment Quarter-master must see all these things done himself, and not trust the particulars to his Fouriers, who oft-times are very careless or ignorant, or both; and indeed our

His Qualifications.

Modern Armies produce but too many Quarter-masters of little better stuff, though you see they should be men of metal, who have learned some Arithmetick, and have some skill of *Castrametation*. Formerly the Eldest Captains and Ritmasters in *Swedish* Regiments used to be their Quarter-masters, but that custom is worn out; at home our establishment joins the Quarter-master, and Proforce, their charges in one person, which conjunction agrees not with all humours.

Wagon-master.

In some Establishments a Wagon-master is one Officer in a Regiment-staff, for which there may be very good reason: of him I shall speak in my Discourse of the Baggage of an Army.

There is another inconsiderable Staff-Officer in most Armies, yet necessary enough in all Regiments of Foot, and that is the Drummer-Major, the *French*

Drummer-Major.

call him Colonel-Drummer: He is to receive his directions from the Major of the Regiment at what hour he is to beat to the watch, when the Dian, and when the Taptoo wherewith he is to acquaint the several Drummers of companies, and appoint them by turns for these Beatings; he is also to order them in what divisions each of them shall beat when the Regiment marcheth; and they are to obey all his directions punctually. In some places he gets a third more of pay than other Drummers, but here at home we acknowledg no such Creature.

Major.

The Major of a Regiment is both an Officer of the Field, and of the Staff: It is fit he be an understanding person, and experimented, of a quick apprehension to receive his Orders, and a ready dispatch in delivering them; he should be vigilant, and of a body able to endure toil. He it is that marshals the Regiment, and appoints every company its due place according to the Precedency they have one of another. He orders the Captains, Lieutenants, and Ensigns to lead Divisions in a march according to their Dignity. In the Field he receives the word and all other orders from the Major-General, and when he comes back to the Regiment, he is to give no orders out till first he hath imparted them to his Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel, and received their directions; likewise he is to call one Serjeant of every Company together (at the setting of the watch is the proper time) and deliver the watch-word, and all his other orders punctually to them, that they may carry them to their several Officers. He is not only bound to give the Orders, but to see them obeyed, for he is frequently to visit the Guards, and where he finds his directions either disobey'd or neglected, he is to bring those to an account who are accessary to the oversight or contempt.

The

The Inſpection the Major hath of the Guards, hath got him the title in *Latin* of *Vigiliarum Præfectus*: If he be in Quarters where the Regiment lyes alone, far from the General, he receives his Orders from his Colonel; in his abſence from his Lieutenant-Colonel; in a Garriſon from the Governour. The *French* Diſcipline admits him not to command Captains, unleſs he have a Company himſelf. The *Swedes* of a long time allowed him no company, yet allow'd him the command over Captains, but it is now many years ago ſince they were permitted to have companies; hence perhaps it is that when they have no companies, they may be called Serjeant-Majors, as when they have companies, the *Germans* call them Captain-Majors, but the *Engliſh* uſe frequently the words of Serjeant Major, and Serjeant-Major General, none of them are uſed either by *German*, *Swede*, or *Dane*. His Duties.

A Lieutenant-Colonel is that in a Regiment that a Lieutenant is in a company, and therefore when the Colonel is preſent, the Lieutenant-Colonel hath no command; and ſince in the Colonels abſence the other commands the Regiment, I think he ſhould be endued with all thoſe qualifications that are required to be in a Colonel, and what theſe are I ſhall tell you as others have told me, with my own ſenſe of them. Lieutenant-Colonel.

A Colonel ſay ſome ſhould be a Gentleman of great experience in Military Affairs, bold and reſolute, courteous, affable, liberal, judicious, aud religious: But ſuch deſcriptions of Military Officers ſeem to proceed from thoſe Philoſophers who teach men to conform their lives and actions to the ſtrict and ſevere rules of Moral vertue; for my part I would not only have a Colonel to be pious and religious, but his whole Regiment likewiſe; but becauſe this may rather be wiſht than expected, I ſay, if he be not exemplarily pious, he may notwithſtanding be a Colonel good enough, ſo he be not a profeſt Atheiſt. I would have a Colonel to be affable and liberal, but though he be both churliſh and Parſimonious, he may be a Colonel good enough. I would have a Colonel to be experienced in moſt of the points of War; yet though he be not, and hath ſeen but little, if he be of a ready wit and good judgment, he may be a Colonel good enough: for Princes and States, when they raiſe Armies, think it fit to make choice of Colonels who can levy Regiments, for which employment without queſtion men of good birth and quality are moſt proper. But courage, an aptitude to learn, and proneneſs to follow advice, are qualities very eſſential and requiſite in all men of that charge, it is little matter how avaritious a Colonel be, ſo he offer not to meddle with any part of the pay of his Regiment, except his own. It is the leſs matter though he be ignorant in ſome points belonging to his command, ſo he be willing to be adviſed by thoſe of his Officers who underſtand them: But thoſe who fancy that the Title of Colonels entails a right upon them, to command what they pleaſe, and to pay their Regiments as they like, and by their wilful ignorance confound matters of Government, and Diſcipline, and introduce and frame Cuſtoms in their Regiments, which no others uſe, ſhould be chac'd out of all Armies as preſumptuous, arrogant, and impertinent, if not worſe. Colonel. His Qualifications.

Having ſpoken now ſufficiently of all the Officers belonging to a Company and Regiment of Foot, it will be time to put the ſeveral Companies in one Body, thereby to make a Regiment; but I will firſt tell the Captains that after they have for ſome time exercis'd their Companies, and thereby known the abilities of their ſeveral Soldiers, they muſt be careful to put them in ranks and files according as they find they deſerve; the propereſt, talleſt and ſtrongeſt men they ſhould arm with Pikes, the reſt with Muſquets. Next to the Corporals the moſt deſerving ſhould be File-leaders; the next place of dignity is the reer, the third is the middle or fourth rank, the fourth dignity is the ſecond rank, as being next the Van, the fifth place of dignity is the fifth rank, as that which is next the reer; the ſixth and laſt place is the third rank: All this is meant where all Companies and Batallions of Foot are marſhal'd ſix deep. Next to this the Captain ſhould have regard to the right and left hand files, and having drawn up his men as he thinks each of them deſerves, he is to command his Clerk to write down the names of all that are in Arms, juſt as they ſtand in files, and thereafter when he draws out his Company, let him conſtantly put them in Battel according to that Roll; this being done four or five days, the To marſhal a Company in ranks and files.

Soldiers by cuſtom knowing their places, their Leaders, and their Sidemen, will be able without the help of their Officers to marſhal themſelves. When all the Companies are to be join'd in one Body, every Captain ſhould caſt his odd men in the reer, (and it is impoſſible there can be above five odd men in one Company) that the Major may make files, and ſo join them to the Regiment in ſuch places as he thinks fitting.

There be ſeveral ways of drawing up Regiments of Foot, and they may vary according to the ſeveral opinions of men, and yet all of them may be good enough: But a Major ſhould not marſhal the Regiment according to his own fancy, or yet that of his Colonels, but according to the known practice of the Prince or State, in whoſe Service he is; for Uniformity is required in Military Cuſtoms as much, or rather more than in other things. The pleaſure of the Prince, or of his General in matters which depend on their own judgments, ought not to be debated or diſputed. I will not trouble my Reader with the difference of opinions in marſhalling the ſeveral Companies, according to the Precedency of thoſe to whom they belong, whether theſe be Officers of the Field, or private Captains, when they are to be join'd in one Body: But ſhall lay down three grounds, wherein I ſuppoſe all our Modern Commanders agree. Theſe are,

Uniformity in Marſhalling Regiments in one Prince his Service.

Firſt, That the Regiment ſhould be marſhal'd in a Square front, the Wedg, Rhombus, and Ring-Battels, not being now made uſe of, except for ſhow.

Secondly, That the Pikemen make the Body, and the Muſqueteers the wings.

Thirdly, That the Colonels Company ought to have conſtantly the right hand, whether the Regiment be drawn up in one, two, or three diviſions. When Regiments were two or three thouſand ſtrong, it was thought fit to marſhal them in three Batallions or Diviſions, and theſe were called, the Colonels, the Lieutenant-Colonels, and the Majors Diviſions; but being to ſpeak of a Regiment conſiſting only of one thouſand, and compoſed of ten Companies, I ſhall tell you how I have ſeen ſuch a one marſhal'd both in one and in two Diviſions, the manner whereof pleaſeth me better than any other that I have either ſeen or read of, leaving notwithſtanding every man free to his own choice, for I offer not to impoſe.

A Regiment marſhal'd in one Diviſion.

The Major of the Regiment having either chuſed the ground himſelf, or got it aſſign'd to him by the Major-General, if he be to draw up in one Diviſion, orders the Colonels Company to draw up on the right hand, next to that the Majors, thirdly the ſecond Captains, fourthly the fourth Captains, fifthly the ſixth Captains, ſixthly the ſeventh Captains, ſeventhly the fifth Captains, eighthly the third Captains, ninthly the oldeſt Captain, and laſtly the Lieutenant-Colonels Company. I know ſome would have the Majors Company to be where I have plac'd the youngeſt Captains, becauſe they think next to the Van and the Reer, the middle is the moſt honourable place: But if they take heed they will find it is not ſo with a middle Company as with a middle man in a file, who upon doubling the front by half files, becomes a Leader. Beſides, no Company can properly be ſaid to be in the middle of a Regiment, unleſs the Regiment conſiſt of odd Companies, which ſeldom or never is practiſed; for draw up a Regiment of ten Companies in one front, the ſixth Company (which is accounted the middle one) or the Company in the middle of the Regiment is not ſo, for it hath five Companies on its right hand, and but four on its left. Now my reaſon for drawing up the Companies in that order whereof I have ſpoken, is this: The right hand or the Van is the moſt honourable place, and next to it the left hand or reer. Now the honour comes from danger, which is for moſt part expected from the Van or the Reer, and hence it will follow that the nearer a Captain and his Company are the danger, the more honourable place they have; and therefore the nearer they are to the Van and the Reer, the more honourable place they have. If then the Regiment be attackt in the Van (where moſt danger is expected) the Majors Company is by much, nearer the danger when it is marſhal'd next to the Colonels, than if it were drawn up about the middle of the Regiment, and conſequently is in the more honourable place; by this ſame reaſon the oldeſt Captain is to be neareſt the Lieutenant-Colonel, who hath the ſecond place of honour; for if the Reer be attackt, the Lieutenant Colonel is neareſt

Reaſons for the manner of it.

neareſt the danger, and next him the firſt Captain, by this ſame rule of proportion the ſecond Captain is next to the Major, it being fit ſince the firſt Captain hath the ſecond place of dignity in the Reer, that the ſecond Captain have the third place in the Van. And if this rule hold (as I hope it will) the third Captains Company muſt be drawn up on the oldeſt Captains right hand, that ſo he may have the third place from the Reer, as the ſecond Captain had the third place from the Van. And to make ſhort, I place the fourth Captain in the fourth place from the Van, and the fifth Captain in the fourth place from the Reer, the ſixth Captain in the fifth place from the Van, and the ſeventh and laſt Captain in the fifth place from the Reer. Now becauſe an Enemy is ſooner expected in the Van than in the Reer, the Van is more honourable than the Reer, and therefore I marſhal the laſt Captain in or near the middle of the Regiment, where being furtheſt from danger either in Van or Reer, he obtains the place of leaſt dignity, for though all places are honourable, yet ſome are more honourable than others. I marſhal then a Regiment of ten Companies, drawn up in one Diviſion thus:

Order of a Regiment in one Batallion.

Colonel.
Major.
Second Captain.
Fourth Captain.
Sixth Captain.
Seventh Captain.
Fifth Captain.
Third Captain.
Firſt Captain.
Lieutenant-Colonel.

How to put them in one Body.

The Companies ſtanding in this order, the Major will have but little trouble to Body them, one of two ways: Firſt, he may command all the Pikes to advance twenty or twenty four paces, and there join them; then let him cauſe the Muſqueteers of the five Companies on the right, to advance to the right hand of the Pikes, and the Muſqueteers of the five Companies on the left hand to march up to the left hand of the Pikes, and ſo his work is done.

Secondly, if he have no other ground than that he ſtands on, he is to command the Pikemen to march thorough the files of the Muſqueteers by the right and left hand, till they meet in one Body in the middle, the Muſqueteers being likewiſe order'd to march by both hands to their due diſtances, ſo that this motion is a *Chorean* Countermarch of files. This may be done with much eaſe, and a few words, if the Major pleaſe; but ſome have the vanity to make themſelves and their Soldiers more buſineſs than they need by crying this and that, riding here and there, making work to themſelves, and ſometimes ſport to the Beholders.

To marſhal a Regiment of ten Companies in two Batallions.

If the Major be order'd to marſhal the Regiment in two Diviſions, he may do it thus: The Colonels Company being to have the right hand of the firſt diviſion, and the Lieutenant-Colonels of the ſecond Diviſion, he ought to place the other Companies according to their Dignities, and theſe are the Majors Company in the Reer of the firſt Diviſion, and the firſt Captains in the Reer of the ſecond Diviſion; the ſecond Captain next to the Colonel in the firſt Diviſion; the third Captain next to the Lieutenant-Colonel in the ſecond Diviſion; the fourth Captain on the right hand of the Major in the firſt Diviſion, and the fifth Captain on the right hand of the oldeſt Captain in the ſecond Diviſion; the ſixth Captain next to the ſecond Captain in the firſt Diviſion; and the ſeventh and laſt Captain next to the third Captain in the ſecond Diviſion. The ten Companies of a Regiment then drawn up in two diſtinct Batallions are in this order:

Order of ten Companies in two Diviſions.

Firſt Diviſion.	*Second Diviſion.*
Colonel.	Lieutenant-Colonel.
Second Captain.	Third Captain.
Sixth Captain.	Seventh Captain.
Fourth Captain.	Fifth Captain.
Major.	Firſt Captain.

Reaſons for that order.

My reaſon for this is, becauſe the Regiment being now divided into two Bodies or Batallions, the two Reers are next in dignity to the two Vans, and thoſe that are neareſt to the two Reers are next in honour to thoſe who are neareſt to the two Vans; for this reaſon I place the ſixth Captain juſt in the middle of the firſt Diviſion, as furtheſt from danger of either Van or Reer of that Diviſion, having two Companies before him, and two behind him, or two on each hand of him. And I place the laſt Captains Company in the middle of the ſecond Diviſion, as the place of leaſt dignity, and that belongs to him, all other Captains having the Precedency of him. The Pikes of the firſt and ſecond Diviſions are in the middle of their ſeveral Batallions, and the Muſqueteers of the five Companies of each Body equally divided on both hands of the ſeveral Bodies of the Pikes, which is done in that ſame way as when the Regiment was marſhal'd in one Diviſion.

Objection againſt that way of marſhalling,

Anſwered.

I know ſome are of opinion that the Majors Company ſhould be in the Reer of the Lieutenant-Colonels Diviſion, becauſe the third place of honour in the Regiment belongs to him, and the Colonel having the Van of the firſt Diviſion, and the Lieutenant-Colonel of the ſecond, the Major ſhould have the Reer of the ſecond Diviſion, becauſe it is the Reer of the whole Regiment; I ſhould eaſily ſubſcribe to this if it were not for two reaſons: Firſt, though it be but one Regiment, yet being divided, it ſhould be lookt on as two diſtinct Bodies, and it is more honourable to have the Reer of the firſt, than of the laſt. Secondly, when a Regiment is divided into two parts, the Major ought to wait and lodg at the quarter of that Diviſion of the Regiment where the Colonel is, becauſe from him he receives his Orders, Directions, and the Word, which he is not oblig'd to carry to the Lieutenant-Colonel (if the quarters of the two Diviſions be divided, as many times they are) but the oldeſt Captain is obliged to come and receive them from the Major at the Colonels Quarter, the firſt Captain in that caſe officiating as Major for the Lieutenant-Colonels Batallion. Now if the Major ought to be where the Colonel is, as I think he ſhould, then I think the Majors Company ſhould be where himſelf is.

Regiment or Brigade marſhal'd a third way,

The Great *Guſtavus* uſed another way of marſhalling his Regiments and Brigades of Foot, which taken altogether was not ſquare of front, yet all the four parts or Bodies which compoſed it, were ſquare. The manner was this, Suppoſe one of his Brigades to be eighteen hundred men (as I can aſſure you he had many weaker) whereof twelve hundred were Muſqueteers, and ſix hundred were Pikemen; the Pikes advanced twenty paces before the two Bodies of Muſqueteers, who immediately join'd to fill up the void place the Pikemen had poſſeſt. Then were the Pikes divided into three equal Bodies, two hundred to each Batallion, the middle Body whereof advanced before the other two ſo far that its Reer might be about ten paces before the Van of the other two. The two Bodies of Pikes that ſtaid behind, were order'd to open a little to both hands, and then ſtand ſtill, all fronting one way to the Enemy; by this means the place which the two hundred Pikes poſſeſt in the middle, remaining void, there were two paſſages like ſally-ports, between the Reer of the advanced Body of Pikes, and the two Batallions that ſtaid behind, out of one whereof on the right hand iſſued conſtantly one or two or more hundreds of Muſqueteers, who before all the three Bodies of Pikes gave inceſſantly fire on the Enemy, and when the word or ſign for a Retreat was given, they retir'd by the other paſſage on the left hand, back to the great Body of Muſqueteers, where ſo many of them as came back unwounded, were preſently put in rank and file, the fire continuing without intermiſſion by Muſqueteers, who ſtill ſallied thorough the paſſage on the right hand; and it is to be obſerved that the firemen fought thus in ſmall Bodies, each of them not above five files of Muſqueteers, and theſe for moſt part but three deep. So you may conſider that near the third part of the Muſqueteers being on ſervice, the other two thirds were ſecurely ſhelter'd behind the three Batallions of Pikemen, who were to be compleatly arm'd for the defenſive. Theſe Pikes had Field-pieces with them, which fir'd as oft as they could, as well as the Muſqueteers; this continued till the Pikemen came to puſh of Pike with the Enemy (if both parties ſtaid ſo long, as ſeldom they did) and then the Muſqueteers were to do what they were order'd to do, and the order did depend on emergencies and accidents, which as they could not be then ſeen, ſo

no

no certain rules could be given for them. In this order did I ſee all the *Swediſh* Brigades drawn up, for one year after the Kings death; but after that time, I ſaw it wear out when Defenſive Arms firſt, and then Pikes came to be neglected, and by ſome vilipended. Worn out.

For the March of a Regiment, if it can all march in one breaſt, it ſhould do ſo; but if not, and if the ground permit it, let the right hand of Muſqueteers march in breaſt, next it, the Body of Pikes, and after it the left wing of Muſqueteers. But if none of theſe can be, then as many ſhould march in one petty Diviſion, as the way can permit; as ſuppoſe twelve, eight, or ten, and ſo ſoon as you come to open ground, you are to march preſently in Squadrons, or as they are now called Squads, or in full Battel, that is, the Regiment all in one front; for by that means your Soldiers are readieſt to receive an Enemy, they march in a more comely order, and ſtraggle far leſs than when they march few in breaſt, and in a long row. The Major appoints Captains, Lieutenants, and Enſigns to lead Diviſions, and Serjeants to attend the flanks, every one according to their dignities; but for my own part I never thought it convenient, much leſs neceſſary that every ſmall Diviſion of a Regiment ſhould have a Bringer up, ſince he muſt be (as ſome will have it) a Commiſſion'd Officer, as well as the Leader of a Diviſion ſhould be. For firſt conſider, that in a Regiment of one thouſand ſtrong, there are an hundred ſixty and ſix files, and admit that the way will permit eight files to march in breaſt, (as that falls not always out) by that account you ſhall have one and twenty Diviſions conſiſting of eight Files apiece; multiply twenty one by eight, the Product is a hundred and ſixty eight Files, which conſiſts of a thouſand and eight men, eight more than the number: Reckon again how many Commiſſion'd Officers you have in ten Companies, beſides the three Field-Officers you ſhall have but twenty nine, now of theſe twenty one muſt be allow'd to lead the Diviſions, and by that account you have but nine Officers to bring up, ſo you want thirteen Commiſſion'd Officers for that imployment, for Serjeants ſhould neither be permitted to lead or bring up, but in caſe of neceſſity, their duty being to attend the flanks. Beſides, all Commiſſion'd Officers are not always preſent, ſome frequently being either ſick, wounded, or abſent on furloff. It will be enough therefore if all theſe petty Diviſions be led by Commiſſion'd Officers, (which yet cannot be, unleſs you allow ſome Enſign-bearers to ſtay from their Colours) and by this means you may ſpare ſix foot of ground between two Diviſions; for thoſe who will allow Bringers up, allow eighteen foot between two Diviſions, to wit, ſix foot between the Reer of the firſt Diviſion, and him that brings it up: ſecondly, ſix foot between that Bringer up, and him that leads the next Diviſion, and ſix foot between that Leader and the Diviſion he leads. This was the order of the two Princes of *Orange*, *Maurice* and *Henry*. But if there be no Bringer up, twelve foot will ſerve well enough between Diviſions. Nor am I of their opinion who will have a Colonel of Foot to begin his march on Horſeback; for ſince he commands Foot, he is bound at firſt to march on foot, though afterwards he may ride. And I avouch too, that he who leads Bodies of Foot ſhould not ride at all, becauſe he may very inſenſibly make the Reer run after him. If the Major lead the Regiment, or a part of it in his Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonels abſence, he is bound to do it in Towns, in Leaguers, or at Paſſes on foot, becauſe then he Officiates as Colonel: but if any of his two ſuperior Commanders be preſent, then he ſhould be conſtantly on Horſeback, for being he is not tyed to any one place, but muſt be ſometimes in the Van, ſometimes in the Battel, ſometimes in the Reer, now here, now there, to ſee that every Officer and Soldier do their duty; he ſhould never be on foot when the Regiment marcheth.

The March of a Regiment.

Reaſons why every petty Diviſion cannot have a Bringer up.

A Major ſtill on Horſeback.

And becauſe the Captain-Lieutenant cannot conſtantly march on foot, others ſhould be ordain'd to aſſiſt him by turns, and thoſe others ſhould be Captains, for by the courteſie of Arms the Captain-Lieutenant is youngeſt Captain. But this aſſiſtance he is to get, is only in the Field, for ſo ſoon as he comes near to Town, Village, or Quarter, he is to march on the head of the Regiment behind one of the three Field-Officers, and all the Captains

A Captain-Lieutenant.

Captains ought to go immediately to their ſeveral Diviſions.

A Brigade. It hath been a cuſtom of a long time, and in many places, to put ſeveral Regiments in one Body or Batallion, which they call a Brigade. There are of theſe both of Horſe and Foot, and the Colonel, who commands that Body, is called a Brigadeer. It is not as yet defin'd, for any thing I know, how ſtrong a Brigade ſhould be, three thouſand, two thouſand, eighteen hundred, or fifteen hundred. The Eſtates of the *United Provinces* had always Brigades of Foot in their Service, but thoſe were ſtrong, five or ſix thouſand. I have ſeen ſix Regiments in one Brigade, and yet it did not conſiſt of ſo many as two thouſand men that carried Arms; here you may ſuppoſe there were Officers enough for ſo few Soldiers. The Colonel who is oldeſt in that ſervice commands the Brigade. There is likewiſe a Major of the Brigade, who receives the Word and other Orders from the Major-General, and gives them to the Majors of the other Regiments of the Brigade, and they to their Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels, and then to the Serjeants of all the ſeveral Companies. This Major of the Brigade is ordinarily he who is Major of the oldeſt Regiment of that Brigade.

When a Brigade marcheth, the Regiments of it have the Van-day about by turns, but ſo have not the Companies of the ſeveral Regiments. It ſeems ſomething ſtrange to me that a Regiment of one thouſand Foot ſhould be divided into two ſeveral Bodies, the Colonel, and Lieutenant Colonels Diviſions, and yet that Regiment Embodied with another, perhaps with other two, and march all in one Body. Truly I ſhould think if the firſt be needful, the ſecond ſhould not be neceſſary.

Colonels of two Regiments. It is a cuſtom with ſome Princes to give ſome of their Colonels more Regiments than one, which I have ſeen, though I confeſs I never ſaw any good reaſon for it; for if a Prince or a State will advance a Colonel above or beyond his fellows, he may rather give him ſome higher title, and conſequently greater pay; yet it were the more tollerable if both Regiments were of Foot, or both of Horſe, for then they might make up a Brigade, and he who is Colonel of both, might be Brigadeer of both. But I have known ſome of them Colonels of Horſe and Foot, and ſure they cannot Officiate in both Regiments at one time, and therefore I confeſs that in one of them a Lieutenant-Colonel is very neceſſary. But it muſt miniſter ſome fuel of heart-burning to many brave Gentlemen, who have ſerved Princes faithfully, to ſee ſome men provided with two Charges who have done no more than themſelves, (perhaps not ſo much) when they have no Charge at all. But to him that hath ſhall be given.

Obſerve that in the *French* Service, Majors being commanded to be under Captains, the ſtreſs of the command of the Regiment lyes on the Lieutenant-Colonel.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of Troops, and Regiments of Horſe, of their Officers, and of Dragoons.

THOSE who ſerve in the Wars on Horſeback, are by a general word called the Cavalry, which is now underſtood in all Languages, though it be deriv'd either from the *French* word *Chevall*, or the *Italian* and *Spaniſh* word *Cavallo*, both which ſignifie a Horſe. Though the *Germans* make much uſe of the word Cavalry, yet they have one of their own as proper and ſignificative as it is, and that is *Reutery*. We have no other word for it in *Engliſh* but what is borrowed from the *French*. It hath been in ancient times a noble ſervice, and ſtill ſhould be ſo; for as I obſerved before, thoſe who ſerved on Horſeback, eſpecially the men at Arms or Curiaſſiers, were all Gentlemen, and moſt of them of a high extraction; but now a promiſcuous levy by the Trumpet hath well near abrogated that commendable cuſtom, and made men of all ſorts (ſo they be of bodies fit for ſervice) whatever their birth be, welcome to ride in Troops. When the *Romans* ſaid, a man was *equeſtris ordinis*, they meant he was a Gentleman; and when they ſpoke ſo, it was nothing elſe but that he was of that rank or claſs, out of which Horſemen were choſen to ſerve in the Wars. This made them with much reaſon demand as their due, the precedency of the Foot, though ſtill the Infantry be the ſtrength of the Army, but now that Horſemen are Plebeians as well as Footmen; the hand and the door is no more due to the one, nor to the other; and in many places Commanders of Horſe and Foot, who carry alike Offices, take the precedency according to their antiquity of bearing charge. But in moſt Courts and Councils of War (by the determination of the Prince) the Officers of the Cavalry have ſeats given them before thoſe of the Infantry, neither do the laſt contend for it.

Cavalry of old challeng'd with reaſon the precedency of the Infantry,

And hath it yet.

It was near the time of the Emperours, before the *Romans* had any light armed Horſemen, but almoſt with all other Nations, and in all times, a Cavalry was divided into heavy and light armed, and they are called ſo from their offenſive Arms, the heavy arm'd are called Curiaſſiers, *Gens d' Armes*, and men at Arms from their defenſive armour, but the light armed are now called Harquebuſiers from their offenſive weapon; the Harquebuſs which before the invention of the Muſquet and Piſtol, was a weapon (only differing in length) common to both the Foot and the Horſe, and they had both their denomination of Harquebuſiers from it. And though none of them now uſe the Harquebuſs, and that the Foot-firemen are called Muſqueteers from the Muſquet, yet the light Horſe, though they uſe Piſtols, keep ſtill the old name of Harquebuſiers.

Curiaſſiers.

Harquebuſiers why ſo called.

What Arms both for offence and defence both thoſe kinds of Horſemen had formerly, and what now they have, is formerly told you in ſeveral Diſcourſes.

It hath been of late a cuſtom to arm the light Horſemen with Carrabines hung about their ſhoulders in Leather Bandileers, beſides their Piſtols, ſo that upon the matter, whole Troops are ſo armed with Carrabines, that you may call them Carrabineers, but it was not ſo in former times, for only a preſcrib'd number of them were ordain'd to attend every Troop of Curiaſſiers, and had no Officers of their own, the manner of their ſervice was to ride up within ſuch a diſtance as they were order'd, and diſcharge their Carrabines on the enemy, and immediately turn to either hand by a Caragoll, and get them behind the Troop, and this they were oblig'd to do, as oft as they were commanded to it by him who was Captain of the Company of Curiaſſiers. Hence it is that the Lord *Carbouſine* tells us that Carrabine is a *Spaniſh* word deriv'd from *Cara*, which ſignifies a face; and *Bino* which ſignifies twofold, as one would ſay, double fac'd, becauſe the Carrabineer kept his face to his enemy, till he had fired his piece, and then turn'd his face to his friends when he Caragol'd.

Carrabine.

Why ſo called.

Seven-

In former times there were only Troops, but no Regiments of Horſe.

Seventy or eighty years ago there were no Regiments of Horſe (properly ſo called) only Troops or Companies, and theſe ſometimes were two hundred ſtrong, ſometimes one hundred, and ſometimes not ſo many, and upon occaſion of ſervice, Troops were join'd together, and the command of ſome of them given for a time by the Prince or State to ſome perſon of great quality, whom they thought fit for that imployment. Sometimes three Troops were join'd together, ſometimes five or ſix, yet they had not the name of a Regiment, nor had he who commanded that Body ſo compoſed, the title of Colonel. The Eſtates of the *United Provinces* uſed this much, but now they levy Regiments. The furious Wars which began in *Chriſtendom* in the year of our Lord 1618, (whereof in proceſs of time we had a deep ſhare at home) reverſed many good old cuſtoms and conſtitutions, and with other changes introduced Regiments of Horſe, and not only ſo, but brought in ſuch numbers of them that in many Armies there were near as many Regiments of Horſe as of Foot; yea, I have ſeen in more Armies than one, a greater number of Horſe-Regiments than of Foot. Inſomuch that ſome years before the Peace of *Munſter*, Regiments of Horſe were ſo weak that the Officers of the ſeveral Troops being all in the Van, did near make a full rank equal in number to any of the three ranks behind them, which were compoſed of Riders or Troopers. And becauſe in Battel, Officers by their courage give good example, this helpt well to make the Regiments and Troops fight well, and upon this account I aver that theſe Regiments conſiſted rather of four ranks, than of three, and ſo were not properly three deep. But let us look a little further back, yet not beyond the time that Piſtols came in requeſt.

Numerous Regiments of Horſe.

French Cavalry.

Clupeati.

Gens d' Armes of two kinds.

The *French* Cavalry even in *Henry* the fourth's time, and the beginning of the Reign of *Lewis* the Juſt, was compoſed of three kinds, theſe were *Gens d' Armes*, Archers, and light Horſe. How the *Gens d' Armes* were mounted and arm'd hath been told you; and theſe were uſed by the ancient *Gauls* before ever the *Roman* name was known among them, and were called *Clupeati*. Theſe latter *Gens d' Armes*, or Curiaſſiers, were all order'd in ſeveral Troops, but not in Regiments; theſe Troops were all to be compoſed of Gentlemen by their birth, and were not of equal ſtrength, they were of two kinds, for ſome were in the Kings pay, ſome not. Thoſe entertain'd by the King, were called *Des Ordonnances du Roy*, or of the Kings Eſtabliſhment. Some of them conſiſted of one hundred Gentlemen, ſome of ſixty, ſome of fifty, and ſome of forty, according to the quality or merit of the Captain, or the pleaſure of the Prince. The *French* Troops of *Gens d' Armes*, which were not in the Kings pay, were compoſed of thoſe Gentlemen who were obliged to ſerve on their own charges three months within the Kingdom of *France*, and forty days without it.

Archers.

Light Horſemen.

The difference between an Archer, and a light Horſeman.

How many Horſes all three were oblig'd to keep.

The *French* Archers before the time of Gunpowder carried Bows and Arrows, and from thence had the name of Archers; but at this time of which I ſpeak, they had for weapons, Piſtols, Swords, Maces, or half Lances. Thoſe who were called *Chevaux Legers*, or light Horſe, had much the like Arms, but inſtead of a Piſtol, each had a Harquebuſs hanging at his Saddle. The main difference between theſe two conſiſted in this, that the Archers compoſed no ſeveral or diſtinct body of the Cavalry, but were to attend the *Gens d' Armes*, for every man of Arms had the allowance of an Archer to wait on him; ſo that how ſtrong ſoever the Company of the *Gens d' Armes* was, of that ſame number were the Archers that attended it. But the Cavalry *Legere*, or the light Horſe were not at all obliged to any ſuch attendance, but had a General of their own who marſhal'd them, who march'd with them, and fought with them, either as he himſelf thought good, or as he was order'd to do by the Great Conſtable, or one of the Marſhals of *France*. And aſſuredly the Inſtitution of the Archers to attend the men at Arms was excellent, for the Curiaſſiers not being able to Caragol, are obliged in their charge to break thorough, or be beaten; and in any of theſe caſes, the Archers were of good uſe: If they were worſted to ſupport them, or to purſue the enemy when he was put to flight, which the men at Arms could not do, becauſe of the weight of their Armour. Now all theſe three, *Gens d' Armes*, Archers, and light Horſemen, were obliged to keep each of them more Horſes than one; whereas now our Troopers are obliged to keep no more but one, and have allowance of pay little enough for that one.

I find

I find, that in the Wars which the Proteſtants of *France* made with their Kings, *Charles* the Ninth, and his Brother *Henry* the Third; they managed them at as ſmall an expence, as poſſibly they could; yet they obliged every man at Arms, to keep three Horſes, two ſtrong Courſers, and one Gelding; every Archer, and Light-Horſe-man, two, a good Horſe, and a good Nag. And I ſuppoſe, you will really think it ſtrange, how they could keep ſo many, when I tell you what allowance of pay they had: Every man of Arms had 45 *French* Livres in the Month, about Three pound fifteen ſhillings Sterling; every Archor and Light-Horſe-man had Thirty Livres, about Two pound ten ſhillings. A Captain of all three had five Riders pay allow'd him, the Lieutenant four, the Cornet three, and the Quartermaſter two: very inconſiderable wages, but aſſuredly, they had either other ſhifts, or things were at eaſier rates in *France* then, than they have been ſince. In the Proteſtant War, in *France* 100 years ago.

In the times of the Emperours *Ferdinand* the Firſt, *Maximilian* the Second, *Rodolph* the Second, and *Matthias*, I find that the *German* Eſtabliſhment was, that no Ritmaſter, or Captain of Horſe ſhould have any Rider in his Troop but Gentlemen, and that every Troop of Curiaſſiers ſhould conſiſt of Three-hundred Riders, many whereof were bound to maintan three ſerviceable Horſes, and all the reſt, two at leaſt; and every one of theſe Gentlemen who kept either two or three Horſes, were to keep a luſty fellow well Hors'd, in quality of a ſervant, armed with a long Gun, wherewith they rode, when commanded, before the Troop, and fired on the Enemy, and immediately retired behind the Troop, as I told you, the Carabineers did, theſe being equal in number to their Maſters, made up Three hundred, and reſembled the *French* Archers. Theſe *Dutch* Servants had the Emperours pay, or that of ſome *German* Prince, but their Maſters received it, with their own; nor had the Maſters power to put away theſe Servants, or the Servants to go from the Maſters, ſo long as the War laſted; but if any difference aroſe between them, it was voided by the Ritmaſter, or Marſhal of the Army. Theſe *German* Companies of Horſe had for Officers a Captain, a Lieutenant, a Cornet, a Quartermaſter, and ſix Corporals, whom they called Ritmaſters (which is to ſay, File-leaders) each whereof had fifty Troops under his command; two Trumpeters. There was likewiſe allowed to every Troop, a Prieſt, a Clerk, a Chirurgion, a Dagmaker, a Saddler, and a Smith. All theſe Curiaſſiers were armed for offence with two Piſtols, a Sword, and a Lance; ſo long as this laſt was in faſhion; ſo if you will reckon all that belonged to this *German* Troop, both Maſters, and thoſe who attended them (who were all obliged to fight) you will find it conſiſted of ſix hundred fighting men, and of nine hundred Horſes at leaſt. But ſince that time I have ſeen four Regiments in that ſame Country, who were not all of them together ſo ſtrong. Old *German* Companies of Horſe, particularly Curiaſſiers. Their Officers.

In later times, Commiſſions have been given for levying Regiments, free Squads, and Troops, but all Regiments did not, nor do not conſiſt of alike number of Companies, nor all Companies of alike number of Riders, nay, not under one Prince, you ſhall ſee a Lieutenant Colonel have four Troops in his Squadron (which he calls free) becauſe he acknowledgeth no Colonel, or other Commander under the Major General, and each of theſe Troops to have fifty or ſixty Riders, being oblig'd to have no more by their Ritmaſters Capitulation: You may ſee in that ſame Army a Regiment of ſix Companies, each of Seventy men; another of eight Troops, each of fifty horſe, ſo little is an uniformity in equal numbers of Troops, or of Horſemen in every Troop regarded, or look'd after. I ſaw one Regiment in the *Sweediſh* ſervice (I may ſay one, for I ſaw not ſuch another in any of their Armies) in which were according to Capitulation, twelve Troops, each of them conſiſting of one hundred Riders effectively, but four of the Regiments of that Army were not ſo ſtrong, as that Regiment was alone. Troops and Regiment of thoſe times.

Troops, Squads, and Regiments of Horſe in our Modern Wars, are not caſt into Wedges or Rhombs as ſome of the Ancient ones were, at which manner of figures *Ælian* makes his *Grecian* Companies to be very dexterous: The Square front being now only in uſe. The number of Ranks of either Regiments or Troops, whether they be ſtrong or weak, are alike in all, becauſe the depth of the Battel is determined by the Prince or State to be alike in all, and

in the matter of this depth there hath been great variance among thoſe, who aſſume to themſelves the title of Tacticks, who teach the rules of War.

How deep Horſe ſhould be marſhaled.

Many would have the file of Horſemen to be five deep; others will not hear of that, becauſe thereby ranks cannot double; an objection which I have anſwer'd already, in my diſcourſe of Exerciſe. Others will have ſix, becauſe that admits doubling of ranks, but that is rejected, becauſe if ſix deep be enough for the Foot, it will be too much for the Horſe. There be others who would have every Troop of Horſe to conſiſt of ſixty and four Riders, and theſe being Marſhall'd eight deep, and eight in front according to the ſquare root, make a perfect ſquare of men and Horſe, and this ſpeculation ſeems very pretty, but I reſerve my anſwer to it till I ſpeak of the ſquare root it ſelf; for the preſent let it ſuffice, that if ſix deep be too many for a Cavalry, eight deep will be very far out of purpoſe. The late Earl of *Strafford*, as he appointed, in his Military Inſtructions, the foot to be eight deep, ſo he order'd his Troops of Horſe to be four in File. But Univerſally now, for any thing I know (unleſs it be in the Low-Countries) the Horſe are Marſhall'd three deep, without regard to doubling of ranks, whereof I have already ſpoken; and aſſuredly, this of all others, brings moſt hands to fight.

Difference of opinions.

Square Root.

Three deep.

When you have known how deep the Troop is to be drawn up, you ſhould cauſe to be ſet down in paper, in what order you will Marſhal your Horſemen; whom you ordain to be Leaders, and whom Bringers up, and whom for the right and left hand files, that all your Riders may be placed according to their dignity, then it will be an eaſie matter to draw up your Troop, and for the Major to draw up the Regiment; for being that all the Horſemen are arm'd alike, there is no ſeparation to be made of one part of the Troop from another, as there is of ſeparating the Pikemen from the Muſquetcers in Foot-Companies, the Major giving every Ritmaſter his place of dignity according to his antiquity or Commiſſion; and thoſe intervals being kept that are appointed, the ſeveral Troops, be they few or many, are very ſoon caſt into the mould of a Regiment.

In my diſcourſe of drilling, I ſaid, that in exerciſing a Body of Horſe, whether one Troop or more, ſome allow for order ſix foot, ſome, ten, and for open order ſome allow twelve foot, and ſome twenty, others conclude ſix foot between rank and rank, and file and file ſufficient, but in marching there ſhould be the length of a Horſe between rank and rank, but ſo much is not at all needful between files: now it ſeems the *Germans* allow ten foot for the length of a Horſe in marching and exerciſing, as well as in their Caſtrametation; for when Horſe are orderly quarter'd in the field, ten foot of ground are allowed for a Horſe to ſtand on between his head and his tail. But for all this, I ſay, ſix foot are not to be allowed in all motions of exerciſe, as in Wheeling, which is the poper motion of the Cavalry, you cannot make it, till your ranks and files be at cloſe order, and in this motion of Wheeling, obſerve, that the Wheeling to the left hand, being the Bridle hand, is more proper, than to the right: Obſerve alſo that after your body hath Wheel'd you are to reduce them to their firſt order, by making the ranks open, which they muſt do by advancing, and not by ſtepping back as the foot do.

Diſtance.

Wheeling.

The ſtronger the Troop be, it ſhould have the more Corporals, who begin now to be qualified with the Title of Brigadeers, for it ſeems not proportionable for a Troop of One Hundred and Twenty to have no more Corporals, than a Troop of ſixty, or ſeventy, yet for moſt part now all Troops have a like number of Officers, and theſe are, the Captain or Ritmaſter, The Lieutenant, the Cornet, the Quartermaſter, three Corporals or Brigadeers, two Trumpeters, ſome have three, and ſome four, a Saddler, and a Smith, and ſome allow a Chirurgion, and a Clerk. Many Troops have no allowance, for the laſt four, though all four are very neceſſary; In ſome places, if a Chirurgion be allowed for every Regiment, it is thought very fair, many Ritmaſters entertain a Saddler and a Smith in their Troops, allowing them the pay of Troopers, and what benefit elſe they can make by their ſeveral Trades. But if all who ride in the Troop be Gentlemen, they will not permit theſe two Mechanicks to ride with them; yet my opinion is, ſince all who ride now in Troops are not Gentlemen, they may without any diſparagement, ſuffer a Smith and a Saddler to ride in rank with them, being they are profitable members of that little Commonwealth. It is, I think an overſight, that a

Officers of a Troop.

Clerk

Clerk is not allow'd for every Company of Horſe; for a Quarter-maſter hath enough to doth otherwiſe, though he be not bound to officiate for the Clerk, to receive the Pay of the Troop, and give it out, and keep the accounts of it; unleſs you will ſay, that the paying Money to a Troop falls out ſo ſeldom, that the receiving it, will be rather a divertiſement than a trouble to the Quartermaſter.

Having ſpoke to the Duties of a Captain, Lieutenant, and Enſign-bearer of a Foot Company, I have nothing to add to the Duties of a Ritmaſter, Lieutenant, and Cornet, but between the Quartermaſters of Foot and Horſe there is this difference, that the firſt hath no command, but the ſecond hath, in other duties there is none. But I ſhall tell the Quatermaſters of Horſe, that they ſhould have skill in Caſtrametation, as much as the Foot Quartermaſters have, and rather more; for the laſt look only to the regular quartering of Men in the Field, the firſt to the quartering of both Men and Horſes. A Corporal of Horſe ſhould have experience, for he either aſſiſts the Lieutenant in placing and ſetting the Guards, or he doth it himſelf without his Lieutenant, he ſets the Sentinels, and ſees them reliev'd; and orders the *Patrovils*, which are Rounds. He is to ride in Rank, and if the Troop march not in breaſt, but in three ſeveral Squadrons, then there is a Corporal on the right hand of every Squadron; but in abſence of higher Officers, Corporals lead Diviſions, ſo do they thoſe parties which they are to command, if there be none to command above them.

Quarter-maſter of Horſe.

Corporals, of Brigadeers.

When a Troop is divided into three Squadrons, they have not their denominations from the Corporals or Brigadeers, but the firſt is called the Captains Squadron, the ſecond the Lieutenants, the third the Cornets, and if there be a fourth, it is called the Quartermaſters. When a Troop marcheth, the Captain leads the firſt diviſion, the Cornet with his Standard the ſecond, the Quartermaſter leads the third, and the Lieutenant brings up; yet ſome will have the eldeſt Corporal to lead the laſt diviſion, and the Quartermaſter to bring up on the Lieutenants left hand, for which I ſee very ſmall reaſon, or rather none at all. Some *French* Troops and ours likewiſe, have beſides theſe Officers whom I have nam'd, a Sub-Lieutenant, or under Lieutenant, who hath no command in the Lieutenants preſence, but in his abſence he commands over the Cornet; the *French* have likewiſe a *Guidon*, to whom perhaps may anſwer he who in other places is appointed to carry the Standard, either in the Cornets abſence, or when he pleaſeth to appoint him to carry it. As to the Officers of the Regiment-Staff of the Cavalry, they are the ſame with thoſe of the Foot, and their Duties are the ſame.

March of a Troop.

Sub-Lieutenant.

Guidon.

But now methinks I hear a Trumpeter ſound a Call. Of Trumpets and of Trumpeters I have ſpoke in my Diſcourſes of the *Roman* Art of War: That which I have now to add, is, Trumpeters ſhould be skilful to ſound all the points of War, and in the Fields they ſhould ſeldom want their Trumpets about them for ſudden Alarms: And becauſe they are frequently ſent to an Enemy, they ought to be both witty and diſcreet, and muſt drink but little, that ſo they may be rather apt to circumvent others, than be circumvented; they ſhould be cunning, and whereever they are ſent, they ſhould be careful to obſerve warily the Works, Guards, and Sentinels of an Enemy, and give an account of them at their return to him who ſent them. One Trumpeter ſhould conſtantly lodge where the Standard quarters. The *German* Trumpeters aſſume to themſelves a great deal of liberty, and have in a manner ſet up a Republick of their own, independent of that Diſcipline, by which the Army (of which they are members) is governed. They pretend to have their own Laws, whereby they puniſh crimes very ſeverely, eſpecially ſuch faults, that any of their number commits againſt the Articles of War of that Prince whom they ſerve; and endeavour to vindicate themſelves from any puniſhment inflicted by others, than thoſe of their own Common-wealth. If any Trumpeter be abus'd or diſgrac'd, whether by his own Ritmaſter, or any other Officer, the reſt reſent it, as an injury done to the whole fraternity; for which they will very readily make him march a whole week without a Trumpeter to ſound before him. None may ſound a Trumpet before a Troop but he who is maſter of their Art, and he muſt prove himſelf to be ſo, by produ-

Trumpeters.

Pretended priviledges of the *German* Trumpeters.

cing a Certificate, ſign'd by a certain number of Maſter Trumpeters, with their Seals annexed to it, and this in their Language, they call a *Lerbrief*: If any, wanting this, offer to ſound before a Company of Horſe, the Maſters may come and take him away with diſgrace, in ſpite of the Ritmaſter. Thoſe who have not yet got *Lerbriefs*, they call Boys, who muſt ſerve the Maſter Trumpeters in all manner of drudgery, though they could ſound all the points of War never ſo well. They pretend to have got theſe priviledges from the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth, under his Manual Subſcription and Imperial Seal. Ask them where this Patent of theirs lyeth, ſome of them will tell you at *Augsburg*, others ſay at *Strasburg*, and a third will ſay at *Nuremburg*. I have not ſeen any of them puniſhed by their Officers, and whatever diſcipline of their own they have I know not, but I have not heard of any of their groſs miſdemeanors. I knew one Colonel *Boy*, an ancient Gentleman, who for many years had commanded Horſe, in whoſe Regiment no ſound of Trumpet was heard, for none of them would ſerve under him, becauſe in his younger years he had kill'd a Trumpeter with his own hand. But it is well theſe pretended priviledges of theirs are confin'd within the bounds of the *German* Empire.

Kettle-drum. There is another Martial Inſtrument uſed with the Cavalry, which they call a Kettle-drum, there be two of them which hang upon the Horſe before the Drummers Saddle, on both which he beats: They are not ordinary, Princes, Dukes, and Earls, may have them with thoſe Troops which ordinarily are called their Life-guards, ſo may Generals and Lieutenant Generals, though they be not Noble-men. The *Germans*, *Danes* and *Sweedes*, permit none to have them under a Lord Baron, unleſs they have taken them from an Enemy, and in that caſe any Ritmaſter, whatever extraction he be of, may make them beat beſide his Trumpeters. They are uſed alſo for State by the Princes of *Germany* when they go to meat, and I have ſeen them ordinarily beat, and Trumpets ſound at the Courts of *Sweden* and *Denmark*, when either of the two Kings went to Dinner or Supper.

Dragoons Dragoons are Musketeers mounted on Horſes, appointed to march with the Cavalry, in regard there are not only many occaſions, wherein Foot can aſſiſt the Horſe, but that ſeldome there is any occaſion of ſervice againſt an Enemy, but wherein it is both fit and neceſſary to joyn ſome Foot with the Horſe, Dragoons then go not only before to guard Paſſes (as ſome imagine) but to fight in open Field; for if an Enemy rencounter with a Cavalry in a champaign or open Heath, the Dragoons are obliged to alight, and mix themſelves with the Squads of Horſe, as they ſhall be commanded; and their continuate Firing, before the Horſe come to the charge, will, no doubt, be very hurtful to the Enemy: If the encounter be in a cloſe Countrey, they ſerve well to line Hedges, and poſſeſs Encloſures, they ſerve for defending Paſſes and Bridges, whether it be in the Advance, or a Retreat of an Army, and for beating the Enemy from them: Their ſervice is on foot, and is no other than that of Musketeers; but becauſe they are mounted on Horſe-back, and ride with the Horſe, either before in the Van, or behind in the Rear of an Army, they are reckon'd as a part of the Cavalry, and are ſubordinate to the General, Lieutenant General, or Major General of the Horſe, and not to thoſe of the foot. And being that ſometimes they are forced to retire from a powerful and prevailing Enemy, they ought to be taught to give Fire on Horſe-back, that in an open field they may keep an Enemy at a diſtance till they get the advantage of a cloſer Countrey, a Straight, a Paſs, a Bridge, a Hedge, or a Ditch, and then they are bound to alight, and defend that advantage, that thereby (though perhaps with the loſs of the Dragoons themſelves) the Cavalry may be ſaved. When they alight, they caſt their Bridle Reins over the necks of their ſide-mens Horſes, and leave them in that ſame order as they marched. Of ten Dragoons, nine fight, and the tenth man keeps the ten Horſes. For what they have got the denomination of Dragoons, is not ſo eaſie to be told, but becauſe in all languages they are called ſo, we may ſuppoſe they may borrow their name from *Dragon*, becauſe a Musketeer on Horſe-back, with his burning Match riding at a gallop, as many times he doth, may ſomething reſemble that Beaſt, which Naturaliſts call a Fiery Dragon.

Serve on foot,

Yet are part of the Cavalry.

Whence they have their denomination.

Since

Since then a Dragoon when he alights, and a Muſqueteer are all one, I have forborn hitherto to ſpeak of the ſeveral ways how the ranks of Muſqueteers fire, having reſerv'd it to this as a proper place. Take them then, thus: The ſeveral ſervices of a Muſqueteer.

If the enemy be upon one of your flanks, that hand file fires that is neareſt the danger, and the next ſtanding ſtill to do the like, that which hath fired, marches thorough the reſt of the files, till it be beyond the furtheſt file of that wing of Muſqueteers: But if you be charg'd on both flanks, then your right and left-hand files fire both, and immediately march into the middle of the Body, room being made for them; and in ſuch pieces of ſervice as theſe, Officers muſt be attentive, dexterous and ready to ſee all things done orderly, otherwiſe confuſion firſt, and immediately after a total rout will inevitably follow. If your Body be retiring from an enemy who purſues you in the reer, the two laſt ranks ſtand, whereof one having fired, it divides it ſelf into two, the one half by the right, the other half by the left-hand marcheth up to the Van, making ready all the while, this way is much practiſed, eſpecially in the Low-Countries, but with ſubmiſſion to their better judgments, I ſhould think it more eaſie for theſe ranks that have fired to march every man of them up to their Leaders, and then ſtep before them thorough theſe Intervals of three foot that is between files, and this may be done without any trouble either to themſelves or their neighbours. If the ſervice with the enemy be in the Van, as moſtly it is, ranks may (after they have fired) fall off two ſeveral ways: Firſt, the rank which hath fired, divides it ſelf into two, and the half goes to the right hand, and the other half to the left, and then they fall down to the reer, and ſo of Leaders become Bringers-up, till another rank comes behind them. But I would have this manner of falling off baniſht out of all armies, for in a great Body it breeds confuſion, and though in drilling it may leiſurely be done without any conſiderable diſorder, yet in ſervice with an enemy, where men are falling, it procures a pitiful Embarras, and though it did not, yet it ought to give way to a more eaſie way of falling off, which is the ſecond way I promiſed to tell you of, and it is that I ſpoke of, of falling down by the Intervals of ground, that is between files, and this I would have conſtantly done by turning to the left-hand after they have fired, becauſe after that Muſqueteers recover their Matches, and caſt about their Muſquets to the left-ſide, that they may charge again, which they are a doing, while they fall off to the reer. But there is a third way for Muſqueteers to do ſervice better than by any of theſe two, and that is not to fall off at all, but for every rank to ſtand ſtill, after it hath given fire, and make ready again ſtanding, the ſecond advancing immediately before the firſt, and that having fired likewiſe, the third advanceth before it, and ſo all the reſt do, till all have fired, and then the firſt rank begins again. It is not poſſible that by this way of giving fire, there can be the leaſt confuſion, or any thing like it, if Officers be but half men; there is another way of firing ſometimes practiſed, that is by three ranks together, the firſt kneeling, the ſecond ſtooping, and the third ſtanding, theſe having fired, the other three ranks march thorough the firſt three, and in the ſame poſtures fire likewiſe. But here I ſhall deſire it to be granted to me that which indeed is undeniable, that when the laſt three ranks have fired, the firſt three cannot be ready to fire the ſecond time. Next, firing by three ranks at a time, ſhould not be practiſed, but when either the buſineſs ſeems to be deſperate, or that the Bodies are ſo near, that the Pikemen are almoſt come to puſh of Pike, and then no other uſe can be made of the Muſquet but of the Butt-end of it. I ſay then that this manner of ſix ranks to fire at two ſeveral times is not at all to be uſed; for if it come to extremity, it will be more proper to make them all fire at once, for thereby you pour as much Lead in your enemies boſom at one time as you do the other way at two ſeveral times, and thereby you do them more miſchief, you quail, daunt, and aſtoniſh them three times more, for one long and continuated crack of Thunder is more terrible and dreadful to mortals than ten interrupted and ſeveral ones, though all and every one of the ten be as loud as the long one. But that I ſeem not to paſs my word to you for this, be pleaſed to take the authority of *Guſtavus Adolphus* King of *Sweden*, who practiſed it at the Battel of *Leipſick*, where after he had fought long, and that the *Saxon* Army on his left-hand was beaten by the *Imperialiſts*, he cauſed the Muſqueteers of ſome

How he fires in the flank, and falls off.

How in the reer.

Muſqueteers after firing fall off two ſeveral ways.

The firſt not at all good.

The ſecond good.

But not at all to fall off is beſt.

Three ranks to fire at one time, and then the other three.

Not ſo good as all ſix ranks to fire at once.

Practiſed at *Leipſick*.

How to do it.

ſome of his Brigades to fire all at once by kneeling, ſtooping, and ſtanding, which produced effects conform to his deſire. If you ask me how ſix ranks can fire all at one time, and level their Muſquets right? I ſhall tell you the foremoſt three ranks muſt firſt be doubled by half files, and then your Body conſiſts but of three ranks, and the poſture of the firſt is kneeling, of the ſecond ſtooping, and of the third ſtanding, and then you may command them all to fire.

How Dragoons ſhould fire, and fall off.

If you command your ranks (after they have fired) to fall to the reer any of the two ways already ſpoken of, though you take never ſo good heed, you ſhall loſe ground, beſides that it hath the ſhow of a retreat, but by making the ranks ſucceſſively go before thoſe which have fired, you advance ſtill, and gain ground. In this order ſhould Dragoons fight in open field, when they are mixed with Horſe, in this order alſo ſhould they fire and advance when they intend to beat an enemy from a Paſs. But when they are to defend a Paſs, a Bridg, or a Strait, they muſt then after firing fall off to the reer, by marching thorough the Intervals of their ſeveral files, becauſe it may be ſuppoſed they have no ground whereon they can advance.

Martinet the *French* Marſhal *de Camp* tells us of another manner of firing different from all theſe that I have mentioned, as thus: Of ſix ranks of Muſqueteers he would have the firſt five to kneel, the ſixth to ſtand and fire firſt, then the fifth to riſe and fire next, and conſecutively the reſt, till the firſt rank have fired, after which he will have the foremoſt five ranks to kneel again, till the ſixth diſcharge, if the ſervice laſt ſo long. By this way you can gain no ground, and I think its very fair if you keep the ground you have, for I conceive you may probably loſe it, and which is worſe, the ranks which kneel before that which gives fire, may be in greater fear of their friends behind them, than of their enemies before them, and good reaſon for it, in regard when men are giving death to others, and in expectation of the ſame meaſure from thoſe who ſtand againſt them, they are not ſo compoſed nor govern'd with ſo ſteady reaſon as when they are receiving leiſurely leſſons in cold blood, how to pour Lead in their enemies boſoms. But I have ſpoke of this in another place, perhaps more than becomes a private perſon, ſince I find that manner of giving fire is practiſed in the *French* Armies by order of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty.

New figures of Battels commendable.

In the marſhalling of Regiments, Brigades, Companies, and Troops either of Horſe or Foot, Commanders, muſt be very cautious when they have to do with an enemy, not to charge the ordinary forms, for if at that time you offer to introduce any new form wherewith your men are not acquainted, you ſhall not fail to put them in ſome confuſion, than which an enemy cannot deſire a greater advantage. If you have a new figure of a Battel in your head, be ſure to accuſtom your Companies and Regiment very often by exerciſe to the practice of it, before you make uſe of it in earneſt. But by this, let me not ſeem to put a reſtraint on any ingenious ſpirit that is capable to create new figures, I think they ſhould be exceedingly cheriſht by Princes and their Generals, and ſuch of them as are approv'd by them ſhould be practiſed. The old *Romans* indeed kept themſelves moroſely to their ancient forms, whereby they had been exceedingly proſperous, and call'd all new Inventions *Schematiſms*. But we are not bound to follow them in all their opinions, for I am of *Lipſius* his judgment, *Valde mihi placent nova, & novitia iſtæ Inventiuncula*: Theſe little new Inventions, ſaith he, pleaſe me mightily. Lieutenant-Colonel *Elton* in his Compleat Body of the Art of War, hath very many pretty figures of ſeveral Bodies of Foot, all of them exceeding delightful, and fit for ſhow, and ſome of them for uſe, provided, Officers and Souldiers be often and thoroughly accuſtom'd to them, before they be practiſed in ſight of an enemy. And to this purpoſe he himſelf ſpeaks very well towards the end of his Book, and with his words I ſhall cloſe this Chapter. "The ſubſtantial and ſolid things of War, are to be "preciſely regarded, without which an Army, though of the moſt valiant men, "will be expoſed to the greateſt dangers, and will fall into a moſt certain ruin.

To be practiſed with much caution.

Muſqueteers on Horſeback are called Dragoons in all Languages from the word *Dragon*, becauſe when they are mounted on Horſes, and riding with burning Matches (eſpecially in the night time) they reſemble fiery *Dragons* flying in the air, but now that in ſome places Dragooners Muſquets are converted into Carabines (a change not to be deſpiſed, if the Carabine can ſend a Bullet as far

as

as a Muſquet) I conceive they may rather be called Carabineers than Dragoons. In *France* the Lieutenant of Horſe marcheth now on the left hand of the Captain or Ritmaſter, four or five foot nearer the Troop, an Innovation, as many other cuſtoms are, againſt which I have little to ſay, or rather juſt nothing.

An APPENDIX to the former CHAPTER.

HAving ſpoken enough of the Officers of both Horſe and Foot, and of thoſe who are neither, and yet both Dragoons, it will not be amiſs to ſpeak a word or two to ſome Queſtions that are ſtarted concerning them. I ſhall propoſe them, and ſpeak my thoughts of them; for to anſwer and ſolve them to the ſatisfaction of all, would be an undertaking purely impoſſible.

The firſt queſtion ſhall be this, which of the two Officers of equal quality, both under one Prince or State, the one of Horſe, the other of Foot ſhall command in chief, having no Superior at that time above them, ſuppoſing thoſe who are to be commanded conſiſt of both Foot and Horſe. The ſecond Queſtion ſhall be, whether an Officer of an inferiour quality may upon occaſion command one of a higher degree: As whether a Lieutenant may command a Captain? The queſtion is ſubdivided into two: As firſt, whether an Officer of Horſe, of an inferiour quality, may command an Officer of Foot of a higher degree? And next, whether an Officer of a King, Prince, State, or Generals Guards, ought or may have the command above an Officer of a Superiour quality, in any other Regiment of the Army? Suppoſe a Lieutenant of the Guards of Foot to command over any Captain of another Regiment of Foot, and the like of the Horſe, there may fall out a thouſand emergences and occaſions for ſuch encounters, and therefore they would be obviated and provided for by neceſſary and punctual orders. As ſuppoſe, which is very ordinary, there be but one general perſon with a part of an Army, and in an Encounter he is kill'd, the Colonels under him ſtriving for the Command in chief, make themſelves a prey to the enemy, which fell out but a very few years ago to the *Danes*, when they unfortunately fought againſt the *Swedes* in the Iſle of *Rugen*. Next, ſuppoſe a ſtrong party of Foot and Horſe commanded by a Colonel, who hath under him but one Lieutenant-Colonel, and one Major, ſeveral Ritmaſters, and Foot-Captains, the three Field-officers are kill'd, the queſtion is, Whether the chief command belongs to the eldeſt Ritmaſter, or the eldeſt Captain, or to him of theſe two, who can ſhew the eldeſt Commiſſion in that ſame ſervice. If the firſt of theſe Queſtions be well and judiciouſly handled and diſcuſs'd, there will need but a few words to be ſpoken to the reſt.

The firſt Queſtion being, which of the two Officers of Horſe and Foot of equal quality ſhall have the command? there be ſome who take a broad axe to it, and by an equal diviſion would ſatisfie both parties, and ſay, that in the Fields the Officer of Horſe, and in Towns, Caſtles, Garriſons, and fortified places, the Officer of Foot ſhould have the prime command; this Arbitration would ſeem to give pretty good ſatisfaction to peaceable men, but the ambition of Commanders of Horſe challenges the Superiority in all places; nor do I think the Officers of Foot ſhould be ſo modeſt as to give it them in any place without the expreſs command of the Prince, or his General. Aſſuredly this Superiority cannot in reaſon be challenged by either Foot or Horſe, unleſs they conceive their imployment is either more neceſſary, more to be truſted to, or more honourable than the other. We ſhall then get ſome light to decide the controverſie, when we have examined whether the Cavalry or Infantry of an Army be moſt neceſſary, or moſt truſted to, and moſt honourable, or all three. And firſt as to the neceſſity, reaſon, and if I have any right reaſon, common ſenſe will

will evince that *Horſes* are not abſolutely neceſſary in the managing a War, but as they ſay, *ad bene eſſe*, only needful they are for the better managing the War, or to ſay better, they are uſeful and convenient, but the Foot are purely and abſolutely neceſſary, as without which no War ever was, nor no War ever can be managed. Conſider that the Impugnation and defence of Towns, Forts and Caſtles is one of the moſt important and moſt neceſſary points of War, or of the whole Military Art, yet theſe have been, may be, and for moſt part are maintained and defended, and aſſaulted and taken by the Foot only, without the help of *Horſemen*, and I think they are not Paradoxical, who ſay that *Horſemen* are ſo far from being neceſſary, that they are not convenient within beſieged places, and without at Sieges as little, unleſs an enemy with Succours be expected. And in the field a well order'd and couragious well armed Batallion of Foot, are not ſo ſoon trode down by a Brigade of *Horſe* as ſome men fancy, and when their charge is ſtoutly ſtood out, I know not what the *Horſe* can do, but ride, I will not ſay, run away. If we look upon the practice of Nations both ancient and modern, we ſhall find all I have ſaid ſupported, and more too. And though our young Gallants will be governed by no former cuſtoms, yet I believe Truth it ſelf hath bid us follow the good old way. And therefore let us take a ſhort view how little neceſſary many Nations have thought *Horſemen* to be in their Wars.

The firſt Battel we read of in holy Writ was when the King of *Sodom* and his Confederates were beaten, and the Priſoners and Goods reſcued by *Abraham*, we find none of theſe nine Kings had any *Horſemen*; nor do I think any will fancy that *Abraham* mounted his three hundred and eighteen Servants on horſe-back when he purſued *Chederlaomer*, *Amraphel*, and the other two Kings. If we had not the warrant of holy Writ for it, we ſhould not be obliged to believe that the Kings of *Judah* and *Iſrael* would have muſter'd ſo many hundred thouſands of men in ſuch ſhort and narrow ſpots of ground as that whereof they were maſters; and ſince we read not of any *Horſes*, we may conclude, all their Armies conſiſted of Foot. Nay more, the Kings of *Iſrael* were commanded not to multiply *Horſes*; and *Solomon* is taxed for prevaricating with this command, as well as for his multiplying Wives and Concubines. Now if the Lord of *Hoſts* had thought it neceſſary that *Horſemen* ſhould have been in the *Hoſt* of his Choſen people, he would not have forbid their Kings to multiply horſes, but rather have commanded them to provide ſtore of them for managing their Wars, which they might eaſily enough have done out of *Egypt*, where abundance of them were to be bought. It ſeems then to me that neither the *Iſraelites* nor their neighbours, the *Ammonites*, *Moabites*, nor the Nations whom Gods people were order'd to extirpate, thought *Horſemen* neceſſary at all.

And if we peruſe other *Hiſtories*, we ſhall find that many ancient people of the world had many bloody Engagements without the help of *Horſes*. And not to go ſo far back, it is not yet above a hundred and ſixty years ſince the *Switzers* with their Foot-Batallions without the help of one *Horſeman*, durſt fight againſt Armies compoſed of numerous Foot, *Horſe*, and Artillery, witneſs their Victory at *Novara* over the *French* Army, wherein they deſtroyed all the *French* Infantry, took all their Cannon, and chac'd away all their Cavalry. And *Francis* the Firſt knew well what work they gave him at *Martignan* when he was in perſon at the head of two brave Armies of Foot and *Horſe*, one *French*, the other *Venetians*, as you have it related in the ſeventh Chapter of the *Modern Art of War*. The *Americans* following the light and law of Nature, made fierce Wars among themſelves before *Columbus* diſcover'd them, without *Horſe*; and when they ſaw ſome of theſe Animals mounted by *Spaniards*, they had ſuch notions of them, as fabulous Antiquity had of the *Centaurs*, whom they imagin'd to be half men, half beaſt. The civiliz'd *Grecians* made uſe of horſes, but not as abſolutely neceſſary, for many of their Battels were fought without them. And the *Romans* who conquer'd moſt of the then known World, made uſe but of few of them, and many times they made their *Horſemen* quit their horſes, and fight on foot, ſo little accounted they them to be abſolutely neceſſary; but of this more hereafter. Only obſerve, that as the *Grecians* had but the ſixth part or the eighth of their Armies horſe, ſo the *Romans* for moſt part had but the fourteenth part of their Army mounted on horſeback. And let no man ſay that this

this was done for want of horſes, for ſo it continued to be when they were Maſters of all *Italy*, *Spain*, *France*, much of *Africk*, and a good part of *Greece*. How little *James* the Fifth of *Scotland* conceived *H*orſemen to be neceſſary in his Armies, you may ſee in an Act of his Parliament, *Anno* 1640, two years before his death, wherein he ordains that if any come to the place of Randezvouz on *H*orſeback, he ſhall ſend back his horſe with a Foot-boy, except Earls, Lords, and Barons, and the reaſon he gives, is becauſe theſe *H*orſes deſtroy poor peoples Corn and Meadows, and are not neceſſary in his *H*oſts, where all men muſt fight on foot.

In my Diſcourſes of the *Grecian* and *Roman* Art of VVar, I ſpoke not of theſe queſtions mentioned here: for as the *Lacedemonians* being asked why their Law-giver *Licurgus* made no Law againſt Thieves? anſwered, becauſe no ſuch crime as Theft was heard of among them; ſo I ſay, neither *Grecian* nor *Roman* knew any thing of thoſe queſtions mentioned in theſe Papers. And ſince by what is ſaid, VVars have been, and may be managed (though not ſo well) without *H*orſe, but not at all without Foot, I conclude the laſt abſolutely neceſſary, but not the firſt; what reaſon then that a Foot-Officer that is abſolutely neceſſary, ſhould be commanded by an Officer of *H*orſe, without whom the War in caſe of neceſſity may be managed?

Next, we are to conſider whether the *H*orſe or Foot is moſt truſted, and which of the two Services is moſt honourable, and theſe I ſhall ſpeak of not ſeverally, but conjunctly, for I ſuppoſe it will not be denied that the greater the truſt be, the greater is the honour; for if the King intruſt a Citizen or a Merchant, who is neither Lord, Knight, nor Gentleman, to be a Privy Councellor, certainly that Citizen by that great truſt is not only honourable, but right honourable, and that title belongs to him as well as to a Lord. We are here to conſider that an Army compoſed of Horſe and Foot, repreſents a man, the Infantry his body, the Cavalry his ſides, aſſuredly the intrinſick parts of a man that are contained within his breaſt and belly, are more honourable than the extrinſecal ones, which be his ſides, legs, and arms; and hence it is that they get the name of noble and vital parts, and if this compariſon hold, as I hope it will, then it is as extravagant a deſire of an Officer of Horſe to be admitted to command over an Officer of Foot as for the rib of a mans ſide to ſeek power over the heart, liver, or lungs of the ſame man. Or if you pleaſe, an Army is like to a bird or fowl, the Infantry is the body of the bird, and the Cavalry the two wings; the ſides of a man may be pitifully wounded, and the wings of a bird broken, and yet the bodies of both man and bird preſerved; and even ſo, as long as the Infantry keeps the Field, Victory is there, though both the ſides or wings of the Horſe be broken and fled. And ſo it fell out at the Battel of *Oxenfield* in *Germany*, in the year 1638.

With the Infantry the Artillery both ancient and modern, was, and is conſtantly intruſted with the Infantry, the Magazines of Arms, Proviſions, Victuals, Ammunition and Money is intruſted; with the Infantry are intruſted the Caſtles, Forts, Ports, Havens and Strengths of the Land, and the Prince his Treaſure, and theſe make the vitals, not only of an Army, but of a State. In fortified Camps not only all theſe, but even the Cavalry it ſelf are intruſted to the Infantry, who are to maintain and defend the Ramparts, Baſtions, and whole Circumvallation of the Camp. With the Infantry the Prince who manageth the War, or his General, or both conſtantly intruſt themſelves, and either the one or other is the head of the Army: Now, as I ſaid before, where the greateſt truſt is, there is the greateſt honour; and conſequently the Infantry are more honourable than the Cavalry. Theſe things were well enough known to the *Grecians* and *Macedonians*; he that commanded the whole *Phalanx*, that is the whole Army, ſtayed with the heavy armed Foot, ſo did all the Artillery and Ammunition of the Army. And certainly they had Detachments, as well as we have; and the *Suntagmatarch* of a Foot-*Phalanx* had under his command two hundred and fifty ſix men, with Colours and ſuitable Officers; how would the merry *Greeks* have laughed, if this *Suntagmatarch*, whom our Captains ſixty years ago in many places, (when Companies were three hundred ſtrong) did repreſent, had been required to ſubmit himſelf to the command of an *Elarchos*, who was Captain of ſixty four Horſe, and repreſented our Ritmaſters now a-days; for ſometimes the *Grecian* Troop of Horſe was one hundred.

In the *Roman* Art of War, a Legion was commanded by Tribunes by turns, or as we call it from the *French*, by *toures*; he whose six month it was to command, had ordinarily four thousand two hundred, sometimes five thousand, and sometimes six thousand Foot under his command; the Horse ordained to attend this Legion were but adjectitious, and were seldom above three hundred, sometimes not so many. The denomination of any Officer is *à majori parte*, from the greater part, and therefore the Tribune was a Colonel of Foot, and yet commanded these three hundred Horse as absolutely as he did any Centuriate in the Legion. Hence it is that with reason I aver that in the *Roman* Discipline the Horse were constantly commanded by Officers of Foot; and peruse all the *Roman* Histories you shall not find that ever any Officer of Horse pretended to the command of any of the Foot. With the *Roman* Infantry were intrusted their Balists, Catupults, their Battering Rams, their Ambulatory Towns, their Bridges, and all the Materials whereof these were composed. Now these were the Artillery of the Ancients: with the *Roman* Infantry were intrusted the Treasurer and Treasure of the Army, all Provisions for Man and Horse, their Altars and places of Devotion; and though the Troops of *Horse* had their petty Standards and *Vexilla*, yet the Eagle which was mounted on a long Pole, and was the great Ensign of the Legion, was constantly intrusted to the keeping of the first Centurion, who was a Foot-officer. With the Foot the Consul march'd, lodg'd, and fought. All these being intrusted to the *Roman* Foot, and not to the *Horse*, shews that these Conquerours of the World esteemed the Foot-service more honourable than that of *Horse*; for still I say, the more trust the more honour. It is true, the *Roman Horsemen* were all elected of Gentlemen, (for so I interpret the *Equestris Ordo*) and therefore I doubt not but they had a Precedency at door and Table before the Legionary Soldiers, who were all levied out of the Commons; but that gave them no Superiority or command over the Foot, which is the thing now pretended to. Nor will the *Roman* Discipline, which order'd the *Horse* to ride the Rounds about the Guards of Foot, as you have it in the twenty second Chapter of the *Roman* Art of War, entitle these *Horsemen* to any Superiority or command over these Guards of Foot; no more than a Gentleman who is sent to go a Round with Musqueteers to attend him, will evince that he hath the command of these Guards or any Centinel of them, both the Ancient and Modern Rounds being only obliged to give an account to those who sent them, in what posture they found the Guards and Centinels; yea, these four *Roman Horsemen* who were to ride the Rounds, were commanded to lye at the door of the *Hut* or Tent of a Centurion of Foot, which I think denoted their subjection to him.

Thus I think it is clear, that with these ancient *Romans*, to whose arms and discipline of War most of the world paid homage, the Foot-service was more honourable than that on Horseback. To confirm this, I hope it will be granted me, that where the greatest danger is, there is to be expected the greatest honour. Now very often the *Roman* Consuls where they saw the Enemy prevail in Battel, they called the Cavalry or a part of it thither, but mistake it not, it was not to fight on horseback, but to make them alight from their Horses, and fight on foot with the Legionaries, which encouraged the Foot when they saw the Horse could not ride from them. And therefore since the danger was greater to fight on foot than on horseback, the *Romans* thought fighting on foot more honourable than fighting on horseback, and consequently the Foot-service more honourable than that of *Horsemen*. *Julius Cæsar* the greatest Captain that ever was, practised this in the greatest Battel he ever fought, which was against the *Helvetians*, now called *Switzers*. To shew good example he alighted first from his horse, and then caused all his Cavalry to alight, and as himself tells us, caused all the horses to be driven away a great way from that place of Battel. And so did several of the *Roman* Consuls before him. And I think you need not doubt but the horsemen being on foot were marshal'd by the Tribune as the Foot were, and so the Decurions who were Captains of horse, received their orders from the Centurions, each whereof commanded sixty Footmen, whereas the Decurion had but the command of thirty. So here we see Officers of *Horse* commanded by Officers of Foot, but never the contrary. I find *Abner*, *Joab*, *Amasa*, fight still on foot, and so did their Master *David* King of *Israel*, so did

Saul

Saul before him, and moſt of the Kings of *Judah* and *Iſrael* after him, except ſome who fought on Chariots to their ſmall advantage, but none fought on horſeback; I believe *Abſalom* fought on foot, though after his rebellious Army was routed, he mounted on a Mule to carry him away with more haſte than good ſpeed. Many Kings in the Modern Wars ſince Gunpowder made a noiſe, have fought on foot; *Edward* the fourth of *England* fought nine Battels on foot, our Kings of *Scotland* did ſo frequently. And if King *James* the fourth was kill'd at *Flowdon*, he was ſlain fighting on foot, and all theſe were Princes who trac'd the path of honour, and ſtudied both to ſhew their own valour, and to overcome their enemies, which they conceived they did more properly on foot than on horſeback.

Since the beſt govern'd Kingdoms and States both ancient and modern have given the honour to the Foot and not the *Horſe*, by intruſting them with their chief ſtrength, their Treaſure, their Artillery, Proviſions, Ammunitions, Towns, Caſtles, and fortified places, I cannot enough admire what new light the Commanders of Horſe of our time have got, that can move them to demand a ſuperiority over the Officers of Foot, of equal quality with themſelves. If they ſay becauſe they can be ſooner at an enemy than the Foot can, it will be anſwered that they can alſo ride ſooner from an enemy than the Foot can go. I ſhall eaſily grant that three or fourſcore years ago, the Curiaſſiers of *Germany*, and *Gens d' Armes* of *France* being all Gentlemen might very well have Precedency at door or board of the Foot Soldiers, but could not thereby pretend to any Superiority or command over them. But now the caſe is altered, for in *Germany*, *Denmark*, *Sweden*, the *Low-Countries*, and here with us in *Scotland* and *England*, for moſt part the horſemen are levied out of the Plebeians as well as the Foot. And I believe the *Gens d' Armes* of *France* are much fallen from their Primitive Inſtitution, moſt of their Cavalry being compoſed of the Vulgar, except the Ban and Arreerban, which conſiſts of Gentlemen that have Eſtates in lands, who by the tenure of their Lands and Inheritance are bound to ſerve the King on horſeback, ſo many days within, and ſo many days without the Kingdom.

But before I go further I conceive my ſelf obliged to anticipate an objection, which both may, and will be made by the great Champions of the Cavalry, and it is this, that many, at leaſt ſome States and Kingdoms have been, and ſome at this day are, whoſe ſtrength conſiſted, and conſiſts in Horſe, and not in Foot. But though I grant them all they ſeek, which yet I will not do, they gain nothing unleſs they make it appear that a War can and may be managed with horſe alone, and not with any Foot, which they will never be able to do. Firſt, they ſay that in the days of *Yore*, the greateſt ſtrength of *France* conſiſted in Horſe; that Kingdom indeed gloried much in a noble and couragious Cavalry, but examine their ſtories, you will find that the moſt glorious of their Kings, *Charles* the Great, his Father *Pepin*, and his Father *Charles Martel*, their famous atchievements in *France*, *Saxony*, *Germany*, *Spain* and *Italy* were done with Foot as well as with horſe; many of their Kings fought on foot, and *Orlando* Nephew to *Charles* the Great, when he had fought well on foot died, of thirſt and wounds. Thoſe of their Kings who made their Cavalry their greateſt ſtrength in the field, bought it dear when they were ſo often worſted by the *Spaniards*, *Flemings*, but moſt of all by the *Engliſh*, whoſe greateſt ſtrength conſiſted in Infantry. This made the *French* Kings beg and hire Foot from *Scotland*, *Germany*, and moſtly from the *Switzers*. Theſe laſt being diſcontented with *Lewis* the Twelfth, made all *France* tremble, when with a numerous Army (in which not one Horſeman was to be ſeen) they were like to fall like an Inundation on that Kingdom, and were come the length of *Dijon* in *Burgundy*, and had reach'd *Paris* without ſtroke of Sword, if the Duke *de Tremouille* had not amus'd them with a Treaty, in which he was forc'd to grant them all they deſir'd, and for performance gave them what Hoſtages they required. *Francis* the Firſt perceiving the error of ſome of his Predeceſſors, in truſting too much to Horſes, ordered ſeven Legions of Foot, all *French* to be levied, enrolled, and paid each conſiſting of ſeven thouſand men, to ſtand perpetually in time of Peace and Wars, and theſe he call'd, and I think very deſervedly, the ſinews and nerves of *France*.

Next they will object, that the *Mamaluks* kept their Empire in *Egypt* and *Syria* above two hundred years with Horſe, and without Foot. This is a horrible miſtake, for their Towns and Forts were taken by Foot, and defended by Foot without Horſe. They alſo loſt their Empire by putting too much truſt in their Horſe, for the Great *Turk Selim* with his Foot and Cannon beat and kill'd *Campſon Gaurus* in the Field, and *Tomomby* at *Cairo*, and ſo put an end to that Tyrannical Monarchy.

Thirdly, They will inſtance the *Perſian*, who defends his Kingdom without Foot, only with Cavalry; but this is a miſtake, for their Towns are defended with Foot, and *Iſmael* in the *Calderan* Plains payed dear for truſting ſo much to his Horſe, when he was chac'd away by *Selines* Foot and Artillery. Since that time the Kings of *Perſia* have endeavour'd, but without ſucceſs, to get *European* Officers to Train their Foot, and order their Artillery; for my part I can as ſoon dream that the *Perſian* Squadrons of Horſe put themſelves in Enchanted Caſtles, as that they defended their Towns againſt Sieges and Aſſaults of the *Turks* with Horſe and no Foot. And I can as ſoon fancy that the *Sophi* rode with forty thouſand *Perſians* all on Horſeback over the Walls of *Babylon*, as that he took it back from the *Turk* without an Infantry.

The *Hungarians* will come next in play, but they never managed any of their Wars without Foot, though they pay'd as dearly for truſting too much to their Cavalry as ever any did, their Army conſiſting moſt of Horſe being routed by *Solimans* Foot and Cannon, and their King kill'd, and moſt of their Kingdom made a Province, the remainder of it falling into the Houſe of *Auſtria's* lap, hath been theſe hundred and twenty years well defended by *German* Foot.

It will be in vain to bring *Pole* on the ſtage, for peruſe the Hiſtories of that Nation, you will find none of their Wars to have been made either offenſively, or defenſively without Foot; to imagin that the *Polonians* conquer'd the half of *Pruſſia* from the Knights of the *Teutonick* Order, and took in ſo many well wall'd Towns without Foot againſt that warlike fraternity, is a meer ſpeculation. Nor have they bought the great truſt they repoſe in a numerous and valiant Cavalry at a cheap rate. In the year 1621 *Pole* was ſav'd almoſt by a miracle, for aſſuredly Prince *Uladiſlaus* would not have defended his Fathers Kingdom, though he had eighty thouſand Horſe, and ſome thouſands of Foot with him, againſt *Sultan Oſman*, who invaded it with three hundred thouſand *Turks*, the great Body and ſtrength whereof conſiſted in the *Janizaries*, who mutinying againſt the *Grand Signior*, forc'd him back to *Conſtantinople*. But what a risk did *Pole* run lately in the years 1655, and 1656, and 1657, where *Charles Guſtavus* overcame that Kingdom with an Army of twenty thouſand men, moſt of them Foot; and obſerve what a well train'd and order'd Infantry can do, *Anno* 1656, when the rebellious *Polonians* had returned to their duty, and that their King *John Caſimir* in the head of one hundred thouſand Horſe, and a conſiderable number of Foot and Cannon, aſſiſted and flankt with ſome Trenches and Redoubts, was routed and beat out of the Field by the King of *Sweden*, and the Elector of *Brandenburgh*; both whoſe forces in Horſe and Foot did not exceed thirty two thouſand. If all this be true that I have ſaid, as I believe it is, then I may conclude, that the Foot-ſervice is more neceſſary, more honourable, and of greater truſt than the Horſe one. Since I believe I have made it appear that a War in all its parts, points and dimenſions may be managed with Foot, without any Horſe, (though I confeſs not ſo well) but that it can be ſo without Foot, is a pure Speculation; why ſhould then Officers of Horſe be ſo overweening as to pretend to a Superiority over Commanders of Foot of equal quality with themſelves, ſince they themſelves may with leſs hurt and leſs inconvenience be ſpared out of an Army, than thoſe of the Infantry? Nor do I ſee with what right an Officer of Horſe can pretend to the command of an Officer of Dragoons of the like quality, for that Dragoons are reckon'd to belong to the Cavalry, though their ſervice be on foot, will only entitle the General or Lieutenant-General, or Major General of the Horſe to command over them, but not a Ritmaſter to give Orders to a Captain of Dragoons, unleſs he can ſhew an elder Patent. Yet when I ſerv'd in *Germany*, this Emperours Father order'd a Colonel-General over all his Dragoons, but whether he was Independent from the Commander in chief of the Horſe, I cannot ſo well tell. And if

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in the field the Commanders of Horſe ought not to aſſume this Superiority, much leſs ought they to do it in Garriſons, Towns, Caſtles, or yet in Barricaded Villages, for theſe do reſemble fortified places. On the other hand, notwithſtanding the opinion of ſome, who underſtand well enough, I think it would be of very hard digeſtion for an Officer of Horſe, though within a Fort or walled Town to receive Orders from a Foot-officer of a lower quality than himſelf. Suppoſe a Colonel of Horſe to be under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel of Foot, or a Major of Horſe under a Captain of Foot. For though there be no Subordination between them, yet when an Officer of a higher quality is commanded by one of an inferior degree, it brings ſuperior charges in diſreſpect and diſeſteem, which would carefully be avoided. *Koningſmark* who became a famous General in the *German* War, when he was Colonel of Horſe, came to lye with ſome of his Troops in *Oſnabrug*, where Lieutenant Colonel *Lumſdaine* commanded in abſence of his Brother Sir *James*, *Koningſmark* pretended to that Command, proteſting that if Sir *James* who was a Colonel, had been there, he would willingly have ſubmitted to his Command, but that either himſelf, or any other Colonel ſhould receive Orders from a Lieutenant-Colonel, was a thing he neither could nor would underſtand: A temperament was found out by thoſe who mediated between them, and the expedient was, that the Lieutenant-Colonel ſhould keep the Keys, and exerciſe all other functions of a Governour, except the giving the Word, which the Colonel of Horſe ſhould give week about; this ſav'd the Lieutenant-Colonels intereſt, and the Colonels reputation. The Great *Guſtavus Adolphus* King of *Sweden* order'd that where two or more Colonels of Horſe or Foot were in the Field or Quarter together, without any General Officer to command above them, the Colonel who had the eldeſt Commiſſion, ſhould command in chief, whether he ſerv'd to Horſe or to Foot, and ſo it was to be underſtood of all other Officers under a Colonel. And whereas it might fall out that many ſeveral Colonels might have received their Patents all in one day, or that otherwiſe their antiquity might be debateable, in that caſe it was order'd that they ſhould caſt lots, which is an excellent way, for the wiſeſt of men hath left it on record in the beſt of Books, That the lot cauſeth contention to ceaſe, and parteth between the mighty. Now why ſhould any Soldier, or why ſhould any General, nay, why ſhould any Prince be aſhamed to follow the rule or example of ſo famous a King, or ſo renowned a Captain as Great *Guſtavus* was known to have been.

Having ſpoken ſo much to the firſt queſtion, I ſuppoſe I need ſpeak but little to the ſecond, which, you may remember, I ſubdivided into two parts, the firſt was, Whether an Officer of Horſe may command an Officer of Foot; though of a ſuperiour quality, as ſuppoſe a Lieutenant of *H*orſe command a Captain of Foot, a Quartermaſter of a Troop of *H*orſe to command a Lieutenant of Foot, a Captain of *H*orſe to command a Major of Foot, and that only by virtue of their ſerving on horſeback: But if it be true, what I have aſſerted, and endeavoured to prove, that no Officers, (what ever their ſervice be) *H*orſe or Foot, of equal quality can with reaſon pretend to the command of one another; then it will aſſuredly follow, that an Inferour can far leſs pretend to any ſuch authority over a Superiour. But there ſeems to be a greater difficulty in the ſecond queſtion, which is, Whether an Officer of a King, Prince, or Generals Guards, either of *H*orſe or Foot, ought to command over not only his equals in another Regiment or Troop, but even over thoſe, who in quality are above him: As whether a Lieutenant of theſe Guards may not, or ſhould not command over any Captain of another Regiment, or a Captain of thoſe Guards over any Major of the Army. And truly, as the queſtion is ſtated, and ſo ordinarily it is ſtated, I muſt anſwer negatively: And yet ſhall go as great a length, with theſe Officers of Guards, as I conceive true Military Diſcipline, and method of War will permit me, and perhaps further. I ſay then, that a Generals guard either of *H*orſe or Foot, much more that of a King, or abſolute Prince, in a march ſhould conſtantly have the Vaunt of all other Regiments, Companies, or Troops of the Army, both for their honour and that they may be in time at the *H*ead quarter to officiate, and do duty: I ſay next, that all Officers belonging to theſe guards have the priority and precedency, not only of Door and Table, but even in all Courts and Councils of War, before any

any other Officers in the Army of their own rank and quality; but not of others of a higher charge; nay more, though it be a received maxim both in the Civil and Military Law, that *Par in parem non habet poteſtatem*, One equal hath no power over his equal; yet I hold when Officers of guards are by ſome emergency or other, or by command, to march, or quarter with Officers of other Regiments of equal quality; the Officer of the guards ſhould have the command over the other. Suppoſe theſe be either Captains, Lieutenants, Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, or Coloncls, further than this I cannot go, till I get more light, than the high demands of ſome hath yet afforded me. Nor can I fancy any reaſon for this pretence of ſuperiority, but the will and pleaſure of the Prince, his General or his Privy Council, and indeed that muſt neither be contradicted nor controul'd; yet I conceive, the inconveniences of ſuch an unuſual command, may be repreſented to the Prince, his General and his Council; and I ſuppoſe they will be loth to give, or to leave any occaſions of heart burnings, animoſities, debates, or diſcontents. How ſtrange and odd will it be to ſee a young and raw Captain of the guards, who by the favour of powerful friends hath come to that charge, to command over a grave and experienced Major? it is the way to make Diſcipline of War contemptible to ſome, and ridiculous to others. I remember that in *Germany* one of the *Swediſh* Lieutenant Generals had the chief command of a little Army, and over all the Garriſons of that Country, which were not few; a ſtrong party of that Army of Horſe and Foot was drawn out to attack a little Town ſtrongly barricado'd, by the enemies; five hundred commanded Foot were to fall on firſt, under the conduct of a Lieutenant Colonel: He who was Lieutenant Colonel of the Lieutenant Generals Regiment, which had the name of Guards, pretended to the command, and debated it ſtrongly; there was an elder Lieutenant Colonel than he, of another Regiment, who ſtiffly refuſed to yield to the Lieutenant Colonel of the Guards, pretending to the command, becauſe he had been a Lieutenant Colonel in the *Swediſh* ſervice long before the other; the Lieutenant General is conſulted, who preſently order'd them to caſt the Dice for it, his own Lieutenant Colonel by lot gained the honour, but loſt his life by the bargain: You ſee how this Lieutenant General was loth to give occaſion of diſcontent, by preferring an Officer of the Guards to another of that ſame quality, but of an elder ſtanding; and yet, if I had been worthy to have been Arbitrator, I had awarded the command to the Lieutenant Colonel of the Guards: Thus far have I hazarded to publiſh my opinion of this controverted point; and as every thing that men write, muſt be ſubject to the variable judgments of ſeveral Readers, ſo I profeſs I ſhall be willing to alter my opinion when the reaſons of others ſhall even but probably convince me to have been in an error. I am ſure to maintain either the one or the other, will tranſgreſs neither Act or Statute of either Church or State. Ordinances of War, even of the greateſt of men, are not irrevocable as the Decrees of the *Medes* and *Perſians* were ſaid to be. But notwithſtanding any reaſon can be given for the maintenance of what I have ſaid in avoiding this queſtion, this great King of *France* gives a Superiority of ſome Officers over others of that ſame degree, and not only to thoſe of his own Guards (which are very many) and thoſe of the Queen, the *Dolphine*, and *Monſieur* his Brother, which I look upon as tolerable; but he gives the command to *French* Officers over ſtrangers of a higher quality, in ſo much that in one Chapter of his Ordinances, he orders Lieutenant-Colonels who are ſtrangers, to be commanded (if I remember right) by a *French* Enſign. If private men might examine the Directions of mighty Monarchs, I ſhould think this were enough to encourage all ſtrangers to offer their ſervice to the Capital Enemies of his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Feltmarshals, Lieutenant-Feltmarshals, Lieutenant-Generals, Generals of the Cavalry, and Infantry, Major-Generals, and Adjutant-Generals.

OUR Modern forces being levied, muster'd, arm'd, well exercis'd, disciplin'd, paid and provianted, and moulded in Troops, Companies and Regiments, call now for General Officers, that these Independent Bodies whereof I have spoken may be cast in the shape of an Army. These shall not be wanting, for it is but too ordinary to have more General Officers in an Army than there are Colonels in it, and yet a great deal of more Colonels than are necessary, if you consider the weakness of their Regiments. And truly I think it is an insupportable abuse and vanity, that no sooner is a Lieutenant or Major-General sent with a part of the Army on some exploit, which may require some considerable time, or that upon some other occasion, either for a speedy march, the accommodation of the Army, or the ease of the Country, every one who commands apart one wing or Tertia of that Army, in a very short time makes up a compleat General staff. Of the General of the Artillery, Commissaries, Muster-masters, and Proviant-masters General, and of the Auditor and Provost-marshal General, I have spoke in their proper places, and so I shall hereafter of the Quarter-master, Scout-master, and Waggon-master General, and now I am to give you a brief description of these General Officers mention'd in the Title of this Chapter.

Many General persons in an Army.

The word *Felt*, or Field-marshal imports nothing else but that person who marshals the Field, and is called in *French*, *Marshal de Camp*, and so the Primitive institution of the Office was, and so it continued, till within these fifty years; for the present in *Germany*, *Sweden* and *Denmark*, those who command Armies Royal consisting of Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery, are qualified by the Titles of *Felt-marshals*, and have an equivalent authority to the ancient Marshals of *France* far above that of *Marshals de Camp*; and those Felt marshals have under them Lieutenant-Generals of the whole Army, Generals and Major-Generals of Horse and Foot, and these last are now the Marshals of the Field, for they draw up the several Regiments and Brigades of both in order of Battel. So upon the matter a Felt-marshal is now General or Commander in chief of the Army, so were *Barrier*, *Torstenson*, and *Wrangel*, successively one after another, in the long *German* War, under *Christina* Queen of *Sweden*. These Felt marshals now have Generals and Trains of Artillery under them. A Felt-marshals absolute command of an Army, as I said before, is of no old date, for in my time *Ilo* was Felt-marshal to *Wallenstein*, *Gustavus Horne* to the King of *Sweden*, *Kniphausin* to the Duke of *Lunenburg*; and as in process of time he hath insensibly attain'd to a higher and more absolute power than before, so the Title of Lieutenant Felt-marshal signifies now more than it could be interpreted to do at its first institution, and the title it self is not old. When the late King of *Sweden* invaded *Pole*, he gratified some of his ancient General Officers with this Title, and it was then and is now, where it is used, look'd upon as more honourable than that of Lieutenant-General, for what reason I cannot divine; yet it is certainly so, for a Lieutenant Felt-marshal commands Generals of Horse or Foot, Count *Koningsmark* had commanded several Armies in chief in the long *German* War both prudently and successfully under the title of Lieutenant-General, but thought himself honour'd seven years after the Peace of *Munster*, with this title of Lieutenant Felt marshal. That must be most honourable that a Prince fancies to be so, and there is good reason for it, because he is the fountain of honour.

Felt-marshal.

Lieutenant-Felt-marshal.

Lieutenant-General of an Army.

A Lieutenant General, (if you take the word ſtrictly) hath no command when his General is preſent; I think it is a moſt proper Title for thoſe who command Armies in chief under a Monarch or free State, becauſe they are their Lieutenants in *Militaribus*, or if a Prince have appointed a Captain-General to command all his forces, then that Captain-General commiſſionates Lieutenant-Generals to command petty Armies under him; but when he joins his forces, the Command of the Lieutenant-General ſeems to ceaſe, becauſe he is but the Deputy of him that ſent him, and a Repreſentative is no more a Repreſentative, when he whom he repreſented is preſent. The *Roman* Conſuls had their Lieutenant Generals, who were called Legates, who commanded Armies apart, when the Conſuls thought fit, but had no command when the Conſul was preſent. Nor doth *Cæſar* give thoſe Legates even in the Conſuls abſence, an abſolute power; for ſpeaking of one of his own Legates in the *French* War, I believe it was *Labienus*, he commends him for not hazarding a Battel with the *Gauls*, though he ſeem'd to have the advantage, becauſe, ſaith he, a Legate hath not that power which he hath, who is *Imperator* or Commander in chief. One of the Dukes of *Aumale* commanded an Army in *France* againſt the Proteſtants with the Title of Lieutenant-General, but ſo ſoon as he join'd forces with *Henry* Duke of *Anjou*, who was Captain-General for his Brother *Charles* the Ninth, the Duke reſign'd both his Title and Office. But notwithſtanding all this, Lieutenant-Generals continue both in their Title and Office in their Generals preſence; and I have known Felt-marſhals have Lieutenant-Generals under them, who have commanded both the Horſe and Foot of their Armies, even when the Felt-marſhals were preſent; as the Earl of *Bramford* who was Lieutenant-General to Felt-marſhal *Barrier*, and *King*, who was Lieutenant-General to Felt-marſhal *Leſlie*. I think the great Dukes of *Muſcovia* have a very commendable cuſtom to chuſe any of their Colonels, who they fancy are qualified for it to be Generals or Lieutenant-Generals of a competent number of forces fit for the expedition they are to be imployed in, and ſo ſoon as that piece of ſervice is done, the Colonel lays down his Commiſſion, and returns to his former Charge, without the leaſt thought or imagination, that he is diſparag'd thereby, the frequent practice of this cuſtom baniſhing ſuch thoughts out of all mens heads. Neither would ſuch a practice be fancyed to be a degrading of men from former honours in other places of the world, if they were but a little habituated to it. The *French* gives now the Title of Lieutenant-Generals very frequently, I ſuppoſe they are independent one of another, and are the Kings Lieutenant-Generals, which is very proper, and obey none but ſuch as he commands to give Orders to them.

Roman Legates.

A good cuſtom.

General of the Cavalry.

A General of the Cavalry commands it under him who is Commander in chief of the Army, whatever title he bear, whether General, Felt-marſhal, Lieutenant Felt-marſhal, or Lieutenant-General. He is to ſee the Troops and Regiments of Horſe kept at that ſtrength that they are appointed to be of; and if by Battel, long marches, great fatigue, or other accidents of War, the numbers of men be diminiſht, Horſes loſt, or made unſerviceable, it is his duty when they come to Quarter, to ſee the Troops made ſtrong, the Horſes put in good caſe, and the Riders well cloth'd and arm'd. In Muſters he is obliged to ſee that no Colonel or Ritmaſter wrong the Muſter-maſters, by making a ſhow of borrow'd men, Horſes or Arms, whereby the Prince may be cheated in his Purſe, or diſappointed in his ſervice. He is to take care that the Cavalry be paid, and provided with Proviant and Fodderage, and good Quarter. He ſhould alſo be a perſon who underſtands ſomething of the Foot-ſervice, in regard that when the greateſt part of the Horſe is ſent in any Expedition, ordinarily ſome Foot are ſent with them, and then it is the General of the Cavalries office to command both. But it is a pity that all General perſons ſhould not make it their ſtudy and their work to underſtand both the Foot and Horſe-ſervice, for I have ſeen conſiderable parties of Foot more haraſs'd and ſpoil'd in a ſhort time under the command of an Officer of Horſe, than if they had been routed by an enemy; ſo little diſcretion ſome have to know the difference between a man and a Horſe. It ſeems in the *Low Country* ſervice the General of the Horſe commanded next the General, and in his abſence over the Army, even when they had Felt-marſhals; but that cuſtom is not now in other places

His Duties.

places where Felt-marſhals, and Lieutenant-Felt-marſhals command the Generals of the Horſe; and it would ſeem that the Eſtates of the *United Provinces* have now voided the difference otherwiſe, ſince they qualified the two Commanders in chief of their Armies with the Titles of Felt-marſhals, Prince *Maurice*, and *Wurz*.

Lieutenant General of the Cavalry.

A Lieutenant-General of the Horſe being in his Generals abſence to do the ſame duties, he ſhould have the ſame qualifications. If the Cavalry be marſhal'd in one Body, the General is to ſtand on the right hand of it, and the Lieutenant-General on the left. But if the Horſe be drawn up in two wings, the General commands the right, and the Lieutenant-General commands the left wing.

Major General of the Horſe.

A Major-General of the Cavalry is to receive the word, and all other Orders from the Commander in chief of the Army; he is to impart them to the General, and the Lieutenant-General of the Cavalry, and after he hath received their commands, he is to give all to the Regiment Quarter-maſters of Horſe, which they carry to the ſeveral Regiments. All complaints and differences between Officers and Horſemen, or among themſelves, are firſt brought to him, which he ſhould endeavour to compoſe in an amicable way, but if he cannot, he is to proceed according to the Articles and Conſtitutions of War. He hath the inſpection of all the Guards of Horſe, and orders them, and keeps liſts of Convoys and Parties, that the ſeveral Officers and Troopers may have their turns, in which a Major-General ſhould ſhow himſelf very impartial; for very few or none there be, who will not think themſelves wrong'd in their reputation, if others be prefer'd to them, where either danger may probably be look'd for, or profit expected, unleſs it can be made clear to them that it is not their turn to go on that party, or with that Convoy. It is the Major-General who marſhals the Cavalry in Battel, having firſt adviſed about the manner with the General of the Horſe, or in his abſence with the Lieutenant-General. If he be an underſtanding, active, ſtirring and vigilant perſon, a General and Lieutenant-General may be laid aſide, as in many Armies over Chriſtendom they are, though not in all. This Officer the *Engliſh* qualifie with the Title of Commiſſary General of the Horſe.

Major-General of Horſe,

His Duties,

General Officers of the Foot.

The Duties of a Lieutenant-General, and Major-General of the Foot are the ſame which I have told you belongs to thoſe of the *Horſe*, *mutatis mutandis*. Generals of the Foot are but rare, *Banier* was under *Guſtavus Adolphus*, and *Lind* under *Charles Guſtavus*, both Kings of *Sweden*, and ſome of the Emperours Armies had them likewiſe. Some Lieutenant-Generals of the Infantry I have likewiſe known, but theſe are not in all Armies. But a Major-General of the Foot is thought a neceſſary Commander in all Armies, though they be never ſo weak; when any of them is wanting, or out of the way, the oldeſt Colonel officiates for him. The *Engliſh* call him Serjeant Major General of the Foot, and in ſome places he is order'd to be conſtantly Preſident of the Council of War.

Adjutant-General,

His Duties,

The name of Adjutant-General denotes his charge and office, for he is a helper to thoſe General Officers of whom I have ſpoken in this Chapter. The orders and directions he gives are not to be look'd upon as his own, but the Generals, and therefore his perſon muſt be known to both Officers and Soldiers of the whole Army. If he have a Regiment, he may of himſelf in ſome urgent occaſions give ſuch directions, as he thinks warrantable, and for which he knows he can be accountable, otherwiſe, whether he be a Colonel, or not, he muſt be ſparing to give any other Orders than thoſe he hath received. *He* muſt be very ready, active, and ſtirring, of a quick judgment to receive, and of a ready utterance to deliver his commands. In an Army Royal when it is encamped, or lyeth in Quarters, or yet when it is marching, two Adjutant Generals, one for the *Horſe*, and one for the Foot, if they be men of active bodies and minds, will be ſufficient, but in a Battel they are too few. To ſupply which defect, and not to increaſe the number of Adjutants, the Commander in chief ought to have half a dozen of underſtanding Gentlemen well mounted, and theſe as the General rides along the Army either to marſhal or encourage it, ſhould ride with him, that the whole Army may know them as ſuch, who are to be employed to carry the General's directions, which may be very many, ac-

cording as the many emergencies and changes of things may make him alter his commands; and the fitteſt perſons for that employment are ſuch Reformado's as have been Majors of *Horſe* and Foot formerly. I have ſeen this place of Adjutant-General made very contemptible by ſome Generals, who have fill'd it up with men, whoſe mean underſtanding, little experience, dulneſs of ſpirit, and weak intellectuals render'd them deſpicable and ridiculous to thoſe to whom they pretended to bring their Orders. *He* is, or ſhould be, a great helper to the Major General, whether of *Horſe* or Foot. But where there are two or three Major Generals of the Infantry, and perhaps as many or more of the Cavalry, I think there needs no Adjutant at all, for I know no reaſon why every Major General ſhould have an Adjutant General, nor will men be found to engage in a charge that is made ſo common, unleſs it be ſuch inſignificant perſons as theſe I have ſpoke of. In *France* this Adjutant General is called *Aide de Camp*, and in ſome Foot Regiments the Major had his Adjutant, who was called *Aide Major*; and this for moſt part is one of the Lieutenants, who hath no allowance for it. In the old *Engliſh* Diſcipline of War this Adjutant was called a Corporal of the Field; and there were four of them in every Army, wherein they were well known; they were mounted on good and ſwift horſes; their charge and employment was the very ſame in all things with that of our Modern Adjutants.

His Charge made deſpicable.

Aide de Camp, and *Aide Major*.

Corporal of the Field.

If I have rightly deſcribed an Adjutant General, I muſt confeſs I differ from *Monſieur de Gaya*, who hath lately written a ſhort Syſtem of the Art of War; in his Nineteenth Page he would have us believe that the charge of an Adjutant General, or *Aide de Camp*, as he calls him, is fit for a young man of quality, and in which (ſays he) it is eaſie for him to learn and make himſelf perfect. Indeed I acknowledg we are bound ſtill to be learning what is good, yet I cannot allow an Adjutant to be an Apprentice, and though it becomes him to be taught by his Betters, yet he ſhould be ſo perfect in the Military Art, that he is bound to teach others; nor can I allow him to be very young, ſince he imbraceth a charge which befits none but an experienced Soldier. But *Monſieur de Gaya* adds, he ſhould be wiſe, vigilant, and vigorous. I confeſs a young man may be wiſe, but I believe wiſdom here is taken for experience, whereof young men of quality may be very oft deſtitute. But *Monſieur de Gaya* forgot to beſtow the qualification of Courageous upon his *Aide de Camp*, which if he want (being he is to carry and diſtribute his Orders in the time of hotteſt danger) I will not give a ruſh for all his wiſdom, vigilancy and vigour. *He* ſays alſo, that his *Aide de Camp* ſhould be always, (*tous jours*) beſides the General Officers to carry their Orders where they are neceſſary. But if he be always with them, how can he be from them when he carries their Orders where they are neceſſary? certainly he muſt be but ſometimes (*Quelquefois*) with them, and ſometimes from them.

Beſides all theſe General perſons mentioned, ſome would have a Quartermaſter General for the *Horſe*, beſides the Quartermaſter General of the Army, becauſe this laſt ſtays conſtantly at the head Quarter with the General of the Army, and the other ſhould be conſtantly with the *Horſe*. But I think places and offices ſhould not be multiplied in Armies, and therefore the Quartermaſter of the oldeſt Regiment of *Horſe* may officiate in the Cavalry in the abſence of the Quartermaſter General, of whoſe office I ſhall ſpeak in my Diſcourſe of *Caſtrametation*.

Places ſhould not be multiplied.

Though many of theſe General Officers of whom I have ſpoken, may ſeem to be more burdenſome than uſeful, to either Prince, State, or Army, yet this preſent Emperour *Leopold* was glad to make uſe of them all in his late War againſt the *Turk*, to ſatisfie that noble deſire of honour which many Princes, and other perſons of high and eminent quality had to ſerve him againſt the common Enemy of the Chriſtian name.

I have told you of all the Duties theſe General perſons are bound to pay in their ſeveral charges, but I have not ſpoke of thoſe parts, vertues and qualities, wherewith ſome who write or ſpeak of that Subject, would have them endued, they will be too tedious to rehearſe, neither can I well do it without Tautologies. But I ſhall tell you that the qualifications required by ſome Authors for a Captain General, being divided between him and all the General perſons under him, may in my opinion ſerve them all ſufficiently, and what theſe are, you may read in the next enſuing Chapter. CHAP.

Qualifications of all theſe General Officers.

CHAP. XIV.

Of a Captain General, or Generaliſſimo.

IF our firſt Parents had not rebell'd againſt their Creator, their poſterity had enjoy'd an everlaſting peace, and ſo ſuch a perſon as we now ſpeak of, had been very unneceſſary. But I aſſure my ſelf never man (except *Adam* when he was in the ſtate of perfection) was endued with theſe gifts, wherewith ſome Notional Authors will have a Captain General to be qualified. He muſt, ſay they, be pious towards God, juſt towards man, and loyal to his Maſter. He muſt be very affable, very wiſe, of a ſudden and quick apprehenſion, of a ſolid judgment, and happy memory. He muſt be very ſevere in his command, and yet very merciful. He muſt be liberal, and free from all manner of Avarice, painful, magnanimous, and couragious, and in one word, endued with all the Moral Vertues. He ought to be an old Practitioner in the Military Art, and well experimented in all its parts and duties. Perhaps you may think this enough, but *Polybius* in his Ninth Book requires more, for he will have his General to be both an Aſtrologer, and a Geometer. If you will tell me where, or in what region of the habitable world, all theſe qualifications ſhall be found in one perſon? *Eris mihi magnus Apollo.*

A Notional deſcription of a Captain General.

That he who is intruſted with the ſupreme Command of Royal Armies, one or more, and with the whole Militia of a State, ſhould be an accompliſht perſon, and if it be poſſible, ſuch a one, as we have deſcrib'd, will not be readily denied, ſince it is a Command of the higheſt nature, the greateſt honour, and deepeſt conſequence that can be confer'd on any ſingle perſon of what quality or degree ſoever, for he is intruſted not only with the lives of thoſe that are in Arms under his Command, but with the defence of the whole Country, Towns, Forts, and Caſtles, with the honour, welfare, and ſtanding of the Prince and State, and with the lives and properties of all their Subjects. The loſs of his Army, or Armies by his negligence, inadvertency, raſhneſs or cowardice, may occaſion the loſs of all theſe, or make them run a very great hazard by his indiſcretion, much more by his treachery; he may in one moment of time loſe the lives and liberties of many thouſands, make numbers of women widows, children fatherleſs, and fathers childleſs, he may loſe the honour and beauty of a whole Province, yea of a whole Kingdom, all which he was bound by his office and charge to preſerve.

The charge of a Generaliſſimo is of the higheſt nature.

The conſideration of theſe things mov'd moſt of the ancient Kings and Emperours, and thoſe of latter times likewiſe to manage their Wars, and lead their Armies in perſon. Thoſe who laid the foundation of the firſt four Monarchies did ſo, as in the *Aſſyrian*, *Nimrod*, *Belus*, *Ninus* and *Semiramis*, and when their poſterity did it not, their Empire was in the wain, and ended with *Sardanapalus*, who hid himſelf from the ſight of men among his women. *Cyrus* led his Armies himſelf, ſo did ſome of his Succeſſors, but when others of them ſtaid at home, and ſent their Lieutenants abroad, the *Perſian* Monarchy decay'd, and became a prey to the Great *Alexander*, who manag'd his Wars in perſon, and ſo did thoſe great Captains of his, who cut out Kingdoms to themſelves out of their Maſters Conqueſts; but their Succeſſors loſt them by ſitting idle at home, and employing their Generals abroad. Many *Roman* Emperours after *Auguſtus*, went to their Wars in perſon, whereby they preſerv'd their Imperial Dignity; but when others imployed their Lieutenants (though many of theſe were excellent men, and often victorious) the Empire was torn in pieces. The Kings of *Leon*, *Navarr*, *Caſtile*, *Portugal*, and *Arragon*, after the deſtruction of the *Gothiſh* Monarchy in *Spain*, went to the field in perſon, and recover'd thoſe Kingdoms out of the hands of the *Saracens*. When the Kings of *France* of the *Merovingian* and *Carolomannian* race kept within their Palaces, and ſuffer'd

A Prince to manage his Wars in perſon.

Many Inſtances to prove it.

the Majors thereof to govern their Armies, they loſt their Kingdoms and Crowns. Our Kings of *Scotland* and *England* uſed moſtly to manage their Wars themſelves; the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth led his greateſt Armies himſelf, and for moſt part was always victorious, for his loſs at *Algiers* occaſion'd by the viſible hand of Heaven; and his forced Retreats from *Inſpruck*, and the Siege of *Metz*, were but ſmall blemiſhes in the beautiful and fair Map of his victorious raign. But ſince his time his Succeſſors the Kings of *Spain* have ſate at home and entruſted their Armies to their Generals, and we ſee that their wide and far ſtretcht Monarchy has been ſince that Emperours time in a conſtant decadency. All the Kings and Emperours of the *Ottoman* race went in perſon to the Wars, till *Selimus* the ſecond changed that cuſtom, and ſince that time none of them have done actions by their Baſhas comparable to thoſe of their Anceſtors. In our own days the Emperour *Ferdinand* the Second intruſted the managing his War againſt *Guſtavus Adolphus* to his Generals, *Wallenſtein*, *Tily*, and *Pappenheim*, all brave and great Captains, yet that Martial King being in perſon on the head of his Armies, prevailed over them all.

Actions of two Brothers compar'd.

We may perceive the great odds of managing a War by a Prince in his own perſon, and by his Captain General by taking a view of the actions of two Brothers, both of them excellent Princes, theſe were the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth (of whom I but juſt now ſpoke) and *Ferdinand* the Firſt, King of the *Romans*, *Hungaria* and *Bohemia*. The firſt, (as I have already ſaid) led his moſt conſiderable Armies himſelf; the ſecond ſtaid conſtantly at home, and ſent his Captain Generals to manage his Wars of greateſt importance; mark the iſſue, *Ferdinand* loſt three Royal Armies, each of them compoſed of a well appointed Cavalry, Infantry, and Train of Artillery: one of them at *Eſecchio* under *Cazzianer*, another at *Buda*, under *Rocandolf*, and the third at *Peſth*, under *Joachim* Marqueſs of *Brandenburg*; all three were wofully and ſhamefully loſt without fighting. And if any think that the misfortune of all the three, or any one of them could not have been prevented by the Princes own preſence, I ſhall anſwer that undoubtedly it had, and my reaſon is this, becauſe that which loſt them all, was the irreſolution of the Generals, who durſt neither fight, nor retire in time, as being ſhie and wary to hazard that which was not their own, whereas *Ferdinand* (if he had been preſent) would quickly have reſolv'd either on the one or the other, and conſequently would have either retir'd in time and ſav'd all his three Armies, or have fought, and by that means been victorious, or would have been beaten with more glory to himſelf, and miſchief to his inſolent enemy. And this is more particularly clear in that Army commanded by *Rocandolf*, who after multitudes of Infidels were already arrived for the relief of the beſieged Queen and City of *Buda*, and that *Soliman* himſelf by ſpeedy marches was haſtning thither, could not be mov'd or perſwaded by any intreaties or remonſtrances of the principal Commanders of his army to raiſe the Siege, vowing and proteſting that he neither could nor would do it, without an expreſs warrant from his Maſter King *Ferdinand*; but before that could come, he and his misfortunate Army were both irrecoverably ruin'd. The ſad Hiſtory of all theſe three Armies, you may read at length in *Paolo Giovio*.

Actions of two Kings compar'd.

Be pleaſed to take another inſtance of a later date: In the year 1657, *Charles Guſtavus* King of *Sweden* invaded the Dutchy of *Holſtein* with a very inconſiderable army, his Horſemen and his Soldiers were almoſt naked, and all beaten with a long march from *Pole*; nor was it ſo ſtrong as eleven thouſand of all. *Frederick* the third King of *Denmark* intruſts a well appointed army of ſixteen thouſand Horſe and Foot to a Feltmarſhal, and ſtays at *Copenhagen* himſelf, by the perſwaſions of his Privy Council. The *Swede* being in perſon on the head of his haraſs'd army prevail'd every where, ruined the *Daniſh* army without one blow, and beſieged the reliques of it in *Frederichſode*, a ſtrong Town, ſtormed it, and took it with the ſlaughter of the *Daniſh* Feltmarſhal, and moſt of his men, and got in it above one hundred Braſs-guns, and much Ammunition. After this a vehement Froſt being commanded from Heaven to favour him with a Bridg, he ſtept over the Ice from Iſle to Iſle on the *Belt*, where he forced the *Dane* to accept of ſuch conditions as he impoſed, which were both diſhonourable and diſadvantageous. Sure if the King of *Denmark* had been perſonally preſent with his forces, he had at leaſt once fought for it.

To

To make War in perſon ſeems to be one of the eſſential Duties of a King or Soveraign Prince; this was one of thoſe reaſons which the people of God gave for their deſire to have a King to rule over them, *To do juſtice among our ſelves, and to lead out our armies to battel againſt our enemies*, and they add, *after the manner of other Nations.* So then it is clear that Kings at that time went to the field in perſon. So did *Saul* the firſt King of *Iſrael*, and ſo did *David*, and moſt of all his Succeſſors Kings of *Judah* and *Iſrael*. And if it be objected that *David* made *Joab* his Captain General, I give two anſwers, firſt *Joab*'s authority ceaſed when *David* was preſent, which he was almoſt conſtantly with his forces, till he was eſtabliſhed King of *Iſrael*. For *Joab*'s employment where he commanded in chief, (if I have obſerved right) was firſt againſt the Rebel *Abſalom*, and this was a Civil War, and then againſt the *Ammonites*, and that was a foreign War, both theſe had their riſe from ſudden Emergencies. In the laſt the Kings preſence, till the latter part of it, was not neceſſary, and in the firſt not at all convenient. But ſecondly, I anſwer that *David* did often repent him of the large Commiſſion he had given to *Joab*, who thereby made himſelf ſo ſtrong that the King durſt not hazard to puniſh him for his miſdemeanors, which he often inſinuated in thoſe words, *You are too ſtrong for me, you Sons of Zerviah.* As to *Solomons* making *Benajah* Captain General, it ſignified but little, ſince there was no War in his time, and the Captain of the Hoſt was almoſt conſtantly beſide him. If any War had fallen out, probably *Solomon* would have conducted his forces himſelf. But his reign was peaceable, as being the Type of the Prince of Peace; yet he might have repented it if he had confer'd that high truſt on *Jeroboam*, who if he had been Captain General, probably would not have fled to *Egypt* for fear of King *Solomon*; for his actions againſt *Rehoboam* declared afterward, that the heart of a Rebel was within his breaſt, whatever his exterior deportment was in the time of that peaceable King.

Kings of *Iſrael* and *Judah* made War in perſon.

The objection of *Joab* anſwer'd.

That of *Benajah* anſwer'd.

But to what I have ſaid, That Soveraign Princes ſhould conduct their armies in perſon, it will be objected, That an Infant King cannot manage a War: To which I anſwer, that then the Prince neareſt in blood ſhould do it, as well as he ſhould govern in Civil affairs. And if it be ſaid, he may uſurp; I anſwer, Better he do ſo than a fellow ſubject, who may play the like prank, if he be inveſted with the like power. But it is known that many Infant Kings have been carried about with their armies to encourage them, ſo great an influence hath the preſence of Soveraign power, (though in a Child) over the ſpirits of Military perſons. Obſerve what *Henry* the ſixth of *England*'s valiant Uncles did for him, and how faithful they were to him during his Minority. Obſerve alſo that *Roxane* her being with Child to the Great *Alexander*, made his ambitious Captains (after his death) ſmother their ſoaring thoughts till time ſhould diſcover to them whether their Soveraign was in her belly or not, that accordingly they might know how to take up their meaſures.

Objections againſt what hath been ſaid. Firſt,

Anſwer'd.

In the ſecond place it will be askt what ſhall an old decrepit, or Valetudinary King do, who is not able to go to the field? Truly I ſhall not deſire him to do as that King of *Morocco* did, who in the Battel he fought with *Sebaſtian* King of *Portugal*, cauſed himſelf to be carried in a Litter, whereby he gain'd the Victory, though with the loſs of his own life in the field. But I ſay ſuch a King may intruſt as many of his ſubjects as are able and capable to lead armies, but he ſhould put the managing the great bulk of the War principally in the hands of the heir of the Crown to command over all, and if he be not of age fit for it, then that great truſt ſhould be given to the next Prince of the blood, who is capable of it. When the Imperial and *Spaniſh* forces Invaded *France* in the year 1635, the *French* King made his Brother *Gaſton* Generaliſſimo, who chac'd the enemy out of the Kingdom. After the Emperour *Ferdinand* the Second had ſuffer'd many loſſes, at laſt he made his own Son the *Hungarian* King, Generaliſſimo over all his armies, who at his very firſt Encounter with the *Swedes*, routed two of their armies at *Nordling* in the year 1634, and in the ſpace of two months made them loſe more ground than they had gain'd in two whole years before.

The Second,

Anſwer'd.

Thirdly, it will be ſaid a Soveraign Queen cannot lead armies, and therefore cannot manage the War in perſon. I ſhall not anſwer, that many Princeſſes have done it glorioufly and ſucceſsfully both in ancient and modern times, and there-

The Third,

therefore all ſhould imitate them. But I ſhall ſay, that ſhe can imploy no better nor fitter Captain General than him who is neareſt in blood to her ſelf, for he is moſt proper to repreſent the Soveraign power who is next to it. I confeſs

Anſwered. Queen *Elizabeth* of *England* did not ſo, and yet was fortunate in all her Wars, ſhe had very gallant and loyal Subjects, neither was it in her power to make that choice I ſpoke of, becauſe he who was next to her in blood, was a Soveraign Prince of another Kingdom. And if it be objected that *Chriſtina* Queen of *Sweden* manag'd her *German* War fortunately under the Conduct of ſeveral brave Captains, who were not of the blood: I ſhall anſwer it is true, yet for all that, I aver that all of them did not ſo much in ſixteen years time after the death of *Guſtavus*, as he did alone in the ſpace of two years. And *Chriſtina* at length found it neceſſary to give the great truſt of all her armies in *Germany* to her neareſt Couſin the Count Palatine, and ſend him over with the Title of Generaliſſimo, which ſhe never beſtowed on any of her Subjects.

The Fourth, Fourthly, it will be ſaid, that a free State muſt chuſe and truſt a Captain General with their forces, for a State cannot go to the Field in perſon, as little can it ſend one of their blood, for he may be a near kinſman to two or three of the State, and have no relation to the reſt. To which I anſwer, that I look

Anſwered. upon it as an intrinſecal defect in all free States, whether Ariſtocratical, or Popular, that a pure neceſſity is put upon them to intruſt their armies to ſuch a

All Free States jealous of their Generals. General, as they in their prudence make choice of, and of whom frequently they live in a perpetual jealouſie, fearing his uſurpation almoſt as much as a profeſt enemies invaſion; and for that reaſon they do often limit his Commiſſion with ſo many reſtrictions, and give him ſuch Committees and Councellors about him, that he is forc'd many times to let ſlip fair occaſions, wherein he might have done the enemy great miſchief, and his Maſters eminent ſervice. And in the election of their General, it is no ſmall queſtion in a State, Whether

Athenians. it be beſt to chuſe a native or a ſtranger? The *Athenians* imploy'd their own

Spartans. Citizens, the *Spartans* their Kings, who were created for no other purpoſe but to lead their armies; for in time of peace they had no more authority than

Romans. any of the other thirty Senators. The *Romans* made uſe of their yearly Conſuls.

Venetians. The *Venetians* moſtly make choice of ſtrangers, and have for moſt part been

Switzers. happy in falling upon prudent and faithful Captains. The Commonwealth of the *Switzers* conſiſts in their Union among themſelves againſt all enemies, eſpecially the Houſe of *Auſtria*, from whoſe ſubjection they emancipated themſelves. All the thirteen particular or Provincial Eſtates being independent one of another, and being without a Head, they are ſubject to Ruptures, and Civil Wars, as they were more eſpecially in the time of *Zuinglius*, for matters of Religion. But their jars laſt not long, fear of a common enemy teaching them to compoſe their animoſities, for nothing makes a Society more faithful than fear of one who hates all of them. When they join unanimouſly at their general meetings, and proſecute the reſults of their Counſels, they are formidable; and when they make a General of their forces, whether it be for their own ſervice, or that of foreign Princes (for very mercenary they are) it is but for one expedition, or for one piece of ſervice, which being ended, his Command is at an end likewiſe, and ſo they need not be jealous of him, or of any that ſucceeds

United Provinces. him. The Eſtates of the *United Provinces* of the *Netherlands* manag'd the long War they had with the King of *Spain* under the Conduct of four Princes of *Orange* ſucceſſively one after another, neither needed they ever fear the Uſurpation of any of them; for though their power was almoſt unlimited, yet it could not tempt thoſe Princes, who were ſo eminent for vertue, to whoſe goodneſs, magnanimity, juſtice and fortunate conduct, theſe Eſtates under God, owe their freedom, yet were they jealous of the late Prince; but it ſeems they are now deſirous to witneſs their gratitude to that Illuſtrious family by making this preſent Prince their Captain General.

Free States uſurp'd by their Captain Generals. *Lacedemon.* How remedileſs this inward diſeaſe is in all free States, that they muſt intruſt their Militia to one or two perſons, the ruin of ſome Commonwealths makes it manifeſt: *Lacedemon* ſeveral times was like to loſe her liberty by ſome of her Kings, who were nothing but her Captain Generals, and at laſt they loſt it under the Tyrant *Nabis*. The fear of Uſurpation made *Athens* commit an inexcuſable folly, or rather a madneſs in their *Oſtraciſm*, whereby the people baniſht the

the best qualified of their Citizens. *Rome* for all her wariness in intrusting her armies to Annual Consuls, miss'd but little to lose her freedom in the Dictatorship of Bloody *Sylla*, and scarce had she recover'd it after his death, when she was rob'd of it for ever by *Julius Cæsar*. *Castruccio Castracani* usurped the Republick of *Luca*, and so have some other petty free States of *Italy* been used. How that Hodg podg of *Oligarchie*, Tyranny, and Anarchy, the long black Parliament of *England*, (which pretended it self to be a free State) was used by their Captain General *Cromwell* is a story well enough known, and he knowing that he might be used in that same fashion, would never part with the Command of the army, no, not after he had usurped the Soveraignty.

Rome.

Luca.

Oligarchie of England.

And indeed if Soveraign Princes will look back to by past ages, they will find it dangerous to intrust their whole Militia to one Subject, unless he be a Prince of the Blood. You may find in Holy Writ, *Abner* Captain of the Host of *Israel*, bring the Kingdom over to *David*, and though the same *David* seems to attest that *Abner* died not like a fool, yet I believe he died like a Traytor, and that was as bad, and an insolent Traytor too, for he told his Master to his face, he would betray him. And truly if *Davids* Political ends had not hinder'd him, I think he had done as just and as generous an act to have put *Abner* to death as he did, when he caused *Baanah* and *Rechab* to be slain, for bringing him the head of their Master *Ishbosheth*. Nor was *Ishbosheth* the last King of *Israel* who was so serv'd by his Captain General. *Zimri* conspir'd against *Elah*, and kill'd him with his whole family. *Omri* Captain of the Host, bandies against *Zimri*, and forc'd him to burn himself in the Kings Palace. And *Tibni* went fair to have done as much to *Omri*. *Jehu* Captain of the Host marcheth against his Master King *Joram*, and slew him with his own hands, and beheaded seventy of his Brethren. *Pekah* a Captain conspir'd against King *Pekaliah*, kill'd him, and made himself King.

And Monarchies also.

Kingdom of Israel.

Prophane Story will furnish more examples of this kind than are necessary to be rehearsed. The Emperour *Mauritius* was forc'd to see his Wife and Childrens heads struck off, and then receive the same measure himself by his General *Phocas*, who usurped the Empire. How *Pepin* and *Hugh Capet*, both Majors of the Palace, and Generals of the forces, used two Kings of *France*, by disburdening their heads of their two Crowns, and clapping them upon their own, are stories well enough known to any who hath read the *French* History. The *Caliphs* of *Egypt* and *Babylon* had their Estates and Dignities, and some of them their lives taken from them by their *Soldans*, who were their Captain Generals. In our own time *Ferdinand* the Second Emperour of *Germany* was like to pay dear for making *Wallenstein* Generalissimo of all his armies, for by that power that haughty Captain General went fair to have rooted out that branch of the House of *Austria* in *Germany*, which hath chain'd the *Roman* Eagle in that family for some ages, and to have made himself King of *Bohemia* to boot.

The Empire.

France.

Wallenstein.

On the other hand a subject would be very wary and cautious to undergo a charge so burdensome and dangerous, as that of the Supreme command of all armies belonging to either Prince or free State; for though he hath not been wanting to his Duty, yet if in the managing of his charge he have miscarried by chance or misfortune, he may make account to pay dearly for it, unless he have to do with both a just and a merciful Master. And if he be so fortunate to do those exploits which extend the Dominions, and add to the honour and benefit of the Prince and State whom he serves, he hath done but his Duty, and can crave no reward but *ex beneplacito*, nor needs he expect any, except from a Gracious Prince; nay it is well if he come off without some dishonour or disgrace put upon him, if not worse, some Princes not loving to look on men who have done them extraordinary services, because they may pretend to these extraordinary rewards, which they intend not to bestow upon them. In bad Requitals free Republicks have shown themselves most unjust to many of their best deserving Captains, as *Sparta* to *Agis* and *Cleomenes*, *Athens* to *Themistocles*, *Miltiades*, *Cimon*, *Phocion* and *Pericles*. *Rome* to *Coriolanus*, *Camillus*, and both the *Scipio's*. Nor have some Princes forborn to stain their honours by being injurious to Captains, who have done them the most signal services. How basely dealt *Tiberius* with *Germanicus*? How cruelly did *Nero* use *Corbulo*? And with what

Subjects would be wary to undertake this great charge,

As very dangerous.

Some free States unjust to their Generals.

Some Monarchs alſo.

what inhumanity did *Juſtinian* uſe the famous *Belliſarius*, who was the ſupporter of his Empire? How ungratefully did *Ferdinand* of *Arragon* requite *Gonſalvo di Corduba* the great Captain, to whoſe Valour, Conduct, and Indefatigable labours he ow'd the Kingdom of *Naples*? So true is that obſervation of *Philip* of *Comines*, the greateſt ſervices are often requited with the greateſt ingratitude.

Boccalini.

Boccalini in one of his *Raguagli*, hath a ſhrewd hint at this, He tells us, that on a time, the news at *Parnaſſus* were, that *Doria* was appointed with his Fleet to fall upon *Hariaden Barbaroſſa*, at a place, where he could hardly either fight or get away; having made Shipwrack of ſome of his Fleet, *Doria* ſent privately to *Barbaroſſa*, advertis'd him of his danger, and advis'd him to get him out of his way. One of *Dorias*'s Captains who was his Kinſman, not knowing of this, came to him, and deſir'd him not to loſe ſo fair an opportunity, to ruine the Arch-Pyrate: *Doria* perceiving his ſimplicity, drew him aſide, and told him, he was not well ſeen in the Affairs of the World; for, ſaid he, my fortune is ſo ſtrictly joyn'd with that of *Hariaden*, that if he be totally routed, I periſh, becauſe I ſhall be altogether uſeleſs: for I would have you know, ſaid he, and learn it of me, ſince you are but a young Captain, that Princes uſe Military men, as they do broad Hats, and thick hoods, which in wet weather, they wear to ſave them from the Rain, but caſt them away, ſo ſoon as the Sun ſhines.

Preſumption of Captains,

But if great Captains, who have done Princes or States great ſervice, be rewarded, or at leaſt, be not ill uſed, they ſhould be aware of another rock; and that is preſumption, upon which they run, when they think the glory of thoſe Actions they have done, intitles them to a liberty to do what they will: For they ſhould remember, that good ſervices are but Duties, which they owe, and which are not to be rewarded but according to the pleaſure of the Prince;

Ruins many of them.

but Crimes are puniſhable by the Laws of the Land where they live, and upon this ſhelf many brave Captains have ſplit themſelves, and ſuffered Shipwrack: So did *Pauſanias*, the Famous *Spartan* King, and *Alcibiades* the Valiant *Athenian*; and ſo did the *Roman Manlius*, who ſaved the Capitol from the *Gauls*; ſo did *Biron* Duke, Paire, and Marſhal of *France*, under *Henry* the Great; Sir *William Stanley* under *Henry* the Seventh, of *England*, and the Earl of *Eſſex*, under Queen *Elizabeth*. The like did the great Captain *Wallenſtein* Duke of *Friedland*, whom I mention'd a little before, who ſtained all his fair actions and eminent ſervices, with the black and infamous Crime of Treaſon,

Inſtances.

againſt one of thoſe Emperors whom he had ſerved ſo well, and who had given him ſo great a truſt. This was likewiſe *Joabs* inexcuſable fault, who preſuming on the greatneſs of his Office, rather than that of his ſervices, was many times too ſaucy with his Prince: And though *Abner* deſerved a worſe death, than that he got, yet he deſerved it not from *Joab*, *Davids* ſervant; and, no doubt, it was intolerable preſumption in *Joab* to revenge his Brothers Death on a man, with whom his Maſter had but juſt now entred into League: And though perhaps the ſame *Joab* had enough of reaſon of State on his ſide, for killing *Abſolom*, yet it was his duty, to have uſed him as the King bad him; for Princes love to be ſerved in their own way, and obedience ſhould be the Glory of Subjects. This preſumption of his moved *David* to leave him a bloody legacy on his Death bed, which *Solomon* did not ſcruple by any pretence of devotion, to cauſe to be executed even at the Horns of the Altar, where he had taken Sanctuary. Nor can Generals excuſe their Revolts, Treaſons, or Rebellions, by any Affronts or Injuries, they can pretend to have received from their Princes. And of this *Narſes* was guilty, though wronged by the Emperor *Juſtine*, ſo was the Duke of *Bourbon*, Great Conſtable of *France*;

A Prince cannot affront his Subjects.

the Firſt, for bringing the *Lombards* into *Italy*, the ſecond, for deſerting his Maſters ſervice, and going over to *Charles* the Fifth; for a Soveraign Prince cannot give his Subject a juſt cauſe to caſt off his duty; And *Tacitus* tells us, that we ſhould ſuffer the wrongs of Princes, as we do Rain, Tempeſts, Hail, Thunder, Lightning, and other injuries of the Air.

And yet for all that hath been ſaid, or can be ſaid on this ſubject, this high and important charge of Captain General of all the Forces, and Armies of a whole Kingdom, hath been offer'd in all Ages, by Soveraign Princes to Subjects (for of neceſſity, ſometimes free States muſt do it) and we find but few

few of those Subjects, who have refus'd it, for desire of Honour (the Idol of ambitious Souls) makes them insensible and blind, that they can neither feel the present weight, or foresee the future danger of so high and so heavy an imployment; but if Princes and Monarchs, will have such Captain Generals, as are not of their own blood, they had better trust their own Subjects with the charge, than strangers: for the first owe them Fealty, Loyalty, and Allegiance; the second, only Military service, from which obligation they shake themselves free, when ever they think it time. As *Francis Sforza*, Father of him who Usurped *Millan*, deserted *Joanne* Queen of *Naples*, and went over to her Enemy of *Arragon*. I humbly think, that a Prince who hath many Armies, should be either by himself, or one of his Blood present with one of them, and entrust the rest to persons of known abilities, who should have no higher titles, than that of Lieutenant Generals, and are to be independent one of another, and this will make them emulous, endeavouring which of them shall do their Master best service; but when Reason of War requires a conjunction of Forces, then as I have often said, the Prince, or one of his Blood should have the supreme command; for to a Prince, all the Lieutenant Generals will give ready and submissive obedience, without repining, grudging or murmuring, which men ordinarily do not to fellow-Subjects. *Charles the* Ninth of *France*, made but a sorry progress in his Wars against his Protestant Subjects, till he made his Brother *Henry* Duke of *Anjou*, his Captain General, who though he was but very young, yet all the Kings Generals giving him an intire obedience, in a short time he brought those of the Religion, to a very low and petitioning condition. The Emperor *Ferdinand* the Third, in the year 1637. gathered together most of his Armies to the number of Eighty Thousand men, gave the conduct of them all to one Count *Gallas*, with the title of Generalissimo, and commanded him to chase the *Swedish* Feltmarshals Banier, and *Leslie* out of *Germany*. *Gallas* put them indeed to a fearful retreat, which they made to the *Baltick* Sea, but his Authority was not so great, as to procure an absolute obedience of all the Generals under him, to his commands, which occasioned the ruin of most of those numerous Forces, within less than nine Months: But three or four years after, the same Emperour made his Brother Arch-Duke *Leopold*, Captain General of his Armies, and sent him against the same Banier, whom he forc'd to retire in some disorder, in which he lost well near the whole Left Wing of his Cavalry. The Arch-Duke notwithstanding some losses which he suffered, did not only preserve, his Brother the Emperors interest, and Forces, but gained several advantages against the *Sweed*, till he was called to be Governour of the *Spanish Netherlands*. Then again went the Emperors affairs wrong, till he went in person to his principal Army, where his presence made his Generals do their Duties so well, that the *Sweed* was once more at a loss; so much doth a Princes presence contribute to the carrying on of Military designs.

Mens ambition.

The *French* Kings Brother Generalissimo.

Leopold the Emperours Brother Generalissimo.

The late Emperour in person with his armies.

To lay a side that Chimerical description I gave you in the beginning of this Chapter of a General, give me leave to say, that one ought to be chosen for that high charge, who knows something of all inferiour charges below his own. The *Sweed* breed some of their Nobility, in Armies, making many of them begin with an Ensign bearer or Cornets place, and so rise by degrees, till they attain to the command of a part or Wing of an Army; then continue but a short while in one Station, yet so long, as they may understand what belongs to every charge under a General. In the next place, our General should be stout, not rash, resolute to lay hold on occasion, as knowing, she is bald behind; he should be very secret, and ready to hearken to advice and have judgement to discern, whether it be good or bad. Very young this General ought not to be, for he must not be a *meer novitiat*, (I speak still of Subjects;) very old he must not be, for age dries up the radical moisture, cools the blood, and weakens the body, and thereby makes a man unfit for these Actions, which require both present resolution, and present expedition: In short, if you have a General indued with some knowledge in Military Affairs, with some prudence, with some liberality, and an unblemish'd reputation; he may pass for sufficient enough, though he have not all these qualities in the Superlative degree: for perfection is not to be look'd for in

Qualities requisite for a General.

Stratagems.

the depraved condition of mankind. As to Stratagems, if he be witty, he needs not loſe his time to read *Frontinus*; for as *Xenophon* tells us, a General ſhould know how to invent Stratagems of his own, as well as to know thoſe who have been before him, as that Muſician is the better Artiſt, who can make new Tunes, than he who can only ſing or play old ones. And in all thoſe qualifications I have now ſpoke of, all General perſons are invited to take a ſhare.

But there are ſome who in the choice of a General require another qualification, and that is that he be fortunate; but how ſhall you know whether he will be fortunate in his future undertakings? if you ſay, becauſe he was happy in his lower imployments, you will take your meaſures very ill; for many are fit to conduct parties or parcels of armies, and to follow ſuch directions as are given them, who are very uncapable to manage the charge of a whole army; and it is very well known that a Commander in the Wars may be fortunate enough under one Maſter, and very unfortunate under another. Beſides, fortune is unconſtant in all things, and in nothing more than in matters of War. I knew when Count *Koningſmark* was Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel, no enterpriſe ſucceeded well with him, nor had he fortune favourable in any party he conducted. But when he came to have a petty army under his own peculiar Command, all went well with him, and as he was advanced to higher imployments, fortune attended him more and more, ſo that he was eſteemed to be one of the moſt ſucceſsful Generals Queen *Chriſtina* of *Sweden* had; but obſerve the change, when he came to ſerve the late King of *Sweden* in his War againſt *Pole*, this *Koningſmark* is pitifully taken at Sea by the *Dantzickers*, and kept Priſoner till the Peace was made. It hath indeed been obſerved of ſome, that they have loſt all the Battels that ever they fought, as if ſome inexorable deſtiny had conſtantly attended their perſons, how brave and accompliſht ſoever they were. They ſay never Battel was won for *Henry* the Sixth of *England*, when he was perſonally preſent, but ſeveral were when he was abſent. There was one of our Earls of *Douglas*, who had the nick-name of *Tineſield*, or Looſe-battel, a couragious perſon, and well experienced in the managing of the Wars of thoſe times, and though he wanted no qualification of a good Captain, yet loſt he all the Battels that ever he fought; and this ill fortune attended him when he join'd with *Piercy* in his Rebellion againſt *Henry* the Fourth King of *England*, for that Battel was loſt, wherein he thought he had kill'd three or four Kings, and he himſelf was taken Priſoner. The ſame rigid fate attended him over to *France*, where fighting at *Vernouville* againſt the Duke of *Bedford*, he loſt both the Battel and his Life.

Fortune unconſtant.

Some never fortunate.

Henry the ſixth of *England*.

One of the Earls of *Douglas*.

There is another extravagant opinion, that it is good for a General to be once beaten, that he may thereafter ſhun thoſe errors which occaſion'd his overthrow; but the Eſcapes, neglects, and Miſtakes in the time of Action, are ſo many, that if a General did not endeavour to prevent them, till by every one of them he loſt a Battel, Conflict, or Rencounter, he ſhould never win a Field in his life. A great deal better it is, ſaith *Monluc*, for a Captain to be wiſe by the loſs of other men, than by his own, and by the neglect of others, (who thereby have ſhipwrackt themſelves) to ſteer his courſe ſo that he ſplit not upon that ſame rock.

An odd opinion.

Many there be who fancy the ſafety of an army to be wrapt up in the ſafety of him who commands it, and therefore will not have him to hazard his perſon, but a diſtinction muſt be allowed here, for if the Prince or Monarch be in perſon at the Medley, when he expoſeth himſelf to danger, he hazardeth more than his army, for he hazards the State and Commonwealth; yet many Princes have done it, *Cyrus*, the Great *Alexander*, *Caſar*, *Henry* the Fifth of *England*, and *Henry* the Fourth of *France*, *Charles Guſtavus* the late King of *Sweden*, all of them ſucceſsfully, and his Majeſty now raigning magnanimouſly at *Worceſter*. But indeed it ſhould not be done by them, but in extream neceſſity. But when we ſpeak of any other Generals, except Soveraign Princes, whatever name they bear, I ſay, he who will not have them to hazard their perſons, robs them of one of the moſt eſſential qualities of their Office, and that is Courage. If a great Captain be never ſo prudent, never ſo knowing in the Military Art, never ſo vigilant, never ſo induſtrious, if he be not ſtout, all the reſt is worth nothing. Nor do I mean for all that, that he ſhould be raſh, there is a difference between

Generals ſhould hazard their perſons

between staring and stark mad. He should not hazard his person but where his presence is necessary, as when he sees or understands that in time of Battel the enemy is prevailing against such a part of his army, thither he should run, for his presence may restore the fight, as hath been seen a thousand times, and it is certain, that in time of action, hardiness is more necessary than prudence. Neither is it enough for him, in time of Battel to hazard himself, but he must do it also in viewing those Forts and Towns which he is to besiege, or the ground where he is either to fight or encamp, yet he ought to be so well guarded, that he may not be surpriz'd by any sudden eruption, or the ambush of an enemy, as the *Roman* Consuls *Marcellus*, and *Claudius* were by one of *Hannibals*. Nor must a Generals courage stop here, for where he finds his advantages, fears the weakening of his own, or the strengthening of his enemies forces, he should not only hazard, but should dare the enemy to Battel, and fight it boldly; for occasion is so disdainful and nice, that if you do not court her when she offers her self, you will hardly ever find her in so good an humour again. Let it not be said that a General may be couragious, and yet not hazard himself. He must shew his courage sometimes, yea many times. It is good for him to be cautious, but he must be adventurous too, and if he be not this, he may happily preserve what he hath gain'd, but cannot probably make any considerable new Conquests; and it is upon such a subject that *Monluc* saith, *Un Chef qui craint, ne fera rien de bon*, a Chieftain who fears will never do good.

In several occasions.

Fronte capillata est, posthac occasio calva.

But I think I hear some say, that a General should hazard his person least of all in Battel, because if he fall, the rout of the army immediately follows. I grant it hath sometimes fallen out so, but that must not make a general rule; for as the safety of an army consists not in the safety of the General, so the loss of an army follows not necessarily the loss of a General. Many brave Generals and Captains (when their armies are irrecoverably routed in the field) are forc'd to fly, and so preserve themselves to better fortunes; so on the other hand many armies have been sav'd, and have gain'd the day, after their Generals have either fled out of the field, or been kill'd in it. At a Battel fought with the *Imperialists* in the year 1638, *Paltsgrave Birkifeld* fled with most of his General persons, yet his army gain'd the Victory; and in our own days the Generals of three armies, join'd at that time all in one, fled before the Battel was half fought, yet the mishap was that the General who fought against them, and bravely kept the field, lost the honour of the day. *Titus Livius* tells us, that the two *Decii*, Father and Son, both Consuls in two several Battels which the *Romans* fought with their neighbours in *Italy*, when they saw their own men began to fly, consecrated and devoted themselves and their prevailing enemies to Mother *Tellus*, and all the Infernal spirits, with all the Hellish rites of that Heathen action describ'd at length by *Livy*, that thereby the *Roman* army might recover the honour of the Field well near lost, and so they being bravely mounted rode among the thickest of their enemies, where valiantly fighting, both of them were kill'd, which made Victory presently turn over to the *Romans*. But we must not believe with *Livius*, that the Consuls bequeathing themselves so heartily to the Devil was so acceptable a sacrifice to heaven, or so supererogatory as to move the Gods to reward it with success to their party; no, it was that excess of valour which they shew'd in the action, that encourag'd the flying *Romans* to turn head, and follow their Generals in that desperate Charge, and I doubt not but the deaths of their Consuls exasperated them, and put an edge on their revenge, and that procur'd them the Victory. The same Author informs us that a *Roman* Consul, one *Petilius Lætus* fighting bravely against the *Liguri.ns* was kill'd, to revenge whose death the *Romans* fought so well, that they chac'd their enemies out of the Field. *Polybius* in his second Book speaks of a very remarkable Battel which two *Roman* Consuls fought with two *Gallick* Kings, the two Consuls having marched with two several armies two several ways by a strange Chance met in such a manner, that one of them began the skirmish with the Van of the *Gauls* army, when the other began to attack their reer, but at the first shock one of the Consuls was kill'd, to revenge whose death his army charg'd and fought thorough the *Gauls*, routed them totally, kill'd on the place forty thousand, and took ten thousand, with one of their Kings. The *Theban Epaminondas*

Generals should hazard themselves in Battel.

Loss of a General doth not lose an army.

Instances for it of ancient times.

got

got his mortal wounds at *Mantinea*, whereof he died that night, yet was his army victorious.

Instances for it of later times.

But to come nearer home and our own days, *Maurice* Duke of *Saxe* in the Emperour *Charles* the Fifths time, was kill'd in that Battel he fought with *Albert* Marquess of *Brandenburg*, yet his army got the victory. A little before that time the Duke of *Bourbon* was the first man that was kill'd at the assault of *Rome*, which did so enrage the army, whereof he was General, that it never gave over storming the Walls till they enter'd them, and then sackt the City. The Prince of *Orange* who succeeded that *Bourbon* in the command of that same Imperial army, was kill'd in a hot encounter with the *Florentine* General *Ferrucci*, yet his army was Victorious. The great King of *Sweden*, *Gustavus Adolphus*, was kill'd even as the Battel of *Lutzen* began, yet did his army fight bravely the whole day, and forc'd the *Imperialists* to go out of the field at night. I knew Feltmarshal *Kniphausin* a good Commander, while he was marshalling the few forces he had at *Hasalon* in the Bishoprick of *Munster* against one *Luersam* Lieutenant General to the Elector of *Colen*, shot dead, upon which one *Gratzenstein*, who commanded next the Feltmarshal, gave the enemy so gallant a charge, that *Luersams* little army was defeated, and himself taken. And to conclude, a General may lose more to his Prince, by too much care to preserve his own person, than by freely hazarding it. Now as our General is bound to give proofs of his courage, so in time of action he ought to be of an excellent temper, for if at that time he be transported with vanity, presumption, credulity; or other perturbations of soul, he may either hazard too much, or not hazard at all; for these or any of these passions may move him to give those Orders and Commands which may easily make him lose the day, and with it the service of his Master, and his own Reputation for ever.

CHAP. XV.

Of Intelligence, Spies, and a General Scoutmaster.

To look for Intelligence, the duty of all Commanders.

A Man can scarcely speak of a careful General, but you will hear him say, that he had always good intelligence, but I can tell him that no General ever liv'd that had always good intelligence, nor is it at all possible. But certainly it is the duty of all Commanders, especially those who lead armies, to endeavour to get Intelligence of their enemies designs, counsels, projects, motions, and marches, their numbers, their strength, their Artillery, the quality of the Soldiers, whether young and raw, or old and experienced, but more especially of the qualifications, vertues and vices of him who commands in chief. And if a siege of a Town or a Castle be to be formed, to know the situation of the place, its manner of Fortification, Bulwarks, Parapets, Ditches, and outer works, what men are within it, what provisions, what Munitions of War, and what Artillery, and what Officers, particularly what a person the Governour is, how the Posts are divided, and what numbers of men are assign'd for keeping every one of them, and many more particulars, that accordingly the General may know how to take his measures, whether he shall presently storm it, or Block it, till he starve the Garrison out of it, or if he shall make his approaches and batteries against it.

Almost every Soldier can tell you, that in all armies Intelligence is the life of action, but how to get good Intelligence to which a General or any Commander may trust, is an Art yet to be found out, and I say more, it will never be found

found, ſo long as that remains true (and it will remain true till the Heavens be roll'd up like a ſcroll) which Truth it ſelf hath ſaid, and it is this, *That all men are lyars*, and ſo long as men are ſo, what Intelligence ſhall men believe. We are not to expect it from Angels, and the Devil is a lyar from the beginning. To confirm this by one inſtance which is unqueſtionable, What Intelligence durſt the leader of Gods people truſt, when ten of theſe twelve Intelligencers, which by Gods appointment were ſent to ſpie the Land of Promiſe, did by their fearful and falſe relations make the people murmur. This truth of the uncertainty of all Intelligence in Military affairs, which I aſſert, will beſt appear if we examine all the kinds of Intelligence that can be had, and theſe I ſuppoſe can be no more but two, publick and private Intelligence. Every one of theſe will admit of a ſubdiviſion, for both of them are of ſeveral ſorts.

To get true Intelligence, very difficult;

Inſtanced.

Publick Intelligence is got firſt by thoſe parties whether ſtronger or weaker, whether of Horſe or Foot, that are ſent either from an army, a part of it, or from a Garriſon, to learn thoſe things, or ſome of them that I have mention'd in the beginning of this Chapter. If the party be to go far, it is to be the ſtronger, and to divide, ſome part of it is to ſtay behind at ſome paſs or ſtrait, to ſecure the retreat of thoſe who advance further. Now ſuppoſe this ſtrong party meets no oppoſition, but returns ſafely, the Intelligence they bring is either from the Country people, which ſignifies but little, and for moſt part juſt nothing, or elſe the party hath taken ſome Priſoners. Theſe can tell you how ſtrong they conceive your enemy is, where he was yeſterday, or where he was this morning, but cannot tell you where he will be this night or to morrow, nor can they tell you any of his deſigns or intentions; and if any of the two, either Country people or Soldiers undertake to reveal the ſecrets of the Enemies General to you, you are unhappy if you truſt them, for ordinarily they ſpeak either ignorantly or falſly; and it is certain, that either a Fool or a Knave may ruin you if you believe either of them. The two *Roman* Conſuls *Veturius*, and *Poſthumius* loſt a brave army at *Caudium*, where they were ſhut up in the ſtraits of Mountains till they were contented to be diſarmed, and paſs ignominiouſly under the Gallows to redeem their lives from the *Samnites*; this miſhap befell them for truſting the Intelligence of the Country people, or Soldiers cloth'd like Country people, who aſſur'd them that the army of the *Samnites* was not within one hundred *Italian* miles of them. You may read it at large in *Livies* Ninth Book. *Curio*, *Cæſar*'s Legate in *Africk*, a good Soldier, believ'd the Intelligence that ſome Priſoners whom he had taken from the enemy, gave him, which was, that *Juba* King of *Mauritania* was gone home from *Utica*, and had taken moſt of his army with him, but had left behind him his Lieutenant General *Sabuca*, with ſome few forces, upon which the Credulous *Curio* marcheth out of his well fortified Camp, fought out the King who waited for him, fought and was beaten, hardly being able to make a retreat to his Leaguer, where he loſt his life. *Cæſar* hath it in the Ninth Book *De Bello Civili*.

Publick Intelligence by ſtronger parties,

Very often falſe.

Two Inſtances of it.

When you ſend a ſmaller party for Intelligence, it muſt not be far, it is done when an enemy is near; theſe are to diſcover, or as it is commonly called, to recognoſce, it is ordinarily of an odd or uneven number, as ſeven, nine, eleven, thirteen, fifteen, or more. If it conſiſts of fifteen, three may go before, four follow to ſuſtain them, and then eight to receive the other ſeven. Suppoſe they come ſafe back, they bring you word that at ſuch a diſtance they ſaw no enemy at all, or they ſaw ſuch a number in ſuch a place, or they ſaw their whole army marching; you have reaſon upon this to draw up in Battel, if you be not ſtrongly encamped, yet the marching army may prove Trees, or Cows at beſt; I have ſometime ſeen the like of this fall out. But this weaker party perhaps brings you a Priſoner or two, if ſo, it hath done much; but what you are to truſt to of a Priſoners Intelligence, I have already told you. And here, as the Proverb goes, a *Tartar* may be taken, your party may be beaten, and ſome of them if not all made Priſoners; you will ſay you care not, none of them can tell your intentions; I believe you, but if that be true, then thoſe you take from your enemy, can tell as little of his. But you will ſay upon a march ſufficient Officers ſhall be ſent with theſe parties which are called forlorn Hopes, (and ſo they may be called if an enemy be near) and theſe will bring in true Intelligence; yet for all their ſufficiency they may bring you ſuch news as may pre-

Publick Intelligence by ſmaller parties, not altogether to be truſted:

Nor that of Officers;

prejudice you if you give abſolute truſt to them, for the beſt of men may be miſtaken, and may miſtake things. Take two notable examples of this, *Cæſar* marching againſt the *Helvetians*, commanded *Labienus* with two Legions with all poſſible ſpeed to go before, and poſſeſs a hill not far from the Enemies Camp, this at a Curſory march he did; *Cæſar* marcheth with the reſt of his army, but ſent one *Conſidius* a Tribune of great experience, and approved valour before, to bring him certain word in what poſture the *Switzers* were: *Conſidius* miſtakes the two Legions which were with *Labienus*, to be *Helvetians*, and when *Cæſar* with his army was within one *Italian* mile and a half of that place, *Conſidius* came poſting to him, and aſſur'd him the enemy was Maſter of the hill *Labienus* ſhould have poſſeſt, and avouched he knew them by their Arms and Colours to be *Helvetians*, and which was worſe, he told him he could not learn what was become of the two Legions. This Intelligence made the great *Cæſar* immediately alter his reſolution, which was to have fallen on the *Helvetians* that very day, for he was in great want of Proviſions: Well, he drew off, and encamped on the next hill, and when the day was well ſpent, he came to know that *Labienus* and his two Legions had poſſeſt that hill as they were appointed, that *Conſidius* had out of fear imagin'd the *Romans* to be *Switzers*, and that the enemy was march'd away far enough. *Cæſar* ſteps aſide to look for bread to his hungry army; the fooliſh *Helvetians* thinking he had fled for fear, follow'd him to their loſs, otherwiſe they had eſcap'd him for that time, perhaps for good and all. Thus *Cæſar* by miſintelligence was like to have loſt a fair opportunity to fight his enemy; and whom ſhould he truſt, if he might not truſt a Veteran Captain, and as himſelf calls him, *Rei Militaris peritiſſimum*, moſt expert in Military affairs?

Inſtanced in *Cæſar*,

And *Conſidius* one of his Tribunes;

The ſecond inſtance is, when *Francis* the firſt made his Retreat from *Landrecy* and *Guiſe*, he encamped one night in view of the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth, who follow'd him, making ſhow as if he intended to fight *Charles* the next day; about break of day one *Zalaſar* a brave and experienced Captain, was ſent to diſcover, who at his return aſſur'd the Emperour that the *French* King was lying ſtill in the ſame poſture he was in the night before, and that a Regiment of *Switzers* had the outer guards, and ſeveral pieces of Artillery with them: fair day-light made his error known, the *French* army was got clear away, thoſe that *Zalaſar* took for *Switzers* were the Emperours own guards of *Germans*, and his Pieces of Ordnance were old Trunks of Trees. This made the poor Gentleman ridiculous to that whole army, in which he formerly had ſo much reſpect, and did worſe than that, for his miſintelligence loſt him his Maſters favour, who by it loſt the opportunity of taking his advantage of the reer of the *French* army.

And in *Charles* the fifth,

And *Zalaſar* one of his Captains.

If you ask me what ſhall be done in this caſe, I anſwer, the uſual cuſtom muſt be followed, Intelligence muſt be both ſought and bought; for parties, forlorn Troops, ſmaller bodies of Horſe, and ſometimes of Foot, muſt be ſent out for Intelligence: neither can any army, or part of an army march with any ſecurity, unleſs ſome be ſent before to diſcover. The want of theſe made the *Roman* army under *Flaminius* become a prey to *Hannibal* at the Lake *Thraſimenes*, where the Conſul loſt his life. I am not ſo vain as to give any new rules for Intelligence; all I pretend to in this place is to demonſtrate that no Intelligence can be ſo exactly good, but it may prove wrong, nor can any be ſent for Intelligence be they never ſo witty and expert, but they may miſtake. Neither is there any Intelligence more to be doubted or misbelieved than that which comes from an enemy; *Sabinus* one of *Cæſars* Legates truſted what *Ambiorix* a petty King of the *Gauls* in publick hoſtility with him, reported; this coſt the lives of a Legion and five Cohorts of *Romans*, beſides that of the Legate himſelf. *Cicero* another Legate not giving truſt to the ſame *Ambiorix*, ſav'd himſelf and his Legion till *Cæſar* came and reliev'd him out of eminent danger.

Yet Intelligence muſt ſtill be look'd after.

No truſt to an enemies Intelligence.

There be other ways of publick Intelligence by ſhots of Cannon or Muſquets, from Hills, Mountains, Towers, or Trees, as alſo by Beacons with ſmoke by day, and fire by night. I confeſs in ſome caſes there can be no better way found out, yet theſe may readily prove uncertain, as many times they have done; for your Centinels and Guards may make theſe ſhots and ſigns upon miſapprehenſions, and ſo diſturb you with falſe alarms, or an enemy may have ſurpriz'd your Guards

Other ways of publick Intelligence.

Guards and Centinels, and by giving you no ſign, or falſe ſigns, ruin you. Intelligence may alſo be given publickly from the Steeples and Towers of beſieged places, and from Mountains without, by either Cannon or fire, by ſigns, and Counter-ſigns, yet all of them may be miſunderſtood, miſcarried, or betray'd. But more of this in my Diſcourſe of Beſieged Cities, Towns, and Caſtles.

Private Intelligence by word, or by writing

Private Intelligence is got by word, or by writing either from thoſe who dwell and converſe with your enemy, or thoſe you ſend among your enemies diſguiſed as their friends. To corrupt a Secretary of a Prince or a General, is a good way for Intelligence; and to do this, he who commands an army muſt ſpare no Gold, and therefore a Parſimonious General will have but bad private Intelligence, or rather none at all. Governours of Forts, and Officers to whom Poſts are intruſted, either in Garriſon or Field, muſt be tried how they may be corrupted. This is an excellent way for Intelligence, and makes the deſtruction of an enemy eaſie, and it ought to be attempted, eſſay'd, and proſecuted with all earneſtneſs, prudence, and ſecrecy. One will do wiſely to ſeem to give full credit to the Propoſals, Intelligence and promiſes of theſe Traytors, but he muſt not always do it, for in this the rule will hold exactly, *Diſce diffidere*, learn to diſtruſt. How many Generals and other great perſons have been cheated by ſuch ſeeming Traytors, Hiſtory and daily practice bear witneſs. In the time of the Civil Wars of *France* in *Charles* the Ninth's reign, a Proteſtant Officer within *Orleance* agreed with much ſecrecy to deliver one of the Ports to the enemy who beſieg'd the Town, and accordingly ſome hundreds were admitted within the City, who were all Maſſacred, and a number of great Guns and Muſquets were fir'd on thoſe who were following, after the Portculleys were let down, and the Drawbridg was pluckt up. Sir *Philip Sidney* was little better uſed with his Intelligence out of *Aloſt*. Such an entertainment was prepar'd for five or ſix thouſand *Spaniards*, to whom *Breda* ſhould have been deliver'd in the night-time, when the Prince of *Parma* govern'd, if I remember right, but when they came near the Town, they grew jealous, and ſo return'd with little loſs.

Proves often falſe.

In the next place Generals ought to have a wary eye over their Secretaries; I believe few of them truſt them with all their ſecrets, nor is it fit they ſhould. And what truſt can you give him, who is willing to betray his Maſter to whom he hath ſworn fidelity? ſhould you not be afraid that he will rather betray you to whom he hath ſworn none? Yet this way of Intelligence hath in all ages been tried, and hath very often prov'd ſucceſsful, and therefore it muſt be ſtill practiſed, and ſomething muſt be hazarded, for all cannot be made cockſure. *Wallenſtein* as was afterward well known, really intended to have betrayed the Emperour his Maſter, and all his armies; but the Duke of *Weymar* and other *Swediſh* Generals durſt not truſt him, till they got aſſurances, and before he could give theſe he was diſpatched to another world. Wherefore I ſay, ſomething muſt be adventur'd, but let it be done with all imaginable care and circumſpection, that if your Intelligence fail you, the loſs may not be conſiderable.

A Traytors Intelligence to be diſtruſted.

Written Intelligence dangerous.

Written Intelligence is very dangerous, both for the perſon that carries it, for him who ſends it, and for him who receives it. If the bearer of it be taken he will no doubt be put to exquiſite tortures till he tell from whom he brought it, and be hang'd when he hath told it; this brings the ſender or writer in danger of his life, and the intercepting this written Intelligence divulgeth ſome of his ſecrets to whom it is ſent, and ſo puts him to new reſolutions, for though the advices he ſent be written in Cyphers, yet the art of finding keys for Cyphers is now common; and though a Cypher be not unlockt, yet he to whom it is directed, will rationally conclude it was unlockt, and therefore will find it needful to fall upon new reſolves. Other manners of writing with illegible Ink, are ſoon found out with fire and water. But notwithſtanding all this there is a neceſſity of writing many times, and it muſt take its hazard.

So are Cyphers.

Yet both to be uſed.

Spies.

Private Intelligence by word of mouth is certainly the ſureſt way, (if any way of Intelligence can be ſure) provided the perſons imployed be witty, ſober, vigilant, and faithful. The firſt three qualifications may be known by converſation, but the laſt only by frequent trial, and yet he may be faithful to you in many things, who may cheat you to purpoſe at the laſt blow. Theſe be the Intelligencers, whether men or women, who are properly called Spies, upon whoſe

Not always to be truſted.

whoſe Intelligence no prudent General, Governour, or good Officer will build reſolutions, till it be confirm'd by ſeveral hands, and even then it will be needful to walk with circumſpection. We find in the life of *Cæſar*, writ both by himſelf and others, that he made it his great work to get Intelligence of his enemies poſture, doings, and deſigns, and that the wonderful celerity he uſed in all his expeditions, was the product of his Intelligence, yet did he never truſt any that ever he got from either friend or enemy, till it was confirm'd to him from others; yet I have told you that his Intelligence did fail, it is true not ſo oft as his Legates were abus'd by theirs, becauſe he truſted not ſo eaſily. When

Their miſerable condition.

Spies are ſent, he who ſends them muſt let them know none of his own deſigns, for theſe they may readily reveal. Theſe Spies are in a woful condition, for ſo ſoon as they are ſuſpected, they are immediately ſearch'd, and if any Papers be found about them, either in their Clothes, the ſoles of their ſhoos, their hair, hats, ſheaths of daggers or ſwords, they are put to torture, and then all they know for moſt part is reveal'd, and though no Papers be found with them, yet

How the *Romans* found out Spies.

are they tortur'd to tell what perhaps they know not. The *Roman* way to find out Spies was by a Trumpet or a Cryer to command all to their Huts and Tents, and thoſe who were then found wandering abroad, were apprehended, and examin'd for Spies.

But I do not remember to have heard or read of a greater miſchief, that want of Intelligence did to any than to the two famous *Carthaginian* Brothers, *Hannibal* and *Aſdrubal*: for after the laſt's arrival in *Italy*, *Hannibal* faceth one *Roman* army, reſolving to hinder it to join with another, which he knew was ſent to hinder his Brother to join with him; *Aſdrubal* faceth the other *Roman* army

Two great Captains both Brothers, ruin'd for want of Intelligence.

under Conſul *Livius*, and provoketh him to Battel, but in vain. All the four armies are encamped and fortified, each diligently obſerving the motions of his adverſary. Yet *Claudius Nero* the Conſul who oppoſed *Hannibal*, marcheth in the night with ſix thouſand commanded *Romans* out of his Camp, joins with *Livius*, who was at leaſt a hundred miles diſtant from him, without the knowledg of either of the two Brothers. Neither had *Aſdrubal* any knowledg of the Conjunction but his own conjecture by the numbers of the Horſes that he ſaw go out to watering, and the two *Claſſicums*, the Badges of two Conſuls; he retir'd that night, but was overtaken next day, beaten and kill'd. Nor did *Hannibal* know any thing of the whole matter, till *Nero* was return'd in ſafety to the *Roman* Camp, and that he cauſed *Aſdrubals* head to be thrown before one of the Gates of *Hannibals*; at the ſight whereof the Gallant *Carthaginian* wept, and ſaid, he now ſaw too well the fortune of *Carthage*; meaning no doubt, that the Heavens were not to be any more propitious to that powerful City, when ſuch two famous Warriors as himſelf and his valiant Brother were ruin'd for want of Intelligence. For,

Quos vult perdere, hos dementat Jupiter.

Jove dements whom he intends to deſtroy.

The puniſhment of Spies very ſevere.

But to return to our Spies, to put them to death without mercy, or to uſe them worſe, hath been ſo ancient, and ſtill is ſo univerſal a practice, that to ſpeak any thing againſt the injuſtice of it, might juſtly make a man ridiculouſly ſingular. In ancient times for moſt part they were tortur'd to death, and little better are they uſed in the Modern War. But do not you think the *Romans* uſed Spies more mercifully at the Siege of *Capua*, who only cut off their hands and noſes, and ſo let them depart in peace.

Cæſar who was merciful enough, and made great uſe of Spies himſelf, cauſed the hands of two meſſengers to be cut off, who were taken carrying Letters from *Corduba* to young *Pompey*; and in the ſame War he apprehended four Spies in his Camp, one was a Soldier, and three were Slaves, the Soldier he beheaded, but the Slaves he Crucified. So you ſee Soldiers muſt be ſubject to the puniſhment of Spies if they ſuffer themſelves to be imployed in their office. But ſince Spies are made uſe of by all Commanders in the Wars, by all Generals, nay by all Princes, why is there a more ſevere animadverſion againſt them, than againſt Robbers, Murderers, yea Parricides?

ricides? They are not only allowed, made uſe of, and commended, but bountifully rewarded by thoſe who imploy them; why then is not there ſome capitulation for them, or at leaſt ſome greater mitigation of their puniſhment, than to deliver them over to the cruelty of a Butcherly Hangman, to whip, torture, hang, ſpit and quarter them? Certainly their Office is lawful, otherwiſe lawful Princes would not make uſe of them; why are they then ſo horribly puniſht for going about their duty? Yes, aſſuredly their Office is lawful, ſince *Moſes* by Gods own appointment ſent a dozen of them to ſpy the Land of *Canaan*, one whereof was *Caleb*, who went in and poſſeſt his ſhare of it, and another of the Twelve was *Joſhuah*, who thereafter was Captain General of the *Iſraelitiſh* Army. Two Spies were likewiſe ſent to *Jericho*, who ow'd the ſafety of their lives to the Harlot *Rachab*, and when they lodg'd at ſuch a womans houſe, had they not been ſent by Gods own people, might not a man have ſaid, that Knaves and Whores were well met together?

Spies may be lawfully uſed.

But to conclude, if Spies eſcap'd without very ſevere puniſhment, Camps, Armies, and all Fortified places would be peſter'd with that baſe, though neceſſary Canaille.

The *Engliſh* have a General Officer whom they qualifie with the Title of Scoutmaſter General, I have known none of them abroad, but I hear in ſome places of *Italy* they have ſomething very like him, and that is, *Il Capitano di Spiani*, the Captain of the Spies. I cannot believe that this Scoutmaſter, or this Captain hath any thing to do with that Intelligence, which I called publick, and is got by parties whether of Horſe or Foot; for the commanding theſe out, and the keeping the Liſts of their Turns or Toures belongs properly to the Major Generals, and ſeveral Majors of Regiments both of the Cavalry and Infantry, none whereof I conceive will ſuffer the Scoutmaſter to uſurp their Office. They muſt then only have the regulation of the private Intelligence, wherein no doubt they may eaſe the General of the Army very much. But being that Spies are properly under their command, if this Scoutmaſter General, or this *Capitano di Spiani* be taken Priſoner by the enemy, whether he may be ranſom'd and uſed as an Officer, or hanged as a Spy, is a queſtion, which becauſe I cannot determine, I ſhall leave it as a Probleme. The *French* have lately conſtituted a Captain of Guides, who perhaps is the Captain of Spies I ſpeak of.

Scout-maſter General.

CHAP. XVI.

Embatteling by the Square-root, examined and rejected.

THE great Apoſtle of the Gentiles tells us, *That the faſhion of this world periſheth*; And truly *I* admire not at all, that Embattelling Bodies of Foot and Horſe by the Square-root is worn out of faſhion, but *I* admire much that ever it was in faſhion. I ſhall not offer to prepoſſeſs my Reader with a bad opinion of it till I inform him of the thing it ſelf. Authors mention Batallions ſquare of men, and Batallions ſquare of ground, Batallions of a large front, and doubled Batallions. To theſe by the permiſſion of thoſe Speculative Martialiſts, I ſhall add another, and that is a Batallion ſquare both of men and ground, whereof I do not remember that I have heard any of them either ſpeak or write.

Several kinds of Batallions marſhal'd by the Square-root.

It will be requiſite for that Commander who intends to draw up his Company, Regiment or Brigade by the Square-root, to have Tables of ſeveral numbers by him, whereof the *Sieur de Preiſſac*, *Beckler*, and *Whithorne* (who tranſlated *Machiavelli* his Art of War into *Engliſh*) have been at the trouble to leave ſome behind them, but to little purpoſe; for any ordinary Arithmetician can make a ſquare number, which is nothing elſe but a number multiplied in it ſelf. As 3 multiplied by 3 produceth 9, 9 multiplied by 9 produceth 81, 81 multiplied by 81 produceth 6561; in it ſelf multiply 6561, the product will be 43046721, and ſo in *infinitum*. But obſerve firſt, that all numbers are not ſquare, and of theſe that are ſquare you may extract the root without a fraction, as a 100 is a ſquare number, becauſe the root of it is 10 without a fraction; for 10 multiplied by 10 produceth a 100. But when you extract the root of a number that is not ſquare, you muſt take the neareſt, as 10 and 11 are not ſquare numbers, and therefore you muſt take the root of 9, and that is 3, now 3 multiplied by 3 produceth but nine, and ſo in 10 you have the fraction of one, and in 11 of two. Obſerve, ſecondly, that every number above 10 hath for its ſquare a number above a 100, as 11 multiplied by 11 produceth 121. Obſerve thirdly, that the root of a ſquare figure is the ſide of it, and in a quadrate ſquare all the ſides are of a like length; ſo that if you would know the ſuperficial contents of a ſquare figure æquilateral, you multiply the number of one ſide by it ſelf, as by example if the number of one ſide of that figure be a 100 men, the Product will be 10000: But if it be an oblong ſquare, that is, which hath two ſides longer than the other two, you are to multiply the length of one of the longeſt by the length of one of the ſhorteſt; as by example, there is an oblong ſquare, whereof each of two ſides contain a 100 Foot, and each of the other two ſides but 50, multiply then the longeſt by the ſhorteſt, that is a 100 by 50, the Product will be five thouſand.

What is meant by the Square-root.

Three neceſſary obſervations.

This being premiſed, if you would have a ſquare Batallion of men, you are firſt to ſee what the number of your men is, and next extract the root of that number, and according to it, form your Body of equal number of men in rank and file. As the number of your men to be marſhall'd is 256, which was the number of the *Grecian Syntagma* or Company, extract the root of 256, you will find it to be 16, for 16 multiplied by it ſelf, produceth 256, and therefore your rank and your file muſt each conſiſt of 16 men, this is a Batallion ſquare of men. Or ſuppoſe your number to be 6560, you will find it is not a ſquare number, and therefore you muſt take the root of the next ſquare number to 6560, and that you will find to be 6561, the root whereof you will find to be 81, for 81 multiplied by it ſelf produceth 6561, and therefore to marſhal 6560, you muſt make your rank conſiſt of 81 men, and your file of as many. But truly you will not find this ſo eaſie to be done in the field, as on a piece of Paper, and when you have done it, perhaps you will ſay it was not worth the half of your pains.

Batallions ſquare of men, how made.

To

To make a Batallion ſquare of ground is to allow no more ground to your front or your rank, than you do to your file or flank, and for this they will give you a rule which will be hard enough to follow on any ſudden occaſion, and it is this, allow ſeven foot in length, and three in breadth for every Soldier; multiply the number of men you are to marſhal by three, and divide the Product by ſeven, then extract the ſquare root of the Quotient, that will be the number of men for your file, by the number of men in your file, you are to divide the whole number of men in your Batallion, and the Quotient of that will be the number of men for your rank. This is a little harſh, yet I cannot make it clearer, perhaps an example will clear it. Suppoſe your men to be 1600, the ordinary number of weak Brigades, multiply 1600 by three, the Product is 4800. Divide 4800 by ſeven, the Quotient will be 685, with a fraction of five. When you extract the root of 685, (becauſe it is not a ſquare number) you muſt take the neareſt, and that will be 26, for that multiplied in it ſelf produceth 676, and this wants but nine of 685. Then by the rule your file conſiſts of 26, and by it you are to divide your 1600 men, and you will find the Quotient to be 61, with a remainder or fraction of 14; ſo by this rule your rank conſiſts of 61 men, and conſequently your 1600 men come to be 61 in rank, and 26 in file, for 61 multiplied by 26 produceth 1586, which with the fraction of 14 makes juſt 1600. Now three foot being allowed to every man in rank (according to the ordinary computation) 61 men in rank poſſeſſe 183 foot of ground, and ſeven foot being allowed for every man in file, the ground the 26 poſſeſs, is 182 foot, which wants but one of the 183, and that proceeds from the fraction of 14. And hereby you have your Batallion of 1600 men to poſſeſs equal ground, though the rank conſiſt of 61, and the file but of 26. And this you will think is very pretty to ſee or look on, whether it be worth your labour or not, you can beſt tell after you have order'd it, which I ſuppoſe you will not do without ſome trouble. Beſides, in this computation (as I have often ſaid) there is an inexcuſable error committed by moſt men in reckoning Diſtances and Intervals, for they ſtill reckon as many of them, as there be men in rank and file, as here, they make 61 Intervals in front, becauſe there are 61 men in front, whereas really there are but 60 Intervals, and in the file they make 26 Intervals, becauſe there are 26 men in file, whereas really there can be no more but 25 Intervals. And theſe two miſtakes will quickly make a vaſt alteration in your Batallions ſquareneſs of ground.

Battallions ſquare of ground.

A Doubled Batallion is ſo called, when the rank conſiſts of twice as many men as the file doth. The way to marſhal it is this: The men you have to order, their number being known, double on paper, for you will, I ſuppoſe, find that more eaſie, than to double their number really in the field. Then extract the ſquare-root of that double number, and that muſt be the number of men for your rank, and the half of that muſt be the number of men for your file. As by example, you are to marſhal 3200 men (the number of ancient Regiments) in a Doubled Batallion, double them, and ſay you have 6400; extract the ſquare root of 6400, you will find it to be 80, for 80 multiplied by 80, produceth 6400, and ſo you muſt marſhal your 3200 men 80 in rank, and 40 being the half of 80, your file muſt conſiſt of 40 men, for multiply 80 by 40, the Product is 3200. Take an example of a number that is not ſquare, and let your men be 2500; double theſe, and ſo they are 5000, look for the ſquare-root of 5000, you will not find it exactly, becauſe it is not a ſquare number, and therefore you are to take the neareſt, and that will be 71, for 71 multiplied in it ſelf produceth 5041, and that is 41 more than the double number of your men: let therefore your rank be of 71 men, the half whereof ſhould be the number of your file, this you cannot do exactly, becauſe 71 is an odd number, you muſt therefore take 35, and that is the half of 70, and ſo make your file to conſiſt of 35 men, and you will be near right, for 71 being multiplied by 35, produceth 2485, which wants but 15 of your number of 2500. We read that the *Spaniards* uſed theſe Batallions in the times of old, but now they do not.

A Doubled Batallion.

A Batallion of a large front is that in which there are many more men in the rank, than in file. Theſe Batallions may be form'd eaſily, and they are thoſe which are now univerſally uſed, but the ſquare root men will needs give us a rule for it, which is of a harder digeſtion than the practice of the thing it ſelf. Yet I ſhall tell you what it is; you ſhall divide your whole men by that number

Batallions of a large front.

of which you intend your front ſhall conſiſt, and the Quotient of that Diviſion ſhall be the number of your file; as by example, you are to marſhal a 1000 men, and you intend they ſhall be 50 in rank, divide the 1000 by 50, the Quotient is 20, and ſo your 1000 men ſhall be 50 in rank, and 20 in file. But if you intend to have a 100 in front, you divide a 1000 by a 100, and the Quotient will be 10, and ſo your Batallion hath a 100 in front, and 10 in file, for a 100 multiplied by 10 produceth a 1000. We may ſafely conclude 10000 men may be marſhal'd in this form of Batallion, with the half of this Arithmetick, and is daily practiſed. For at this time all Bodies of Foot drawn up either ten or ſix deep, and Bodies of Horſe three deep, are Batallions of large fronts, and are marſhal'd very well by thoſe who neither know, or ever did hear of a ſquare-root.

But let me add to theſe Theoretical marſhallings of a Batallion ſquare both of men and ground, let the number of your men be what it will. And thus, Make firſt as many men in file as in rank, and then you have a Battallion ſquare of men. In the next place allow no more diſtance between your ranks than you do between your files, and then your Batallion is ſquare of ground likewiſe.

A Batallion ſquare of men and ſquare of ground likewiſe.

As for example, you are to draw up 2500 men, extract the root of that number, you will find it to be 50, for 50 multiplied in it ſelf produceth 2500, and therefore your rank muſt conſiſt of 50 men, and your file of 50 men, and conſequently you have a Batallion ſquare of men; then allow as you muſt do, for every Combatant one foot to ſtand on, by that means every rank poſſeſſeth 50 foot, and every file 50 foot. Allow 49 Intervals in the rank, for more there are not, and for every Interval three foot, amounts to 147 foot, and allow no more but three foot for every Interval in the file, you have likewiſe 147 foot for the Intervals of files; now add 147 to 50, which the fighting men ſtand on, the aggregate will be 197, and ſo many foot of ground doth every rank poſſeſs, and ſo much doth every file poſſeſs; and conſequently your Batallion of 2500 is ſquare of ground as well as of men. Would you know how much ground this Batallion ſo marſhal'd poſſeſſeth in all, multiply 197 by 197, and you will find the Product to be 38809 foot, which will be near eight *Italian* miles. But I hear you cry out that ſix foot are always allow'd for an Interval between ranks.

Objection,

Anſwered.

But I anſwer you negatively, not always, for ſo many Foot are but allowed in a march, becauſe the length of a Pike requires that diſtance, when it is ſhoulder'd, but ſtanding in Battel ready to give or receive the Charge with Pikes either order'd or advanced, three foot are ſufficient for the Pikemen as well as for the Muſqueteers; and when they Charge, one foot and a half of diſtance between ranks of Pikemen is enough. If you will then make uſe of this Batallion of mine, let it be with Pikes advanced, but if you be pleas'd to follow my advice, you ſhall never make uſe of it at all.

Moſt of all theſe uſeleſs.

But all theſe forms of Battels fram'd by the ſquare-root, (except the Batallion of a large front, which is more eaſily fram'd without it than by it) are of much trouble and little uſe, they are theſe which bring feweſt hands to fight, and renders them apt to be ſurrounded, and ſo are all Batallions that have deep files. Next by that manner of Embatteling you muſt conſtantly alter the forms and figures of your Battel, according as the numbers of your men increaſe or decreaſe, and in them there is a daily change. Captain *Cruſo* who *Engliſhed Du Preiſſacs* Military Reſolves, in a Marginal Note calls Embatteling by the ſquare-root an impertinent curioſity; and to what purpoſe, ſaith he, the ſquare-root, ſince now all *Europe* marſhals their foot ten deep, except the *Swede?* for he wrote near forty years ago. And to that ſame ſenſe at this time, I ſay, to what purpoſe the ſquare root, ſince now all *Europe* marſhals their foot ſix deep, and their Horſe three deep, except the *Hollander?* But I ſhall bring you a greater authority againſt deep files, and ſquare-root Battels; *Xenophon* tells us when *Cyrus* fought with *Cræſus* for the Kingdom of *Lidia*, *Cræſus* his army was marſhal'd both Horſe and Foot thirty deep, except his Mercenary *Ægyptians*, who were ten thouſand, who would not, ſays he, abandon their Country cuſtom in making ſquare Battels, and therefore their 10000 men were drawn up a 100 in rank, and a 100 in file, and a 100 times a 100 makes 10000. And ſo their Batallion was ſquare of men, and might have been alſo of ground if they allow'd no greater Intervals of ranks than of files, which hardly they could do, being they were all offenſively arm'd with Pikes both long and ſtrong. But our

Ægyptians ſquare Batallion of 10000 men.

Author

Author ſaith that *Cyrus* was glad of this, wiſhing *Cræſus*'s whole army had been marſhal'd a thouſand deep, for then he had ſooner deſtroy'd it, as I have told you in the ſecond Chapter of my Diſcourſes of the *Grecian* Art of War. Yet *Xenophon* tells us that theſe *Ægyptians* fought beſt of any of *Cræſus* his army, yea ſo long till they had fair quarter given them. And withal he informs us that *Cyrus* his own army (his Foot I ſuppoſe he means) were marſhal'd 24 deep, and that was eight more than the depth of the *Macedonian Phalanx*.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Modern way of Embatteling and Marſhalling Armies.

AS all Armies are marſhal'd according to the pleaſure of thoſe who command them, ſo their pleaſure often is, and ever ſhould be over ruled by the circumſtances of time, the poſture of the enemy they have to do with, the Weather, the Sun, the Wind, and the ground on which they are to fight, if the General find by his foreparties, or Vancouriers, that his enemy is before him, drawn up in Battel, ready to receive him, he will do himſelf an injury to march forward, for it is not to be fancied, that his adverſary will be ſo courteous as to permit him to marſhal his army, but will take his advantage and fall upon him, before he can draw up his Van, eſpecially if his march have been thorough any cloſe or ſtrait Country; and in ſuch a condition as that, a Generals own ready wit and reſolution muſt ſerve him for Counſellors, for there will be no time given him to call a Council of War. But we ſpeak now of Embatteling Armies, when Generals have half the choice of the ground.

A General ſhould have a ready wit.

The manner was in many places, and ſtill is in ſome, to marſhal Armies in three diſtinct Bodies, one behind another, the firſt was called the Vanguard, the ſecond the Battel, the third the Reer-guard. But ſeveral times every one of thoſe conſiſted of three Bodies likewiſe, theſe were two wings of Horſe, and one Body of Foot; and when they march'd, theſe three great Bodies were called the Van, Battel and Reer. Their proper Title was to be called ſo when they marched, for many times when they drew up in order of Battels, it was in one Breaſt, and then the Horſe were divided in two wings, and the Foot made the Battel. This was done when the ground was very ſpacious, and to prevent ſurrounding, otherwiſe Armies ſeldom fight but in two Battels, if not in three. But as I ſaid, time, ground, the power of an enemy, miniſter occaſions to a Commander of an Army to alter the ordinary cuſtom, and frame a new method of his own to ſerve him for that opportunity. I ſhall give you one inſtance, and that of a mighty army, marſhal'd, as few before it have been, and I believe none ſince. It was that which *Charles* the fifth, and his Brother King *Ferdinand* had at *Vienna*, when they lookt for Sultan *Soliman*, the ground was very ſpacious, and though their numbers were very great, yet thoſe of the *Turk* were very much beyond them, and they fear'd to be out-wing'd by his numerous Horſe. The order of their Battel was to be this if they had fought: They had ſixty thouſand arm'd with Pikes, Halberts, Partiſans, and other long Staves, theſe were divided in three great Batallions, each of twenty thouſand; on the right hand ſtood one of them, on the left hand the ſecond, and the third in the middle. There were about ſix or ſeven thouſand Harquebuſiers on foot, to attend each of theſe great Batallions of Pikes, who were to have ſeveral little Intervals thorough which theſe Harquebuſiers were to ſalley and fire inceſſantly before the grand Batallions, till they ſhould be neceſſitated to retire through theſe ſame Intervals to the Reer, and then the Pikes were immediately to cloſe and fill up thoſe void places. Theſe three great Batallions ſeparated one from another,

Armies marſhall'd in three diſtinct Bodies.

How the mighty Army of the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth was marſhal'd at *Vienna*.

another, made two great Intervals, in each of which ſtood fifteen thouſand Horſe. Here then you ſee upon the matter, one of the braveſt Armies of Chriſtians that ever was marſhal'd in one front without reſerve (only ſome thouſands of men were order'd to guard the Baggage and Munitions) ſcarce read of before or ſince. Here you ſee the Pikemen make the Wings, whereas both before and ſince they made the Body: Here you ſee the Firemen marſhal'd behind, and ordain'd to ſally from their ſtation, and do their ſervice in the Van, and then to retire to their place according to the cuſtom of the ancient *Grecian* and *Roman Velites*, and not marſhal'd on the wings of the Pikes.. And here you ſee the Horſe, who before that time and ſince made the wings of an army, make now the Body of it, ſtrongly flanked with Pikes; this being the inverſion of former Ordinances of War, was then thought neceſſary to prevent the ſurrounding, and the impetuoſity of the *Turks* numerous Cavalry.

Battel and Reſerve.

Armies for moſt part now are marſhal'd in two diſtinct Bodies, the Vanguard, and the Arreer-guard, which are commonly called Battel and Reſerve. But it is not only difficult, but purely impoſſible for any the moſt experienced General, to ſet down any one certain rule or order, whereby he may conſtantly keep one manner of marſhalling, or one form of Battel, as it is called *forma aciei*, though he could be aſſur'd that his Regiments or Brigades of both Horſe and Foot, ſhould conſtantly continue of one ſtrength, ſince the place, ſituation, Houſes, Villages, Caſtles, Hills, Valleys, riſing heights, hollow grounds, Waters, Woods, Buſhes, Trees, and Marſhes, do occaſion ſuch alterations as make the form or mould of an Army caſt in one place, change ſo much, as you ſhall not know the face of it on another piece of ground, perhaps not above one or two hours march from the former. And in this, as I ſaid before, the General is to act his part, and take ſuch advantages as he may, and readily poſſeſs himſelf of ſuch places, which being in the enemies power might do him prejudice. One of his great cares in Embatteling would be to ſecure both his flanks, which are called the right and left hand of his Army with ſome River, Brook, Ditch, Dike, or Retrenchment, if theſe cannot be ſo readily got, then he may do it with the Waggons or Baggage of his Army; for in time of Battel it is almoſt impoſſible for a Batallion or Body either of Horſe or Foot to ſtand when it is charg'd both in front and flank, and this is ordinarily done by overwinging, ſo that the ſtrongeſt in number hath the advantage, which the weaker ſhould endeavour to counterballance by art, policy, and ſtratagem.

Flanks of an Army to be well ſecur'd in Battel.

This makes me wonder how *Charles* the Fifth, a great Warrior, in his Inſtructions to his Son *Philip* the Second, aſſerts that thirty thouſand Foot, and four thouſand Horſe is a ſufficient Army againſt any enemy how ſtrong ſoever, provided it be ſtill kept at that ſtrength, and freſh men put in their places, who are either put in Garriſons, or are kill'd or dead; becauſe, ſaith he, hardly ſhall you find any ground capable to contain more without encumbrances. But himſelf found ground to marſhal one hundred and ten thouſand men at *Vienna*, almoſt all in front; and if he find ground to marſhal theſe thirty four thouſand men, certainly it will be neceſſary to have a Reſerve of twenty thouſand. And aſſuredly greater numbers have the advantage of ſmaller, if they be well order'd to ſecond one another, whether the ground be ſpacious or narrow, Reſerves being rightly placed.

Numbers a great advantage if they be well order'd.

Many are of opinion, and it is grounded on reaſon enough, that Horſe and Foot fight beſt together, but they differ in the way, for ſome would have one Regiment of Horſe, with two Regiments of Foot, or if the Cavalry be ſo ſtrong, a Regiment of Horſe for every Regiment of Foot, and marſhal'd alternately; as firſt, a Regiment of Horſe, and then one of Foot, and ſo with the reſt. Others like not this ſo well, but like better to fortifie their Squadrons with Plottons of Muſqueteers, who give their Vollies inceſſantly, before the Horſe come to their Charge, and this aſſuredly doth exceedingly diſorder and damnifie Bodies of Horſe before they can come to make uſe of their Piſtol or Lance, for the Lance is not yet out of faſhion with the *Polonians*, *Hungarians*, *Tranſylvanians*, and *Walachians*, beſides thoſe of more Eaſterly Nations. Of this manner of mixing Foot with Horſe, *Guſtavus Adolphus* made good uſe in his Wars with *Pole*, and in *Germany* too, eſpecially at the Battel of *Leipſick*. But that great Prince was not the firſt that invented it, it was uſed in the world many

Horſe and Foot together.

Plottons of Muſqueteers with Horſe.

many ages before him among the ancient *Gracians*, *Romans*, and *Germans* too as I have already ſhewn you. *Coligni* the famous Admiral of *France* had ordinarily Harquebuſiers of Foot mixt with his Horſemen; and truly as I think, Muſqueteers have done, and can do good ſervice againſt Horſe before they come to the Charge, ſo I conceive in the Charge, Pikemen well arm'd for the defenſive, would notably aſſiſt Horſemen if they were interlin'd with them. But it ſeems Generals think not ſo, becauſe they do not uſe it.

But in the marſhalling Armies there is great difference of opinions concerning the Intervals between the greater Bodies, whether theſe be Regiments or Brigades. Some allow but 24 foot of ground between them, and they ſay if they be greater, the enemy may eaſily get into theſe void places, and ſo fall upon the flanks of the ſeveral Bodies and ruin them, a conſideration that carries much reaſon with it. But truly this order is good if the Army be drawn up in one front, without any Reſerve. But if it have a Reſerve theſe narrow Intervals in the Battel render it uſeleſs, nay they may help to ruin it. My reaſon is this, a Reſerve is appointed to advance againſt an enemy, at one of theſe three occaſions, which are when the Battel is weary, when it is in danger, and when it is beaten. Now in none of theſe three can the Reſerve be ſteedable if there be not ground for it to advance, to draw up, and to fight, but who can imagin that a Brigade of three hundred men in front, in the reſerve, can advance, draw up, and fight on a ſpot of ground twenty four foot broad, or yet on a plot of ground three hundred foot broad, for there they ſhould only have ground to ſtand on, but no room to handle their arms, eſpecially their Muſquets. But it will be yet worſe if the Brigades of the Battel be flying, and theſe of the Reſerve advanceing, for there ſhall be in that caſe ſuch a medley, and an Embarras, that they ſhall ruin one another without the help of an enemy.

Narrow Intervals between great Bodies,

Obſtructs help from the Reſerve.

I ſuppoſe for theſe or the like reaſons, others allow as much Interval between two Brigades marſhal'd in the Battel as can contain a Brigade drawn up behind it in the Reſerve, all the Brigades being ſuppoſed to be of a like ſtrength and number. And thereby whether the Battel reel, faint, or fly, the Reſerve may come up to the ſhock with an enemy, without any empeachment given to it by the flying Brigades of the Battel, and thereby a fair opportunity given to thoſe who fled or retir'd, to rally on the ground whereon the Reſerve ſtood, which was the order the ancient *Romans* kept in their three Batallions of *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, as I have at length ſhewn you in my Diſcourſes of their Art of War. And it ſeems in the days of *Charles* the Fifth about a hundred and twenty years ago, the Intervals between Batallions were ſo narrow, that the Reſerves could give them little or no aſſiſtance, whereof he complains in his Inſtructions to his Son; for he ſaith they were all drawn up in direct lines, (theſe are his words) that if you beat, (ſaith he) the formoſt Bodies, they fall back upon the reſt, who are directly behind them, and ſo bring them in diſorder and confuſion: which hurtful error of marſhalling, that Emperour ſaith he intended to rectifie, and to that purpoſe refers the King his Son to his written Notes upon that Subject. Now what better way is there to rectifie this evil, than not to draw up any Batallion of the Reſerve directly behind a Batallion of the Battel, but in a direct line behind the Interval that is between two Batalions of the Battel; and this is the *Romans* way, who drew up the three Bodies of their ſeveral Legions one behind another, Chequerwiſe.

Large Intervals of better uſe.

Charles the Fifth his Complaint.

And here the Objection mention'd before, that an enemy may eaſily enter at theſe wide Intervals and charge the flanks of the Brigades in Battel, muſt be anſwer'd, that theſe Intervals are defended with greater and ſmaller pieces of Ordnance, ſuppoſe every one of them with four greater and leſſer Pieces, or with three, according as the Train is great or ſmall; and if that does not the deed, or that any of the Brigades of the Battel begin to ſhrink or reel, then that Brigade of the Reſerve that is behind the Interval in danger ſhould be order'd ſpeedily to advance and poſſeſs it: It would ſeem that the not marſhalling the Battel and Reſerve in this order at the Battel of *Woodſtock*, fought in the year 1636, was either the *Swediſh* error, or miſtake; for *Banier* who commanded the right wing of the *Swediſh* forces, being overlaid with numbers, had been undoubtedly beaten if the Battel and left wing had not prevail'd; ſo ſoon as he ſaw the danger, he ſent Poſt after Poſt to Lieutenant General *Vizthumb*, who

Intervals defended by Ordnance.

Error at *Woodſtock* Battel.

who commanded the Reſerve, commanding him to advance inſtantly to his ſuccour, but he made no great haſte: the *Swede* having obtain'd the Victory, *Vizthumb* next morning is queſtion'd for his ſlow advance, he juſtified himſelf by making it appear, that if he had advanc'd immediately, thoſe who were running away in Troops would have routed him, at leaſt have ſo diſorder'd him, that he could have done no ſervice, and therefore he ſtood firm in his firſt ground, till all the runnaways were paſt him, and then march'd up in good order. Moſt of this was known to be true, but if Battel and Reſerve had been marſhal'd in the manner I ſpoke laſt of, there had been no danger of that whereof *Vizthumb* was afraid, for there had been room enough for him to have advanc'd, and for thoſe who fled, to have run away. But it ſeems it was order'd otherwiſe.

Army of 16200 Horſe and Foot, divided into ſeven Brigades of Foot, and ſix of Horſe,

But we ſhall marſhal an Army both ways, firſt with the leſſer, and next with the greater Intervals; and we ſhall ſuppoſe our Army to conſiſt of ſixteen thouſand Horſe and Foot, and a few more. We ſhall draw them up in a fair Campaign or Heath, which hath very few or no encumbrances of Houſes, Trees, heights, or hollow places, and the right hand of it ſhall be fenced with ſome unfordable water, and the left with the Waggons of the Army. The Army it ſelf ſhall conſiſt of ſeven Brigades of Foot, and ſix of Horſe. Each Brigade of Foot ſhall conſiſt of 1800 men, in all 12600. The ſix *B*rigades of Horſe ſhall conſiſt of 3600, which being divided into ſix parts, gives 600 Horſemen beſides Officers, to every Brigade; in all 16200. In the firſt way of marſhalling, I ſhall allow as I ſhould do, one foot of ground for every Foot ſoldier to ſtand on, and three foot diſtance between files; but becauſe ſome think this too much, have patience, and at my ſecond marſhalling of the army, I ſhall allow them leſs, though no leſs belongs to them. To every Horſeman I allow four foot of ground for himſelf, and the diſtance between him and his ſidemen. Some will think it too much, but *Bockler* allows him ſix, this is too much; at next marſhaling I ſhall allow him leſs than four.

Marſhal'd in Battel and Reſerve with leſſer Intervals.

On the right wing of the Van-guard or Battel, ſhall ſtand two Brigades of Horſe, and on the left wing as many, and between the wings the Body ſhall be compoſed of four Brigades of Foot. On the right wing of the Reer-guard or Reſerve ſhall ſtand one Brigade of Horſe, and on the left wing another Brigade of Horſe, and between the two wings the Body ſhall be compoſed of three Brigades of Foot. The length of the Battel you may compute thus, every Brigade of Horſe being ſix hundred, and drawn up three deep, conſiſts of two hundred Leaders, for each of theſe, four foot are allowed, that is eight hundred. Multiply eight hundred by four, (which is the number of the Brigades of the *B*attel) the product is 3200. Three Streets or Diſtances each of eight foot-broad muſt be allow'd in every *B*rigade, *inde* twelve Streets in four *B*rigades, theſe make 96 foot, then you have two Intervals on the right hand, one between the two *B*rigades of Horſe, and another between the Horſe and the right hand of the Foot, and as many you have on the left hand of the *B*attel, in all four great Intervals, each of them of 24 foot, for more ſome will not allow, *inde* 96 foot; add 3200 to 96, and both to 96, you will find the aggregate to be 3392. And ſo much ground doth the four *B*rigades of Horſe poſſeſs with their Intervals. Each *B*rigade of Foot conſiſting of 1800 men, being ſix deep, hath 300 Leaders, theſe poſſeſs 1200 foot, 1200 being multiplied by four (which is the number of the Foot-brigades of the *B*attel) produceth 4800. There muſt be a diſtance of ſix foot between the right hand of the Pikemen, and the right wing of the Muſqueteers, and another on the left hand, theſe two Diſtances take 12 foot, and therefore four *B*rigades require 48 foot. Now four *B*rigades have three Intervals, each of 24 foot, *inde* 72. Add then 72 for greater Intervals to 48 allow'd for leſſer Diſtances, the aggregate is 120; add 120 to 4800, the aggregate is 4920: ſo much ground doth four *B*rigades of Foot poſſeſs with their Intervals. *B*e pleaſed to add 4920 to the 3392 Foot, which the four *B*rigades of Horſe poſſeſt, you will find the aggregate to be 8312 foot, which being divided by five to make paces, the Quotient is 1662, and two foot; ſo much ground do our four Brigades of foot and four Brigades of Horſe take up in front, the Intervals between Brigades being allowed to be no greater than 24 foot. According to this allowance the Reader may eaſily calculate the longitude of the three Brigades of Foot,

The Longitude of the Battel computed.

Foot, and two *B*rigades of Horſe, which make the Reer-guard or Reſerve, if he conceive it worthy of his pains.

To marſhal our Army of 16200 men another way, in order to Intervals, I ſhall in the firſt place allow no more ground to either Foot-ſoldier or Horſeman for himſelf, and diſtance from his ſidemen, but three foot in all. *B*ut for the great Interval between two *B*rigades, I ſhall allow as much ground as a *B*rigade may ſtand on, that the Brigade in the Reſerve may poſſeſs it when order'd to advance. You will remember we agreed that four Brigades of Foot, and four of Horſe ſhould make the Battel, and three Brigades of Foot, and two of Horſe ſhould make the Reſerve; which I marſhal thus, On the right hand of the Battel two Brigades of Horſe, but between them an Interval of as much ground as one of the Brigades poſſeſſeth. On the left hand of the ſecond Brigade of Horſe, an Interval of 24 foot, on the left hand whereof four Brigades of Foot marſhal'd in one front; theſe four muſt have three Intervals, each of them capable to contain a Brigade of Foot, on the left hand of them an Interval of 24 foot, and then two Brigades of Horſe with ſuch a diſtance between them as that the two Brigades on the right wing had. The Reſerve I marſhal thus, One Brigade of Horſe drawn up at a convenient diſtance directly behind the Interval between the two *B*rigades of Horſe on the right wing of the Battel. Then on its left hand, three Brigades of Foot drawn up directly behind the three Intervals appointed to be between the four Brigades in the Battel, and on their left hand, the ſecond Brigade of Horſe drawn up behind the Interval appointed to be between the two Brigades of Horſe, which makes the left wing of the Battel.

Marſhal'd in Battel, and Reſerve with greater Intervals.

The Longitude of the Battel marſhal'd as I have ſaid, you may compute thus, The two Brigades of Horſe on the right wing, each conſiſting of 600 Horſe, and conſequently of 200 Leaders, both of them 400 Leaders, each whereof hath three foot of ground allow'd him, require 1200 foot, and the Interval 600, the diſtance between them and the Foot 24, as much you are to allow to the left wing of the Horſe, add theſe together, you will find the aggregate to be 3648. Each Brigade of Foot conſiſting of 1800 men ſix deep, hath 300 Leaders, and ſo the four *B*rigades have 1200 Leaders, each of theſe hath three foot allow'd him, *inde* 3600 foot, ſo every *B*rigade hath 900 foot of ground, as much muſt every Interval have, now there be three Intervals, and three times 900 amounts to 2700. There muſt be in every Brigade two Intervals, each of ſix foot between the Pikes and Muſqueteers, ſo 12 foot in every one, and in all the four 48. Add 48 to 2700, and both of them to 3600, the aggregate is 6348. So much ground is requir'd for the Foot of the *B*attel. Add 6348 to 3648, which was allowed to the Horſe, the aggregate will be 9996, which will want four foot of two *Italian* miles. I ſhall neither trouble my Reader nor my ſelf to compute the Longitude of the Reſerve. What I have ſaid of two ways of Marſhaling this Army of 16200 Horſe and Foot, is meant only in order to Intervals, for it is moſt certain, an Army may be drawn up in as many ſeveral figures and forms as there may be Generals to ſucceed one another in the command of it.

Longitude of the Battel computed.

Between the Battel and Reſerve there ſhould be as great diſtance of ground as a Brigade of Foot poſſeſſeth in its Longitude; but if the Army be marſhalled in three bodies, then the diſtance between Battel and Reer-guard muſt be double, that diſtance that is between Van-guard and Battel, that there be room for both to rally, this was obſerv'd by two late Princes of *Orange*, *Maurice* and *Henry*, in drawing up their Armies, following therein the practice of the *Romans*, in their Intervals between their *Haſtati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the Women, and Baggage belonging to an Army, of the General Waggon-maſter, and of his Duties.

OUR levied men being arm'd, paid, exerciſed, diſciplin'd, divided into Troops, Companies, Regiments and Brigades, with Officers belonging to them, and ſufficiently provided with General Officers, and a Train of Artillery, and at length marſhal'd in order of Battel, are now ready to march, but I am afraid, the Baggage will diſturb them, unleſs it be put in ſome order.

Baggage juſtly called *Impediminta.*

The great number of Coaches, Waggons, Carts, and Horſes loaded with baggage, the needleſs numbers of Women and Boys who follow Armies, renders a march, ſlow, uneaſie and troubleſome. And therefore the *Latins* gave baggage the right name of *Impedimenta*, hinderances. But becauſe without ſome baggage an Army cannot ſubſiſt, it would be his care who commands in chief to order the matter ſo that the baggage may be as inconſiderable and ſmall as may be, and that it march in ſuch order that every Waggon-man, Carter and Baggage-man may know his own place, that ſo they may neither diſturb one another, nor yet hinder the march of the Army. The place where the Baggage ſhould march is appointed according to the knowledg the General hath of his enemy, if he be in the Reer, the Baggage ſhould be ſent before the Army; if he be in the Van, it ſhould be in the Reer. But in theſe places there ſhould be with it a Convoy of Horſe and Foot, ſtrong or weak, according as occaſion ſeems to require. And of Convoys for Baggage I ſhall ſay theſe few things in general: In them theſe Horſemen who are not very well mounted, may well enough be employed, but no men are to be ſet there, whether of Foot or Horſe, that are ſick, lame, or wounded, for that were to betray both them and the Baggage to an enemy. When Convoys are put to fight for defence of their Charge, as many times they are, (for the deſire of booty ſpurs men to deſperate attempts) they ſhould (if conveniently they can) caſt themſelves within the Waggons and Carts drawn up round for that purpoſe, from whence Muſqueteers may do notable ſervice, and out of which retrenchment the *Horſe* may as they ſee occaſion, make handſome Sallies. If they cannot get this done, they ſhould be ſure to put as much of the Baggage, or all of it, if they may, between them and their own Army, and themſelves between the Baggage and the enemy, whether he fall out to be in the Van, or in the Reer. Sometimes if the danger appear to be both before and behind, the Baggage marches in the middle of the Infantry, and though ſome be of the opinion, that the Baggage ſhould ſtill follow the Artillery, yet that doth not, nor cannot hold in all caſes and emergencies, the marching of both Armies and Baggage many times depending on contingents, of which no determinate rule can be given.

Baggage ſhould have Convoys of Horſe and Foot.

The way to regulate Baggage is to appoint under a ſevere penalty that no Company, Troop or Regiment ſhall have more Waggons, Carts, or Baggage-horſes than ſuch a ſet number already order'd by the Prince, or his General, which ſhould be as few as may be, with full power to the Waggon-maſter General to make all that is over that number, prize, with an abſolute command to all Colonels to aſſiſt him in caſe of oppoſition. In the former Diſcourſes we have ſeen that the *Grecians* and *Romans* to free themſelves as much as was poſſible, of this great Embarras of Baggage, loaded their Soldiers like Mules and Aſſes; this perhaps did ſuit thoſe times, better than it would do ours. But moſt of our Modern allowances for Carriages of an Armies Baggage hath been in the other extream. I ſhall inſtance four.

The number of Waggons, Carts and Baggage-Horſes ſhould be determined.

The *Swediſh* Kings and their Generals allow ten Waggons to every Troop of *Horſe*, and two to every Company of Foot, and a Sutlers Waggon to every one of

of them, ſometimes two to a Troop of *Horſe*, beſides the Waggons allowed to the field and Staff-officers of Regiments. Let us then ſuppoſe that the Cavalry of an Army conſiſts of five thouſand *Horſe*, and theſe divided into a hundred Troops, and fifty *Horſe* in a Troop were thought fair in the *German* War. Theſe hundred Troops had for themſelves a thouſand Waggons, and a hundred for their Sutlers. Model theſe hundred Troops in twelve Regiments, and allow for every Regiment ſtaff eight Waggons, you are to have ninety ſix Waggons more, add theſe ninety ſix to the other eleven hundred, the Waggons of your Cavalry (beſides Coaches) amount to eleven hundred ninety ſix. Let there be an Infantry of nine thouſand men join'd to this Cavalry, let it be divided into fifteen Regiments, and each Regiment into eight Companies, there will be a hundred and twenty Companies, for every Company two Waggons are allowed, and one for the Sutler, theſe are three for a Company, *inde* for a hundred and twenty Companies three hundred and ſixty Waggons; for the Staff of every Regiment allow eight Waggons, *inde* for fifteen Regiments a hundred and twenty Waggons, add a hundred and twenty to three hundred and ſixty, you have four hundred and eighty Waggons for the Infantry, beſides Coaches. Add 480 to 1196, the Waggons of the Cavalry, the total of Waggons for both amounts to 1676, you may ſafely allow to the general perſons of this Army at leaſt a 120 Coaches and Waggons, and then you have 1796; beſides all theſe numbers of Waggons belonging to the Train of Artillery, and the Proviant, I have ſeen in a *German* Army that exceeded not 6000 Horſe and Foot, not ſo few as 900 Waggons.

Swediſh allowance of Waggons.

My ſecond inſtance ſhall be of the *Dane*, and ſome *German* Princes, whoſe allowance is ſomewhat leſs than the *Swedes*.

Dane and *Germans*.

The third of the Emperour, who allows more Waggons to both Horſe and Foot than the *Swede* doth, and that is needleſs.

Emperours.

My fourth Inſtance ſhall be of the *French* allowance, not of our times, but Fifty years ago, for four of the Genſd'arms Baggage a Waggon was appointed; *inde* 25 Waggons for 100 men at Arms. The light armed were allowed no Waggons, but were appointed to carry their ſtuff on Horſeback; and how many Horſes were allowed them for that uſe, I find it not ſpecified; but we may make a conjecture, when we ſee how many were allowed to the Foot: In the time of *Henry* the Great, who died about ſixty years ago, one Horſe was allowed to carry the Baggage of four Souldiers: hence we may conclude, that a horſe was allowed for the Baggage of two Light-horſemen, or of Archers; ſo for Infantry of 10000 men, beſides Officers, 2500 Baggage horſes were allowed. Beſides, a Gudget or Boy was allowed to ſerve two Soldiers, *inde* for 10000 Souldiers, 5000 Gudgets, the very Vermine of an Army. Theſe horſes and Boys, did, no doubt, very unneceſſarily deſtroy both Proviant and Fodderage. And yet *Louis de Montgomery* in his *Milice Francoiſe*, approves of this allowance. But the *French*, now, of all other people puts the greateſt reſtraint on their Baggage: And indeed, if *Montgomery* had liv'd till my time, I could have let him ſee one hundred *French* Souldiers, whoſe Baggage (except the Clothes on their backs) might all have been carried in a Handkerchief. And though I joyn freely with him in his opinion, that the Souldiers ſhould not carry ſuch burthens as the *Romans* did of old, yet I would have neither Horſe nor Boy allowed to them; It is too much, that the bad Cuſtom of later times, hath eas'd moſt of them of the burthen of defenſive arms, and therefore every one of them both may, and ſhould carry his own Knapſack and four or five days proviſion of meat; with a Hatchet at his girdle, which laſt I ſee too much neglected, on this ſide of the Sea: in ſo much as where an Infantry comes to encamp, if it be for one night, or two, or more, the Souldiers muſt make uſe of their Swords, for cutting down branches of Trees, and to cleave Wood, either for making their Huts, or for fire; indeed I know not for what moſt of their Swords ſerve, being for moſt part ſo extreamly baſe, yet aſſuredly Hatchets were more proper for thoſe uſes, I have ſpoke of, than their Ammunition blades, which can hardly cut any thing. But ſuch an allowance of Boys and Horſes, were in faſhion in *France*, long before *Louis de Montgomery's* time: for I find ſome in Records of the Civil Wars, the Proteſtants did retrench theſe allowances,

French allowance of Waggons and Horſes fifty years ago,

Much retrenched.

A Souldier may carry his own luggage.

Allowance of Boys to ſerve Soldiers out of uſe,

when their Souldiers were Garriſon'd; for then it is ſaid, four of them had but one Gudget allow'd them to wait on them, and a whole company of them, were but allow'd ſix horſes for their Baggage, and indeed I think both theſe were too many for them in the field, in Garriſon they needed none of them. Though you allow every Souldier two pound of Bread and Cheeſe every day, and God knows, he gets not ſo much many times in four days: ſuppoſe he hath a couple of Shirts, a pair of Stockins, and a pair of Shoos in his Knapſack, (and how many Souldiers have all theſe?) and a Hatchet; I ſay, all theſe will not weigh ſo much as a Head-piece, and a Corſlet, and therefore he may well enough be obliged to carry them.

As not neceſſary.

Every Regiment, whether of horſe or foot, ſhould have a Waggon or a Baggage-maſter, and where the eſtabliſhment of the Prince doth allow him no pay, the Colonel ſhould order a ſufficient Serjeant or Corporal to exerciſe that Office by turns, theſe are to ſee that every Officers Baggage, from the higheſt to the loweſt, march according to the Dignity and Precedency of him to whom it belongs, whether it be carried on Waggons, Carts, or Horſes. But theſe Regiment Baggage-maſters are not to ſuffer the Baggage of the Regiments to march, till they have received their Directions from the Waggon-maſter General, when, and in what manner it ſhall be done. This Waggon-maſter General's charge is exceeding toylſome, when an Army marcheth. Every night after the Army comes to Quarter, and every morning before it march, he muſt attend the Major Generals of the Cavalry, and Infantry, and receive his Orders from them, if the whole Army march together; but if the Cavalry march apart, then the Major General of the foot gives the Waggon-maſter his inſtructions, particularly a liſt, in what order the Army is to march, for ordinarily, Regiments and Brigades change by turns, and their Baggage muſt march in that ſame order, that themſelves do: the Waggon-maſter having got his liſt, he accordingly orders the Regiment Baggage-maſters (who are obliged to wait on him every morning) to cauſe their luggage march, wherein they may not fail; for (unleſs ſome extraordinary occaſion alters it,) the Prince, or in his abſence, the Commander in Chief his Coach, or Coaches, with his Waggons go firſt, then the whole Train of Artillery behind it, the Coaches and Waggons of all the general Officers according to their dignity: after them, the Waggons of that Brigad, that hath the Van for that day, and ſo all the reſt in order, according as the Regiments or Brigades march. If any Waggons or Baggage-horſes preſs to be before theſe, behind whom the Waggon-maſter General hath ordered them to march, he may ſafely make prize of them, owe them who will. When the Waggons come to a Heath, or a Champaign field, the Waggon-maſter ſhould order the Waggons to draw up two, four, or five in rank, and to drive in that order, ſo long as the ground permits them to do ſo, and this ſaves time, and makes diſpatch, and when they come to ſtrait ground, they are to fall off, by the right hand, in that order wherein they were before. The ſame courſe he is to take with Baggage horſes. This Baggage-maſter General is allowed to have two Lieutenants; ſo that if the Army march three ſeveral ways, (as ſometimes it doth) himſelf and his two Deputies ſerve to marſhal the Baggage of all the three. If the Army is divided into two, or the Cavalry march alone, one of his Lieutenants goes along with the Horſe, the other ſtays with himſelf, and he is conſtantly to be there where the General of the Army and Train of Artillery either marcheth, or quartereth.

Waggon-maſter General,

His Toyle.

The order how the Baggage of an Army marcheth.

Waggon-maſter hath Deputies.

Many times Waggons are commanded to be burnt and deſtroyed; ſometimes all the Women and moſt of the Baggage are left behind at ſome Garriſon and fortified place, or with the Body of the Infantry and Artillery when expedition calls away all the Horſe, Dragoons, and as many Foot as are able to march luſtily. In ſome of theſe occaſions, Officers go fair to loſe their Waggons, and ſome of their moveables.

Women following an Army divided into three Claſſes. Firſt.

Women who follow an Army may be ordered (if they can be ordered) in three ranks, or rather in Claſſes, one below another. The firſt ſhall be of thoſe who are Ladies, and are the Wives of the General and other principal Commanders of the Army, who for moſt part are carried in Coaches; but thoſe Coaches muſt drive according to the quality of them to whom the Ladies belong,

long, and as the Baggage of their Husbands is appointed to march by the Waggon-maſter General. The ſecond Claſſe is of thoſe who ride on Horſeback, and theſe muſt ride in no other place than where the Baggage of the Regiment to whom they belong, marcheth, but they are very oft extravagant, gadding here and there, and therefore in ſome places they are put in Companies, and have one or more to command and over-ſee them, and theſe are called in *Germany*, *Hureweibles*, Rulers or Marſhals of the Whores. I have ſeen them ride, keep Troop, rank and file very well, after that Captain of theirs who led them, and a Banner with them, which one of the Women carried. The third Claſſe is of thoſe who walk on foot, and are the wives of inferiour Officers and Souldiers; theſe muſt walk beſides the Baggage of the ſeveral Regiments to whom they belong, and over them the ſeveral Regiment-Marſhals have inſpection. As woman was created to be a helper to man, ſo women are great helpers in Armies to their husbands, eſpecially thoſe of the lower condition, neither ſhould they be raſhly baniſht out of Armies, ſent away they may be ſometimes for weighty conſiderations; they provide, buy and dreſs their husbands meat when their husbands are on duty, or newly come from it, they bring in fewel for fire, and waſh their linnens, and in ſuch manner of employments a Souldiers wife may be helpful to others, and gain money to her husband and her ſelf; eſpecially they are uſeful in Camps and Leaguers, being permitted (which ſhould not be refuſed them) to go ſome miles from the Camp to buy Victuals and other Neceſſaries. At the long Siege of *Breda* made by *Spinola*, it was obſerv'd that the married Souldiers fared better, look'd more vigorouſly, and were able to do more duty than the Batchellors; and all the ſpite was done the poor women, was to be called their husbands mules, by thoſe who would have been glad to have had ſuch mules themſelves. Among all theſe kinds of Women in well order'd Armies, there are none but thoſe who are married. If there be any elſe, upon examination made by the Miniſter, Prieſt, or Conſiſtory, they are put away with ignominy, at leaſt ſhould be conformable to all Articles of War.

Second.

Third.

Women helpful to their Husbands in Armies,

Uſeful in Camps.

But a ſtrange ſtory is writ by good Authors of that famous Duke of *Alva*, whoſe name is yet ſo hateful to moſt of the *Netherlands*. They ſay at that time he marched from *Italy* to the *Low-Countries*, to reduce them to the obedience of his Maſter the King of *Spain*, a permiſſion was given to Courtizans to follow his Army, but they were to ride in Troops with Banners. They had their ſeveral Capitaneſſes and Alfieras, or ſhe-Cornets, and other Officers, who kept among them an exact Diſcipline in all points that concern'd their profeſſion: They were divided into ſeveral Squadrons according to their quality, and that was diſtinguiſht no otherwiſe but by the difference of their beauties, faces, and features. Thoſe of the beſt ſort were permitted only to traffick with men of the higheſt quality, thoſe of the ſecond rank with Commanders of great note, thoſe of the third with Officers of a lower condition, and thoſe of the fourth degree with Officers who were of the meaneſt quality, and Souldiers, whom thoſe of the other three ranks rejected. An excellent Commonwealth! where it was prohibited under all grievous pains, not to ſuffer themſelves to be Courted by any either above or below the rank wherein they were placed, and that was impartially done according to the Talent nature had beſtowed upon them; ſo that every common Souldier, inferior perſon, or low Officer, Enſign, Captain, Colonel, or General Commander knew to whom they might addreſs themſelves, and from whom they might buy repentance. A practice which I ſuppoſe never had a Precedent in either Chriſtian or Pagan Army, and which with an impudent face loudly cry'd defyance to both Religion and Moral honeſty.

A ſtrange ſtory of Courtizans.

An abominable Commonwealth.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the March of an Army.

A careleſs march the ruin of an Army.

IF there be any confuſion in the march of an Army, or that the right ordering it be neglected by general perſons in appointing every Regiment or Brigade its own place, with the Train of Artillery and Baggage, or that Colonels, Majors and Captains be careleſs to obey their orders in their march, and ſuffer their Souldiers to run, ſtraggle, and lag behind, it not only gives an enemy a wiſhed advantage, but is enough of it ſelf to ruin an Army even without the help of an enemy. In a march an Army may be ſurprized in paſſing a River, whether that be by Foord, Bridg or Boat, or when it marcheth thorough marſh grounds, or cloſe Countries, when it aſcends or deſcends Hills; to all theſe inconveniences a careful General ſhould advert, and according to the Intelligence he hath, either he is to advance his march ſpeedily to gain a paſs or advantage of ground, or ſtop his march, and encamp and fortifie, and if nothing elſe will help, he ſhould draw up in Battel, either fronting that ſame way as he was marching, or facing about to fight the enemy, whether he be in his front or reer, and let God diſpoſe of the Victory as ſeems good in his eyes.

An Army may march in three ſeveral manners:

Our Modern Armies have marched, and do ſtill march one of three ſeveral ways, theſe are firſt by dividing an Army into three ſeveral Bodies, Van-guard, Battel, and Arrier-guard; ſecondly, by marching in two diſtinct Bodies, as they uſe to fight, and theſe are commonly called Battel and Reſerve. Thirdly, all in one Battel, whereby is meant the half of the Cavalry in the Van, the other half in the Reer, and the Foot between them. To clear all theſe three ways of marching, let us ſuppoſe our Army to conſiſt of ſix Brigades of Horſe, and eight of Foot. Theſe are divided after the firſt way thus: In the Van-guard three Brigades of Horſe, and out of theſe a ſtrong party of three or four hundred Horſe to go before to ſearch the ways, and diſcover. That party ſhould be about one *Engliſh* mile before the three Brigades of Horſe, and out of it ſhould be ſmall parties ſent out about half an *Engliſh* mile, which ſhould conſtantly acquaint the great party, and it the Brigades behind, and ſo from hand to hand, till the Intelligence of all they learn, comes to the General. After theſe forlorn Troops of *H*orſe follow commanded Muſqueteers, with Pioneers to ſmooth and make plain the ways for the Artillery, whether it be by cutting Trees or hedges, or filling hollow grounds or Ditches. After the three Brigades of *H*orſe follow ſome Field-pieces, ſuppoſe the half of thoſe that are with the Army, and ſome Waggons loaded with Ammunition; immediately after them march two Brigades of Foot, theſe are follow'd by the Baggage of the whole Van-guard, and behind it a commanded party of *H*orſe and Foot; ſo you ſee this Van-guard is a petty Army of it ſelf. In the next place comes the Battel, in this order: Firſt, two Brigades of Foot, after them the Prince or his General in perſon, attended with the Guard of his Body, and Servants; behind theſe the General or Colonel of the Artillery, who is followed by the great Ordnance, and whole Train of Artillery; after it cometh in due order, the Baggage belonging to the General Officers, and to all the four Brigades which compoſe the Battel; in the Reer whereof march two more Brigades of Foot, and theſe ſometimes are brought up by a party of *H*orſe. After the Battel comes the Reerguard of our Army, and that is the Reverſe of the Van-guard, for firſt marcheth its Baggage with a commanded party of *H*orſe and Foot, next follow two Brigades of Foot, then ſome Field-pieces; behind them, the other three Brigades of *H*orſe, who have a party behind them at the diſtance at leaſt of one *Engliſh* mile, to give them advertiſement if an enemy be following. And this is the firſt, and a very commendable manner of the march of an Army. But obſerve to make the greater expedition, eſpecially if an Army be numerous, theſe three

First manner in three Bodies.

Van-guard.

Battel.

Reer-guard.

three great Bodies may march three ſeveral ways if the Country conveniently afford them, and this makes a ſpeedy march; but in this caſe the Battel muſt have two Brigades of *Horſe* which it had not before, and conſequently the Van guard, and Reer-guard, each of them but two, whereas by our former marſhalling each of them had three; when they divide, they are appointed to meet at ſuch a time and place as the General ſhall appoint, whether that be every night, or every third, fourth or fifth night; this is done when an enemy is not near. The Commander in chief marcheth and lodgeth conſtantly with the Body of the Infantry and the Artillery. And theſe great Officers who command the Van-guard and Arrier-guard, have Majors attending them every day and night, beſides Ordinance-*Horſemen*, to receive their Directions, and bring them ſpeedily to them in regard ſome new intelligence may rationally move them to alter the manner of the march, or any Orders they gave concerning it.

Theſe three Bodies may march three ſeveral ways.

The ſecond manner of the march of an Army is in two Bodies, Battel and Reſerve. You will be pleaſed to remember that the Army we now ſpeak of conſiſts of ſix Brigades of *Horſe*, and eight of Foot, which I thus order: In the Battel ſhall firſt march 400 commanded *Horſe*, who ſhall have a ſmaller party before them to diſcover; next them Pioneers or Country people with a party of Muſqueteers or Fire-locks to plain the ways, then four Brigades of *Horſe*: Next them, Field-pieces, then three Brigades of Foot; after them the Prince, or he who commands by his authority, the General or Colonel of the Artillery follows; after whom comes the great Ordnance, and whole Train, which is followed by the Coaches and Waggons belonging to the General, and all the other General Officers; after them comes the Baggage belonging to all the Brigades of the Battel, in that ſame order that the Brigades themſelves march; after which come two Brigades of Foot, and then a party of *Horſe* brings up the reer of the Battel.

Second manner in two Bodies.

Battel.

The Reſerve follows in this order: Firſt, a Commanded party of *Horſe* and Foot, then the whole Baggage that belongs to the Reſerve; next to it Field-pieces with their Waggons of Ammunition, after them three Brigades of Foot, and then two Brigades of *Horſe*, about one *Engliſh* mile behind them, follows the Reer-guard of Commanded Horſe. Theſe two great bodies for expedition ſake, may likewiſe march two ſeveral ways, (if the General have no apprehenſion of an enemy) and join, when he gives order for it. Obſerve when an enemy is in the reer, the Battel is the Reſerve, and the Reſerve is the Battel, and conſequently more Brigades ſhould be in the Reer than in the Van, and in the Reer at ſuch an occaſion, the Commander in chief of the Army ſhould be.

Reſerve.

Theſe two Bodies may march two ſeveral ways.

The third manner of an Armies march, is when it neither marcheth in two nor three diſtinct Bodies, but in one intire Body, which is frequently practiſed; let me then once more refreſh your memory by telling you our Army conſiſts of ſix Brigades of Horſe, and eight of Foot. Three Brigades of Horſe march firſt, and make the Van-guard, theſe have before them commanded Horſe, Pioneers, and Muſqueteers as the others had. Then follow four Brigades of Foot, the General after them, next him the General of the Artillery, with his whole Train, after it marcheth the other four Brigades of Foot, and theſe eight Brigades of Foot compoſe the Battel of the Army; the other three Brigades of Horſe make the Reer-guard, behind which at a miles diſtance follows a ſtrong party of commanded Horſe. The Baggage may be in the Van, or the Reer, or if the General apprehend danger in them both, it may march immediately after the Train. This great Body may be very ſoon divided into either two or three ſeveral ones, and may march as many ſeveral ways as the General pleaſeth.

Third manner in one Body.

May be divided eaſily into ſeveral Bodies.

But truly with ſubmiſſion to great Commanders I ſhould be of opinion, that the Baggage of an Army ſhould never be divided, unleſs the Army it ſelf divides: if danger be in the Van, let it all ſtay in the Reer, the proper place of Baggage; if the enemy be expected in the Reer, poſt away all the Baggage to the Van; if in both, neceſſity will force it to be in the middle of the Army. But my humble opinion is, that without apparent danger it ſhould conſtantly be in the Reer of the whole Army, for the diſadvantage is but ſmall that the Brigades or Regiments of the Van have (and withal they have but their turns of it) that they muſt wait very long at night till their Baggage come from the Reer: It is but

The proper place of Baggage in a march.

but ſmall, I ſay, if you compare it with the great prejudice the Prince or States ſervice ſuffers, by having the Regiments or Brigades which march in the Reer benighted, being hinder'd by the Baggage that is order'd to march before them, two, three, ſometimes five hours, whereas if that Baggage had not been in their way, they might have reach'd their Quarter ſeaſonably enough. But there is a worſe thing in it than that, when upon the unexpected appearance of an enemy in the Van, the Brigades that are in the Reer-guard being ſuddenly call'd up, they are not able to advance for the unavoidable Embarras of Baggage that is before them. Indeed I think the middle or center of the Infantry a proper place for the great Guns, and Train, and the Generals Secretaries, and Cabinets with his Papers, and for moſt of his, and ſome of the other General Officers Coaches, eſpecially if their Ladies be in them, and there I think theſe ſhould conſtantly march. But my judgment is, that all other Baggage whatſoever belonging to either Horſe or Foot ſhould be in the Reer, according to that priority or precedency the Regiments or Brigades have themſelves in the march, and theſe ſhould change every day, that who is in the Van one day, may be in the Reer the next, that all may participate equally of the eaſe or toil of a march.

Where the ſick and wounded ſhould be.

What is ſpoke of the place where Baggage ſhould march, is to be underſtood alſo of the ſick and wounded Soldiers, who if they cannot be put in ſome ſecure or fortified place, ſhould be brought forward, though Baggage-horſes ſhould be borrowed from the owners for that uſe, and in time of danger ſhould be ſent as far from it, as may be with a good Guard or Convoy.

When ground will permit the Brigades of an Army, whether Horſe or Foot to march in one breaſt or front, there is a queſtion, what diſtance or interval ſhould be kept between theſe Brigades. There be ſome, who theoretically argue, that the diſtance between two Brigades, (both marching in breaſt, but the one behind the other) ſhould be of as much ground, as a Brigade drawn up in front doth poſſeſs; becauſe, ſay they, when one Brigade is drawn up on the right hand of a large field, where the whole Army is to be marſhal'd, the ſecond Brigade which follows, cannot draw up in full breaſt on the left hand of the firſt, unleſs there be ſuch an Interval between them on their march, as that I juſt now told you of; nor can the third draw up on the left hand of the ſecond, unleſs it have that ſame diſtance: the like is to be ſaid of all the reſt.

Diſtance between Brigades on a march, ſhould not be ſo great as when they are to fight.

To this I anſwer, when an Army is marſhal'd in Battel-order, that diſtance is to be kept between Brigades, whereof I ſpoke in the laſt Chapter, and ſo the ſecond will have the leſs difficulty to marſhal it ſelf on the left hand of the firſt: But that cannot make me allow ſo much ground between Brigades on a march, as I willingly do, when they are to fight. To the reaſon produced againſt it, I ſay, to think that a Brigade, all in one breaſt, and marching directly behind another (though at never ſo great a diſtance) can draw up in breaſt on the left hand of another, without ſome turning, or wheeling, is a meer ſpeculation. And I ſay more, let a Brigade march in three Squads, at as great a diſtance as you will, the ſecond ſhall not draw up on the left hand of the firſt, without ſome wheeling. And if a ſmaller body cannot do it, much leſs can a greater. And practice will ſhew the vanity of the other opinion, to any who will be at the pains to examine it, and obſerve it in the march of Brigades in the field, as I have done oftner than once. This opinion then vaniſheth, unleſs they who follow it, bring a better reaſon for it, which I have not yet heard. But be pleaſed to take notice, what an inconvenience, and that no ſmall one, the obſerving this rule will bring along with it in a march (I ſpeak ſtill when Brigades march all in one front, one behind another) at that rate there ſhall be ſuch a vaſt diſtance between the Van and the Reer, that the laſt Brigade, ſhall not get up (though it run, which it ſhould not do) to the place where it ſhould be marſhal'd, but in a very long time, which you will eaſily grant to be true, if you will with me make this computation: We have ſpoke of eight Brigades of foot in this Chapter, to be in our Army, each of them ſhall be no ſtronger than 1800 men, and therefore each of them muſt be 300 in front, allowing four foot to every Leader; theſe 300 Leaders poſſeſs in rank 1200 foot of ground, as much (by this opinion which I combate) muſt be allowed for an Interval between two Brigades marching one after another, in breaſt; now in eight Brigades there are ſeven Intervals, ſeven times 1200 foot make 8400: Every one of the Brigades poſſeſs in deepneſs

The contrary opinion examin'd.

36 foot,

36 foot, multiply 36 by 8 (which is the number of the Brigades) the product is 288. Add 288 to 8400, the aggregate is 8688 foot; ſo much diſtance there is from the Leaders of the firſt Brigade of Foot, to the Bringers-up of the eight and laſt. Take a view of our ſix Brigades of Horſe, each whereof ſhall conſiſt of no more than 600, being three deep, each Brigade hath 200 in front, allow but three foot for every Rider, the front of each Brigade poſſeſſeth 600 foot of ground; as much muſt every Interval between Brigades have: now in ſix Brigades there are 5 Intervals, 5 times 600 make 3000, allow for three ranks and two Intervals in every Brigade marching in breaſt, 36 foot, and multiply 36 by 6 (which is the number of the Brigades) the product is 216; add 216 to 3000, the aggregate is 3216 add that to 8688, the aggregate is 11904; divide this number by 5, to make paces, the Quotient will be 2380 paces and four foot; this will be two *Italian* miles, and more than one third between the firſt rank of the Cavalry, and the laſt rank of it; the Infantry marching in the middle, a thing intollerable, that there ſhould be ſo vaſt a diſtance between the Front and Reer of an Army of 18000 Horſe and Foot, marching in Brigades, and every Brigade marching in breaſt, and neither piece of Ordnance, Waggon or Baggage-horſe among them.

And found inconvenient.

An intollerable diſtance.

And this leads me to another ſpeculation, which is, that all who have the conduct of Armies, ſhould in a march allow as little Interval between either greater or ſmaller Bodies, as poſſible may be, in regard, Woods, Waters, Paſſes, cloſe Countries, Straits, and narrow ways, will make a greater diſtance between the Vans, and Reers of their Armies, than is in their power to make leſs. To verifie which, let us ſuppoſe with *Bockler*, a late *German* Author, that 10000 Foot and 1000 Horſe are upon a march, where the Foot may march ten in breaſt, and the Horſe five; and have only ten half Cannon, with Powder and Bullets for one day, and only ſome neceſſary Baggage with them; he paſſeth his word, to us, that this little Army when it is marching ſhall take up of ground between Van and Reer 28000 foot; this is more than five *Italian* miles, and one half. I have a little examined the computation, and I believe his reckoning to be right.

Diſtance between Van and Reer of an Army marching.

But, if you pleaſe, let us not truſt his word, but try our ſelves, what diſtance there may be between the Van of an Army, conſiſting of 15000 Foot, and 3000 Horſe, with which ſhall be no more Ordnance than ten Demi-cannon, and twenty Field-pieces; and a leſs Train, if any, you cannot allow to an Army of 18000 fighting men. And with this Army we ſhall ſuffer no more Waggons to be than 1200 for carrying all the Ammunition, Inſtruments for Fortification and Artillery, Proviant and Baggage belonging to the General Officers, and the whole Horſe and Foot, whereas twice that number may be well enough allowed; and to make the diſtance the leſs, we ſhall allow but two horſes for every Waggon, without having any regard to Coaches, or great Ruſt-Waggons (drawn ordinarily by ſix horſes,) whereof there be but too many in every Army. Let us imagin we march not in a Champaign, but in a cloſe Country, yet not ſo cloſe, but the Horſe ſhall march five in breaſt, and the Foot ten, and there be many ways, which will not permit ſo much; and to ſpare ground, I ſhall allow no Intervals between Regiments or Brigades of Foot, only Intervals between Diviſions ſhall be allowed, and no Interval at all between either Regiments or Diviſions of the Cavalry ſhall be allowed, but the whole 3000 ſhall march five in breaſt all in one row.

Inſtanced in an Army of 18000 men.

The Foot being ſix deep, and ten in front, will march 60 men in each Diviſion. We muſt ſee how many ſuch Diviſions will be in 15000 men. To know this, divide 15000 by 60, the Quotient will be 250, ſo you have 250 diviſions; allow, as you muſt, 36 foot for the 6 ranks of every Diviſion, that is 6 foot for the ranks to ſtand on, and 30 foot for the 5 Intervals; therefore you muſt multiply 250 by 36 (which is the number of your Diviſions) and the product will be 9000. For an Interval between two Diviſions I ſhall only allow 12 foot, whereas many allow 18; now there be 249 Intervals, multiply therefore 249 by 12, the product is 2988. Add 2988 to 9000, the aggregate is 11988: And ſo many foot of ground muſt 15000 Foot have from Van to Reer, when they march ten in breaſt.

15000 Foot marching ten in front or breaſt.

3000 horſe marching five in Breaſt.

Being our 3000 Horſe are to march five in breaſt, you are to divide 3000 by 5, and the Quotient will be 600, ſo you have 600 ranks, we muſt allow every Rider ten foot for the length of his Horſe, multiply then 600 by 10, the Product is 6000. Ordinarily a Horſes length is allow'd for an Interval between ranks of Horſe; but becauſe we would march cloſe, we ſhall allow but the half of that, to wit, five foot: now there be in 600 ranks 599 Intervals, multiply then 599 by 5, the Product will be 2995. Add 2995 to 6000, the aggregate is 8995, ſo many foot of ground 3000 Horſe take up in their marching five in breaſt.

Ten Demi-Cannondrawn one after another,

We have ten Demi-cannon which ſhoot each of them a bullet of 24 pound at leaſt, each of them ſhall weigh no more but 4400 pound of metal, though the *Germans* allow more than 5000. Allow then one Horſe to draw 250 pound of this Piece, you ſhall need 18 Horſes at leaſt to draw one Demi-cannon, with her Carriage, Leaver, Sponge and Laddle, theſe 18 Horſes being coupled, make nine couple; allow then for nine couple of Horſes, for the length of the Piece and her Carriage 110 foot, and it will be little enough: multiply then 110 by 10 (which is the number of your Demi-cannon) the Product is 1100, ſo much ground they muſt have when they are drawn one after another, and here is no allowance for diſtance between them, nor ſhall we give any between the 20 Field-pieces, but ſhall allow each of them to be drawn by two Horſes, nor ſhall we give more ground to the Horſes, Piece and Carriage than 20 foot, that is for all the twenty 400 foot.

And twenty Field-pieces.

1200 Waggons drawn one after another.

Our 1200 Waggons will take up much ground, nor is it poſſible to help it. Nor can we allow leſs ground for a Waggon drawn with two Horſes, and a convenient diſtance between it and the Waggon which follows it, than 22 foot, multiply then 1200 by 22, the Product will be 26400, ſo much ground require twelve hundred Waggons when they are drawn one after another.

The Foot then require 11988 foot, the Horſe 8995, the Demi-cannon 1100, the Field-pieces 400, the Wagons 26400, add theſe numbers together, the aggregate will be 48883. Theſe make in paces 9776, and three foot, about nine *Italian* miles, and three quarters. If you ſuſpect I have caſt up a wrong account, be pleaſed to work your ſelf, and mend it at your pleaſure.

By this you may ſee if the Army be ſtronger than this of ours, as many be, or the Train greater, as indeed it ſhould be, or your Waggons more numerous, as aſſuredly they will be, or the way narrower, as for moſt part it chanceth to be: you may ſee, I ſay, how many miles may be between your Front and your Reer. And indeed, though the Train of Artillery, by the ſticking of great Guns and Pot-pieces in deep, dirty, or clay ground, give no retardment to the march, as frequently it doth; or that an Army meet with no extraordinary encumbrances, as happily it may: yet it will be no marvel to ſee the Van at the head quarter, before the Reer-guard be march'd out of their laſt nights Leaguer, though the march be fourteen or fifteen *Engliſh* miles long, and therefore there is good reaſon to allow as little diſtance or Interval between ſeveral bodies or batallions as may be, and to divide an Army into two, three or more bodies, and march ſeveral ways to make the greater expedition, when it may be done ſafely, and without danger of an enemy, and if he be in your Reer, and that you intend not to fight, dividing, ſo you keep good order, facilitates your Retreat.

A cloſe march the beſt, and ſecureſt.

The two Princes of *Orange*, *Maurice* and *Henry*, both of them excellent Captains, order'd that in a march, when one Regiment was divided into two great Partitions, there ſhould be no more but fifty foot of diſtance between them, and only eighty foot between one Regiment and another. Theſe Princes cauſed their Armies to march (according to ancient cuſtom) in three great Bodies, Van-guard, Battel, and Reer-guard, and thoſe they called *Terciaſ*, or *Terſos*, a *Spaniſh* word which ſignifies *Thirds*, and ſo the *Spaniards* called their Regiments of old, and for any thing I know they do ſo ſtill. Theſe *Terſos* of the Princes of *Orange* were indeed grand Brigades, and theſe had Majors, who were call'd Majors of the Brigades beſides Majors of Regiments.

And

And in a march the Princes allowed no greater diſtance between theſe great bodies, but an hundred, or a hundred and twenty foot at moſt. And herein they did not quadrate with the opinion of ſome of our modern Captains, who will have as great a diſtance between Brigades as the longitude of a Brigade is, which we may ſuppoſe to be very many times a thouſand foot, though ſometimes leſs; and conſequently if there be ten ſuch Brigades of Foot, the very nine Intervals between the ten Brigades takes up nine thouſand foot, near two *Italian* miles, and therefore if the way be not very broad, there will be ſeveral miles between the Van and the Reer of the Infantry; but the reaſons brought by thoſe that are of this judgment may be demonſtrated to be but weak by a viſible practice.

To march over a Paſs, or a Strait,

When an Army is to go over a Paſs, a Water, or a Bridg, the whole Bodies of it ſhould be order'd to march very cloſe, loſing ſomething of their ordinary diſtances, that one Brigade or Batallion being paſt, another may immediately follow without intermiſſion. Captain *Rud* the late Kings Engineer, a very worthy perſon, ſays at the paſſing a ſtrait an Army ſhould make an halt, and draw up in battel, and then paſs over ſo many in breaſt as the place will permit, and when they are all over, draw up again before they march. For the laſt part I ſhall agree with him, for no ſooner ſhould any Forlorn-hope, Troop, Company, or Regiment be over a Paſs, but they ſhould draw up in Battel till ſome others be over, and if there be not ground enough, they ſhould advance by little and little, till they find a more ſpacious field, where they may draw up in breaſt, and expect the reſt; or if he mean that every particular Regiment or Brigade ſhould draw on that ſide of the ſtrait which it is to paſs, till the Reer of that Regiment or Brigade come up, and then begin their march over: I ſhall yet agree with him, but for a Van of an Army to ſtay till the Reer come up, before it begin to paſs a ſtrait, is a great loſs of time, which in the march of an Army is very precious; for in an Army but of an indifferent ſtrength, that halt ſhall be the ſpace of at leaſt four hours, and this furniſheth an opportunity to an enemy to oppoſe the paſſage, or wait his advantages on the other ſide of the ſtrait, with more force, policy, and deliberation.

And not loſe time.

CHAP. XX.

Of Quartering, Encamping, and Modern Caſtrametation. Of the Quarter-maſter General, and of the Quarter-maſter of the General Staff.

THE day is far ſpent, and the Army hath march'd far, Quarter muſt be made ſomewhere, and it muſt be either in Towns, Villages, or the fields.

To Quarter in Villages.

If the Army be diſperſed in ſeveral Villages or Hamlets, it is done that it may be refreſhed for ſome ſhort time, and when there is no danger of an enemy. If it be to lodg for one night, and an enemy is near, then both Horſe and Foot ſtand in the field all night, with ſtrong Guards, Forlorn-hopes, Rounds, and Patrovilles. If an enemy be not near, ordinarily the Head-quarter is in ſome little Town or Village, and the Cavalry quarter'd round about in Hamlets; the Infantry is encamped cloſe by the Head-quarter, and if it be but to ſtay a night or two, it doth not uſually Entrench, but as the old *Grecians* did, Encamps on ſome place ſomething fortified by nature, as on a hill, or ſome defenſible aſcent, or where a river may be on one hand, and a marſh on the other, and where the place is defective, they muſt help it with Spade and Mattock, if danger is apprehended. Or if the Foot muſt lodg in a Champagn, their Waggons drawn about them will be an excellent good ſhelter againſt ſudden Infalls, and this the *Germans* call a *Wagonburg*, that is a Fortification of Waggons; and it is better than the *Roman Foſſa Tumultuaria*, in ancient times. Where ever this Night-leaguer chanceth to be, he who commands in chief, muſt be careful to chuſe ſuch a place as wants for neither wood, water nor foderage. An Alarm-place ſhould be appointed for the Horſe, in caſe their Quarters happen to be beat up in the night, as alſo a place of Rendezvouz, at which the whole Army is to meet next day, (if it be all in one Body) and at ſuch an hour as the General ſhall appoint.

To Quarter in the Field.

To Encamp, and fortifie for a long time.

The Encamping of an Army for ſome conſiderable time requires an orderly Caſtrametation and Fortification, and though it be not very ordinary, yet it hath been, and may be occaſion'd by ſeveral accidents and emergements, ſuch as theſe: When an enemy comes unexpectedly, whoſe ſtrength and deſigns are not known; when a Prince or his General thinks it not fit to hazard a Battel; when he would preſerve the Country behind him, whether it belong to the Prince himſelf, or to his friends, or that he hath won it from his enemy. When the Peſtilence or other contagious Diſeaſes rageth ſo in Towns and Villages that he dares not hazard to quarter his Army in them. When he ſuppoſeth he may deſtroy his enemy by temporizing, as *Fabius Maximus* who uſed to ſubdue his enemy more with hunger than the ſword. Or as *Saluſt* ſays, The greateſt commendation of a General is to gain the victory without blood: Or when *ratio belli*, and ſometimes, *ratio ſtatus*, makes him ſtay for more of his own forces, or thoſe of his friends and allies. This oblig'd the Great *Guſtavus* to fortifie his Leaguers, and his Armies within them at *Verben*, and at *Nuremburg*. Or laſtly, when he is to beſiege a Town, Fort, or Caſtle, which he conceives will not very ſoon render, and may rationally expect ſuccours and relief.

Reaſons for it.

Louis de Montgomerie's diſapprobation anſwered.

Being then there are ſo many, and may be more reaſons for a fortified Leagure, I cannot agree with *Louis de Montgomerie*, who will only allow of Entrenched Camps in two caſes, when an Army is near a conſiderable enemy, and when other lodging cannot be had. And he alledgeth that the *Roman* Camps and their *Hiberna*, and ſome of our fortified Leaguers would be only good in *Arabia* the Deſert, but not in a Country where Towns, Villages, and Incorporations may be had. But beſides the reaſons I have given for Entrenched Camps, I ſhall ſay to *Montgomerie*, that it is not improbable but many of theſe places where

where the *Romans* kept both their Winter and Summer Quarters were then as Deſert as *Arabia* is now; and in our time it is ordinary to take in Villages, Hamlets and Caſtles within the circuit of a fortified Camp; or if a fortified Town be either behind, or on the flank of a Camp, it adds infinitely to the ſtrength and conveniences of it, provided there be no contagion or infectious diſeaſes within that Town.

But let us ſuppoſe that which often falls out, that a Leaguer is to be planted in an open field, where no Town or Village is, and then let us ſee, how an Army can be conveniently quarter'd in it, that it be ſo capacious as to contain all is ordain'd to be within it; and next that there be no part or place of it redundant or uſeleſs, in regard it muſt be fortified, and the ſmaller circumference a fortification is of, the more tenible and defenſible it is, and the fewer men will maintain it. But before a Prince or his General form his Camp, he ſhould be obſervant of ſuch conſiderations as theſe which follow: Firſt, if he can chuſe, he ſhould not Encamp in low grounds, for theſe are unwholſome of themſelves, and will quickly be made worſe. Next, if he Encamp on a hill, it ſhould be ſuch a one as hath a river, or water running by the foot of it, and ſuch a water whoſe ſtream cannot be diverted by the enemy; for a river or deep running water doth not only ſerve the neceſſities of the Camp, but defends ſome ſide or part of it. Thirdly, he ſhould be ſure that his enemy have no fortified place or Garriſon on the ſide or flank of his Camp, much leſs behind it, which may cut off the paſſes and avenues, whereby his Proviſions ſhould come. Fourthly, he ſhould Encamp in ſuch a place where his Horſe may not want fodder, and where abundance of Hay, Straw, or growing Corn may be had, both to feed the Beaſts, and for the Soldiers to cover their Huts with, and to lye upon. Fifthly, if Woods be not near him, he ſhould lay down a way how wood may be brought to him abundantly, for fire to the Guards, for dreſſing meat, for baking and waſhing, for the uſe of the Artillery, for Palliſado's, Batteries, Platforms and Bridges. But obſerve that if a great and thick Wood be contiguous, as much of it as lyeth within ſeven or eight hundred foot of the Camp ſhould be cut down, and two or three Sconces or Redoubts built where the Trees ſtood, for preventing ambuſhes, or ſudden eruptions of an enemy. And after the Camp is planted and entrenched, the Commander in chief would order ſtrong Convoys both of Horſe and Foot, for bringing all manner of Victuals, Proviſions, and Munitions to his Camp from theſe places where he hath appointed Magazines to be kept; as alſo he ſhould appoint Guards to Convoy the empty Carts, Waggons, and Horſes back again, and cauſe his Souldiers to uſe the Country people kindly and well, and not ſuffer them to be outraged any manner of way, that thereby they may be encouraged to return the oftner.

Some Conſiderations neceſſary before Entrenching a Camp.

Magazines for Proviſions.

The defence of the Camp conſiſts in two things, the firſt is its fortification, the draught whereof is the work of the Engineer, by encloſing it within and without the Ditch with Bulwarks, Curtains, Redoubts, Sconces, half moons, and Tenailles, all which go under the General name of Trenches, which word is only proper for the Fortification of a Leaguer, and but borrowed for the Approaches to beſieged places. The ſecond Defence of the Leaguer conſiſts in its Guards, and of theſe I ſhall ſpeak in the next Chapter. The ſubject of this is the orderly diſpoſing and giving a due proportion of ground to every Regiment, Troop and Company of Horſe and Foot, whereon to pitch their Tents, or build their Huts, to the Generals Tents, to all the General Officers, to the Train of Artillery, for the Proviant-maſter and Proviant, to the Waggon-maſter and Waggons, and finally to all that belong to the Army, from the higheſt to the loweſt; and this is called *Caſtrametation*, a *Latin* word which ſignifieth the Meaſuring the Camp, for the ground muſt be proportionably given out by an equal meaſure, and the doing it is the proper work of the Quarter-maſter General.

Defence of a Camp.

What Caſtrametation is.

This Officer knowing the Generals pleaſure, is to give the ſeveral Regiments and Brigades their Towns, Villages and Hamlets for their Quarters; nor muſt any of them offer to take any other than thoſe that are aſſign'd to them by him, and therefore when the Army is to be quarter'd, though but for one night, the Regiment Quarter-maſters of the whole Army are bound to wait upon him and receive his directions; and if they be to Encamp in ſuch a Leaguer as that we

A Quarter-maſter General.

now

now ſpeak of, it is he who meaſures out to every Regiment its proportion of ground, as ſhall be preſently declared. It is he likewiſe who hath the inſpection of the old Fortifications, and the directing new ones, and for this reaſon the Engineers are properly under him, but he is to ſee the working and finiſhing of theſe Fortifications. He hath frequently a Lieutenant or Deputy under him. His Office is very honourable, for by it he ſits in all Courts and Councils of War. He ſhould be an underſtanding perſon, and a good Mathematician. The oldeſt Colonel of the *Swediſh* Army uſed to be General Quarter-maſter, but that cuſtom is worn out long ago.

His Office and Duties.

Quarter-maſter of the General Staff.

The Quarter-maſter of the General Staff is only needful at the Headquarter, and when he knows from the Quarter-maſter General, where that is, he goes thither with the fore Troops, and makes the Billets ready, chooſing out the beſt houſes for the General, and then divides the reſt among the general Officers, according to the quality of the charges they have; This Officer hath often a liſt (ſign'd by the General) of the names of many others beſides General Officers, who are to be lodged at the Headquarter, and theſe are often Colonels of foot, but more commonly ſome reformed Officers, Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and Majors, and others alſo, who have ſerved the State or Prince before, and wait on the Commander in Chief for imployment. But many times, it falls out, that there are not houſes at the Headquarter to ſerve the half of the General Officers; and in that caſe, this Officer is to divide all the Barns, Stables, Yards, Encloſures, and Hedges, as equally and proportionably, as he can, for in quartering, no man hath power to appropriate a piece of ground to himſelf. In ſuch a Camp as we are now to deſcribe, this Quarter-maſter divides the ground given by the General Quartermaſter to the General Officers according to that length and Breadth, that is allotted to every one of them, and that is more or leſs according as the perſon is of higher or lower quality.

The greater an Army is, the ſtricter and better order it ſhould keep in encamping; for unleſs it be well looked to, multitudes breed confuſion. Thoſe numerous Armies we read of under the *Aſſyrian* and *Perſian* Monarchs, had no doubt the Art of encamping; but much more, I think, are we obliged to believe, that *Moſes*, *Joſhuah*, and other Great Captains of the Iſraelites, in their forty years wanderings in the *Arabian* Wilderneſs, had the art of caſtrametation in its perfection, which I conceive was derived either by written directions or Tradition, from one Generation of that people to another, and ſo made the quartering of thoſe vaſt Armies we read of in holy writ led out to Battel by the Kings of *Iſrael* and *Judah*, eaſie to them. *Tamberlan* that famous *Tartarian* King is much commended for the excellent order he kept, and the rules he gave both for the march and Encamping that numerous Army of his conſiſting of a Million of men. And I doubt not but the *Turk* hath very good Conſtitutions for the regular Caſtrametation of thoſe multitudes of men, which uſually he leads after him. But though ſome undertake to deſcribe both his Politick and Military Government, yet they give us but a very general intelligence of the laſt, whatever they may ſeem to do concerning the firſt.

The *Iſraelites* excellent Caſtrametators;

So are the *Turks*.

Whether the Great *Cyrus* Encamped his Army as *Xenophon* ſays he did; and if he did ſo, whether he had learned it from the *Aſſyrians* or the *Perſians*, or invented it himſelf, matters not much: it is enough that it is univerſally thought to be excellent, and in the Modern Wars prefer'd to the *Roman* Caſtrametation. The manner of his Encamping (as that Author informs us) was ſhortly this: He lodged himſelf in the midſt of his Army, and in the Center of it; about him were the Guards of his perſon, and his Engines of War, ſuch as Tortoiſes, Rams, and the like, as alſo his Magazine. Without theſe were his Horſemen, and about them lodged his light armed Foot, as Slingers, Darters, and Archers, and without all theſe quarter'd his heavy-armed Foot, who ſerved for a wall (ſays our Author) to the reſt of his Army, though no doubt he had a retrenchment (when neceſſary) without them.

Cyrus his manner of Encamping,

If then a whole Army, Horſe and Foot, Train of Artillery, Magazine of Proviſions, the whole General Staff, all the Waggons and Baggage be to Encamp in one Leaguer, according to this Pattern given us by *Cyrus*, he who commands in chief ſhould lodg in the center of the Army, and his Guards next him: about him the General Officers, Train of Artillery, Magazine of Proviant, and Waggons;

Imitated in our Modern Caſtrametation.

gons; without all theſe the Cavalry, whether they be Curiaſſiers, or Harquebuſiers; and without them the Infantry, which ought to be neareſt the Rampart, as fitteſt to maintain it, and ſooneſt ready to run to the Parapet of the Wall or Gates of the Camp, till the Horſemen have time given them to ſaddle and bridle their Horſes.

But before the Quarter-maſter General begin to meaſure out the Camp, it will be fitting that the General by Trumpet and Drum make his pleaſure known in theſe particulars: That none preſume to come near the Quarter-maſter General, while he is doing his Duty, but Quarter-maſters, Fouriers, and a few to ſerve them, leſt by a multitude of ſpectators and gazers, he and thoſe with him be diſturbed in the exerciſe of their charges. That none offer to pull up, take away, or remove any ſtaves or marks that are planted or fixt for deſignation of Quarters, Huts, or Tents. That no Officer or Souldier preſume to take any more, or any other ground than that which is allotted to him by the Caſtrametator. That no Turff be caſt up within the circumference of the Camp, for ſpoiling it, eſpecially in rainy weather. That no fires be made among the Tents and Huts, but only in thoſe places which are allotted for them. All theſe things ſhould be intimated, or what elſe the preſent circumſtances of place, time, accidents, or emergences may require.

Some proclamations from the General,

Muſt preceed the caſtrametation.

The Quarter-maſter General ſhould have Liſts given him of the numbers of every Regiment, Troop or Company both of Horſe and Foot; and becauſe all Regiments are not alike ſtrong of Companies, nor all Companies alike ſtrong of men, the Rolls muſt mention how many Troops and Companies are in each Regiment. and how many men in each Company. A Liſt muſt be given him by the Quarter-maſter of the General Staff, how many General Officers are to be lodged about the General; he muſt have Rolls of all the Perſons, Guns, great and ſmall, and Waggons belonging to the Ordnance. The like he muſt have from the Proviant Office. The Waggon-maſter General muſt give him a Liſt of thoſe Waggons which cannot conveniently quarter beſides the Regiments to whom they belong, but he muſt not add to that number that is allowed by the eſtabliſhment of the Prince or State to whom the Army doth belong.

Liſts muſt be given to the general Quarter-maſter.

And from whom.

Obſerve that the Quarter-maſter General after he hath got all theſe Liſts, draws a platform of the figure of the whole Camp on paper, and ſhews it to the General of the Army, and it being approv'd by him, the Quarter-maſter goes about his work. Obſerve next, that there muſt be no meaſures in the Army but conform to thoſe of the Quarter-maſter General, whether theſe be feet, roods, toiſes, or fathoms. Obſerve thirdly, that the length of all the Quarters of the General, General Officers, Train, Proviant, Waggons, Regiments, Troops or Companies muſt be equal and uniform, and this longitude is appointed by the Caſtrametator with the Generals conſent in this Camp of ours, the length of all Quarters ſhall be, if you pleaſe, three hundred foot. Obſerve fourthly, that the latitude or breadth of particular Quarters, is unequal, for a Quarter is broader or narrower according to the ſtrength or weakneſs of the Troop or Company that is to lodg in it. By this you will ſee that all the ſeveral Quarters of the whole Camp will be quadrangular, but not at all æquilateral, for ſome of them are longer than they are broad, but in moſt the breadth exceedeth the length, ſo you may conclude them all to be of an oblong figure. Fifthly obſerve, that all Quarter-maſters ſhould come provided with four long Staves or Poles, which are to be plac'd at the four corners of that oblong quadrangle ordain'd for that Quarter, theſe four Poles ſhould have ſome Colours, Flag or Enſign upon them, whereby it may be known for whom that Quarter is appointed. Sixthly obſerve, that the Quarter-maſters of Troops, and Fouriers of Foot-Companies ſhould come provided with four leſſer Staves for deſigning the four corners of the quadrangle ordain'd for each Troop or Company; as alſo they ſhould bring with them a great many leſſer ſticks, branches, or twigs of Trees, whereof four muſt be prickt at the four corners of every Hut, and of every part deſign'd for Horſes.

Obſervations neceſſary for regular encamping.

A Regular Caſtrametation being not frequently uſed ſeems to be a knotty piece; but *arrige Aures*, Reader, obſerve what I have ſaid before, and take heed to what I ſhall ſay hereafter, and I hope you ſhall find it eaſie.

All

All theſe things, whereof I have ſpoken, being prepar'd, which need not take ſo much time as I have ſpent in writing them; the Quartermaſter General meaſures out to the Quartermaſter of the Staff, the Generals Quarter, in the very middle and center of the Camp; and the ground that ſome would have allotted for it, ſeems to be more than needs, that is 300 foot in length, and 600 in breadth. This is very much, and four times and one half more than the *Romans* allowed to their Conſuls *Prætorium*, which was two hundred foot ſquare, and ſo contained within its circumference 40000 foot, and that was eight *Italian* miles. But if you will know how much ground is within the quarter of our modern General, you are to multiply the length of it by its breadth, that is 600 by 300, work and you will find the product to be 180000 foot, that is 36000 paces, 36 *Italian* miles. It is too much for any General, below a Soveraign Prince, or one of his blood: And therefore I think out of this may be taken a *Forum*, or Market-place, and a quarter for Volunteers or Strangers, and the General will ſtill keep enough. However a Generals quarter ſhould be very large, for he needs much ground for his Dining-room, Bedchamber, and Anti-chamber, a Hall for his Council of War to ſit in, Rooms for his Major-Domo, his Gentlemen, Pages, Lacquies, Butlers, Cooks, Maſter and Grooms of his horſes, for his Proviſions, for Kitchens, Cellars, and Stables, for all his Servingmen and waiters; as alſo two places for thoſe who wait for Orders, or attend diſpatches, one covered, the other uncovered. But few of our Generals keep ſuch a Port, unleſs they be Princes. This quarter ſhould have a Ditch about it, with a Drawbridge, and a ſtrong Guard kept at it.

Quarter for the Lord General,

In the next place, the Caſtrametator meaſures out to the Quartermaſter of the Staff, a quadrangle of ground, within the Circumference of which are to lodge all theſe General Officers, whom I have mentioned all over theſe Diſcourſes, and therefore I ſhall not need to name them here; all of them may be quarter'd according to their places and dignities, in a place of 300 foot long, and 400 foot broad; multiply the one by the other, you will find the contents of it to be 120000 foot, and that is 24 *Italian* miles, which is ground enough.

For the General Staff.

No ſooner hath the Caſtrametator ſeen four ſtaves prick'd at the four corners of the aſſigned quarter, but he leaves the particular lodgings to be divided (yet ſtill according to his direction) to the Quartermaſter of the Staff, and goes with the Quartermaſter of the Train, to whom he meaſures out a Quarter for the General of the Ordnance, which ſhall be 300 foot long, and 50 broad, multiply the one by the other, the Content is 15000 foot, 3 *Italian* miles, in which may be lodged, beſides himſelf, ſuch of his Officers as he ſhall think fit. But in lodging the Train it ſhould be conſidered, that ſeveral Guns with neceſſary Ammunition, are often left behind at needful places, and many of them muſt be planted on the Bulwarks, and Curtains of the preſent Camp, the reſt will require the leſs ground; and therefore the General having already got his Quarter, all the reſt of the Officers and others belonging to the Train, whatever name, Title, and Office they may bear (whom I particularly nam'd in my diſcourſe of the Train of Artillery) the place for the Magazine of Arms and Ammunition for all the pieces of Ordnance to ſtand on, and an empty place where Waggons may be loaded and unloaded, and for ſome Streets, each of them twenty foot broad: for all theſe I ſay, it will be enough to allow a quadrangle of 300 foot long and 500 broad; for if you multiply the one by the other, you will find the content of this quarter (beſide that of the Maſter of the Ordnance) to be 150000 foot, *inde* 30 *Italian* miles. If this be true, as probably it is, *Achilles Terduzzi* is much miſtaken, to require for a Train of Artillery belonging to an Army Royal, (which himſelf will have to conſiſt of 18000 Foot and 6000 Horſe) the fourth part of the whole Camp; I do not find, that the Lord *Baſta*, the Imperial Lieutenant General in *Tranſilvania*, to whom I conjecture, *Terduzzi* was principal Engineer, ever had ſo conſiderable a Train, as required half ſo much ground.

For the General of the Ordnance.

For the whole Officers, Guns and Ammunition of the Train.

To the Proviant-maſter General we ſhall allow a Quarter 300 foot long, and 60 broad; the one being multiplied by the other, produceth 18000 foot, ſome more than three *Italian* miles, and one half. This will be enough for him and all his Officers and Baggage, and for a large place for disburthening of Waggons: for you ſhould conſider that all Proviſions are brought to the Camp either by Country Carts, Horſes and Waggons, and theſe return ſo ſoon as they are un-

For the Proviant-maſter General.

unloaded; or by the Horſes belonging to the Baggage and Sutlers of the Army, and theſe preſently return to their Maſters, and the Proviant it ſelf is inſtantly given out and diſtributed to the Army.

As to the Waggons it is to be conſider'd that all of them that belong to the General Officers and the Train, may get room enough at the ſeveral Quarters, and ſo may moſt of thoſe that belong to the Regiments of Horſe and Foot, but upon all adventures the Quarter-maſter General ſhall appoint a place for 600 Waggons, and the Waggon maſter General and his Lieutenants, and for this uſe he ſhall allow no leſs ground than 300 foot in length, and 512 in breadth for the 600 Waggons, and 300 foot in length, and ten in breadth for the Waggon maſter and all his Officers; this laſt quarter makes 3000 foot, more than one half of an *Italian* mile. To underſtand the quarter allowed for 600 Waggons, obſerve firſt, that we allow no more Horſes for every Waggon than two, with a Waggoner and a Boy. Secondly, every Waggon muſt have 12 foot of ground to ſtand on in length, and ſix in breadth, and every Horſe four foot in breadth, and eight in length; for I will not allow ſo much length for a Baggage-horſe, as for a horſe for ſervice, which is ordinarily reckon'd ten. Thirdly obſerve, that both the Waggons and Waggon horſes ſtand in their length by the breadth of the Camp, and in their breadth by the length of the Camp, as all Horſes in Caſtrametation do, and ſo do the Huts of the Horſemen, and Foot-ſouldiers, as you will ſee anon. Theſe grounds being laid down, fifty Waggons may ſtand by their breadth in 300 foot of ground, which is the length of the whole Camp, ſix foot being allow'd for the breadth of every one of them. Over againſt them fifty Waggons more, all in one row likewiſe, ſo a hundred Waggons are quarter'd for their breadth, which is the Camps length; for the length every Waggon hath twelve foot, ſo the two rows have 24 foot, and between them a ſtreet of twelve foot, and behind one of them another empty place of twelve foot for fodder, and the Waggon men to lye, though theſe ordinarily lye either in or under the Waggons, theſe two ſtreets having allowance of 24 foot, and the two rows of Waggons 24 foot likewiſe, the quarter appointed for a 100 Waggons takes up 48 foot of the breadth of the Camp; multiply 48 by 6, becauſe you have 600 Waggons, the Product will be 288, this ground 600 Waggons muſt have for their breadth; for their length is the ſame with all the quarters of the Camp, that is 300 foot. We have now 1200 VVaggon-horſes to quarter, and that muſt be beſides the Waggons; you know we allow four foot for the breadth of the Horſe, and therefore in 300 foot, you may quarter 75 Horſe, for 4 times 75 make 300. Over againſt theſe 75 more in one row, theſe make 150. Behind the one of the two rows an empty place for fodder, 6 foot broad, between the two rows a ſtreet 6 foot broad, the two ſtreets have 12 foot in breadth, and the two rows of Horſes have 16, that is 8 foot for every row, (and you remember 8 foot are allowed for the length of a Baggage-horſe) 12 being added to 16, make 28, ſo many foot do two rows of Horſes with two ſtreets take up of the breadth of the Camp; and in theſe two rows are contain'd 150 VVaggon-horſes, whoſe whole number are 1200, 8 times 150. Multiply then 28 by 8, the Product is 224 foot, and ſo much ground do theſe 1200 VVaggon-horſes take up of the breadth. Be pleaſed to add theſe 224 foot to the 288, which is allowed to the VVaggons, the aggregate will be 512, which we allowed for the breadth of the Quarter meaſured out to 600 VVaggons, and 1200 VVaggon-horſes, the length allow'd is the ſame of all other quarters 300 foot. Multiply 512 by 300, the Product is 153600, ſome more than thirty *Italian* miles, and one half, in the ſuperficial meaſure.

For the Waggon-maſter General and 600 Waggons.

For 1200 Waggon-horſes.

Our Caſtrametator hath left the VVaggon-maſter General to divide proportionably that allotted ground among his VVaggons, and is gone to quarter the Cavalry, but he finds unequal Liſts, therefore he muſt be at the greater trouble to give to every Regiment ground according to its ſtrength; for as I ſaid before, all Regiments (even thoſe under one Prince) are not of equal number of Troops, nor all Troops of equal number of men. But here we ſhall ſuppoſe we are to Encamp a Regiment of eight Troops, and every Troop to conſiſt of a hundred Riders, comprehending in that number the Corporals and Trumpeters; you will remember that the breadth of the Horſe is meaſur'd by

Quarter for the Cavalry.

the length of the quarter, and his length by the breadth of it. Obſerve ſecondly, that ten foot are allowed for the length of a Horſe, and four for his breadth. Obſerve thirdly, that we allow to every Rider ten foot for the breadth, and four for the length of his Hut. But I hope the Horſeman will not be ſo capricious as to think his Horſe and he are laid in equal ballance, becauſe they have a like proportion of ground allow'd them, for if I cannot make a difference, I ſhall immediately make a diſtance by putting a Street five foot broad between him and his horſe, and that ſhall be for his horſes fodder.

Quarter for a Troop of one hundred Horſe.

A Troop then of a 100 Horſes is quarter'd in two ſeveral rows, 50 in a row, ſide for ſide, which fifty Horſes take up for their breadth; and of the length of the quarter 200 foot, to wit, four for every horſe. The length of every horſe hath 10 foot, every Riders Hut hath 10 foot, that and a Street between them 5 foot broad, make 25 foot, the other row of horſe and riders take up the like quantity of ground, to wit, 25 foot, theſe added together make 50 foot. The horſes ſtand tail to tail (becauſe their heads muſt be to their Maſters huts) and between the horſes tails there is a Street 20 foot broad; add theſe 20 to the other 50, the aggregate is 70, and that is the breadth of a quarter allotted to a Troop of a 100 horſe. As to the length of this quarter, it is as the reſt 300 foot, whereof I told you the breadth of 50 horſes took up 200. The other 100 is thus divided, The Ritmaſter hath 20 foot of it for the length of his Tent or Hut, the Lieutenant hath 10, and the Cornet hath 10, and between him and the Troopers Huts there is a Street 20 foot broad, theſe make 60 foot; in the length at the reer of the Troopers Huts, there is a Street 20 foot broad, and that 20 added to 60 make 80; behind that Street the Saddler, Smith, and Sutler have a quarter 10 foot in length, which being added to 80, make 90; behind them there is a place for fires, and dreſſing meat, 10 foot long, that being added to 90 makes 100 and ſo the length of a quarter for an 100 horſe is 300, and the breadth 70, multiply the one by the other, the Product will be 2100 foot, which is the ſuperficial meaſure of that quarter. But obſerve that the Ritmaſter quartering in the front takes up with his *Hut* all the 70 foot; the Lieutenant and Cornet behind him ſhare that breadth between them, and accommodates likewiſe the Quarter-maſter, and him who aſſiſts the Cornet to carry the Standard, whom the *Germans* call *San Junckher*, the Gentleman of the Standard, or Colours.

For the Colonel, and his Staff.

Having lodged one Troop, it is eaſie to quarter a Regiment, and conſequently a whole Cavalry. I told you our Regiment of horſe ſhould conſiſt of 8 Troops, and every Troop of 100 Horſemen; if one Troop then require 70 foot in breadth, 8 muſt require 8 times 70, multiply then 70 by 8, the Product is 560. Some allow no more ground to a Colonel of horſe than to a Ritmaſter, there may be reaſon for it, if he quarter on the head of his own Troop, as ordinarily Colonels did when they had but the temporary command of 3 or 5 Troops, but now that he is abſolute Colonel of 8 Troops, we allow his Captain Lieutenant to quarter on the head of the Troop, and we give to the Colonel and his Field and Staff Officers a Street of 70 foot broad, and 300 long; which I thus divide, The Colonel ſhall have all the 70 in breadth, and 40 in length behind him, the Street 20 foot broad, which traverſeth the whole Regiment, then there ſhall be 200 foot in length, and ſtill 70 in breadth, for all his Field and Staff Officers, and for Stables and Waggons. In the reer of theſe that Street which traverſeth the reer of all the Horſemens Huts; behind that a plot of ground 10 foot long for Saddlers, Smiths, and Sutlers belonging to the Staff; and behind that 10 foot are allowed for Kitchins and fire, add theſe together, they make 300 foot in length, and 70 in breadth. Now the 8 Troops, and the quarter for the Colonel and his Staff, being all of equal length and breadth, muſt have 8 Intervals, for every one of which muſt be allowed 20 foot of breadth; ſo for all the eight 160 foot. The 8 Troops you remember had for their latitude 560, the Colonel 70, theſe added make 630, add for the Intervals 160, the aggregate is 790, for the breadth of a Regiment of Horſe of 8 Troops, the length 300. If you would know the ſuperficial meaſure of this quarter for a Regiment of 8 Troops of Horſe, multiply 790 by 300, and if I have operated right, the Product is 237000 foot, 47 miles, and near one half.

The latitude of the whole Quarter.

The

The Caſtrametator hath now leiſure to meaſure out ground to the Infantry, and he finds the ſame difficulty as he did in the Cavalry, that is, the inequality of the Companies in each Regiment, and the numbers of men in each Company. But having done his buſineſs on paper at home, he will eaſily give to each Regiment Quarter-maſter his due proportion of ground in the Field. But ſince all along in theſe Diſcourſes, I have ſpoke of a Foot-regiment conſiſting of ten Companies, and of a Company conſiſting of a hundred men, we ſhall in this place quarter them according to that number. And firſt we ſhall lodg a Company according to the pattern whereof the reſt ſhall be ſoon accommodated. In the number of the hundred I comprehend Caporal, Lanceſpeſatas, Appointes, Gentlemen of the Company, and common Souldiers. Thoſe who ſhall be quarter'd as Officers, are Captain, Lieutenant, Enſign-bearer, two Serjeants, Clerk, Fourier, Furer of the Colours, Captain of Arms, and two Drummers, for theſe laſt are almoſt univerſally enroll'd with the Officers, I know not why. Quarter for the Infantry.

The cuſtom was in moſt places for the Captain, Lieutenant, and Enſign to lodg all three in the Van or front of the Company, and this is continued yet in many places. But truly, ſince a Lieutenant will needs be the ſecond Officer of the Company, I think he ſhould quarter as he marcheth, and that is in the reer. *Henry* of *Naſſau* Prince of *Orange*, alter'd the cuſtom, and order'd them all three to pitch their Tents in the reer of the Company, at leaſt the Captain, for two reaſons, that the Souldiers might more readily get to their place of Arms, and not be hinder'd with the huts or cords of their Officers Tents; and next that by their preſence in the reer, debates and brawls betwixt Souldiers and Sutlers ſhould either be prevented, or quickly voided. But let us in this place follow the old way, (which may ſoon be alter'd according to emergents, or the Generals pleaſure) and quarter our Foot Company in the Field thus:

The Captain being in the front, ſhall have for his Tents 40 foot in length, and 24 in breadth; and obſerve that 24 foot is all the breadth that is allowed to the whole Company. Behind the Captains lodgings, on the right hand, the Lieutenant hath 10 foot of length, and 8 in breadth allow'd him for his quarter, and on the left hand the Enſign hath as much. Obſerve that behind the Captains Tents begins a Street which runs to the reer of the whole Company, and divides the Lieutenant and Enſigns quarters, and the two rows of Huts equally, and this Street is 8 foot broad; this Street is a direct one, and goes the length of the quarter; but there is another which is a traverſe Street, and goeth through the latitude of the Company, and it is 10 foot broad, it begins behind the Lieutenant and Enſigns Huts, and traverſeth the whole breadth of the Regiment when the Companies are join'd together. Obſerve that all the Huts of the Company are 8 foot broad, except the Captains, and therefore hereafter I ſhall only ſpeak of the length of the Huts. Behind that traverſe Street of 10 foot broad in a direct line, under the Lieutenant the oldeſt Serjeant hath his Hut, for which are allowed 8 foot in length, below him the Fourier hath 6 foot long, below whom the Clerk hath likewiſe 6 foot, and below the Clerk the oldeſt Drummer ſhall have 5 foot in length. Add theſe together, you will find that theſe four, Serjeant, Fourier, Clerk, and Drummer have 25 foot allow'd for their Huts in length, and 8 for the breadth, as all the Souldiers have. Behind the oldeſt Drummer in that ſame row are 50 huts for 50 Souldiers, for each whereof are allowed three foot and one half. Multiply then 50 by $3\frac{1}{2}$, and the Product will be 175, add 175 to 25, which the four Officers have, the aggregate is 200, and ſo many foot of ground doth the huts of that row beginning at the traverſe Street take up in length. Over againſt the oldeſt Serjeant, in a parallel line, and directly under the Enſign, is the ſecond Serjeant lodged; below him the Captain of Arms, under him the Furer, and below the Furer the ſecond Tambour, and under him the other fifty huts for the other fifty Soldiers all in one row; all theſe having a proportion of ground allowed equal to the firſt row on the right hand. In the reer of the Souldiers huts there muſt be a Street 20 foot broad for Waggons and Carts to paſs and repaſs, and this Street traverſeth the whole breadth of both Company and Regiment, as the other of 10 foot doth at the Van of the Inferior Officers huts. Next to this traverſe Street in the reer there is a place for Waggons and Sutlers 10 foot long, and behind

For a Company of 100 men.

Allowance of ground for Huts.

behind that there is another place 10 foot long likewiſe, for fires and dreſſing meat, for there muſt be no fire among the huts, and both theſe places enjoy the full breadth of the Company, which is 24 foot. Be pleaſed then to remember that 40 foot in length are allowed for the Captain, 10 for the Lieutenant, 10 for the firſt traverſe Street, 200 for the rows of under Officers and Souldiers huts, 20 for the ſecond traverſe Street, 10 for Sutlers, and 10 for fire, add theſe together, the aggregate will be 300, which is the length of the quarter. Remember alſo that 8 foot are allowed for the breadth of all Officers and common Souldiers huts, except the Captains. Then two rows of huts require 16 foot in breadth, between theſe rows there muſt be a direct Street running from the back of the Captains Tent to the reer, as I told you before, and it is 8 foot broad, add 8 to 16, makes 24, and ſo much ground the Captains Tents poſſeſſeth, and it is the breadth of the Companies quarter. Multiply the length by the breadth, that is, 300 by 24, the Product is 7200 foot, near one *Italian* mile and a half within the Circumference of this Companies quarter.

Length and breadth of a Foot companies quarter.

Let us in the next place quarter the Colonel with his Field and Staff Officers, which ſhall be done thus: There ſhall be a place in the middle of the Regiment, which ſhall be 300 foot long, and 64 broad; on the right hand of this place five Companies ſhall lodg, and on the left hand of it the other five. Of this place the whole breadth, to wit, 64 foot, ſhall be allowed to the Colonels Lodgings, and 50 foot in length, by which means he ſhall have all the Tents and Huts of his Captains, Lieutenants and Enſigns in a parallel line with his own. Behind the Colonels Lodgings is that Street whereof I ſpoke before, of 10 foot broad, which traverſeth the breadth of the whole Regiment, and in which moſt Caſtrametators, will have the Colours and Arms to ſtand, but Tents and huts before that Street will make it in my judgment very improper for that uſe. Below that Street there ſhall be a plot of ground 40 foot in length, and 64 broad, to be equally divided between the Lieutenant Colonel and Major, if they do not quarter beſides their Companies, and behind them a Street 20 foot broad. Below that Street ſhall be a quarter 50 foot long, and 64 broad, to be divided among the Miniſter, Quarter-maſter, Auditor, Secretary, Chirurgeon, and Marſhal; and below them the third Street 20 foot broad. Next to that ſhall be a place 70 foot long, and 64 broad, for Waggons and Baggage; behind that the fourth Street of 20 foot broad, which is at the reer of all the Souldiers huts, and traverſeth the breadth of the whole Regiment. Next to that are the two places formerly mention'd, for Sutlers and fire, one behind the other, each 10 foot long, and 64 broad. If you then remember that the length of the Colonels Lodgings is 50 foot, 10 for a Street, 40 for the Lieutenant Colonel and Major, 20 for a ſecond Street, 50 for the Staff-Officers, and 20 for a third Street, 70 for Waggons, 20 for the fourth Street, and 20 for Sutlers and fires, when you add theſe numbers together, the aggregate will be 300, which is the length of this quarter, as it is of all other quarters of our Camp, the breadth of this particular one being 64 foot, as I told you before.

Quarter for the Staff of a Foot Regiment.

It's length and breadth.

In the quartering the ten Companies of the Regiment, five on the Colonels right hand, and five on his left, reſpect would be had to the dignity, antiquity, and precedency of the Captains; my own opinion is, they ſhould be quarter'd according to that order wherein they were marſhal'd in the field, and what that is you may find in the Eleventh Chapter.

Let us then take a view of the whole breadth of this Regiments quarter, for doing whereof we muſt firſt conſider that the ten Companies make ten diſtinct Bodies, and the quarter for the Colonel and his Staff the eleventh. Eleven Bodies muſt have ten Intervals, for every one whereof we ſhall allow 16 foot, that one Waggon may paſs by another: multiply then 10 by 16, the aggregate is 160; this much is allowed for the ten Intervals, every Company hath 24 foot for its breadth; *inde* for 10 Companies, 240 foot, the Colonel and Staff hath 64, add 160 to 240, and both theſe to 64, the aggregate is 464, and that is the latitude of a Regiment of Foots quarter. If you would know the ſuperficial meaſure of this quarter, multiply the length of it, which is 300 foot, by the breadth of it, which is 464 foot, the Product will prove to be 139200 foot, near 28 *Italian* miles.

Length and breadth of a Regiment of Foots quarter.

Its Superficial meaſure.

By

By what hath been ſaid, it will be eaſie to know how any Troop, Company, or Regiment either of Horſe or Foot, of what ſtrength ſoever, may be quarter'd; as if the Colonels Company be ſtronger by fifty men, than the reſt, as in ſome places they be, it may have a row of Huts more than others have. In the *Low Country* Wars, the Princes of *Orange* allowed four foot for the length of every Foot-Souldiers Hut; but the *Germans* for moſt part allow but $3\frac{1}{2}$, whom in this point I have followed in this Caſtrametation. By the account of four foot long for every Hut, a row of Huts for fifty men ſhould have the allowance of 200 foot; but in our days *Henry* Prince of *Orange* took away 20 of that, leaving but 180, and theſe 20 foot he join'd to the breadth of the traverſe Street in the reer of the Huts, which before was but 20, but by this addition came to be 40 foot broad, that Waggons and Proviſions might have more room to go out and in, and paſs and repaſs. The 300 foot which I have allow'd for the length of every Companies quarter, may be abridged or enlarged as the General ſhall find occaſion for it; but an uniformity in the length of the whole Camp is both decent and requiſite. He who commands in chief, may order (if his affairs require it) that in one row of fifty Huts an hundred Souldiers ſhall quarter, it will be no prejudice to them, but rather helpful, provided they have no wives.

Princes of *Orange*, their allowance for Souldiers huts.

Two Souldiers may quarter in one hut.

Between the quarters of the Foot, and the fortification of the Camp, there is a void place of 200 foot broad, this the Ancients call'd *Pomerium*, we name it the Alarm and Parading place, or place of Arms: And though as I told you before, many would have the Colours and Arms to ſtand in that Street which traverſeth the quarters behind the Colonels Tents, yet aſſuredly in time of Alarms the Souldiers running to their Arms, and the Enſigns to their Colours, cannot in ſo narrow a place but be much embaraſs'd; beſides, they have not room to draw up, therefore it were more fit to have the Colours fixt before the head of the quarter in this place of Arms, and to have the Pikes of every Company leaning on a Tree laid acroſs other two Trees fixed in the ground, and in fair weather the Muskets alſo, but in time of rain the Souldiers ſhould carry them into their huts; and in that caſe I ſhall adviſe Officers to cauſe the Muſqueteers to draw their Ball, becauſe when an accidental fire comes, careleſs Souldiers (and how many be there of theſe?) will be more ready to run out of their huts, and carry their Knapſacks and Cloaks with them, than their Muſquets, and theſe being charg'd with Ball, render all endeavours to quench the fire exceeding dangerous, if not altogether impoſſible, becauſe the Powder wherewith theſe Muſquets are charged, being fired, ſends their Bullets ſo extravagantly at random on all quarters, that men know not how to ſhelter themſelves from them; an experience whereof I once ſaw in a tranſient Leaguer, which for that reaſon I ſpeak of, was well near burnt to the ground, and yet next day I heard of no order given to prevent the like miſchief for the future, which ſhould have been done.

Place of Arms.

Muskets charged with ball, dangerous in huts.

After the Regiment Quartermaſters have given the Quartermaſters and Fouriers their proportions of grounds; and that the four corners of each hut are marked with four twigs or ſticks, the Souldiers that are not working at the Fortification fall to and make their huts, but the Officers muſt ſee it be done regularly, that none take more or leſs ground, than what is allowed them, leſt thereby they ſpoil the uniformity of the Quarter.

Fouriers are to mark all the ſeveral huts.

If the General can ſpare none of that ſpacious ground allow'd for his lodgings, for a Market-place, and a quarter for Volunteers and ſtrangers, then the Caſtrametator muſt meaſure out ground for both, not far from the Proviant Office, for none of them muſt be neglected. When all is done, the Quartermaſter General, or one of his Engineers, is to draw the Fortification of the Camp, all the Lines whereof are to be marked, by making a furrow in the earth, half a foot deep, and half a foot broad: The whole Trenches are to be wrought by the ſeveral Regiments of Foot, according to their numbers of men; becauſe the Retrenchment is for their own ſafety, unleſs the Prince General get them to be helped by Country people or Pioneers. By what is ſaid, you ſee our Quartermaſter General ſhould be a perſon of ſtrong Intellectuals, and well ſeen in the Mathematicks, eſpecially Geometry, which both Fortification and Caſtrametation acknowledge to be their Mother.

Souldiers are to work at the Fortification of the Camp.

For

For avoiding Infection, noyſom and contagious Diſeaſes, procured by the daily killing and ſlaughtering Beaſts in a plentiful and numerous Leaguer, it is convenient that deep pits be dig'd, and that all that is not uſeful be caſt into them, about the middle of the pit there ſhould be a thick board laid faſt, thorough which a whole ſhould be cut, and what is caſt in the pit ſhould be let down through that hole, and therefore a board ſhould be laid over that hole and then ſo much of the earth as was digged out of the pit, ſhould be caſt in, till the mouth of it be made equal with the ſuperfice of the ground, and that earth may be taken out as oft as you will, till the pit be full of theſe noiſome things up to the board, and then it ſhould be cloſed up; and if pits be uſed in this faſhon, it matters not if theſe pits be dig'd among the huts, or in the Streets of the Camp. The carrying theſe things three or four hundred foot without the Camp, is exceedingly troubleſome, and the killing the beaſts ſo far without exceedingly inconvenient, and of no conſequence, ſince thereby the Air may be Infected as well without as within the Camp, and that is all one matter. Whether pits may not be dig'd for Souldiers to do the works of Nature in, and ſome Cloth Canvas or ſome ſuch thing put about it, as the *Turks* do; or if it be beſt to continue the cuſtome of going without the leaguer, one hundred paces, (which ſhould be marked by a long pole, and a wiſp of Straw at the top of it) ſhall not be the Subject of this Diſcourſe: for aſſuredly, the debate of it cannot be very ſavory.

Where there is no great danger of a viſible enemy, a General may quarter his Army in two diſtinct Bodies, Battel and Reſerve, the diſtance between them being 4 or 500 ordinary paces; the Foot in the middle, and the Horſe on both Wings, as the General thinks moſt expedient; as to theſe Oblong Quadrangles, wherein are encamped ſeveral bodies, whereof I have ſo oft ſpoke, you may if you pleaſe, call them as the *French* do, Parks, and that properly enough: Know likewiſe, that Cuſtom hath obtained, that the outward line of Fortification of Camps that regards the Enemy without, is called Circumvallation, and the inward one towards the Beſieged place, hath the name of Contravallation: Whereas in very deed and in common ſpeech, both of them are Circumvallations; nor are they ſo to be termed, in ſtrict ſence and proper language, unleſs uſe be made of Stakes or Palliſades, which the Old *Romans* conſtantly practis'd, and are called in Latin, *Valli*, whereof I have ſpoken largely in another place.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Guards, Watches, Parads, Sentinels, Rounds, and Patrovilles.

IT is to little purpoſe to fortifie either a Camp or a Caſtle, unleſs men be appointed to maintain the Fortification; and becauſe men cannot watch conſtantly, therefore they muſt watch by turns, either according to the number of the men, that are quartered within the fortified place, or the danger the place may be in of a near and powerful enemy; for though Guards ſhould be kept, and ſtrictly kept, even when no danger ſeems to threaten, yet it were madneſs to weary Souldiers, as much by watching, when no enemy is expected, as when one is aſſuredly look'd for. If the Companies of Horſe and Foot be full and compleat, I think either in Field or Garriſon, an Enemy not being near, the fourth nights Duty is enough to keep Officers and Souldiers in mind of their buſineſs, though I know, others think the third night eaſie enough. If an Enemy be near, and have not yet made approaches, it will be to no purpoſe, to weary Souldiers more than is needful, the third nights watch will be ſufficient, for it is not ſo much the number, as the carefulneſs, order, and diligence of watches that preſerves a Camp, Town, or Fort from ſurprizal. But when an enemie hath inveſted the place, and made approaches, more Sentinels are requiſite, and conſequently more men ought to be on the guard, and this may bring the duty to the ſecond night, ſometimes I have ſeen Souldiers kept on Duty two nights together, and have only the third night allow'd them to repoſe, and not to go to bed or put off their clothes that third night neither, but to lie in readineſs, to run to their Poſts, ſo ſoon as call'd upon. But when a Beſieger hath made Galleries over the Ditches, it is ordinary for the Beſieged to lie conſtantly at their ſeveral Poſts.

Guards to be ſtronger or weaker according to the nearneſs of an Enemy.

Our modern Guards are, as the ancient were, either of Horſe or Foot, in the Fields whether the Camp be Fortified or not; Foot and Horſe have ſome Guards appointed without the Leaguer, ſometimes together, ſometimes the Horſe without the Foot, who are obliged to keep Sentinels on horſe back in ſuch places as the Major General, or Adjutant General ſhall appoint, and theſe Guards and Sentinels are to be viſited often by the Officers of the Cavalry, who are on the watch, or by the Lieutenant or Major General of the Horſe. Theſe viſits are ordinarily called *Patrollies*, or *Patrovilles*, to diſtinguiſh them, I think, from the viſits of the Foot Guards, which are called Rounds in Garriſon; Horſemen are ſeldom required to watch in the night, unleſs it be in the time of a Siege, but in the day time they are obliged to ride out in parties as ſtrong, and as far as the Governour of the place ſhall think fit to appoint, and this duty is ordinarily called, recognoſcing, or beating the ſtreets.

Guards of Horſe.

Within a leaguer, the Foot keep Guards conſtantly, beſides theſe outer poſts ſpoken of already. The Guards within are twofold, ordinary, and extraordinary. The ordinary are thoſe which are kept within the Fortification, for its neceſſary defence; whether it be in the Baſtions, Curtins, Redoubts, or Sconces. The extraordinary are ſuch as are kept at the General, Lieutenant General, or other general Officers lodgings, at the Proviant, the Waggons, at the Artillery, and Ammunition; but obſerve that here the Sentinels muſt ſtand with Pikes, for being ſo near powder, they are not permitted to have burning Matches, and conſequently not to take Tabaco.

Foot Guards twofold.

There are alſo two kinds of Sentinels, extraordinary Sentinels, and ordinary ones. The extraordinary Sentinels are thoſe we call forlorn, the word we have from the *Dutch*, which ſignifieth loſt, the *French* call them perdues, which is the ſame. There are of them both Horſe and Foot. The firſt ſits on Horſe-

Forlorn Sentinels or perdues of Horſe.

Forlorn Sentinels of Foot.

Horſe back with his ordinary Arms; the Foot perdue lyes on his belly, but hath neither Musket, Fuſee, or Carabine, only a Sword drawn, and if he be Maſter of a Dagger and a Piſtol he may have them too: He is called loſt, becauſe he is put in the moſt dangerous places, and neareſt the Enemy; neither is he to come back, if he be only attack'd by one man; if by two, he may retire to the next perdue, if there be any, but if a greater number than two come upon them, they are bound to run quickly and Alarm that Guard to which they belong. In this place, ſpeaking of an Alarm, I wonder, why Monſieur *de Gaya* in the 82 page of his Book tells us, that in Garriſons, when Alarm is beaten or ſounded, all Souldiers ſhould firſt meet at their Captains houſes, and from thence march to the places appointed for them to maintain. This to me ſeems very ſtrange doctrine, unleſs he have aſſurance that an Enemy will neither enter nor ſcalade, till his Souldiers firſt very fairly meet at their Captains lodgings, and then march to their Poſts; But by his favour, I hold it more convenient, that the Souldiers run as faſt as they can, though man by man, *a la desbandad*, directly to the places of the Ramparts or Retrenchments ordained for them to defend, commonly called Poſts, or Alarm-places, without taking notice of their Captains quarters. We make it the Sergeants duty to place the Foot perdues at theſe Poſts appointed by the Serjeant Major; but I have known it done by the Furer, or Caporal of the Gentlemen, and where ſuch an Officer is allowed, it ſeems to belong to his office, and not to the Sergeant, who hath employments enough beſide. He who is to be perdue, ſhould be a Gentleman of the Company, whom the *French* call *Appointe*; and where theſe have no allowance of Pay, the Captain ſhould make choice of ſome, whom by their birth and behaviour, he conceives moſt fit for that imployment. The Furer, or Sergeant, is to bring the Forlorn to his Poſt, and bring the other away with him, he is alſo obliged frequently to viſit his Perdues; for very often, if they be not vigilant, they are ſtolen away by an active Enemy. And therefore no Perdues, either of Horſe or Foot, ſhould be entruſted with the Word, that they may not be able to give it to the Enemy, if they happen to be taken: A better order, in my opinion, than that of the *Romans*, who entruſted their Common Souldiers with the *Teſſera*. Our forlorn Sentinels are much uſed in the Field, when two Armies lye near other, waiting their advantages. But they are eſpecially made uſe of at Sieges of Towns, Forts, and Caſtles.

Ordinary Sentinels of Horſe. Of Foot.

Their Duties.

The ordinary Sentinel, if he belong to the Cavalry, ſtands on Horſe-back; the Foot-man, whether it be in Camp, Town, or Garriſon, ſtands with his ordinary arms. It is true, I have ſeen Gentlemen of Companies ſtand with drawn Swords at the Chamber-doors of Princes, when they have been viſiting Garriſons; but notwithſtanding that, all Foot Souldiers ſhould ſtand without doors with their ordinary Arms, whether they be Pikes or Muskets, when they are Sentinels, and conſtantly at their Sentinel poſture; neither ſhould any of them be permitted to ſet down their Arms the whole time they are on that duty, but if they be weary, they may ſhoulder their Pikes or Muskets, and walk to and fro with them, and ſo refreſh themſelves; but at the approach of a Commiſſionated Officer, they are immediately to return to their Sentinel-poſture, yet they are never ſuffer'd to ſet their Arms out of their hands. But this is too much conniv'd at by Officers, who thereby ſhew either their negligence or ignorance, in not heeding or not knowing what belongs to a Sentinel; whoſe firſt duty is to have one of his hands at his Arms, when either they are order'd or ſhoulder'd, and both hands at his Musket, when he is at his Sentinel-poſture: Nor do I know a more proper puniſhment for this neglect, than to make that Souldier who would not carry his own Musket one hour, carry both it, and three Muskets more belonging to his Comrades upon both his Shoulders two hours. As for the time, how long an ordinary Sentinel ſhould ſtand, whether on Horſe or Foot, I know no reaſon why he ſhould be on that duty longer than one hour, for he may grow either weary or ſleepy, or both, and in that time he would be ſometimes viſited by his Caporal, or Lanceſpeſate: And in a rigid froſty winter night, he ſhould not be permitted to ſtand longer than half an hour at one bout. In Garriſons and Fortified Camps, Sentinels of Foot ſhould be provided with Frocks and Hoods,

to

to keep them from rain, ſnow and cold, which every one of them is to deliver to him who relieves him. There ſhould alſo be little Wooden houſes (which commonly are called Sentinel houſes) built for them on the Walls of Towns, Caſtles, and Camps; three on every Baſtion, and two on every Curtain.

Sentinels at Officers doors.

Thoſe who ſtand Sentinels at Commanders and Officers doors in Towns or Leaguers, need not, and I think, ſhould not challenge any man that paſſeth, unleſs he offer to come within his Arms; and if Officers would advert to this, neither themſelves or others would be ſo much troubled with the needleſs vociferations and clamours of thoſe ſenſeleſs Sentinels, who ſtand at their doors.

Sentinels on Walls.

A Sentinel on a Wall in the night time ſhould challenge all who come near him, if they be Rounds, he is to permit them to paſs; if not, or that he knows not what they are, he is bound to fire upon them, and cry Alarm; upon which, not only the guards, but all within either Garriſon or Camp, either do or ſhould run in Arms to their ſeveral Poſts. Thoſe who ſtand at the door and Arms of the ſeveral *Corps de guards*, ought indeed in the night time to challenge all who come near them, but ſhould hinder none to paſs about their affairs, unleſs they miſdemean themſelves by word or deed, but if thoſe who come near them be Rounds, or call themſelves ſo, the Sentinel is to ſtop them, requiring them to ſtand, and immediately to call out his Caporal; and if thoſe perſons, who call themſelves Rounds, will not ſtand, after they have been twice or thrice required ſo to do, the Sentinel may lawfully fire upon them, or puſh at them with his Pike, and be free from any miſchief that is done them, as being procured by either their own wickedneſs, or folly, or both.

Sentinels at *Corps de guards*.

The duty of a Sentinel to a Round, ſhould lead me to ſpeak of Rounds; but before Rounds be appointed to go, the Watch muſt be ſet, whereof the Round is an appendix or part. In ſetting Watches, and appointing Guards, obſerve ſhortly four things. The time when, the place where, the number how many, and the perſons who ſhould viſit theſe Watches or Guards. A Guard that is vigilant preſerves thoſe who ſleep, and Sentinels are the Guards of that Guard.

Four particulars to be obſerv'd in all Watches.

All theſe four particulars, are abſolutely to be determin'd by him who commands in chief, and as his pleaſure ſhould over-rule in them all, ſo time, place, occaſion, emergence, and the pleaſure of the Prince or State whom he ſerves, ſhould over-rule him. To keep too many on Watch, will in a ſhort time render thoſe who watch, incapable to Watch at all; to keep too few, encourageth your enemy to attempt that, from which a well order'd and ſufficiently ſtrong Guard would deter him. But by all Souldiers, though there be no danger to be imagin'd, a Watch ſhould be kept; neither can a command iſſue from a Prince, that can or ſhould hinder an Officer to keep Watch, though their orders may be ſuch, as may render men uncapable both to do the main buſineſs about which they are ſent, and keep any conſiderable Watch, or any Watch at all. But to our four particulars obſervable in Watches, I ſay,

The time when.

The time when the Guards ſhould be ſet in Armies (for I ſhall ſpeak of Watches in Garriſons afterwards) if they be on a March, is immediately after a whole Army, or a part of it is quarter'd, whether that be in Towns, Villages, or the Field: The Cavalry are to ſend out Troops and Parties to recognoſce, and keep outer Guards, ſometimes they have Foot with them, but for moſt part they watch alone, and the Foot is to ſet their Watches inſtantly after their arrival, before any of them begin to quarter.

The place where.

The place where the Horſe-men are to keep their Guards is without the quarter, further or nearer, as it ſhall pleaſe the Major General, or Adjutant, to whom it belongs to appoint thoſe Guards. The place for the Guards of Foot, is within the quarter, or very near to it, fortified by ſome Hedge or Encloſure, ſome Church or Church-yard, helped with the Spade and Mattock.

The number how many.

The number, how many ſhould watch either of Horſe or Foot is uncertain, as that which depends on the Intelligence a General may have of the nearneſs or remoteneſs of an Enemy.

The perſons who viſit theſe Guards.

The perſons appointed to viſit theſe Guards are appointed by him who commands at the Head-watch, and theſe viſitors are called *Patrovilles* and Rounds, as I obſerv'd before. In our Modern Militia we do not follow the *Grecian* nor *Roman* cu-

ſtome, in giving the office of riding Rounds only to Horſe-men, for with us thoſe of the Cavalry ride their Patrovils, and thoſe of the Foot either ride or walk their Rounds; of which more anon.

Watches in Fortified Leaguers.

In Fortified Camps, where Armies are to ſtay for ſome time, there is a definite hour appointed by him who commands in chief, when the Trumpet ſhall ſound and the Drum beat for ſetting the Watch. So ſoon as the Horſe-men are conveen'd, they are ſent to their ſeveral Poſts without the Camp; for the Foot there is a place appointed where all the Guards ſhall meet, and this is called the Parading-place: *Parad* ſignifieth a ſhow, and ſo doth *Monſtre*. Military men have appropriated the firſt to that ſhow, Watches make before they go to their ſeveral Poſts, and the ſecond to that ſhow Officers and Common Souldiers make to Muſter-maſters and Commiſſaries before they enter into Pay, or after, when they are review'd.

A Parade, what.

How guards march to the Parade.

In Leaguers the Foot-Watches are two-fold, firſt, private; theſe are Guards to keep Sentinels at the Tents of the Field Officers, the Colours, Arms, Ammunition, and Waggons. Next, publick Guards, and theſe conſiſt of whole Companies, one, two, or three ſometimes out of a Regiment, as the duty ſeems to require; theſe meet at the ſeveral Captains Tents or Huts, and after the Drums have done beating the Gathering, the Captains march with their ſeveral Companies in good order to the Parading place of the Regiment, or of the whole Army; more ordinarily to the laſt, which is either a place appointed peculiarly for it, or is the *Forum*, or Market-place, near the Generals Lodging, or Pavilion. Here they are drawn up according to the antiquity or precedency of the Regiments to whom they belong, by either the Major General, or Adjutant General of the Foot. At this Parade ſhould all the Majors of the Foot be, as alſo one Sergeant out of every Company, and moſt of the Captains of the whole Army. The Companies being marſhall'd in breaſt, the Major or Adjutant General calls the Majors together, to whom he imparts the ſeveral orders and directions of the General, which may, and very oft doth vary every night, becauſe they depend on emergencies. The Majors ſtand in a ring on both hands of him, according to their dignity, the firſt ſtanding on his left hand, in whoſe ear he whiſpers the Word, and he whiſpers it to him who ſtandeth on his left hand, and ſo ſucceſſively, till the youngeſt Major deliver it to the Major General: If it be returned right to him, there is no neceſſity to ſend it about the other way, as ſome would have; but if the Word be not deliver'd right to him, then he gives it to the Major who ſtands on his right hand, and ſo it is re-deliver'd to him by the Major, who ſtands on his left hand, not without a check to him or them, by whoſe inadvertency it was miſtaken. This word, for moſt part, is the name of a Town, a Country or a Caſtle, ſometimes it is the proper name of a Man, and ſometimes it is a Sentence, as it pleaſeth him who gives it, who is ſtill he who commands in chief. Men may paſs any Sentinel without it in the night time, but none ſhould paſs the *Corps de guards* that are on the Fortification unleſs they give the Word. And from the miſunderſtanding of this, many groſs abuſes are committed, as when Servants, or other mean perſons are ſent in the night time either into Camps or Towns, concerning affairs very lawful in themſelves, and have the Word given them, that they may paſs the Guards, which ſhould not be ſuffer'd; for if the buſineſs is neceſſary, and will admit of no delay, as the ſending for a Phyſician, Apothecary, Chyrurgion, or Miniſter for ſick or wounded perſons, in ſuch caſes addreſſes ſhould be made to him who commands over the whole Guards, who is obliged to ſend a Caporal, or a Gentleman of a Company along with the perſon that is ſent, who ſhould ſee him paſs and re-paſs without interruption. When the Major General imparts his orders to the Majors, the Sergeants of the Parade ſhould make a ring at a good diſtance about them, ſtanding with their Halberts order'd, and this both to ſhew with what reſpect orders ſhould be given and receiv'd, as alſo to hinder any to come near, and hearken to what is ſaid or ſpoken either to the Majors, or among themſelves.

How the Orders and Word are given to the Majors.

An abuſe in making it common.

Where Orders ſhould be given by the Majors in Fortified Camps.

After the Majors have done their buſineſs with their Major General, they ſhould give both the orders they have received from their ſuperiours, and their own to the ſeveral Regiments; and many think, they ſhould do this at their own quarters, beſide the Colours, which I think is formal enough, and may well

well enough be done: but my humble opinion is, they ſhould do it at the great Parade, and therefore I ſaid before, that at it there ſhould be a Serjeant of every Company there; and the reaſon I give for my opinion is this, that the ſeveral Companies that are to be ſent from that Parade to divers places of the Fortification, there to keep Watch, may carry the Word along with them, and ſo not need to wait ſo long as for the Major firſt to go home to the quarter of the Regiment, and then give out his Orders, and ſend them to the Companies that are on duty in ſeveral Poſts. And to anticipate that objection which I ſuppoſe will be made againſt my opinion, that Majors are to give to the Companies the orders of the Colonels, as well as of the Major Generals; I ſay, that at Parades, all Colonels, all Field and Commiſſionated Officers ſhould be preſent, for a Parade is the Exchange of Officers, neither ſhould any thing excuſe their abſence, but indiſpoſition, or being on preſent duty, and this is incumbent for Officers to do, where-ever the Parade be, whether in Camp or Garriſon; when the Major gives orders to his Sergeants he doth it in the ſame manner as the Major General doth to the Majors, and ſhould have a ring of Musketeers about him, to hinder any to approach or hearken, unleſs they be Commiſſionated Officers of that Regiment, who may be within the ring, and may hear, but ought not to ſpeak, while the Major is diſcourſing to the Sergeants. After Orders and the Watch-word are given, every Captain marcheth to that Poſt that is appointed him, and that appointment is made two ways, either as the Major General pleaſeth, in ſending Companies ſeveral nights to ſeveral Poſts, and not conſtantly to one; or it is done by billets, the way thus, The names of the ſeveral Poſts being writ in ſeveral Papers, they are caſt into a Hat, and are drawn by the Majors, who according to the billets they draw, ſend their Captains to their Poſts: And this indeed is the beſt way, for it ſaves the Major General from ſuſpicion of partiality; and doth a more general good than that, for it prevents Treachery, whether it be in Camp, Garriſon, Town, or Caſtle.

All Commiſſioned Officers ſhould be preſent at a Parade.

How the Poſts are divided.

After the Watch is ſet, it ſhould not be permitted to any, whether he be Officer, or Common Souldier from the higheſt to the loweſt, to leave his Poſt, unleſs ſickneſs occaſion it, neither indeed ſhould an Officer (of what quality ſoever he be) by abſenting himſelf, give example for Souldiers to deſert their Poſts; thoſe Officers who do it ſhould be exemplarily cenſur'd, yet for moſt part this piece of Diſcipline is neglected, which too often encourageth an Enemy to make attempts, which perhaps otherwiſe he would forbear. Truly, it is a ſhame to hear, what excuſes I have heard in more places of the World than one, and none more ordinary, than for an Officer to ſay, I was no longer from my Guard than I was taking my Dinner and Supper at my Lodging. If Officers would dine or ſup in their *Corps de guard*, as they are bound to do, Souldiers would not offer to go home to look for their meat. Officers ſervants ſhould bring their Victuals to them, and Souldiers Wives ſhould carry their Husbands meat to them, if they have Wives, if not, their Comrades ſhould do it.

No Officer or Common Souldier ſhould go from his Guard.

Watches being ſet, they ſhould have Houſes wherein they may ſhelter themſelves from rain, ſnow, cold, or exceſſive heat, and fire ſhould be in them, even in Summer, for kindling of Matches: Theſe houſes we ordinarily call Courts of guard, which ſome do not like; but I think they are wrong, for a *Corps de guard* in *Engliſh* ſignifies the Body of a guard, which may be in an open Field or Street, or where men may ſit, ſtand or lye, and ſo the *Corps de guard* cannot properly be interpreted to be a Houſe, which I think may be well enough called a Court of Guard. In theſe Houſes all that watch in too hot or cold weather, or if it rain or ſnow, may ſtay within, except Sentinels, yet they muſt not all be permitted to ſleep, for a third part at leaſt ſhould be ſtill kept waking, and to that purpoſe they may be permitted to play, ſo they make no clamour or noiſe; and if it be fair weather, Officers ſhould conſtantly ſee the third part of the Guard walking without doors. The Caporal and his Lanceſpeſate, or he who aſſiſts him, ſhould not both be aſleep, and ſeldome ſhould they both be within the Court of Guard, but without, either viſiting the Sentinels, or attending the Rounds, for both theſe Duties belong to them.

Corps de guard, what.

Two thirds of a Guard may be permitted to ſleep.

Watches in Garrisons.

Having spoke so fully of Watches and Parades in Leaguers and Fortified Camps, there is but little to add concerning them in Garrisons, whether Towns or Castles: In these, the Governours, and in their absence, their Deputies appoint the time when, the places where, the number how many, and

The time.

the persons who shall keep Guards, and who shall visit them. The time when to set the Watch is ordinarily some hour in the afternoon, sooner or later, according to the length or shortness of the day, or the pleasure of the Governour: The Emperours Armies had a custome to do it constantly at twelve a clock of

The place.

the day. The places where, are the several Courts of Guard, one in the Market-place, where the Head-watch lodgeth, one at every Port, one at every Bastion, one at every Half-Moon, Raveline, and Horn-work, and sometimes

The number.

not so many, according as the danger is great or less. The number how many is variable, according to the Intelligence or Strength of an Enemy, or according to the trust or distrust the Governour hath of the Citizens, Burgesses and

The Visiters.

Inhabitants. The persons to visit the Guards, are not only all Officers of whatsoever quality that are upon the Watch, but also the Gentlemen of the Com-

Who gives the Orders, and how.

panies, *Appointes*, or Reformadoes. If there be more Regiments than one in a Garrison, the Governour either calls all the Majors to him, and gives them the Word and other Orders, or if there be a Town Major, he gives his directions to him, and he imparts them to the rest of the Majors, and they to their Sergeants, in that same manner as I told you was done in a Leaguer; those that are on the Watch, and those that are to relieve them, standing all the while

To divide the Posts.

in Arms, and in great silence. After that, the Town Major divides the whole Watch into as many parts as there are several Posts, and sends them thither, either by his own command, or by billets: These Posts are of greater and lesser concern, and accordingly have more or fewer men allotted for their defence, and according to the number of the Souldiers, Superiour and Inferiour Officers are appointed to command them, as Captains, Lieutenants, Ensigns, and Sergeants, the Head guards being reserv'd for Field Officers, unless the place be besieged, and then they may have Posts assign'd them at Ports, Bastions, Half-Moons, or Horn-works. So soon as Guards come to their several Posts, the Officers who are to be relieved, shew what duty they are to do, and where their night and day Sentinels should stand; these being reliev'd, the Guard which hath watched, draws up in one body, and either marches or troops (according as the Governour orders it) if it have Colours, to the place where they lodge; but if it hath had no Colours, it marcheth to their Captain, or Colonels door, and is there dismis'd.

Rounds.

Those who visit the Guards, to see whether they and their Sentinels do their duty, are called Rounds. These are ordinarily divided into Grand, and Petty Rounds; nor do I know how to discourse better of both, than to reduce their

Questions concerning the Great Round.

duties to these questions which are made concerning them, and wherein many differ in their opinions, and resolve them as well as I can. First, Whether the

First.

Grand Round should give or receive the Word? Many are of the opinion; that though the General himself go the Great Round, he should give the word to the Caporal, because under the notion of trying whether all the Caporals of the several Guards have the Word right, an Enemy giving himself out for the Captain of the Watch, may get the Word, to the great prejudice of the Camp or Garrison. And indeed I find it was constantly given to the Caporal by all Rounds fifty or sixty years ago, but the other custome hath now prevail'd over all, except it be with the *Spaniard*. But the Officer, be he who he will, that goes the Grand Round, being known, there is no danger to give him the Word; and so any of the two may be used, as it pleaseth the Prince

Second.

or his General to appoint. The second question is, Whether the Captain of the Watch be obliged to go the first Round, or if he may send Petty Rounds before him, and go the Head round at any hour he pleaseth, because his main business being to see that all the Guards be present on their Posts, the longer he delays his coming, the better Watch will be kept, his presence being by them all expected every hour: Yet Custome in many places, obligeth the Great Round to go before mid-night, and to send Petty Rounds before him, if he go not the first Round himself, which he may do if he please; nay, some think he should go the first Round; but much of this, without hazard, may be left to his

his diſcretion, who is Captain or Colonel of the Watch, unleſs he be limited by the General. But if the Governour intend to go the Head Round himſelf, he ſhould acquaint him who commands the Watch with his intention; yet moſt Governours chuſe rather to go Petty Rounds, becauſe ſo they may beſt ſee how Sentinels behave themſelves, and when they come to a *Corps de guard* they give the Word to the Caporal, who knowing him, preſently calls out his whole Guard in Arms, that the Governour may ſee them all preſent; this is a duty which the Governour owes among many others: But I ſhall have a fitter opportunity to ſpeak of him in my Diſcourſe of Towns and Forts. The third queſtion is, Whether this Colonel, Governour, or Captain of the Watch, may ride his Great Round, or if he be oblig'd to walk on Foot? It being granted he may ride, (as all Rounds in ancient times did) the fourth queſtion will be, Whether he ſhould receive the Word on Horſe-back, or if he ſhould alight, and either give it, or take it? I think, if he be permitted to ride, I know no reaſon but he may either receive or give the Word on Horſe-back. The fifth queſtion is, Whether the Grand Round be obliged likewiſe to go the laſt Round, which ordinarily is called the Morning Round? and if he do, whether he ſhould likewiſe receive the Word? Inded I have ſeen it in ſome places refus'd, and in ſome practis'd; in my judgement, there is no ſhew of reaſon why the Caporal ſhould give the Word to any Round but the Head Round, though the General go it in perſon; for the receiving the Word by the Grand Round from the Caporals, is to know, that they have the Word ſo right, that they cannot be cheated with another Word by any of the Petty Rounds; there is neither neceſſity or conveniency to demand it again from them, and leaſt of all for the Morning Round to ſeek it, for that is the laſt Round, after which it is no matter whether the Caporal have the Word right or not. Indeed, it is my opinion, that he who commands the Watch in chief, ſhould go more Rounds than the Grand one, and eſpecially the Morning Round, for then is the danger of an Enemies infall moſt to be ſuſpected, but the receiving the Word once from the Caporals is enough in Conſcience, and I think too much. But the Caporal is ſtill obliged to call all his Guard to their Arms, whenever he ſees him who commands the Watch in chief, let him go as many Rounds as he pleaſeth. Our Rounders propoſe a ſixth queſtion, Whether he who commands a particular *Corps de guard*, either in Camp or Garriſon, be he Captain or Lieutenant, be obliged to give the Word to the Grand Round, or if it be enough that the Caporals do it. To which I anſwer, that the Caporals having the Word right is moſt neceſſary, becauſe it is he who receives all the Petty Rounds, and the Word from them: But if the Grand Round demand it from all the Officers, be they what they will, upon all the ſeveral Poſts, they are obliged to give it to him, but this is ſeldome practis'd. When the Caporal hears the Sentinel, who ſtands at the Court of Guard, bid the Round ſtand, and calls him to come out, he ſhould immediately iſſue with his Sword drawn, and two Musketeers with cock'd Matches attending him: The Caporal is bound to ask, What Round? and if it be anſwer'd, The Great Round, then the Caporal calls out all the Officers and Souldiers to their Arms, and letting the point of his Sword fall, either gives the Great Round the Word, or takes it from him, according to the cuſtome of the place, and after that he waits on him, till he be paſt all the Sentinels on the Walls that belong to that *Corps de guard*.

Third.

Fourth.

Fifth.

Sixth.

Caporals duty to the Grand Round.

Petty or common Rounds, where Guards are ſtrong, are frequently gone, by Lieutenants, Enſigns and Sergeants; yea, and by Captains, where all the Watches are commanded by a Colonel, or a Lieutenant Colonel: But for moſt part, Reformadoes, *Appointes*, and Gentlemen of the Company, do that duty, as I ſaid before; nor do they go theſe Petty Rounds when they pleaſe themſelves, but when they are directed to do it by their ſuperiours. At their return, they inform thoſe who ſent them, how vigilant or negligent they found Sentinels and Guards. They are obliged at every *Corps de guard*, to give the Caporal the Word, which if they do not right, he who commands that Guard may diſarm them, and detain them Priſoners, and the two Musketeers (who ordinarily convoy them) till he acquaint the Captain of the Watch with the whole matter. There is a queſtion, when a Round and Counter-round meet on the Wall, which of the two ſhall give the Word to the other? Some ſay, that he

Common Rounds.

Queſtion concerning them.

he who challengeth firſt, ſhould receive it; others aver, that the inferiour ſhould give it to the ſuperiour; ard ſo ſay I, if they know one another, as a Gentleman of a Company to a Sergeant, a Sergeant to an Enſign, and he to a Lieutenant; but they add that equals ſhould paſs by other, without giving it at all, but this may prove dangerous; and truly, I think the beſt way to take away conteſts of that nature, is to ſend no Counter-round at all, but make all the Rounds go one way. Neither do I think the ſending many Rounds the ſafeſt way to keep good Watch, for Sentinels (as experience daily ſhews) are more careful to take notice of Rounds who are their Friends, than of Enemies, who are without the Walls; eſpecially when they are ſure to be complain'd of and puniſh'd for neglecting to challenge the Rounds, but may eaſily ſhun to be queſtion'd for not challenging an Enemy who ſurprizes them. I have known Watches and Guards kept in better order by a few Rounds, and the Officers who were upon Guard, their frequent viſiting their own Sentinels, than when the Ramparts and Parapets of both Camps and Garriſons, did loudly echo with challenging, Who is there? and anſwering, Round; and then the reply, of either Round go by, or Round ſtand; and for that very ſame reaſon which I gave you but juſt now.

Too many Rounds uſeleſs, and hurtful.

There go likewiſe Rounds from the Head Watch through the Streets of Camps and Garriſons, and theſe are called Patrovils; they are ſent to ſee that no abuſes, thefts, robberies, clamours, ſquabbles or Riots be committed; and if they find any ſuch, they are not to connive at the doers of them, as too many of them do, but are to bring them to the Head Watch till they be examin'd next day; and for this reaſon, I would not have fewer Musketeers Carabiners, or Fire-locks ſent out with a Patrovil than eight or ten, becauſe three or four may be beat back to their Guard by ſome that are very inſolent, with whom no authority will prevail, but that which is armed; and indeed authority is not at all terrible, but when ſhe appears in Arms, for *Vana ſine viribus ira.*

Patrovils.

If Garriſons be kept in Towns, Forts or Caſtles, where Clocks are, the Sentinel may be reliev'd, as the hour ſtrikes, and ſo ſave Match; but if in the Fields or Leaguers, where no publick Clocks are, or in beſieged Towns, where ordinarily Clocks do not ſtrike, nor Bells ring, then the Caporals are to have allowance of Match, which they call *Paſſelunt*, whereby they regulate themſelves to relieve their Sentinels, when ſix, ſeven, eight, or nine Inches of it are burnt.

Paſſelunts.

In Camps and Garriſons, Drummers are to beat *Taptoo* at night, and in the morning *Revallie*. This word *Zapzu* or *Taptoo* is High and and Low *Dutch*, and ſignifies, no more drink to be tapp'd or ſold; and is not, as ſome fancy, to advertize the Guards to place their Night Sentinels, but to acquaint Sutlers to ſell no more drink, and Souldiers to go home to their Lodgings; and who is found out of their quarters after it, ought to be puniſh'd. It ſhould be beat conſtantly at one hour Summer and Winter, and ten a clock at night is a proper time for it: But By-Guards (as they are call'd) and Night Sentinels are to be put to their Poſts when day-light is well near ſpent, and this in Winter will be about four, and in Summer about ten a Clock at night; neither ought the laſt Night Sentinels to leave their Poſts till the *Dian* or *Revallie* beat, which cannot be done at one conſtant hour (as the *Taptoo*) for in Winter it may be eight, and in Summer three or four in the morning; and beat it ſhould not, till the Captain of the Watch gives order for it, and he is not to take up his meaſures by day-light, but by the clearneſs, darkneſs, or miſtineſs of the morning, the Night Sentinels being to continue on their duty, till they can diſcover all the Fields about them: When by order of the Colonel or Captain of the Watch, the *Dian* is beaten at the Head Watch, all the Drummers of the reſt of the Guards ought immediately to beat, and then the Night Watches and Sentinels come to their ſeveral Guards. It is then alſo, that the Souldiers (who have been in their quarters or huts all night) and either Townſ-men or Countrey people who are ordered to work at the Fortification either of Town or Camp, are to go to their work; and therefore this beating of the Drum in the morning, I think, is more properly called *Travaille* than *Revallie*.

Taptoo.

Night Sentinels and By-guards.

Dian, Travaille or *Revallie.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Of things previous to a Battel, of a Battel it ſelf, and of things after a Battel.

OF all Martial Acts, to fight a Battel well, and gain the Victory, is of the higheſt importance, and makes the Prince or his General moſt renown'd: It is this, (and neither Retreats nor taking Towns, though both theſe ſhew the qualifications of an excellent Captain) that crowns them with Laurel: By the winning of Battels, ſometimes one, ſometimes more Kingdoms are gain'd by one party, and loſt by another. Let us then take a view of thoſe things that ſhould be adverted to, before ſo great a hazard be made. Moſt men are of opinion, that he who hath the conduct of an Army ſhould never ſuffer himſelf to be forc'd to fight: I ſay ſo too, if he can help it, and what is the meaning of this, but that his Intelligence ſhould be ſo good, that if he intend not to fight, he ſhould either quickly get himſelf out of the way, or ſtrongly entrench his Army in a place where he cannot want proviſions. But when he hath done either of the two, he may be forc'd to fight, for who can ſave his Army without fighting, if his Enemy ſtorms his Retrenchment, or in his Retreat purſues him fiercely and powerfully? To force an Enemy to fight, hath a doubtful event, for many times it ſucceeds well, as it did with *Alexander* at *Arbela* againſt *Darius*, with *Scipio* againſt *Hannibal* at *Zama*, with his Brother againſt *Antiochus* in *Aſia*, with *Charles* the Fifth againſt the King of *France* at *Pavia*, and *Guſtavus* his Army againſt *Wallenſtein* at *Lutſen*. Yet peruſe Hiſtory, you will find that many more have loſt, than ever gain'd by it, take a few inſtances: *Edward*, the Black Prince, was forc'd to fight at *Poictiers*, ſo was *Henry* the Fifth of *England*, at *Agencourt*, yet both gain'd glorious Victories: *Harold*, when he might have protracted the War, being Maſter of all *England*, forc'd *William* of *Normandy* to fight, and thereby loſt both his Crown and his life: *Edward* the Second, of *England*, forc'd *Robert Bruce*, King of *Scotland*, to fight at *Bannockburne*, but loſt the honour of the day, and moſt of his numerous Army: *Julius Cæſar* made himſelf conſtantly maſter of his own dyet, either by Entrenching or Retiring, ſo that he was never forc'd to fight, but when he pleas'd: But when he forc'd *Pompey*, he try'd both Fortunes. At *Dirrhachium* he was beaten off with loſs, and was glad to retire, which indeed he did with admirable Prudence and Courage: At *Pharſalia* he brav'd the ſame *Pompey* to Battel, which ſo ſoon as he accepted, *Cæſar* got the Victory. Yet it ſeems moſt agreeable to reaſon, that men ſhould fight well, when they are forc'd to fight, Deſpair whetting their Courage; and for this reaſon many Captains take away all means of eſcape from their own Armies, to make them ſenſible their ſafety is in their hands, and not in their feet, and withal, they leave an open way for their Enemy to run away; and hence is the common Maxime in War, That a Bridge of Gold ſhould be made for a Flying Enemy.

Genera's ſhould not be forc'd to fight, if they can chuſe.

To force an Enemy to Battel ſucceeds ſometimes well.

Sometimes very ill.

A Golden Bridge.

Before a Battel it is fit to view an Enemies countenance, and try his Courage, by frequent Skirmiſhes, and theſe very oft (each Army ſending help to their own parties) draw on a Battel inſenſibly. Good Intelligence (if poſſible) ſhould be had of his numbers of Horſe, Foot, and Artillery, and in which of theſe his greateſt ſtrength lyes; but I will repeat nothing in this place of what I have ſaid in my Diſcourſe of Intelligence. In the next place our General ſhould view (if he have time and opportunity for it) the ſituation of the Field where both his own, and his Enemies Army are to fight, that accordingly he may either lay ambuſhes, or ſhun them: This was one of *Hannibal*'s Maſterpieces: he ſhould take notice how the Wind blows, that accordingly by the ordering

Intelligence.

Situation of the Field.

The Wind.

ordering his Batallions, he may take the advantage of it. He ſhould caſt up
The Sun. his account, how the Sun will ſhine (if it be a fair day) at ſuch hours, when he conceives the fight will begin, that thereby he may order his affairs. If his Intelligence be good within his Enemies Army, he ſhould endeavour to ſtir up
To make an Enemy jealous. jealouſies, diviſions, and diſſentions in it, and in the time of theſe, if his Friends give him the ſign, fall upon him. After his Army is marſhall'd, if he
Harangues. have time, he ſhould ride along the Front of all his Brigades, and by ſhort Speeches, Couragious looks and geſtures, and with Promiſes of noble Rewards he ſhould enflame the Spirits of his Souldiers with a deſire to fight, and withal, he ſhould aſſure them, that the honour of their Prince, and their own ſafety, depends only on their courage and gallant behaviour, all hopes of Retreat being taken away. But this commendable cuſtome of haranguing Armies by Generals is much worn out in our late Wars; and I ſhrewdly ſuſpect moſt of thoſe Orations we read are the fine fictions of Hiſtorians, who are better at that, than the deſcribing the manner how Generals marſhall'd their Armies. If a General be ſtrong in Cavalry, he ſhould ſhun fighting in a ſtrait or cloſe Countrey; if his Infantry be numerous, he ſhould ſhun Heaths and Champaigns; yet it is but ſeldome in his power (though ſometimes it be) to
The planting the Ordnance. chuſe either the one or the other. He ſhould adviſe well with the Maſter of the Ordnance, how to plant his Artillery, whether on the Flanks, in the great Intervals, or upon ſome heighth and aſcent, whether that be before or behind the Army, or if his train be great in all theſe places; this ſhould be done before the beginning of the fight, that accordingly Batteries and Beds may be readily made, and the Gunners ready to fire when they are commanded. Our Army being marſhall'd either in one, two, or three Bodies, as our General's own reaſon and experience will direct him, or the ground permit; of which I have ſpoken in the ſeventeenth Chapter. All theſe things being done, the Word and the Sign ſhould be given, and theſe are quickly carried through
The Word. the Army by the Major Generals and the Adjutants. At ſuce a time the Word is ordinarily a Sentence, (for Souldiers are no Grammarians) as, God with us, For God and the King, Our truſt is in God, and *Vivat* ſuch a Prince, and
The Sign. the like. The Sign may be a Handkerchief on the Hat, or a piece of Linnen on the right or left arm, a twig of a Birch, an Elme, an Oak, or a Sycamore, or it may be a Fur, or what elſe the Prince or his General pleaſeth. The Word and Sign are given both to Officers, Common Troopers and Souldiers;
Both many times alter'd. and ſometimes they are alter'd in the time of Battel, if there be any ground or ſuſpicion that the Enemy hath got them, or any of them. I remember, when the *Imperialiſts* had loſt the Battel at *Oldendorpe* in *Germany*, in the year 1633. the Priſoners (who were all *Roman* Catholicks) pretended they had been beaten by the juſt Judgement and Revenge of the Bleſſed Virgin, in regard, before the Battel began, the Word was *Sancta Maria*, and in the time of the Fight, it was changed (for the reaſon I ſpoke of) to *Viva Ferdinando*.

The Battel. Being ready to advance to the Charge, the General takes his place, having aſſign'd before, a Station to all his General Officers of the Field. Many have reaſon enough to think that the General himſelf ſhould ſtand in the middle of the Infantry of the Battel, where he uſeth to march, but that is not conſtantly practis'd, yea, and but ſeldome in our late Wars; for many times he
A Generals ſtation in time of it, who commands in chief takes his ſtation in the right Wing of the Cavalry; ſo did the Great King of *Sweden* at the firſt Battel of *Leipſick*, and ſo he did at *Lutſen* likewiſe: So did Count *Tili* at that ſame Battel at *Leipſick*, and ſo did *Banier* at *Woodſtock*. I told you formerly in my diſcourſe of marſhalling Armies, That *Charles* the Fifth intending to fight Sultan *Solyman* at *Vienna*, drew up all his Cavalry in the two great Intervals which his three great Batallions of Foot made, fifteen thouſand Horſe were in each of the two Bodies, and in that on the right hand ſtood the Emperour himſelf, and with that on the left, his Brother, King *Ferdinand*. Nor was, nor is, this cuſtome of a Generals ſtanding in the right Wing of the Horſe, or between it and the Infantry, a new thing, the *Roman* Conſuls uſing it frequently, when two of them joyn'd together. Sometimes in our late Wars, when the Army was marſhall'd in Battel
Should be where he pleaſeth. and Reſerve, five General perſons have commanded in five ſeveral places, as thus: In the Right Wing the Commander in chief; in the Body of the Infantry,

try, which makes the Battel, he who hath the command next to the General; in the Left Wing ſtood the third perſon in dignity; in the Right of the Reſerve, the fourth; and in the Left hand of it, the fifth. So the *Suediſh* Generals order'd their buſineſs at *Woodſtock*, where two of their Armies were joyn'd againſt an *Imperial* and a *Saxiſh* Army. *Banier* the firſt Felt-Marſhal, commanded the Right Wing of the Cavalry; *Leſlie* the ſecond Felt-Marſhal, commanded the Battel of the Avant-guard; Lieutenant General *King* the Left Wing of the Horſe, Lieutenant General *Vitſdrun* the Right hand of the Reſerve, and Major General *Ruthven* the Left. But in ancient times a General of an Army choſe to ſtand where he pleas'd, and where he thought his preſence could be moſt ſteadable: ſo *Pompey* made his ſtation in the Right Wing of his Army at *Pharſalia*; which *Cæſar* obſerving, choſe to ſtand on the Left Wing of his, that he might be oppoſite to his Grand Competitor. And I know nothing can tye a General in our times to take a ſtation, or no ſtation to himſelf, but as he pleaſeth. For my own part, I think, he ſhould tye himſelf to no particular place, but ſhould ride where he ſees or hears the greateſt danger to be. Indeed, he ought to appoint particular ſtations to all his general Field-Officers, from which they ſhould not budge upon any pretence whatſoever, without expreſs command from the Commander in chief, and theſe places ſhould be given them, according to the honour and precedency they enjoy by their ſeveral charges. As let us ſuppoſe he hath under him a Lieutenant General of the whole Army, a General and Major General of the Horſe, and a General and Major General of the Foot; he may place his Lieutenant General on the Right Wing of the Avant-guard, the General of the Cavalry on the Left, and the General of the Foot in the Battel, the Major General of the Horſe on the Right Wing of the Reſerve, and the Major General of the Foot on the Left: And keep himſelf free from any one ſtation, to ride with his Adjutants and Guards, where he thinks his preſence is moſt neceſſary, and ſhortly to be an Ubiquitary, that being reſtricted to no place, he may be every where. If he have more General Field Officers than theſe juſt now menti-on'd, he may place three more, one on the left hand of the Right Wing, the ſecond on the Left hand of the Left Wing, and the third on the left hand of the Battel.

Stations of the general Field-Officers.

A General an Ubiquitary.

Before the Battel begin, there uſe to be fore-parties of both Horſe and Foot ſent out to skirmiſh, theſe are called Forlorn Hopes, and *Enfans Perdues*: Thoſe of the Foot ſhould advance one hundred paces before the Body; thoſe of the Horſe further. But I find, at the Battels fought both at *Dreux* and *St. Dennis*, between the Proteſtants and *Roman* Catholicks of *France*, none of thoſe Forlorn Hopes were made uſe of at all, and as few were uſed at *Lutſen*, where *Guſtavus Adolphus* loſt his life.

Forlorn Hopes.

When an Enemy is marſhalling his Army, your Artillery ſhould inceſſantly play upon him, to hinder him all you may to order his affairs; and if your Battel be already marſhall'd, under the ſhelter of your Ordnance, you ſhould advance, and take your advantage of him, before his Batallions or Squadrons be drawn up; but in ſo good order, that the Scene be not changed, that by your precipitation you give not him an opportunity to take advantage of you. Your advance on an Enemy, in what poſture ſoever he be, ſhould be with a conſtant, firm, and ſteady pace; the Musketeers (whether they be on the Flanks, or interlin'd with either the Horſe or the Pikes) firing all the while; but when you come within Piſtol-ſhot, you ſhould double your pace, till your Pikes cloſely ſerr'd together, charge theſe, whether Horſe or Foot, whom they find before them. It is true, the buſineſs very oft comes not to puſh of Pike, but it hath, and may come oft to it, and then Pike-men are very ſerviceable.

To advance on an Enemy.

If a misfortune fall out, that a Brigade, Regiment, or other part of an Army be beat, or begin to run and quit the Field, this ſhould be conceal'd from the reſt of the Army; and the Souldiers told that the Enemy in other places is beaten, and if they fight but a little, the Victory will be inſtantly theirs. I ſhall not ſpeak here of what advantage a large Front is, having done it ſo often before; but if a General perceive that the buſineſs may be quickly decided, I think he ſhould double the Front of his Foot, and make but three Ranks, where formerly they were ſix, and ſo being able to out-wing his Enemy, he

To marſhal the Foot in three Ranks.

may fall on his Flank; for at no extraordinary march an Army may be brought to push of Pike, before three Ranks of Musketeers have fired successively, if they do not begin to fire till they be within distance less than Musket-shot, and after they have given their three Volleys, then they may give the fourth (which will signifie as much, if not more, than all the three) by kneeling, stooping, and standing; whereof I have spoke in the eleventh and twelfth Chapters.

When any Regiment or Brigade runs, or offers to quit the Field, the Reserve behind should be order'd immediately to advance, and encounter the Victorious Enemy, who will hardly be able to withstand that fresh charge, for it may be almost received as a Maxime, That a Troop, Regiment or Brigade, how strong soever it be, which hath fought with and beaten that Body of equal number that stood against it, may be easily routed by a Troop, Regiment, or Brigade that hath not fought, though far inferiour in number. If any part of an Army get the Victory of those who stand against it, he who commands that part, ought to send some Troops in pursuit of the routed Enemy, and with the rest fall on the Flank of that Batallion which stands next him, and yet keeps ground. The neglect of this duty lost the famous General, Count *Tili*, the Battel of *Leipsick*, for himself being on the Right hand of the Imperial Army, beat the Duke of *Saxe*, and his Army out of the Field, whom *Tili* hotly pursuing, did not fall on the Left Flank of the *Swedish* Army, left naked by the flight of the *Saxons:* But at that same time the King of *Sweden* (who was on the Right hand of his own Army) had routed Count *Pappenheim*, who commanded the Left Wing of the *Imperialists*; upon which that martial King did not fail to charge the Flank of the Imperial Battel, which was left naked by *Pappenheim*'s Flight; and this help'd to procure the Victory to the *Sweed.* As I told you in another place, *Banier*'s Right Wing was well near beaten at *Woodstock*, nor did the Reserve come so soon to his succours. About that same time, Lieutenant General *King* had routed the Right Wing of the Imperial Army, and with it bore down the Right hand of their Reserve, and fell on the Right Flank of their Battel (which yet disputed their ground with Feld-Marshal *Leslie*) who thereupon cast down their Arms, and yielded the Victory to the *Swedes*. And the mentioning this Victory puts me in mind to advertize all Officers of Foot not to teach their Musketeers to neglect the use of their Rammers, a lesson too often taught and practis'd; for at this Battel I speak of, the Imperial Foot were on a Hill, up which *Leslie* advanced with his Infantry, but neither his, nor the Imperial Musketers made use of Rammers, only (as the common custome is) when they charg'd with Ball, they knock'd the Buts of their Muskets at their Right foot, by which means most of the Bullets of the *Imperial* and *Saxish* Fire-men fell out at the mouths of their Musket, when they presented them down the Hill upon the *Sweeds*; whose Bullets could not run that fortune being presented upward: And for this reason it was observ'd that few of the *Sweedish* Foot fell.

When a Reserve, or a part of it, advanceth, those who fled have a fair opportunity to rally, and in a short time to second the Reserve; and though rallying at so near a distance is not frequently seen, yet it is not banish'd out of the Modern Wars, or Armies. At *Dreux* both Armies rallied twice or thrice with various success, the Generals of both Armies being both made Prisoners. And at *Lutsen* both Armies rallied often (for they fought from morning till night) most of the Imperial Cannon being twice taken, was as oft retaken. Some Great Captains have thought it fit in time of Battel, to make a show of their Waggon-men, Carters and Baggage-men at a distance, as if they were succours newly arrived; and certainly nothing terrifies an Army more in time of equal fight, than an unexpected Enemy; as *Robert* Duke of *Normandy*'s fortunate arrival in the time of Battel between *Godfrey* of *Bouillon*, and the *Saracens*, in the Holy Land, deliver'd the Victory to the Christians. But these feigned Musters of Baggage-men and Carriage-horses, produce not always the wished effects. *Sulpitius*, a *Roman* Dictator, being to fight with the *Gauls*, order'd all that attended the Baggage of his Army to mount upon Mules and Sumpter-Horses, and hide themselves in some near Hills and Woods, and in the time of fight to make a show as if they would cut off the *Gauls*, pass to their Camp, which the Muleteers doing upon a sign from the Dictator, the

A good Rule, but not Infallible.

Not to fall on the Flank of an Enemy a great neglect.

Instanced.

The doing it contributes to the Victory.

Instanced.

To rally.

Fresh succours in time of Battel discourage an Enemy.

Instance.

False shews sometimes happy,

the *Gauls* immediately fled. Such a Stratagem did King *Robert Bruce* happily use against *Edward* the Second, of *England*, in the Battel near *Sterling*: But the like being practis'd by the *French* at *Agencourt*, against *Henry* the Fifth, King of *England*, had an issue contrary to the thing intended. Not always.

It hath been always, and ever will be a rule of War, That no man offer to plunder, or look for booty, till the Enemy be totally routed, and chac'd out of the Field; but for most part it is ill observed. When *Parmenio*, at *Arbela*, sent word to his Master *Alexander*, that the *Persians* were fallen on the Baggage, which was but slenderly guarded; it was well answer'd of that great Prince, *Let*, saith he, *the Enemy be master of all the goods that belong to my Army, so I over master him, for then I shall recover my own, and get his to boot.* The not observing this rule lost the Christians the Victory against the *Turk* at *Agria*. At the Battel of *Janquo* in *Bohemia*, in the year 1644. (if I mistake not) the *Imperialists* were well near masters of the Field; in so far that several Brigades of the *Swedes* had run away, and very many of their Officers were taken Prisoners; but they fell too soon to the plunder of the *Swedish* Waggons, which *Torstensone*, *Christina*'s Felt-Marshal did not offer to rescue (though his own Lady was taken with them) but took the advantage of the Enemies disorder, and with fresh and couragious Troops pluck'd the Victory out of his hand, beat them out of the Field, recover'd his Lady, all his Prisoners and Baggage, and made himself master of all the Imperial Coaches and Waggons, took numbers of Prisoners, and among them him who commanded in chief, the Count of *Hatsfeld*. No plunder till an Enemy be totally routed. Instances.

I know not how the proposition of some will relish with our great Captains, that some lusty strong men should be arm'd with Head-pieces and Corslet, and long and large Targets, all Musket-proof; and a Rank of these ferr'd together, order'd to march before every Batallion of Pikes, and so protect them from shot, till they be within two Pikes length of the Enemy, that they can make use of their own Weapons. But whether this be approv'd or not, I think it would be of no great charge to the Prince or State, who manageth the War, to order every Pike man to have at his girdle a Pistol, with a Barrel two foot long, whereof the three first Ranks may make use before they present their Pikes, and the other three fire over the heads of those who are before them, in the time they are charging.

Now the Battel is done, and if it fall out, that it hath been so well fought, that none of the Armies can boast of Victory, but that both have left the place of Combate, as it were by mutual consent, or that they are parted by night, then either both prepare to fight next day, or the one finding those wants, of which the other hath no knowledge, takes the advantage of darkness, and retires to some place of security, where he may provide for his hurt men, be furnish'd with what he wants, recruit his Forces, and so give a stop to his Enemies further progress; and this, no doubt, is a tacite acknowledgement that he yields the honour of the day to him who keeps the Field. But this was never laid in ballance by any prudent Captain with the preservation of his Army, the loss whereof may lose the Prince his Master more than such a Punctilio of Honour, which at a more fortunate Rencounter, may quickly be recover'd. But if both resolve to try their fortunes next day, then both prepare for it, the wounded are sent away, Ammunition is given out, and those who are sound, are refresh'd and encourag'd. This falls out but seldome, though sometimes it hath happen'd. The Victory is pronounc'd to be his, who remains master of the ground where both fought; and in ancient times he acknowledg'd himself to be vanquish'd, who desired liberty to bury his dead. *Bernard* Duke of *Saxon Weymar* having belieged *Reinfeld*, and two Imperial Armies coming to raise the Siege, he fought both till night parted the fray, but with this difference, that the *Imperialists* got between him and the besieged Town, and so succour'd it; upon which the Duke retired, and left his Enemy the badges of Victory; but with a resolution to return, and throw the Dye of War once more, as he did, as you shall hear anon. Things to be done after the Battel. Badge of Victory.

When an entire Victory is obtain'd, he who hath lost the day should not lose his Courage too, but ought to gather up his Shipwrack, rally his dispers'd and broken Troops, get new recruits, dissemble his losses, encourage his party, and What a Vanquish'd General should do.

and draw to a head again; theſe are things practis'd by all intelligent Generals; withal he ſhould with all convenient diligence ſend a Trumpeter to the Victorious General, to demand a liſt of his Priſoners, which when he hath got, he ſhould make all the haſte he can to get them ranſom'd or exchang'd: and this is a duty he owes to Prudence, Honour and Conſcience.

What a Victorious General ſhould do.

On the other hand, he who hath gain'd the Victory may loſe himſelf if he be ſecure, for a reſolute enemy may ſoon take him napping. As that ſame Duke of *Weymar* did the Imperial Army that had beaten him; for having got together the reſt of his Forces that were not with him at his late overthrow, he return'd and gave Battel to the *Imperialiſts*, who dream'd of no ſuch thing, and obtain'd ſo compleat a Victory over them, that he made all the general perſons his Priſoners, who were led into *Paris* in triumph: *Duc de Savelli*, an *Italian*, was one of them, who eſcap'd afterward out of Priſon; but the deep contemplation of the ſudden change of fortune in his Military imployments, mov'd him to make an exchange of his Helmet with a Cardinals Cap. It is for that, that he who commands a Victorious Army ſhould not in ſloth paſs away his time, but improve his Victory to the greateſt advantage of his Maſter; and not be guilty of that whereof one of the greateſt Captains among the Ancients, *Hannibal*, was taxed, that he knew not how to uſe Victory; whereof two others, one before him and another after him, could never be accuſed, and thoſe were the Great *Alexander*, and the Great *Julius Cæſar*.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Retreats.

Four Maſter-pieces of a Great Captain.

TO Retire after a Battel, or a brisk Rencounter, leads me to ſpeak of Retreats. Next the fighting well, and winning of a Battel, the three great Maſter-pieces of a Captain are to make a Retreat, to take a fortified place, and to defend one: Of the firſt I ſhall ſpeak in this, of the other two, in the two following Chapters. Here I am not to ſpeak of thoſe petty Retreats which parties of Horſe and Foot make purpoſely, diſſembling fear, to make an unwary Enemy follow too eagerly, till he be brought to that Ambuſh prepar'd to intrap him, as is frequently practis'd in skirmiſh, when two Armies face each other, or in Battel when they fight, or when either an Army or a ſtrong party faceth a Town, whether it be block'd up or not. But this diſcourſe is of the Retreat of an Army, from the Poſt it once undertook to maintain from the Countrey, through which it once intended to march, or from the Town, Caſtle or Fort, which it once intended to beſiege, or block up.

Occaſions and Reaſons of Retreats.

The occaſions of Retreats may be theſe, Peſtilence, Flux, or other contagious Diſeaſes in the Army, want of Proviſions and Munitions, the approach of an unexpected or a ſtrong Enemy, ſome Diſorders, Diſcontents or Mutinies, or juſt apprehenſions of them; the couragious, or ſometimes obſtinate holding out of a fortified place, contrary to expectation; the ſudden diminution of the Army by ſome accident of War not foreſeen, or to joyn with thoſe Forces who are coming to ſtrengthen the Army, which conjunction, without ſuch a Retreat, might be hinder'd by an active Enemy. Or though none of thoſe be, yet he who commands an Army often retires, for reaſons known only to himſelf, or when he thinks it not conducible for his Maſters ſervice to hazard Battel with an Enemy, though no ſtronger, perhaps not ſo ſtrong as himſelf.

Retreats ſhould be made in time.

To make a Retreat from an advancing Enemy, or from Armies whoſe conjunction cannot be hinder'd, is not at all difficult, if he who is to make it, have ſo good Intelligence as he may begin it in time; but if it be bad or uncertain, or that his Scouts and Parties diſappoint him, nothing is more difficult;

cult; and in this place I refer you to my Diſcourſe of Intelligence; when an Enemy is near, orders are given and obeyed with ſo great haſte and confuſion, that the March looks rather like a flight than a retreat: and this hath ruined many Armies, and loaded their Generals with diſhonour and diſgrace.

If for want of good intelligence, an enemy comes unlooked for, or that a General have fought with loſs; in both theſe caſes, the retreat ſhould begin in the night. It is true, all Retreats infuſe fear in an Army, which is augmented by the darkneſs and horror of the night, and therefore the common Souldiers ſhould be encouraged, and told by their ſeveral Officers, that the Retreat will be but of a ſhort continuance, and that if an Enemy follow, they will face about and fight him; but withal very ſtrict and ſevere Diſcipline ſhould be kept that none ſtraggle, for in ſuch occaſions, they are very apt to run away, and indeed at ſome times, and in ſome places, it is better to hazzard a Battle than to offer to retire; for if an Army muſt be loſt, it is done with more honour by the firſt than by the laſt. But if an Enemy be near and a Retreat is reſolved on, it ſhould I ſay begin in the night, becauſe in the day time it will be ſeen, and then it is not to be ſuppoſed, that an Enemy will be ſo ſupinely negligent, as not to follow the Rear immediately; but though one Enemy know of anothers diſlodging, yet he will be very cautious to purſue him in the night time, having juſt reaſons to fear Ambuſhes and other ſtratagems; and if a retiring Army get the advantage of one nights march, he who commands it may next day poſſeſs himſelf of ſome fortified place or Paſs, and thereby be able to force him who follows to ſtand, and then he may adviſe whether it will be more convenient for his affairs, to continue his retreat or to fight, and many times this laſt ſucceeds well, but ſometimes it ſucceeds ill; but I ſay ſtill, better fight than ſtill retire, when the retreat cannot probably be made without the loſs of all or moſt of the Army. A Champaine or a long Heath, a numerous Cavalry of a purſuing Enemy, the wearineſs of both Men and Horſes of the retiring Army, hunger and want of ſleep very often render the fighting a Battle more feaſible than a Retreat. *Cornelius Arvina* a *Roman* Dictator, perceiving the *Sabines* would ſtorm his Camp, not yet well fortified, left his fires all burning, and retired in the dead time of the night, with all imaginable ſilence and diligence; but being overtaken next morning, and ſeeing he could not make his Retreat good without a viſible loſs, faced about and fought with ſucceſs. *Cneius Scipio* ſped not ſo well, becauſe he fought not in time. This Conſul perceiving three Armies againſt him in *Spain*, retired in the night time; next day the Enemies Cavalry was in his Rear, with whom he only skirmiſhed, but that retarded his March ſo much, that the *Carthaginian* Infantry reached him at night, before he could entrench himſelf; he fought them, but was beaten and killed: but if he had faced about in the day time, with his whole Army, and fought the Enemies Cavalry, he knew not what effects it might have produced. *Philip* of *Macedon*, being worſted by the *Romans*, retired in the night time to the Mountains, and thereafter preſented them Battle. Let us briefly ſumm up ſome of *Hannibals* Retreats from the *Romans*, and theirs from him, for they will very aptly ſhew the benefit and ſafety of Night-Retreats.

To begin a Retreat in the Night.

In ſome caſes better Fight than Retire.

Inſtances.

After this great *Carthaginian* had fought *Marcellus* at *Numiſtro* with equal fortune, knowing his own wants, he diſlodged in the Night and retired: *Marcellus* knew it, but durſt not follow him for fear of his Ambuſhes. Next Year *Marcellus* fought out his redoubted Enemy, found him at *Canuſium*, fought with him and was beaten, but fought the next day and did beat *Hannibal* into his Camp, out of which he retired that ſame night, *Marcellus* not daring to follow him. In the *Brutian* Country, the Conſul *Sempronius* is worſted by *Hannibal*, and gets him to his Camp, and in the Night with great ſilence retires, and joins with the Proconſul *Licinius*, returns, fights the *Carthaginian* and defeats him, and he in the Night retired with ſafety to *Croton*.

Hannibals Retreats from the *Romans*, and theirs from him.

Julius Cæſar intending to march away from *Pompey* to *Appollonia*, ſent away his ſick men and Baggage in the beginning of the Night well guarded with a Legion; at the fourth Watch he ſent away the reſt of his Army, except two Legions

Cæſar's Retreat from *Pompey*.

Legions and the Cavalry, ſo ſoon as they were gone, to ſave a punctilio of honour, he cauſed a March to be ſounded, and got him away with all poſſible ſpeed, and made his retreat good, notwithſtanding *Pompey*'s purſuit at the River *Genuſo*, with his Horſe mixt with Foot. But I find, that for the ſpace of four days he retired ſtill, ſending his Baggage conſtantly before, and following with his Army in the night, and what ſtands he made to face the Enemy behind him, were all in the day time.

Charles the fifth from the Duke of *Saxe*.

Nor have Princes and great Captains in our Modern Wars thought it diſhonourable to follow the example of that famous *Carthaginian*, and thoſe illuſtrous *Romans*, in making their Retreats in the Night-time, whereof I ſhall not weary you with more inſtances than three. The victorious Emperor *Charles* the fifth, finding himſelf not in a capacity to fight *Maurice* Duke of *Saxe*, (who was got very near him, before he had any knowledge of his march) retired with great ſilence in the Night time from *Inſpruck*, for haſt leaving ſome of his Houſhold-ſtuff behind him. *Francis* the firſt of *France*, having Victualled the beſieged Town of *Landrecy* in view of both the *Imperial* and *Engliſh* Armies, marched twelve Leagues back to *Guiſe*, where he ſtayed till the Emperor came in perſon, who marched with a puiſſant Army to give the King Battle. But *Francis* being ſenſible of the danger of an ingagement, left ſome Tents and Baggage, and many fires, and in the Night without Drum or Trumpet retired to places of ſafety: This was looked upon as one of the braveſt actions that ever was done by that Martial King; yet ſome blame him, perhaps with reaſon, for ſtaying the Emperors coming, after he had relieved the Town, which was his only errand.

Francis the firſt from *Charles* the fifth.

Wallenſtein from the Duke of *Weymar*.

Wallenſtein Duke of *Friedland*, fought the *Sweediſh* Army at *Lutſen*, till night parted them, and though he knew the King was killed, and that his own Forces were more numerous than the Duke of *Weymars*, yet knowing his own wants, he reſolved to retire, and did it that ſame night without noiſe of Trumpet or Drum, and left ſome Cannon behind him, and though he ſtaid next day at *Leipſick*, yet the night after, he got him away, and made but ſhort ſtay at any place, till he came to *Prague*, where he put himſelf in a poſture to meet and fight that Enemy, from whom he thought it then fit to retire.

But many who have preferred a vain punctilio of honour to the ſafety of their Armies, have loſt both their Armies and their honours. Whereof take only two inſtances. After *Lautrec* Captain General of the *French* Army had obſtinately continued the Siege of *Naples*, notwithſtanding that a peſtilentious Diſeaſe had conſumed the beſt part of his Army, and made the reſt unſerviceable, whereof he dyed himſelf. The Marqueſs of *Saluſſes* who ſucceeded him in the command, with the advice of the other prime Officers, reſolve to quit the Siege, and retire to *Anverſa*, where a *French* Garriſon lay, three Leagues from the Camp; in purſuance whereof, knowing their danger (ſince the *Imperialiſts* were very ſtrong within the City, commanded by two great Captains, the Prince of *Orange*, and *Davalo* Marqueſs of *Guaſt*) they divide their infirm and ſickly Army, equally, into three parts, Foot and Horſe, mixing the one with the other, and with every Batallion appointed three Falconets, leaving all the reſt of their Artillery and Baggage in their Leaguer as a prey to the Enemy. At break of day they march without Drum or Trumpet, and a tempeſtuous Rain falling in the mean time, hindered the *Imperial* Sentinels and Guards for a great while to take notice of the *French* Retreat; yet for all that they are overtaken by 500. Horſe and ſome Harquebuſiers on foot, and though the laſt Batallion of the *French* fired, and fought right well, yet did the *Imperial* Horſe, increaſing in numbers, fiercely charge them and rout them, and immediately after, the ſecond Batallion likewiſe, killing and taking all. Thoſe of the firſt Batallion by a ſpeedy march got to *Anverſa*, and ſaved themſelves till the Prince of *Orange* came, and made them render on diſcretion. Now it is very clear, that if the Marqueſs had begun his Retreat in the beginning of the night, or at midnight (for it was in Autumn) he had undoubtedly brought his Army ſafe to *Anverſa*; for his Rear would have been ſooner by that account at that place, than his Van was, which came ſafely, though it began not to march till break of day, and by the bargain he had ſaved his own life, for there he got his mortal wounds, whereof he dyed.

Error in the *French* retreat from *Naples*.

The

The second instance is of *Piter Strozzi*, a *Florentine*, who commanded in chief over an Army of *French* under *Henry* the second, near to *Sienna*, within which Marshal *Monluc* was Governour; An Army of *Spaniards* under the command of *James* of *Medici*, stronger by far than *Strozzi*, lay close by him. *Strozzi* resolves to retire to *Lusignan*, but would needs do it in the day time, and consulted the matter by Letters with *Monluc*, who disswaded him from it, with many reasons, and particularly by the fresh example of the late King of *France* his retreat in the night-time from *Guise*, and so prevailed with him to retire in the Night-time. And so soon as day was spent, he sent away two Pieces of Ordnance to *Lusignan*, intending to follow with the Army. But the haughty *Florentine* looking upon it as a dishonourable thing for him to show his back in the night-time to *Medici*, to whose Family he carried an inveterate hatred, would needs make his Retreat in spight of him in the day time; and the issue was, his Army was routed, and himself hardly escaped. But that which *Monluc* writes of this, is very observable, That he no sooner understood that *Strozzi* had resolved to retire in the day-time, but foreseeing the event of so frantick a resolution, he instantly conveened the Podesta, the Magistrates and principal Citizens of *Sienna*, and assured them the Army in which they trusted, at that very time and hour in which he was speaking to them, was defeated, and therefore advised them without delay to prepare for a Siege; and the event shewed he spoke truly, if not Prophetically, for that day was the *French* Army beaten, and next day the City was invested by the victorious Army.

Error in *Strozzi* his retreat from *Sienna*.

It is true, two of King *Ferdinands* Generals, *Cazzianer* and *Rocandolf*, (each whereof lost an Army to their Master of 24000, or 30000. brave *Germans*) retired, the first from *Esecchio*, the last from *Buda*, both in the night-time, but they did it not soon enough, and lost their Armies deservedly, because they obstinately continued at these places against all reason, and the advice of their principal Officers, when they had certain intelligence of the daily march and approach of the Turks. I never said, nor thought that a Retreat in the Night would infallibly save an Army; I have been an eye-witness of the contrary, but I ever said, and still think, that when an Enemy is near, a Retreat is much more proper to be begun in the Night than in the day. The timely and orderly breaking up and retiring of Armies from the Sieges of Towns, hath saved many of them, whereof it will be more proper to speak in the next Chapter, when I discourse of the Sieges of Towns and Fortified places.

Retreats should be made in time.

The manner of Retreats, whether they be made by day or by night, useth to be this. 1. The whole Train of Artillery (except some Field-pieces, which should stay in the Rear) with the Generals Coaches, Chancery, and principal Secretary, are sent away with a strong Convoy of Foot and some Horse, then all the sick and wounded men, next to them the Baggage of the whole Army, next to it a party of Horse, behind whom comes the whole Brigades of Foot, and after them the Cavalry, and in the Rear of it all the Dragoons, with as many commanded Musketeers out of the several Foot-Regiments as the Commander in chief thinks fitting, and as many of them mounted on Horses as can be, and behind them a select party of Horse and Foot for present service, which are to be relieved by turns, by those who are before them, one Party still facing the Enemy till the Party that was behind them be past. This is to be observed if the whole Army march one way; but if it can divide and go several wayes, the expedition will be the greater, the time and place being named (the last whereof should be a Pass or fortified place) by the General where all shall meet, so that he who is first shall stay for the rest, unless some command be given afterward to the contrary. The same order in retiring is to be kept by several grand Divisions or Wings of the Army, as if it marched in one Body.

The manner of a Retreat.

But the truth is, the Baggage of an Army makes so long a train, that it retards the Retreat exceedingly, especially where there are enclosures and hedges; and therefore I wonder that in all Retreats, order is not given to leave all Waggons and Carts behind, (for in a close Country that will be a great deal more advantagious than to burn them) and every man should take his best and

Waggons and Carts rather to be left behind in the highways than to be burnt in a close Countrey.

and moſt precious things out of them, leaving all traſh and luggage of ſmall value in them (which will likewiſe retard the purſuing Enemy) and theſe goods the officers ſhould caſt upon one Horſe, or two at the moſt, and upon the reſt of the Baggage-Horſes either ſick men ſhould be mounted, or Musketeers for ſervice, and this ſhould be ſeen done by the Colonels themſelves under pain of Infamy; and no leſs do they deſerve who will prefer a little paultry ſtuff to either the welfare of the whole Army, or the ſafety and preſervation of any one ſick or wounded member of it; yet this is not done ſo oft as occaſion requires it ſhould be, which groſs overſight can be imputed to none ſo much, and indeed, I think, to none elſe but to the General.

In all Retreats great care ſhould be taken that none get leave to fall behind, to prevent which not only all the Superiour and Inferiour Officers of Regiments ſhould do their duties, but the General Marſhals ſhould ſeverely execute their power againſt Delinquents; and here, if at any time, it is lawful to ſhoot thoſe who will not keep Rank and File. I told you that ſome light Field-pieces ſhould be left in the Rear, for there they may be ſerviceable; and the loſs is not great; if they be taken, for if he who commands the Army ſee he cannot with any probability face about and fight, nor can retire in that order that I have ſpoke of, being hardly purſued by a powerful and prevalent Enemy, he ſhould rather bury, or if he cannot do that, break and ſpring his great Ordnance, than loſe his Army by a hopeleſs hazarding it to preſerve his Artillery, and rather leave his Foot to fight for good quarters, than loſe both it and his Cavalry; for the rule never fails, That it is better to ſave ſome than loſe all; yet all means ſhould be try'd before either Infantry or Artillery be deſerted. I have heard that the ſtaying two or three hours for a Mortar which was a great one, and bemired in deep and dirty way, occaſion'd the loſs of Prince Palatine and Lieutenant General *King*'s little Armies in their Retreat from *Lemgaw* to *Vlotho*. When a party of either Horſe or Foot, or of both, perceives they are neither able to fight, nor retire in a Body, it hath been, and may be practis'd to disband the party; he who leads it, bidding every man that belongs to it to go what way he pleaſeth, or ſhall find moſt ſafe or convenient for him, and to meet at ſuch a place as he then names, ſo ſoon as poſſibly they can.

Ordnance to be broke or ſprung in ſudden Retreats.

That famous Retreat which the two Felt-Marſhals, *Banier* and *Leſlie*, made in the year 1637. from *Turgaw* in *Saxony*, made a great noiſe in the World. It was indeed a noble action, and the matter was ſhortly this: *Banier* had beſieged *Leipſick*, which kept out gallantly againſt him; he makes ſome breaches, and prepares to ſtorm it; in that very time come Letters from *Leſlie*, ſhewing that he was forc'd to retire from the River *Saal*, and march towards him, Count *Gots* with an Imperial Army being much too ſtrong for him: *Banier* immediately gave over the ſtorm and the Siege too, ſends away his Artillery, Baggage and Foot, and follows with his Cavalry, and joyns *Leſlie* at *Turgaw*, this Town they fortifie, and bring in a world of proviſions both for Man and Horſe, and reſolve to make it the ſeat of War, againſt all the *Imperial* and *Saxiſh* Armies joyn'd together at that time, to the number of fourſcore thouſand fighting men, under the command of Count *Gallas*, for the deſtruction of the *Swede*; whereof the two *Swediſh* Felt-Marſhals had good enough Intelligence, yet perſiſted in their reſolution, till the *Imperialiſts* were come very near them, and then they began to caſt up another account, and found they had loſt by their ſtay there a third of their Forces; and therefore, though a little too late, they reſolve to march to *Pomerania*; and ſo broke up, and got over the River of *Oder* at *Landsberg*, in ſpite of all oppoſition, and maugre all the Enemies they had about them, joyn'd with Felt-Marſhal *Wrangle*, without loſs of either Infantry or Cavalry. A very gallant and memorable action, yet it cannot be denied but they ſhould have begun their Retreat ſooner, and ſo have ſav'd that third part of their Army which they loſt. Next year *Banier* made *Gallas* retire with a quicker pace than he had made when *Gallas* purſued him. But that ſame *Banier* was not ſo fortunate four or five years after, in his Retreat from Arch-duke *Leopold*; for in it he loſt well near the whole Left Wing of his Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant General *Wittemberg*.

Banier and *Leſlie*'s Retreat from *Turgaw*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of several ways to take fortified places, particularly of Sieges, Trenches, Approaches, Redouts, Batteries, Zaps, Galleries, Mines, Storms, and Assaults.

THE Art to take fortified Towns and Castles, hath been always, and still is accounted one of the necessary endowments of a Great Captain. The manner used by the Ancients, and those of later times is still the same; for Breaches made by the Ram, and by the Cannon are still Breaches; and Approaches made by the help of the Vines, Tortoises and Muscles, and without them, are still Approaches. Fortified places may be taken three several ways, by Intelligence, by Surprizal, and by Siege. Of these three, that which loseth least time, and costs least Blood, is to be chosen; and therefore that of Intelligence with a party within the Fort is the easiest and the safest, and this, without doing it wrong, you may in plain *English* call Treachery: It proceeds principally from the villany of some within; and though this be one of the most hateful vices that corrupt our depraved nature, yet Princes and their Generals look upon themselves to be obliged not only to cherish it in an Enemy, but to hire men to commit it at excessive rates: For the price a Traytor will seek for the delivery of a Town, Cittadel or Castle, will seldome exceed that which the maintenance of an Army will amount to in two or three days: This is *Amo proditionem*. Whether it be lawful for men to solicite, encourage, yea, to hire men to sin, I leave to the Divines; but I can assure them, Military men think it very convenient to practise it. This way of taking Towns, *Philip*, Father of *Alexander* called his Golden Key. This treachery is committed either by the Governour, and then the whole Town or Fort is betrayed, and the hazzard which he without runs is little or none at all; or it is committed by one man, or one party within the Town, by betraying a Port, or Post, or part of the Wall, whereby he who commands without, may quickly make himself master of the whole Fort; but here he runs the hazzard of opposition from those who are not in the Conspiracy: But he to whom the place should be betray'd, ought to take good heed that he be not cheated, for it is a tickliſh piece. All Intelligences should not, nay, few Intelligences are to be trusted. I have told you in my discourse of Intelligence, how wary a General should be to trust those who offer to betray Forts, and gave you some Instances of those who have been abused by it; let me add one more out of the Duke of *Roan*'s Memoires: A *Roman* Catholick Gentleman, one *Meslay*, who had married a Protestant Wife, pretended some discontent with his own party, and having a Foot Company within *Montpellier*, watched every fourth night in the Cittadel; this, upon a stipulation of very advantageous conditions, he offers to deliver to a Cousin of his own, one *Bretigni*, a Protestant Gentleman, who serv'd in the Duke of *Roan*'s Army: After some demurr, the Duke approv'd of the matter, and march'd with six thousand men very near *Montpellier*, sent fifteen hundred men with *Bretigni* the Architect of the design, but advis'd him not to hazzard within the Cittadel, till *Meslay* came out and put himself in his hands; but credulous *Bretigni* neglected this so important a part of the business, and enter'd with thirty seven well arm'd men; the Traytor not daring to let more come in: *Bretigni* and his Brother and sixteen more were kill'd, and nineteen taken Prisoners. *Roan* who was not far off with the gross of his Army, retir'd in good order, more sorry for the loss of two brave Gentlemen, than the missing the Cittadel, as having mistrusted the design all along.

Three ways to take fortified places.

By Treachery.

A tickliſh piece.

A Traytor not to be trusted.

The second way of taking fortified places is Surprizal, whereof there are so many kinds that they cannot all be reckon'd: Sometimes Forts are sur-

By surprizal.

priſed by Souldiers diſguiſed like Countrey people, both as men and Women with ſhort Carabines, Piſtols, or Daggers under their Cloths, wherewith they diſpatch a Guard, and ſo are maſters of a Port, and immediately give the ſign to them to advance, who are ordained to ſecond them. Sometimes it is done by Armed men hidden in Waggons and Carts under a little Hay, or Straw, whereof the firſt ſtops on the draw-Bridg to hinder the drawing it up, then all leap out of their Waggons, and whilſt ſome are killing the Watch, others are underproping the Portcullies with Forks, made purpoſely for hindring it to fall; in the meantime they give the ſign to their Friends, who are not far off. Sometimes a Town is ſurprized by an Enemies entring man by man at a Poſtern or hole made for evacuation, or at ſome ruinous place of the Wall; ſometimes by a ſudden and unforeſeen ſcalado; ſometimes by petarding the Ports or Draw-bridges. If any of theſe wayes of ſurprizal ſucced, it is the next eaſy way to intelligence. In the next Chapter you may read how Forts are defended againſt all theſe wayes of ſurpriſal.

By a Blockade.

The third way to take Fortified places, is by Siege, and it is twofold, either by not making approaches, which is called a Blockade, or by approaching, and this is more properly called a Siege. A Blockade is made by a General when he hath hopes to ſtarve a Garriſon, as knowing that they within have either conſumed their Victuals themſelves, or lent them to their Friends; and this was *Briſac*'s condition when the Duke of *Weimar* blocked it up. The way to block a place, is, to lay Regiments and Companies of Foot and Horſe at all Paſſes, Advenues, or other convenient places, to hinder all perſons, all Proviſions, and all things to enter the Blockaded Fort. This way to take Forts ſaves blood, and is of leaſt danger, provided he who blocks up the Fort be abſolute Maſter of the Field during the whole time of the Blockade, but it ordinarily loſeth very much time to the Beſieger, for I have known a Town blocked a whole year, and not taken then without a petty Battle.

By a Siege.

A Siege properly ſo called, is, when an Army inveſts the place, entrencheth it ſelf, makes Approaches, Redoubts, Batteries, Zaps, Galleries and Mines, and after all that, either leaves it or takes it by ſurrender or aſſault. The forming and carrying on a Siege is no ſmall Maſter-piece of a General, to whoſe own ſpirit, conduct and prudence, many circumſtances muſt be left; as to the conſideration of the nature, ſtrength or weakneſs of the place he is to beſiege, the ſeaſon of the Year, the ſtout or weak reſiſtance he may expect from the Garriſon within; of which and of the abilities of the Governour he ſhould have good Intelligence: He ſhould alſo have a ſerious conſideration of his own Proviſions, Money, Meat and Munitions; and many more particulars, of which, and concerning which, no definite or certain rules can be given. And before he form or lay down his Siege, he ought to weigh and conſider well all the advantages and diſadvantages that may accrue to him: As whether the gaining the Town or Caſtle he Beſiegeth will counterpoize the loſs of men, and that vaſt expence of money, meat and munitions, that muſt be hazzarded and beſtowed in reducing it; how long time his own Proviſions will be able to hold out, whether he be able with probability of ſucceſs, to withſtand or fight any Enemy that dare adventure the relief of the Beſieged place. And that which concerns moſt both his Maſters ſervice and his own honour, is to caſt up his account ſo well, that if any unexpected accident or adventure fall out, ſuch as are the change of Weather, inundations of Waters, a mighty and unlooked for Succourſe, a Peſtilence or other heavy diſeaſe in his Army, he may notwithſtanding theſe, and in ſpight of an Enemy, raiſe his Siege, and march away to places of ſafety, and conſequently make an honourable Retreat with little or no loſs of Men; for it is not to be thought that an Army marcheth away from a Beſieged place with diſhonour, becauſe *ratio Belli* depending on emergencies, and accidents, changeth as oft as *ratio Status*; and as in this nothing is thought diſhonourable that can ſave the State, ſo in that, nothing can be diſhonourable that can ſave the Army.

Conſiderations before a Siege be formed.

How to begin the Siege.

I have not the vanity to preſcribe or give rules for what ſhould be done at Sieges, but I preſume, I may be permitted to tell Novices, (for to them only I write) what is done and ordinarily practiſed at Sieges. After a reſolution

is

is taken to Beſiege a place, diligence and expedition ſhould be uſed, that all Paſſes, High-wayes and Avenues be poſſeſt by the Cavalry, that no entrance to the Fort be permitted; and that all Citizens or Souldiers belonging to it, be ſeized on and made Priſoners, that intelligence may be got of all affairs within. Many Generals at Sieges entrench their Armies, and many do not. Thoſe who do not, have no apprehenſion of an Enemy, and therefore upon intelligence of the approach of one, they muſt be ready to march, either to meet and fight that Enemy, or leave both him and the Beſieged place for good and all; both which I have known practiſed. Thoſe who Entrench their Armies, take the far ſurer way; though the doing it coſts a great deal of time and labour. The Entrenchment muſt be made both againſt thoſe within the Town, and againſt any without, who will hazzard to relieve it. The Fortifications of the Camp are properly called the *Trenches*, (though the word be frequently taken for approaches) and in that word are comprehended the lines of Communication, which Lines are divided into ſeveral parts, Field-ſconces, whole and half Bulwarks, Star-works and Redouts. None of theſe ſhould have a Curtain between them above ſix or ſeven hundred foot long, for the diſtance of them one from another ſhould be leſs than a Musket ſhot. They ſhould be built of black Earth, if it can be had; but if the ground be ſandy, it muſt be knit together with Withs, faſcines, Straw, or growing Corn, and without with a Ditch and Palliſado. Of the ſame matter ſhould the Redouts and Batteries in the approaches be built. The Star-ſconces having their ſides 40 or 50 foot long, and their points far diſtant, are ordinarily made in haſt, when time will not permit better to be made.

At ſome Sieges Armies are not entrench'd.

Armies Entrenched at Sieges.

If an Army be numerous enough, or that there be ſtore of Pioneers with it, a General may fortify his Camp, and begin his approaches both together, and this will ſave him much time, which in ſuch occaſions is very precious. But if he cannot do both at once, he ſhould Entrench himſelf, and then begin thoſe works, which are called Approaches, running Trenches, and by the *Dutch Laufgraben*. In making theſe to break Ground without the range of a piece of Ordnance, will be too far, and within Musket ſhot perhaps too near, yet many think 8 or 900. foot from the beſieged Fort is paſſable. At this place where the approach begins, a Sconce ſhould be made, and in it a Court of Guard; neither were it amiſs here to make a Battery, and in it to plant ſome Culverines and twelve pounders, to beat down the neareſt Parapets of the Fort, from whence thoſe who are to work in the approaches may be infeſted. But before I approach any nearer the Fort, I muſt tell you, that I admire how Captain *Rud* the late Kings Engineer hath left it upon Record, That the Romans were the firſt that uſed the Spade at Sieges, and that *Julius Cæſar* was the firſt that beſieged Towns by circumvallation. Againſt the firſt aſſertion, though we ſhould not ſpeak of prophane Authors, yet we find it written in the 15. *verſe* of the 20. *Chapter* of the ſecond book of *Samuel*, *That* Jacob *caſt up a Bank*, (ſaith our Tranſlation) *againſt* Abel, *where the Rebel* Sheba *was*. Deodati in his *Italian* tranſlation calls it *Baſtione*, a Bulwark: Now theſe could not be done without the help of a Spade or ſomething like it; and this action of *Joab* was done ſome ages before *Romulus*. Againſt the ſecond aſſertion, I object the ten years Siege of *Ven*, which was by circumvallation, and that was ſome Centuries of years before *Cæſar* beſieged *Alexia*. And we read in holy Writ, that Trenches were caſt and Towers built againſt beſieged Towns, and that was nothing elſe but circumvallations; and thoſe who made them, did ſo little know *Cæſar*, that they did not foreſee, that ever ſuch a man would be in the world as *Cæſar*.

To approach to a Fort.

Captain *Rudd*'s opinion diſputed.

But to return to our firſt Sconce or Battery, from it a line, or if you pleaſe a running Trench (which upon the matter is nothing elſe but a Ditch) muſt be digged, and run either to the right or left hand, 3, 4, or 500. foot long, a little crooked and oblique, for doing which, Souldiers are appointed with Pickaxes, Spades and Shovels, one behind another at the diſtance of 4, or 5. foot, the formoſt digging 3, or 4. foot deep, caſting the Earth up either to the right or left hand between him and the Fort, and ſo by him who is firſt, and them that come after him; the running Trench is made 6, or 8. foot deep, and at firſt 6. Foot broad, and thereafter 10, or 12. broad; ſometimes more,

A running Trench.

if it be neceſſary to make uſe of Waggons in the approaches, which falls out ſometimes. At the end of this firſt Line a Redout is to be made; this is a work of four ſides and four Angles, for moſt part equilateral, each ſide 40, 50, or 60. foot long: And ſometimes, but very ſeldome, Redouts are built of an oblong figure, and then the longeſt ſide may be of 120, 100. and the ſhorteſt 40, 50, or 60. foot. From that Redout another approach runs 5, 6, or 700. foot long to the other hand in the ſame manner, and at the end thereof another Redout or Battery ſhould be made, from whence begins the third running Line to that hand, that the firſt Trench did run, and ſo alternately till Batteries be made, and the Zap begin. Obſerve, that the ground without, on which the approaches are to be made, is divided by the Generals appointment into ſeveral Poſts. The approaches whereof to the Beſieged Fort, go equally on; and therefore all the Redouts and Batteries of them ſhould defend, flank, and ſecure one another againſt the outfalls and Sallies of the Beſieged.

A Redout Equilateral.

An oblong one.

The nearer the approach come to the Ditch of the Fort, the deeper and broader it ſhould be, the better to defend the Souldiers; and the deeper any work be, that requires a Breaſt-work, the higher will the top of that Breaſt-work be: for that reaſon, many times three ſteps of a foot bank will be neceſſary for Souldiers to aſcend to the defence of their Breaſt-works, either in caſe of Sallies, or yet to give fire upon the Parapets of the Towns Fortifications.

Breaſt-works, and Foot-banks.

In ſuch convenient places of theſe approaches, as either the General of the Artillery or Quartermaſter General (for to their charges and inſpection belong the Approaches) ſhall think fit, ſome of theſe Sconces ſhould be made, which commonly are called Batteries; for properly a Battery is nothing elſe but the Platform on which the Ordnance ſtand, which is alſo called the Bed of the Cannon; and on theſe Batteries ſuch Pieces are planted as are thought neceſſary, ordinarily whole and Demi-Cannon, and whole and Demi-Culverine. In making theſe Redouts & Trenches, conſideration ſhould be had of the nature of the Earth that is digged; if it be good black Earth, it will ſerve without help for Breaſt-works; but if not, then muſt Baskets be made, and filled with Earth or Sand compactly. But whether the Breaſt-work be of Earth, or made of Gabions, it is neceſſary it be ten or twelve foot thick. If the ground be mariſh, no doubt, it will exceedingly retard the Approaches; for Wooden palls muſt be ſtruck in the Earth, and Withs, Straw and Rubbiſh laid upon them for a foundation to a Battery; and upon the Battery, Gabions and Baskets filled with Earth, as was done by Prince *Henry* of *Orange* at the Siege of the *Buſch*, and there he was well helped in that mariſh Ground by a dry Summer. Where a running Trench is made, if the ground be tollerably good, and yet mariſh on both ſides, it muſt be made in a ſtreight and direct Line, and not an oblique one, as the other whereof I ſpoke: and for the defence of the Souldiers, there muſt be blinds, and the Trench it ſelf ſhould be two foot deeper than an approach which is either crooked or ſerpentine.

A Battery.

Gabions and Baskets.

Some running Trenches direct, ſome oblique, ſome Serpentine.

When the Approaches are brought near the Ditch of the Beſieged place, the Counter-ſcarp (which is the ſhield of the Fortreſs) is in danger, and then the Zappe begins. This Sappe or Zappe is nothing elſe but a digging, as all the reſt of the Approaches are; but men have appropriated it to that digging which is near to, or in the Counter-ſcarp. We have borrowed it from the *Italian*, in which Language *Zappa* ſignifies a Mattock, *Zapare* to dig or delve, and *Zappamento* a digging or delving. The Sappe then begins at both ſides or faces of the Bulwark, towards which the approaches have been made, ſometimes but on one ſide the Souldiers Zappe under favour of the Canon, which ſhould play luſtily from the ſeveral Batteries, and of the Musketeers, who ſhould inceſſantly fire upon the Flanks and Parapets of the Baſtion, from both Batteries and Redouts; the manner of Sapping is this: Againſt that part of the Bulwark which the Beſiegers intend to undermine, (which ordinarily is the capital point, or that angle that coupleth the two faces of the Baſtion) one man kneeling or bowing, digs three foot deep and three foot broad, throwing the Earth both before and on both ſides of him, and ſtill advanceth; another follows him cloſe, and makes it three foot broader and deeper, if the Ground

Zappe why ſo called.

The manner of a Zappe.

Ground permit it; to him ſucceeds the third, who adds three foot more to the depth and breadth, ſo that a man may walk covered. In this manner (the Zappers being often reliev'd by turns) the Zap is continued, till they have digg'd through the Counterſcarp, which muſt be done, though it be lin'd with Stone and Mortar, otherwiſe all their labour is loſt. When this is finiſh'd, the Beſiegers are to fight with the two mercileſs Enemies and Elements of Fire and Water, the firſt from the Walls of the Fort, the ſecond from the Ditch, over which they muſt be, before they come to the Wall, for doing whereof all the Earth and rubbiſh that hath been caſt out in Zapping, muſt be caſt in the Foſs; and with it, a world of Faſcines, which are bundles or knitchels of the twigs and ſmaller branches of Trees, in every one whereof ſhould be Stones to make them ſink, they ſhould be ſix or ſeven foot long; for this reaſon, at Sieges, Souldiers, when they are not on other duty, are order'd to make many thouſands of them. There muſt likewiſe uſe be made of great logs of Timber, great Stones, and ſacks full of Sand, or any thing elſe that may be thought fitting to fill the Ditch; and this is continued without intermiſſion (your Ordnance and Musket firing inceſſantly on the Flanks and Parapets of the beſieged) till a damm be made to the place you would be at, ſuppoſe it be that angle of a Bulwark I juſt now ſpoke of, becauſe it hath no other defence but from that part of the Curtain which is called the ſecond Flank, which, for that reaſon, the Beſiegers ſhould make as uſeleſs as may be with Cannon and Culverine. Obſerve in paſſing (ſince you are paſſing over the Ditch) that if there be any Caſemates (as now they are not much uſed) they muſt be deſtroy'd before the damm be begun. Upon this damm (which muſt run more to one ſide of the angle than the other, that ſo it may be ſubject but to one Flank) a Gallery muſt be made, the one ſide whereof, which is in greateſt danger, muſt according to the dammage it is to expect from the Artillery, be ſeven, eight, nine or ten foot thick of ſtrong Balks, coupled together in manner of a gallows, covered above with Boards, above which is to be laid Earth three foot thick: If the other ſide of the Gallery be made up with ſtrong boards, it will be ſufficient. Theſe Galleries may be more or fewer, according to the number of the Baſtions of the beſieged place, or the ſtrength and number of the Beſiegers Army. Prince *Maurice* of *Naſſaw* had ſeven of them at *Juliers* when he beſieg'd it, about ſixty years ago.

How to fill the Moat.

Caſemates.

A Gallery.

Galleries being made over the Moat, the Beſiegers either make a breach with their Ordnance, or they Mine before they come to the Aſſault, or they do both. If a breach or *Breche* be reſolv'd on, it is the moſt expenſive way; for, as I told you in my Diſcourſe of Artillery, ſome require to make a *breche*, eighteen pieces of Ordnance, eight whole Cannons, ſix Culverines, and four Demi-Culverines; and for theſe ſome Gunners require three Batteries, one for the Cannon to ſhoot in a direct line, and two for the Culverines to ſhoot croſswiſe or obliquely, to cut away thoſe parts of the Wall which the Cannon hath ſhaken. I ſhall not trouble you with a diſcourſe of Batteries, which are thoſe platforms of Boards on which the Pieces ſtand, how even and plain they ſhould be made, that they ſhould be higher behind than before, according to the greatneſs of the Piece is to be planted on them, both to hinder her to recoil too far, and bring her the more eaſily forward to her Loop hole; nor of the length of a platform to fit a piece for her carriage and recoil; nor of the ſeveral ſorts of Batteries, as thoſe of Earth, of Timber, and of Woollen Sacks; nor of ſunk Batteries, nor of the *Appareill*, which is nothing but the aſcent to the Battery, for the more eaſie bringing up the Cannon to it: All theſe things, and many more concerning Batteries, belonging properly to the Gunners Art, and but accidentally to this Diſcourſe. I ſhall only tell you, that when a *Breche* is to be made, Gunners differ about the diſtance that ſhould be between the Battery, and the Wall to be batter'd. Some are of opinion that one hundred and fifty paces are far enough, and that no Battery ſhould be made further from the mark; and thoſe ſay likewiſe that the neareſt Battery ſhould be four hundred foot from the mark: Others ſay two hundred foot makes a convenient diſtance, and a third ſort (it may be with greateſt reaſon) aver, that a Battery at the Counterſcarp, where only the breadth of the Moat is between the Battery and the Wall hath the greateſt force, and the Ordnance prove moſt effi-

To make a *Breche*.

Diſtance of Batteries from the place to be battered.

efficacious. But the nearer the Battery be, the greater care ſhould be taken that their Parapets be ſo ſtrongly and well contriv'd, that neither the Ordnance may be in danger of diſmounting, nor the Gunners and Matroſſes in hazzard of their lives, but neither theſe, nor many things elſe can be ſecur'd by the wit of man. Theſe old Stone Towers that ſtand on Walls, fortified *a l' antique*, ought to be batter'd down, at leaſt their Parapets; for I have ſeen more hurt done from thoſe to Approaches, than from either Curtain or Bulwark of any Modern Fortification.

Three ſeveral Batteries to make a breach.

I have ſaid, that to make a breach ſome require three Batteries, one for the 8 Cannon, the ſecond for the 6 Culverines, and the third for the 4 Demi-Culverines. The firſt to play on direct angles, which terribly ſhakes the Wall; the ſecond to play traverſly and croſs, to cut out what the Cannon hath ſhaken, and the third to beat down the Parapets, or render them uſeleſs. By this means it is conceived, that in leſs than twelve hours time a ſufficient breach may be made, which the Defendants muſt not be permitted to repair, for an Aſſault ſhould immediately follow. Nor will I in this place trouble my Reader with the different opinions of Gunners, yea of Captains, whether it be more conducible for gaining the Fort, to make a breach in a Bulwark or a Curtain. Some ſay, as I told you formerly, the faces of a Bulwark near the Capital having leaſt defence, are with leaſt danger attack'd and aſſaulted, and therefore ſhould be firſt batter'd; others think, that Baſtions having moſt *terreplein* (for we muſt ſuppoſe them full of Earth) render Breaches for a long time ineffectual, becauſe having ſo much Earth ſo near at hand, they may quickly be repaired, and other Retrenchments may be made ſucceſſively behind one, two, or more breaches; whereas there is a far greater difficulty to do ſo in a Curtain, where there is no more earth or *terreplein* than the thickneſs of the Rampart; and to that, that the danger of aſſaulting a Curtain comes from two Flanks of the two neareſt Baſtions, they ſay, they may be made uſeleſs before the Aſſault both by the direct and traverſe Cannon, adding of Demi-Culverines, Quarter Cannons, and Field-pieces.

Whether to batter a Curtain or a Bulwark.

Mines.

But having overcome the difficulties of the Moat, it is many times thought fit to lodge at the foot of either Bulwark or Curtain, and there to undermine. What uſe the Ancients made of Mines, I have ſhewn you in its proper place; nor are Mines other things now than they were in the days of yore, except that they differ in their contrivances; for of old, the principal end of Mining was to underdrop the Wall with Timber, till the underminer was order'd to fire that Timber, and therefore the Mine might be greater and wider than now, when Gun-powder is to be put into it. *Norton* in his practice of Artillery ſays, that *Pietro di Navarra* was the firſt who made uſe of Gun-powder in Mines, and made Furns or Ovens, or as we call them, Powder Chambers. If this be true, (as I know nothing to the contrary) it ſeems ſtrange to me, that the compoſition of Powder being found out by the *German* Monk about the year of our Lord 1301. it ſhould not have been uſed in Mines two hundred and thirty years after its invention, for it is not yet one hundred and thirty years ſince *Pietro di Navarra* dyed. He was a very ingenious man, and a ſubtile and vigilant Captain, for his great and good ſervices *Charles* the Fifth gave him great rewards, and made him an Earl: But *Pietro* having deſerted him twice, and gone over to the *French* King, he was taken at the Siege of *Naples*, and kept Priſoner in the *Caſtel del Ovo* (which by his dexterity himſelf had formerly taken from the *French* for that ſame *Charles*) and old, crazy, and ſickly as he was, his Head, by order from the Emperour, was appointed to be taken off; but the morning before his execution, it was prevented either by himſelf, or his favourable Guardian *Hickard*, and he was found dead in his Bed, as *Giovio* relates the ſtory.

Pietro di Navarra.

To demoliſh a Wall by a Mine is to be preferr'd to a Battery, for two reaſons; firſt, it is of far leſs expence; ſecondly, Batteries being ſoon perceiv'd, may be made uſeleſs, by Countermures and Retrenchments; but Mines are more imperceptible, yet they are dangerous works for them that are in them, becauſe of Countermines, which when the Mine-maſter finds, he is to divert his courſe to the Right or Left hand, or ſink his Mine deeper; and if the Counterminers be under him, he had need make haſte and take his advantage, by piercing holes

Countermines.

holes, and chacing them away with ſcalding Water. But take a few general Rules for Mines. The entrance ſhould be ſeven foot high and five foot broad, ſay ſome; four foot and a half high and four broad, ſay others: This laſt, and indeed perhaps no Mine is for a fat corpulent man. The Mine all along muſt be lin'd on both ſides, and cover'd above with boards, and underpropt for keeping up the Earth. The mouth of the Mine ſhould be carefully conceal'd from the beſieged. *Philip* King of *Macedon*, who was afterwards beaten by the *Roman* Conſul *Flaminius*, did not ill to cauſe a great heap of Earth to be laid on the other ſide of a beſieged Town, there where his real Mines were, and ſo deluded the beſieged. The heighth and breadth of the Mine ſhould decreaſe, and grow leſs by little and little, from the entry till it arrive at the place which ſhould be undermined, ſo that the mouth of the Furn ſhould be no wider than to receive the Veſſels wherein the Powder is, whether theſe be Barrels or Troughs. Some will have this Powder Chamber to be ſix or ſeven foot high, four or five broad, and five or ſix long; others ſay, only four foot and a half high, the breadth four, or three foot and a half: But I think aſſuredly it ſhould be proportion'd to the quantity of the Powder, and the number of the Veſſels that are ordain'd to be put into it. Theſe Furns ſhould be cloſely and ſtrongly ſtopp'd, that the Powder get no vent, but that which naturally it ſeeks, upwards. The train whereby the Powder in the Furn is to be fired, ſhould be ſo well order'd that it be not too long a firing, for that diſappoints them who are to ſtorm, making them apprehenſive of danger of they know not what: And this occaſion'd the death of two *French* Marſhals within theſe forty years, who admiring why the Mine did not ſpring, after they had order'd the train to be fired, went into the Mine to know the cauſe, where they both dyed; the Mine at their being there, working its effect: Nor muſt it fire too ſoon, leſt he who fires the train, be buried in the ruins of the Mine. Beſides Countermining, ſeveral things hinder the effectual operation of a Mine; ſuch are, the ill ſtopping the Powder-Chamber, the weakneſs of the ſides, occaſion'd by Countermines, Caves, Caverns, and hollow grounds, as alſo the failing of the train in its duty, by reaſon of its wetneſs, moiſture, or ſome bad contrivance, and the placing the Powder too low in the Furn. When a Mine hath ſprung, if it caſt the Wall outwards towards the Beſiegers it makes the entrance very difficult for the aſſailants, if the Defendants act their part with Courage; and it is juſt ſo with a breach after a Battery, which *Charles* the Fifth, and his General the Duke of *Alva*, experimented at the memorable Siege of *Metz*.

General Rules for Mining.

The Train.

What hinders Mines to ſpring.

When large Breaches are made by furious Batteries, and that Mines have operated happily, then an univerſal Aſſault ſhould be given by the whole beſieged Army, each part of it being to ſtorm at its aſſigned Poſt. Theſe Aſſaults being given reſolutely, and continued obſtinately, though the firſt or ſecond may perhaps be beat off, will probably reduce the place: And then it will be a noble part of the Victorious General to order fair quarter to be given; or if the beſieged have with too much obſtinacy, and upon weak grounds, by holding out too long, and by making him ſpend too much of his time, provok'd him to wrath and revenge, to make examples of them to others, he ſhould order no hurt to be done to women, old men, and children; and in one word, to kill none but thoſe who are found in Arms: But a promiſcuous putting all to the Sword, ſparing neither ſex nor age, is too often practis'd; for the Pillage, the Ancients uſed after the expugnation of Towns, to bring it all to the Treaſurers Lodging, who ſold it, and diſtributed the money, as he was appointed by the General, ſometimes all of it to the Army, ſometimes a part of it, and ſometimes none of it. The like hath been often practis'd in the Modern Wars, but the cuſtome is almoſt worn out, the Plunder belonging to thoſe who can take it, which is *Capiat qui capere poteſt*; and this is truly a very unequal partition, for thoſe who ſtay in Arms upon the Wall, or perhaps in the Market-place, to make them good againſt any oppoſition may ariſe from hidden Reſerves of the Enemy, ſhare not ſo well as thoſe, who ſo ſoon as they enter, run preſently to the Plunder. Some Princes and Generals give the Pillage of Towns, taken by ſtorm, to their Armies for ſo many hours, ſometimes for a day, for two days, or three days. It is commonly thought, the Priſoners and

Aſſaults.

Fair quarter to be given.

Plunder.

and their ranſomes belong to thoſe who took them, and ſo it is commonly practis'd, unleſs they be great Officers, and thoſe ſhould be deliver'd to the General, yet that General ſhould be ſo generous as to beſtow ſome handſome Preſent or gift on thoſe who took them, which ſome do, but many do not. The Ordnance, and all that belong to it, all publick Magazines of Proviſions, Munitions, and Arms belong to the Prince or State who manageth the War.

Reaſons to leave a Siege, and retire.

But if all Aſſaults be beat off, and all the Beſiegers have done hath prov'd ſucceſsleſs, or that the beſieging Army is waſted, as no doubt, it will diminiſh every day, or that a numerous and freſh ſuccourſe be expected, or other unhappy accidents fall out; then a wiſe General will raiſe his Siege in time, and rather march away, than be chac'd away, and he ſhould go where he may refreſh and recruit; and be wiſe by the examples of thoſe otherwiſe renown'd Princes and Generals, who have obſtinately continued Sieges, to their irreparable loſs and danger: So did *Lautrec*, a great Captain, continue the Siege of *Naples*, fighting againſt a redoubted and couragious Enemy within the City, and a contagious diſeaſe which rag'd within the bowels of his own Army, which occaſion'd firſt the loſs of his own life; ſecondly, the ignominious rout and deſtruction of all his Forces; and thirdly, the utter undoing of the *French* Intereſt in that Kingdom to this very hour. So *Charles* the Fifth, a fortunate and warlike Emperour, and his General the Duke of *Alva*, a renowned Captain, continued the Siege of *Metz* (which was gallantly defended by the Duke of *Guiſe*) till the Imperial Army moulder'd away, and was made deſpicable, by the ſword, ſickneſs, and grievous winter weather, and at length was forc'd to make a pitiful Retreat from it, after which that great Prince retir'd to a Cloiſter, and from it to another world. So did that Emperours Great Grandfather, *Charles* of *Burgundy*, with a great deal of vanity, but with a greater deal of loſs, continue his Siege of *Nuiſe* as it were in deſpight of the *Roman* Emperour, and all the Princes of *Germany*, till he was forc'd to ſneak away from it, with dammage and diſhonour enough. So did *Rocandolf* continue the Siege of *Buda*, notwithſtanding all the prayers and perſwaſions of all his great Officers to the contrary, to the utter undoing of a rich and a gallant Army, as hath been told you in another place.

Obſtinacy in continuing them loſeth Armies.

Inſtances.

To raiſe a Siege without taking the place no diſhonour.

But as in ancient times, ſo in our late *European* Wars, it hath been an ordinary thing for brave Generals to raiſe their Sieges, either upon the intelligence of the advance of a ſtrong ſuccourſe, or ſome other weighty conſideration. So did the great *Guſtavus* raiſe his Siege from *Ingolſtadt* in *Bavaria*: The *Swediſh* Felt-Marſhal *Banier* from *Leipſick* in *Saxony*: His Succeſſor *Torſtenſon* from *Birn* in *Sileſia*, and *Wrangle*, who ſucceeded him, from *Eggar* in *Bohemia*: So did *Wallenſtein* from the Sieges of both *Magdeburg* and *Stralſund*: So did Marqueſs *Spinola* raiſe his Siege from *Bergen op Zoom*, upon Count *Mansfeld*'s conjunction with *Maurice* Prince of *Orange*, and was not aſham'd to bury ſome of his Cannon, that he might make his Retreat with more expedition: So did that ſame Prince *Maurice* raiſe the Siege he had form'd at *Groll*, upon *Spinola*'s advance towards him. And ſo did his Brother *Henry* Prince of *Orange* riſe from *Venlo*, upon the approach of the Cardinal *Infant*. But if a General be well provided, and there is no ſickneſs in his Army, and if he have ſtrong hopes to carry the place, he ought not to leave it, unleſs it be to fight the ſuccourſe that is coming to it. This hath been often practis'd, ſometimes unfortunately, and ſometimes ſucceſsfully. Take a few inſtances of both. Count *Tili* left the Siege of *Leipſick*, march'd toward the King of *Sweden*, who came to relieve the Town, and fought him, but to his great loſs: So did the Duke of *Weymar*, and the *Suediſh* Felt-Marſhal *Guſtavus Horne* leave the Siege of *Nordling*, and march'd to fight the *Hungarian* King, but with the loſs of the day, and their Army too. But that ſame Duke of *Weimar* had afterwards better fortune when he beſieg'd *Briſac*, from the Siege whereof he roſe twice, and fought the Armies that were ſent to relieve the Town, and return'd both times to the Siege, crown'd with Laurel. So did the *Swediſh* Army leave the Siege of *Hameln*, (that Town out of which they ſay a Piper plaid firſt all the Rats, and next all the Children, and of the laſt none returned) and met the Imperial Army which advanc'd to relieve it, and fought with Victory. So did the *French* and *Engliſh* leave the Siege of *Dunkirk* not many years ago, and fight *Don Juan d' Auſtria*, and beat him.

Inſtances.

To march from a beſieged Fort to fight an Enemy, hazzardous.

Inſtances.

But

But if the Beſieging Army be well, and ſtrongly entrench'd againſt an Enemy both within and without the Town, and want for no proviſions, he ſhould make no ſuch hazzard, but lye ſtill, and when a ſuccourſe comes, it muſt either look on, and leave the attempt, or ſtorm the Beſiegers fortified Camp. If the ſuccourſe be forc'd to march back without doing his errand, then the Beſieger is maſter of the Town or Fort. So did the Duke of *Alva* when he beſieg'd *Mons* in *Henault*, keep himſelf within his fortified Camp, and endur'd all the bravadoes of *William* Prince of *Orange*, who came with an Army out of *Germany* to relieve the Town, the Duke knowing well that the Prince for want of Money would in a ſhort time be forc'd to disband his Army. If he who comes with the ſuccourſe, reſolves to ſtorm the Beſiegers fortified Camp, he doth it with as much diſadvantage as an Army without ſhelter can fight with one that is entrench'd, and ſeldome ſuch attempts are ſucceſsful. *Hannibal* try'd it at the Siege of *Capua*, and though he did it both skilfully, cunningly, and couragiouſly, yet after he had ſtorm'd the *Roman* Camp, and was beat off, he was forc'd to leave that rich and great City to be a prey to its exaſperated Enemy. Count *Pappenheim*, though a brave Captain, yet gave cauſe to queſtion his diſcretion very much, when he was ſo laviſh of his Maſter, the Emperours Souldiers (at a time when he had ſo much need of them againſt the Victorious King of *Sweden*) as to ſtorm the fortified Camp of *Henry* Prince of *Orange* at *Maeſtricht*, where he left not ſo few as 1500 dead men on the place, beſides as many more who were wounded. The Prince followed a precedent was given him by *Spinola*, when he beſieg'd *Breda*, who kept himſelf within his Trenches conſtantly, when firſt *Maurice*, and then *Henry* Prince of *Orange* and Count *Mansfield* offered him Battel, and beat off likewiſe ſome aſſaults more made on ſome places of his Camp, by that ſame Prince *Henry*, and Sir *Horatio Vere*.

To lye ſtill entrench'd notwithſtanding of any ſuccourſe.

To ſtorm an entrenched Camp often unſucceſsful.

When an Army that hath attempted the relief of a Town hath retir'd, and is either baffled or beaten, the Governour of the beſieged place may with reputation yield on honourable conditions, which will not be ſo good as they would have been before; but be what they will, they ought to be punctually and inviolably kept; but of this I ſhall ſpeak in another place. If a Beſieger obtain a Victory over the Army that comes to relieve the beſieged place, ſome think he may drive all his Priſoners to the Ports of the Town, and if the Governour will not take them in, he may ſuffer them to ſtarve. But I can find no reaſon why the Governour ſhould admit them, and far leſs why the Victorious General ſhould have reſpited their lives from the Sword, to put them to a more mercileſs Death; yet I ſaw ſome part of this practis'd at that Town of *Hammeln*, whereof I ſpoke but juſt now; for, after the defeat of the Imperial Army, the *Swediſh* General ſent all the Priſoners (who were no fewer than three thouſand) to the Ports of the Town, but the Governour gave entrance to none of them. But, I conceive, this was done only to frighten the Garriſon out of the thoughts of further reſiſtance, and to give them within, aſſurance that their Friends were defeated, and not to ſtarve thoſe poor Creatures. But the matter came not to the tryal, for next day the Governour ſought a Parley, and got it, and then made an accord, got Articles fair enough, and gave over the Town.

Of rendition.

To drive Priſoners to the Port of a beſieged Town.

The ſeveral works that are without the Ditch of a Royal Fortification muſt be taken notice of ſo much, that it will be neceſſary for a Beſieger to make himſelf maſter of them, before he make his approaches to that ſide of the Fortreſs, on which any of theſe outer works are. Engineers ordinarily make five kinds of them; theſe are, Half-Moons, Ravelines, Horn-works, Crown-works, and Tenailles; ſome add a ſixth kind, Traverſes. The manner to take them is the ſame I have already deſcrib'd, only I add, that it will be fitting (if poſſible) to take away the Water out of thoſe Moats that are not dry, for the ground of Water-Ditches often proves muddy, yet the mud is ſooner made paſſable with Faſcines, than water is. It is true, if the Ditch be any thing deep, after the Water is away, you muſt have Ladders to deſcend at the Counterſcarp, but theſe may help you to aſcend the Scarp, or the *Fauſſe Bray*, if the Fort have one. The taking away Water from a Ditch is very ordinary, and practicable by any Engineer, if there be a deſcending ground from any part of the Moat.

The ſeveral kinds of Outworks.

To draw Water from a Ditch.

But notwithſtanding all hath been ſaid, he who leads an Army, if he find none of theſe works without the Counterſcarp to retard him, and the place it ſelf either is not well fortified, or ſcarce of Men and Munition, or thoſe within are timorous, or do not well agree among themſelves, or that by his Intelligence he hath learned that the Governour is either not experienced, not vigilant, or is a man of little Authority or Courage, after his firſt ſummons (by the anſwer whereof he may gueſs at the Governours reſolution) he may, to ſave his Maſter much expence, and himſelf and his Army much time and labour, ſo ſoon as he arrives make Batteries, and after a furious Cannonading, fill up the Moat as well as he can, eſpecially if it be a dry one; clap Ladders to the Wall, and his Souldiers being well refreſh'd and encourag'd, hazzard a ſtorm with probability enough of ſucceſs: But on the other part, if the place be well mann'd, (though the Fortification be none of the beſt) and commanded by an active and experienced Governour, who hath good Officers under him, and wants for neither Meat, Artillery, Arms, or Munition, it is but high preſumption, or rather madneſs, to give an Aſſault without theſe previous Approaches, Breaches and Zaps, whereof I have ſpoke. The late King of *Sweden*, a very martial Prince, blemiſhed his reputation in Military affairs by his inconſiderate ſtorming *Copenhagen*, in which was the *Daniſh* King with all his Family, many of the Nobleſs of *Denmark*, a good Souldiery, three thouſand Students well arm'd, and ſome thouſands of Burgeſſes, who were to fight manfully for all that could be dear to men on Earth. The event of this Aſſault was correſpondent to the attempt, for *Charles Guſtavus* was beat off with a great loſs of both his Army and Honour. Nor was his Unkle *Guſtavus Adolphus* excuſable (though he was the *Mars* of his time) for ſtorming the Imperial General *Wallenſtein*'s Camp at *Nuremburg*, ſtrongly fortified on a Hill, and who with his own and the *Bavarian* Forces, had as many men within his Leaguer as the King had without, yet was the Aſſault obſtinately continued almoſt a whole day, and as reſolutely was the Camp defended by the *Imperialiſts*; inſomuch that the Hill ſeemed to be nothing but fire and ſmoke. The concluſion was, the King was beaten off, and forc'd to leave ſome thouſands of dead men on the place, and fill all the Lazaretto's of *Nuremburg* with thoſe who were hurt and wounded. This action of his proceeded from the great confidence he had in his fortune, and former ſucceſſes; but here ſhe turn'd her back and frown'd upon him, nor did ſhe ever ſmile on him afterward, for about three months after that he loſt his life at the Battel of *Lutſen*.

To ſtorm without Approaches.

Inconſiderate aſſaults ſeldome ſucceſsful.

Charles Guſtavus.

Guſtavus Adolphus.

There is a Book of Military matters, dedicated by an *Italian* Earl to the late *French* King, this Kings Father; it is call'd, *Il Guerriero prudente & politica del Conde Galeazzo Gualdo priorato*: After he hath diſcourſed of the attacks of Forts, he concludes thus, *Il lavoro delle quali Batterie, Traverſe, Gallerie, Approci, & altre ſimili attioni, eſſendo opere inſegnate Diligentiſſima mente da molti buoni Autori, ſparmiero il tedio, che poteſſe ricevere il Lettore da queſte mie imperfette fatiche.* The labour or travel of theſe Batteries, Traverſes, Galleries, Approaches, and ſuch other Actions, being works which have been moſt diligently taught by many good Authors, I ſhall be ſparing to give my Reader the trouble he may receive from theſe imperfect fatigues of mine. Theſe words I deſire my Reader to look upon as my language or at leaſt as my ſenſe, by which I excuſe my ſelf from running out more copiouſly on thoſe particulars.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Defence of fortified places against all the ways of expugnation. Of all things necessary for Forts; of Governours, of their duties and qualifications.

THere be as many several ways and means to preserve and defend Towns, Forts, Castles and Cittadels, as there be to take them: But the most difficult part of all is to guard against Treachery; it is a close and hidden Engine, against which open defences are seldome proof. Nor do I know any better way than for a Governour still to imagine he may be betray'd, and therefore to be constantly on his Guard, to trust but few, and yet seem to trust all: He should have a wary eye (without seeming to be jealous) on all the Inhabitants of the place, upon the Officers and Souldiers of his Garrison, especially on such as are known to be of revengeful, discontented, or avaritious Inclinations; and if he learn that there is any tampering between any one of them and an Enemy, he should do well to proceed against them with just severity, for that will prove to be *pœna ad paucos, terror ad omnes.* If the Governour have any Intelligence at the Court of the Prince or State who are Enemies to his Master, or with the Secretaries of their Generals, it will be easie for him to learn what Traytors he hath in his Garrison, and to proceed accordingly against them. A good antidote also against the poison of Treachery, is neither to trust the several Ports nor Posts of a Garrison'd place constantly to one Officer, nor to one Company or Band of Souldiers, whereof I spoke in my Discourse of Watches and Guards. It hath been of bad consequence in all ages, and will be ever a temptation to all base and treacherous Souls to hatch treasonable designs. The doing it ruin'd the late gallant Duke of *Guise*, and all his great actions, whereby he went fair to have disburthen'd the King of *Spain*'s head of the Crown of *Naples*, immediately after the unexemplified Rebellion of *Masanello*; but the Duke's entrusting the several Posts of that great City of *Naples*, constantly to the same Officers, encourag'd one of them to treat with the Count *d'Ognati*, and sell him that which was entrusted to him, when the Duke was reducing an inconsiderable Isle without the City: this blasted all his fair hopes, and shortly after lost him his liberty.

How to guard against Treachery.

The late Duke of *Guise*.

I told you in the last Chapter, that Surprizal was the second, and next to Treachery, the easiest way to take fortified places. I spoke of several kinds of Surprizals; of any of which, if a Governour gets Intelligence, it is easie for him to render it ineffectual, with the great hazzard, if not the inevitable loss of many of the intended Surprizers; but without Intelligence, a Scalado is prevented by Guards duly order'd and set, strictly and severely kept, and by the diligent going of Rounds either the circuit of the whole Fort, or from Post to Post: for a Scalado is soon perceiv'd by vigilant Sentinels and careful Rounds, and as soon are the Ladders thrown down, with those who are upon them. So were the Duke of *Savoy*'s people used at *Geneva* seventy years ago, where the Inhabitants expecting no such thing in time of Peace, kept but a very careless Watch. And when *Spinola* besieg'd *Breda* in the year 1625. Prince *Maurice* of *Orange* his design to scale the Cittadel of *Antwerp* was utterly defeated by a more than half sleeping Sentinel. In the next place, there will be no danger, for a Fort to be surpriz'd by Souldiers disguis'd like Countrey people, if a vigilant Guard examine and search narrowly all who enter the Ports, especially in the mornings and evenings, which should be done in all Frontier Garrisons; and the proper place for doing this is eight or ten paces without the Draw-bridge, where there should be a great balk, laid traverse the Streets,

Against a Scalado.

Against a disguis'd Enemy.

A *Spaniſh* Reuter.

tyed at each end by an Iron Chain to a Poſt made firm in the ground, and through that balk are great holes bored, through which are pales of Wood made faſt, and theſe ſharp at both ends, this denies acceſs to any, either Horſe or Foot, till it be open'd. And here likewiſe ſhould all Waggons and Carts be ſearched, eſpecially if they ſeem to be loaden with Hay, Straw or Corn, through and in which Halberds ſhould be thruſt, for many times under ſuch coverts, arm'd men are carry'd in at Ports of fortified places. Neither ſhould any Cart or Waggon be ſuffer'd to ſtop on a Draw-bridge, for that is often done to hinder the drawing it up, till an Enemy lurking not far off, runs to the Port and ſurprizes it; and in ſuch a caſe, if the Portcullis (at which, for that purpoſe there ſhould conſtantly ſtand a Sentinel) be not very ſoon let down, an Enemy may underprop it with ſtrong Forks, ſhorter or longer, made purpoſely for that uſe.

Againſt Waggons & Carts.

If the Ports of a Town, Caſtle or Fort, be in the midſt of the Curtain, as they ſhould be, and ordinarily are, the Flanks of the neareſt Baſtions ſeem ſufficient to defend thoſe Ports from Petards, or any other manner of Surprizal; yet ſome think that long and great pricks of Iron of five or ſix foot length, fixt in the lower part of the Draw-bridge would do well, that when the Draw-bridge is drawn up, thoſe pricks ſtanding out may hinder Petards to be affix'd, as alſo that in the upper parts of the Gates and Ports loop-holes be made, pretty wide, out of which may be thrown Stones, Logs of Timber, and Granadoes againſt the Petardeers, or Water pour'd to quench the Petard, if it be already hung on. There are ſeveral other ways to be uſed againſt Petards, concerning which I refer you to Engineers and Gunners. But it were good to have within every Port a piece of Ordnance of a large Caliber, conſtantly charg'd with Cartridges, wherewith to welcome thoſe who firſt offer to enter, for one of thoſe unexpected Vollies doth often make an Enemy (who in all Surprizals hath the half, if not more, of the fear) retire faſter than he advanced. I knew an Enemy who had got over the Walls of a little Town in *Germany*, without oppoſition, and had advanc'd to the Market-place, where receiving not above fifteen or ſixteen Musquetades, run over the Walls faſter than he enter'd. There be two general ways good againſt all manner of Surprizals. The one for the defence of Ports, that is, a Raveline before every Port defends it from all manner of Attacks and Enterprizers. The ſecond to defend Curtains and Bulwarks, if the Ditch be dry, a row of Palliſadoes planted in the middle of it, ſecures the Wall, for theſe cannot be cut down ſo ſoon, but the Guards (unleſs they be all aſleep or drunk) will be ſufficiently alarm'd to receive an Enemy: If there be two Moats, and Water in both, a row of Palliſadoes between them ſecures the place; if there be but one, and Water in it, it ſhould not be full to the brink, for ſo Boats may eaſily tranſport men, but they cannot deſcend with them, without being heard, and then they may be aſſured of a ſhrewd reception. But all this depends on the careſulneſs and watchfulneſs of the Guards, on which indeed doth principally depend the ſecurity and ſafety of the place.

A great piece of Ordnance within a Port.

Two defences againſt all Surprizals.

To defend Forts againſt Blockades, or formed Sieges made by Approaches, there be ſix things requiſite; firſt, the fortification of the place, whether that be by Nature, or by Art, or both; ſecondly, Men; thirdly, Money; fourthly, Victuals; fifthly, Ammunitions; ſixthly, all kind of Arms, Defenſive and Offenſive, therein comprehending Artillery. The firſt of theſe belongs to the Engineer, wherein I have no more skill than to tell my Reader, that he, or any who will ſtudy Fortification, will profit more by one leſſon taught by word of mouth from an Engineer, than by twenty writ in a Book, and illuſtrated every one of them by Figures. I ſhall ſpeak a word or two of every one of the other five neceſſaries for a Fort.

Six things requiſite for a Fort againſt Sieges and Blockades.

Fortification.

The ſecond requiſite is Men, of whom there ſhould be no more nor fewer than are able to maintain it. Horſe-men, if the Siege continue long, prove burthenſome, yet in three caſes they may be made uſeful, firſt to make Sallies, both before and after the Beſieger makes his Approaches, till thoſe come ſo near, that Horſe dare not hazzard out; ſecondly, if there be a void ſtreet or Interval between the Houſes and the Rampart of the Fort, ſo broad that Horſemen can ride five or ſix in breaſt, they may be very ſerviceable to beat an Ene-

Men.

Horſe-men how ſerviceable in a Siege.

Enemy out, after he hath come over the Wall confusedly. This Interval all ancient Towns had, and they call'd it *Pomærium*, for they had two of them, one before, or without, and another within the Wall. Thirdly, If the Horses be called to the Shambles (which in Sieges is no extraordinary case) the Horse-men may either have a Post given them to defend, or they may be divided among the Foot. When Count *Nanso* (about one hundred and thirty years ago, an Imperial General, storm'd *Peronne*, after a great breach made in the Walls of it, he was beat off by the *French Gens d'arms* belonging to the Lord *Florenge*, who left their Horses, and in full Harness, with Pikes, Partizans and Halberds, maintain'd the breach two hours till they were relieved. And I have seen my self, Horse-men alight from their Horses to storm with the Foot. The estimate of the number of the Foot for maintaining a fortified place against a Siege must be taken from the circuit of it: Some will have for every Bulwark of the greater Royal Fortification one thousand Souldiers, and for the lesser Royal eight hundred, meaning still besides the Inhabitants, others four or five hundred Souldiers enough with the Citizens. But since we know not what the number of the Inhabitants will be, such, I mean, as are able to bear Arms, or whether they may be trusted or not, we must cast up our account without them. Some therefore will have for every ten foot of the circumference of the whole Fort six Souldiers, but others think one Souldier enough for two foot, and so five Souldiers for ten foot of ground. If this calculation hold for all the out-works, Counterscarp, and *Fause bray*, as well as for the Fort it self, then it can hardly be deny'd me, that the whole Infantry of an Army Royal, will be few enough to maintain a lesser Royal Fortification of ten Bastions, commonly call'd a *Decagon*. But let us speak only of the Fort it self, and suppose it to be an *Octogon*, that is, a Town fortified with eight Bastions, a greater number than which our late Engineers require not in regular Fortifications, though there be some to be seen of ten, some twelve, and some more Bulwarks. We are first to see of how many foot of circumference our *Octogon* will be. We shall appoint every Curtain of this Fort to be five hundred foot long (an Engineer may make it shorter or longer as he pleaseth) by this account eight Curtains take four thousand foot; every Flank shall have the allowance of one hundred foot, and there being sixteen Flanks in our Fort, they require sixteen hundred foot, for the face of every Bulwark shall be allowed three hundred foot, and there being sixteen faces in the Fort, they must have four thousand eight hundred foot. Add these three numbers 4000, 1600, and 4800, the aggregate will be 10400 foot. Allow then one Souldier to maintain two foot of ground of this Town, you shall need 5200 men. But if you will allow six Souldiers to every ten foot of ground, then you must have 6120 Foot Souldiers to maintain this *Octogon*, without mentioning any of its Out-works; and how necessary these be, I shall not offer to dispute, since it is certain that the longer an Enemy can be kept from the principal Fort, he is at the greater loss of time, men, munition, and expence, and consequently the longer time is gain'd to the Prince or State, to whom the besieged place belongs, to provide for its relief. But on the other hand, many Out-works require many men to maintain them, many men require much meat, and the shorter time meat lasts, the sooner will the Fort give over: besides, the mouldering away of men in Out-works hugely weakens the defence of the Fort it self. Neither are these Out-works of an old date, if it be true, what Cardinal *Bentivoglio* says, that *Maurice* Prince of *Orange* first added them to Fortification. I dare not believe this, for I suppose it is not above sixty four years since *Maurice* was Captain General of an Army. But if the Inhabitants of this *Octogon* of ours be the Subjects of the Prince or State for whom the Fort holds out; and more especially, if they be of that same perswasion in matters of Religion with the Garrison Souldiers, then fewer Souldiers will serve, perhaps by half, for those Burgesses within the Walls will fight stoutly for their Wives, Children, Goods and Liberties, which is *pro aris & focis*. But if neither of these be, and that the Citizens are to be mistrusted, the Governour hath to do with a double Enemy, an avow'd and open one without, and a secret, yet a certain one within: And therefore he had need of both more Men, and more strict Watch; neither must he fail to disarm these Inhabitants, and command them, for most part, to keep within doors; but

How many men requisite to maintain ten foot of ground.

How many requisite to defend an *Octogon*.

Outer-works.

Of the Inhabitants of a Fort.

but in ſuch caſes Cittadels are ordinary. Theſe Fortreſſes, that are by nature ſtrong, as ſituated on a Hill, or flanked with ſome inacceſſible and ſteep Rocks, or helped by the nearneſs of ſome River or Marſh, beſides their artificial Fortification, will need by a great deal, fewer men, and ſo be defended at a far leſs expence. The number of theſe Souldiers I ſpoke of is to be reckon'd without Officers, neither are you to imagine, that in ſtorm or aſſault all the Souldiers are to be drawn up in one Rank or row, on the Bulwarks or the Curtains; for at that rate, two foot being allowed to every man, none of them ſhould have room to handle their Arms; neither ſhould their giving fire be ſucceſſive as it ſhould be. In time of ſtorm Souldiers appointed for the guard of a Poſt ſhould be drawn up three deep, or in three Ranks, that when one Rank hath given fire over the Parapet, it may deſcend, and the ſecond mount the Foot-bank, and after it the third.

How Muskeeteers ſhould fire from a Parapet.

Money. The third thing requiſite for a beſieged place is Money, and ſo long as there is Money to pay the Garriſon, and meat and drink to buy for that Money, the publick Magazines of Proviant ſhould not be touched, and for this reaſon many Governours cauſe Braſs to be coyned, ſome Leather, and order it to paſs for currant Money, engaging thereafter to give good coyn for it: So did *Toyras*, Marſhal of *France*, forty years ago, when he was beſieged in *Caſal*, by the famous Marqueſs *Spinola*. Yet a Governour ſhould always reſerve, if he can, a ſtock of Money unſpent for all accidents, as knowing the difficulties of the Siege will encreaſe with time: for though loyalty, duty, reputation, good words, and hopes, prevail frequently with Souldiers to ſtand out againſt all hardſhips and difficulties manfully, yet, as the *French* ſay, *Argent faict tout*, Money doth all. Intelligence is bought with Money, fellows will be hir'd with Money to go through the ſtricteſt, cloſeſt, and beſt guarded approaches, and this is ordinarily done in time of a Sally made for that purpoſe; and if the Intelligencer have agreed with the Governour concerning the preciſe time of his return, another Sally is made for his reception. At the time of a deſperate Sally, at the reparation of a dangerous breach, at the work of Retrenching in time of a furious Cannonade, or when an Aſſault is aſſuredly expected, a largeſs of Money, with large promiſes of more, hath a wonderful influence upon the hearts of Souldiers. Nor ſhould a Governour ſpare, in time of want, to borrow from the Inhabitants; for if they be diſaffected, he may force them to lend, and if they be friends, it will not be time for them to hoard up their Moneys, when they are in danger to loſe all, as the unhappy *Conſtantinopolitans* did when Sultan *Mahomet* took their City by aſſault.

Great uſe for it in Sieges.

A Governour may borrow from the Inhabitants.

Ammunitions. The fourth and fifth things requiſite for a Garriſon are Munitions of War, and Arms. Powder, Match and Ball ſhould be frugally husbanded, or freely ſpent, according to the quantity and ſtore, wherewith the Fort is provided: It ſhould not be laviſhed away in the beginning of the Siege, nor ſhould it be ſpared in the time of Zaps, Batteries, Galleries and Aſſaults, but no needleſs waſte ſhould be made of it in all or any of theſe; for this purpoſe a conſiderable Magazine of Ammunitions ſhould be put in all Forts, eſpecially in frontier Garriſons, where the attack of an Enemy is ſooneſt expected; for many times to ſupply this want, great hazzards are run to convoy Horſe men into the beſieged place, who carry leather bags full of Powder on the croups of their Horſes.

Arms. Our Fort ſhould likewiſe be provided with all manner of Arms, Defenſive and Offenſive, Pikes, Half-Pikes, Halberds, Partizans, two-handed Swords, Hangmens Swords, Morning-Stars, with all manner of Fire-works and Hand-Granadoes, for reſiſting a ſtorm, againſt which there ſhould be prepared alſo huge balks and logs of Timber, tyed to Poſts with Ropes or Chains, to let fall over, and pull up again: for theſe (as likewiſe a great number of greater and leſſer Stones) do good ſervice in time of Aſſaults, when an Enemy is mounting either the Curtain or Bulwark, and cannot be reach'd by ſhot unleſs from the Flanks, which for moſt part are made uſeleſs by the Enemies Cannon before the Aſſault. We read, even ſince the invention of Powder, what uſe our Anceſtors made of molten Lead, ſcalding Water, and boyl'd Oyl in time of Aſſaults, at which *Louis de Montgomery* in his *French* Milece makes good ſport, and ſays, the Defendants had as good throw handfuls of Aſhes at their Enemies: But I am nothing of his opinion; for though experience were ſilent, both reaſon and ſenſe do

Louis de Montgomery his opinion.

do teach us, that Fire doth more hurt than Aſhes, and is not burning fire in all theſe I ſpeak of? Scalding Water no queſtion doth miſchief, and may be us'd with no other expence than fire, but Lead and Oyl are chargeable, and may, I think, be employed for better and more proper uſes.

Munitions for the mouth.

The ſixth and laſt, but not the leaſt requiſite and neceſſary thing for a beſieged place is Munitions for the mouth, without which all the reſt ſignifie nothing. What ſeveral proviſions of meats and drinks (preſuppoſing there be Water enough in the Fort) are neceſſary for a Garriſon, I have told you in the eighth Chapter, where I have diſcourſed of Proviant. The queſtion is now, what quantity of them ſhould be ſtored up in a Garriſon that apprehends a Siege. There be ſome who think that ſix months proviſion is enough, and of theſe *Louis de Montgomery* is one, becauſe, ſay they, in that time either the Winter ſeaſon will force the Beſieger to remove, or the relief of the place will be attempted by him to whom it belongs. But we have ſeen in our own times the contrary of both, though we had never heard of the Siege of *Troy*. Others ſpeak of three years proviſion, and this doth well; but the Governour when he is not beſieged, ſhould every year lay in one years freſh proviſions, cauſing the Souldiers to eat and pay for that which is oldeſt. I believe none will deny but a Garriſon ſhould be provided with meat and drink for one whole year at leaſt: And no ſooner ſhould a provident Governour foreſee or apprehend a Siege (whereof he may have many grounds for a probable conjecture) but he ſhould command all the Inhabitants to provide themſelves of a whole years food and maintenance, that his publick ſtores may be preſerv'd for the Souldiery, and all Citizens who are either unable or unwilling to do ſo, as alſo all unneceſſary people ſhould be commanded to remove out of the Town or Fort.

For how long time a Town ſhould be provided with meat and drink.

Citizens to provide a years meat.

But after a place is inveſted, and the Siege formed, it is, I think, an act of inhumanity to thruſt out the Inhabitants, eſpecially if they have not had time to provide themſelves, yea, I think, it is more mercy to cut their throats within, than to ſend them out; for it is not to be thought that an Enemy will ſuffer them to paſs, but will force them back to the Town-Ditches, where they may lamentably languiſh and ſtarve to death. Such an action as this, in my opinion was an eternal blemiſh to the reputation of *Monluc*, that famous Marſhal of *France*, who, after *Sienna* (whereof he was Governour) had been ſtrictly beſieged, ſhut out of the City four thouſand Inhabitants, Men and Women, young and old: The Marquels of *Martignan*, who commanded the Emperours and *Coſmo di Medici*'s forces, cauſed all theſe miſerable wretches to be chaced back to the Ditches; *Monluc* would receive none of them within the Town: Some luſty ſtrong fellows broke through *Martignan*'s Trenches, and eſcap'd; many Women and Maids were privately (contrary to the Marquels his command) taken into Tents and Huts, to ſatiate the luſt of the *Spaniards*; but there dyed of them of meer hunger near three thouſand. Upon this woful occaſion the ſame *Monluc* in his Commentaries hath this expreſſion: *Theſe are*, ſays he, *the mercileſs laws of War, we muſt be many times cruel to diſappoint our Enemies: God be merciful to us for doing ſo great miſchief.* Indeed he had reaſon to cry for Gods mercy for committing ſo horrible a wickedneſs. But in what *Codex* did he read of ſuch a Law of War? Nay, where did he hear of ſuch a cuſtome of War? Strange it was in him to expel and expoſe thoſe to a mercileſs death, whom he nor none elſe had appointed to provide for a Siege, and whom he might have expell'd before the Siege was form'd, that they might have ſhifted for themſelves, or begg'd through *Italy* for bread. If ever there was a precedent for this, it was not to be imitated by one who profeſſed the name of Chriſt. And that which made this action of his altogether inexcuſable was, that he expected no ſuccours, for after he was forc'd to yield the Town, wherein many of thoſe Citizens whom he permitted to ſtay, were conſum'd with Famine, and the remnant of his Souldiers ſo hunger-ſtarved that they look'd like Skeletons: He confeſſeth in the firſt Tome of his Commentaries, That he could never think of what he did, but with a ſad affliction of ſpirit for his folly, (he ſhould have ſaid, vanity and arrogance) in reducing that noble City, and his own Souldiery, to the laſt morſel of Bread; and ſubmitting them to the mercy of an incenſed Enemy, when he knew well enough that his Maſter, *Henry* the Second of *France*, was neither

A mercileſs act of Marſhal *Monluc*.

And altogether inexcuſable.

neither able to relieve him at that time, nor desirous he should bring himself and the City to those extremities.

Brisac. *Reinach*, Governour of *Brisac*, in the year 1638. had a great deal more reason to keep out that strong Town to the very last against the Duke of *Weimar*, since he knew his master the Emperour, would use all means under Heaven to relieve a place that was of so great a concern to the house of *Austria*, yet did he shut no Inhabitants out of it, after it was besieg'd. This *Brisac*, for the famine it suffer'd during that Siege, was an Epitome of the miseries of *Samaria* and *Jerusalem* in the *Holy Land*; and of *Sancerre* and *Rochel* in *France*. *Cæsar* in his *Gallick* War tells us, with a great abhorrency of the fact, That when he had reduced *Vercengentorix* and his *Gauls* to great want within *Alesia*, at a Council held by the besieged, one of the prime men among them proposed, that all the old and unserviceable people of the Town should be kill'd, and preserv'd for food to those who were able to work and fight. But the provisions for the belly, be they great or small, should be sparingly measur'd out after the publick store-houses are once broke up. To what I have said of things requisite and necessary for besieged places, I shall add the care that should be taken for the sick and the wounded, for which Apothecaries Shops and Chyrurgions Chests should be well furnished, for curing both sicknesses and wounds; for the inspection whereof some skilful Physicians should be entertain'd.

Alesia.

Physicians, Apothecaries, and Chyrurgions requisite.

Our fortified place, be it never so strong, is but a dead body till men be put into it, and then we may say it hath living members, whereof Victuals are the nutriment, and Munitions of War, Arms, and Moneys shall be the supporters. In this Body, to make it serviceable to the Prince, who is the Creator of it, a Rational Soul must be infused, and that Soul shall be called the Governour: And of him I may say, almost, as I said in another place of a Captain General, that such a Governour, as many in their Discourses, and some in their Writings describe, is to be found in no Countrey unless it be in *Utopia*; or to be read of in any Books except Romances. He must, say they, have an universal knowledge of Fortification and Gunnery, he must be very wise, of a ready judgement, and a great memory, he should be affable and courteous; yet severe, eloquent, vigilant, sober, temperate, religious, loyal above measure, couragious, and indefatigable. This seems to be enough, but there must be more, he must be an old experienced Captain, and one who hath given good proof that he can both take and defend fortified places. This is a very strange qualification, for if a man be not admitted to be a Governour, unless he have been one before, he shall never be one in his life. It needs therefore to be restricted thus, he shall not be chosen to be Governour of a frontier Town, or a Royal Fortification, unless he have formerly well defended some Fort or Cattle of lesser importance.

A Governour of a Forress;

A notional description of him.

The truth is, much of the safety of the place depends on the Governour, and therefore he should be no Novice in Military affairs; but for all that, he should not be an old man, for age wastes that natural vigour which is requir'd in a man of his charge, and makes him unable for that fatigue which he is obliged to undergo. As to his experience, I think it is enough if he have been at two or three Sieges, and within one or two besieged places, provided he be of a quick apprehension and judgement, for such a one will learn more at one sight than others will do at twenty. He should understand the general rules of Fortification and Gunnery, he should be of a jocund and jovial humour; for when Souldiers who are besieged look on their Governour, and see him sullen, who perhaps naturally is so, they fancy he is conscious of some defects, weakness, or danger, whereof they know nothing. He should be very couragious, and though he be bound to save himself from all needless dangers, yet in assaults he should not be shy to expose his person to the most eminent perils; for his presence doth exceedingly animate those who are hazzarding their lives in that piece of service. If this be true, as I believe it is, then those are mistaken, who think a Coward a fit person to be a Governour, because his constant fear will make him constantly vigilant, but to what purpose his vigilance, when two or three hours Battery of Cannon shall terrifie him to a surrender? An opiniator our Governour should not be, but ready both to seek and follow the advice of his

The real qualifications he should have.

A Coward a bad Governour.

his Captains, Engineers, and Gunners; and yet of that judgement, that he may of himſelf conclude the advice that is given him to be rational. It is fitting he have two or three or more Engineers with him, for ordering Retrenchments, and inventing new Defences, Engines and Machines, according to the emergencies of the Siege. Good Gunners and Cannoneers he ſhould have in the Fort, who have skill to make Batteries, Counter-batteries, and ſunk Batteries, and to diſmount the Enemies Ordnance. And if there be more Regiments than one in the Garriſon, it were fit the Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels and Majors, were men of good underſtanding and experience, that if either the Governour, or any of them chance to dye (which frequently falls out) thoſe who ſucceed to them by their antiquity or priority of place, may be endued with thoſe qualifications that are ſuitable to their truſt and charge.

Engineers and Gunners.

Being ſatisfied with the qualifications of the Governour, and thoſe who are to aſſiſt him, let us in the next place take a view of thoſe duties he owes, and is bound to perform in the time of a Siege. Before the danger be near, he ſhould deſtroy all the Suburbs (for thoſe are the Cut-throats of Fortreſſes) all Mills, Houſes of pleaſure, Trees, Yards, Gardens, Barns, Encloſures, Hedges, or any thing elſe, under, or by which he conceives an Enemy may be ſhelter'd, or make his Approaches more eaſie. And this he ſhould do betimes, that before an Enemies arrival all within two hundred paces of the Counterſcarp, may be an *Eſplanad*; for truly when the beſieging Army advanceth near the Town, I know not what good it is, or can do, to burn houſes, which indeed is quickly done, but the Walls of thoſe Houſes ſtanding, gives as good and as eaſie ſhelter, though not ſo good an accommodation, as the Houſes did. Next, the Governour is to divide all his men into ſeveral Poſts, allowing ſo many to the defence of each, according to the ſtrength or weakneſs of the place, changing nightly if he can, for fear of Treachery: withal, he ſhould keep a ſtrong Reſerve conſtantly in the Market-place, to make uſe of as he ſhall think fit to give direction. At the beginning of the Siege he is to diſcharge all private Parleys and Diſcourſes with thoſe who are without; ſome diſcharge all Songs and Whiſtlings, the ſtriking of Clocks, and ringing of Bells, that thereby no ſecret ſigns or advertizements formerly agreed on, may be given. He is bound to ſpare his Souldiers from toyl and fatigue as much as poſſibly he may; and it is well if he can order the matter ſo that they may watch one day, work the ſecond, and reſt the third.

Duties of a Governour.

To make all plain without the Fort.

To divide it in ſeveral Poſts.

To diſcharge private Parleys.

To ſpare the Souldiers from unneceſſary toil.

If the Governour have Horſe in his Garriſon, when the Enemy advanceth towards it, he may ſend them out, with foot behind to ſuſtain them, to make ſome light skirmiſhes, and to bring back with them Priſoners, if they can. But before the Approaches be advanc'd, ſo long as an Enemy is freſh, and in great Bodies, Sallies do him ſmall or no hurt, and the loſs of one man of the Beſieged doth the Governour more hurt and prejudice, than the loſs of ten can do the Beſieger. Sallies are neceſſary then, when they are undertaken to hinder the making, or the finiſhing of a Battery; or if made, to ruine it, or to hinder the progreſs of a Zap, or to nail Ordnance or Mortars. Sallies ſhould be reſolutely made, and the Retreat from them orderly: In the time of them, the Ordnance from the Baſtions of the Town ſhould play luſtily upon the Approaches where the Salliers are not, and over all the Approaches upon the Fields, to hinder ſuccourſe to come from the leaguer or quarters; and feints made at other Ports of the Town, as if the Beſiegers were to Sally out of them likewiſe. Thoſe who Sally, will not do well to amuſe themſelves with taking many Priſoners, one or two may ſerve their turn, to bring to the Governour to give him intelligence; and thoſe they take ſhould be but common Souldiers, for they will be more apt to tell what they know than others of better quality; nor is it to be imagin'd, that thoſe will be taken in the Approaches, who are upon the Generals Secrets, unleſs it be very accidentally. What Priſoners you carry into a beſieged place, you muſt reſolve to entertain them (for back you muſt not ſend them) and guard them, that they eſcape not, this will be both burthenſom and troubleſom to you, and to allow them no maintenance is inhumanity: And this was the Governour of *Briſac*'s fault, for which he was like to pay dear, as you may hear in the next Chapter. If by a Sally the Beſiegers be beat out of a Battery, the Pieces of

Sallies.

When neceſſary.

To take few Priſoners at Sallies.

What is to be done in the time of a Sally.

Ordnance and Mortars that are in it, ſhould be immediately cloy'd and nail'd; or if the Sallyers have ſome time to put Powder under the platform, or a train with a burning match to the Powder Chamber, which is ordinarily beſide the *Appareill*, it may much endanger and endammage the Beſiegers, when they return to repoſſeſs their Battery. But a careful Enemy having Reſerves to attend all accidents, many times purſues the Sallyers ſo furiouſly in their Retreat, that the Beſieged are forc'd to ſhut their Gates againſt their own people; therefore it were not amiſs to have Ladders at the Counterſcarp, whereby they may deſcend to the Ditch, if it be dry, and ſo get into the Caſemates; but theſe are for moſt part left out in our lateſt Fortifications, I know not for what reaſon; or if there be Water in the Moats, in that caſe little Boats may receive thoſe Souldiers that cannot enter at the Sally Port. In all, or any of theſe Sallies, the Governour ought not to hazzard his perſon, or offer to ſtir out of his Fort, let the pretence be never ſo ſpecious or plauſible. I know many gallant men have done it, to their irrecoverable loſs.

A Governour not to ſally.

When a Governour perceives where an Enemy intends to batter, or to lodge, whether it be in Curtain or Bulwark, he is oblig'd immediately to begin a Retrenchment behind the place aim'd at; but for all that, he is to diſpute that Curtain or Bulwark, or any part of them to the uttermoſt; he muſt defend it to extremity, by Sallies, Counter-batteries, by ſinking Cannon to deſtroy the Galleries, and by Counter-mines to blow up thoſe who lodge in the breaches; and if he muſt quit it, he is to do it by inches. But all this while the Governour is buſie working at his Retrenchment, that when he is forc'd to part with that for which he hath fought ſo well, he may retire his men to his Countermure, where the Beſiegers ſhall have a new work to begin. A Retrenchment is a new line, as regularly drawn, and fortified with Flanks, as the conveniency of the place may permit: It is made up of ſtone, earth, rubbiſh, boards, balks and planks, feather-beds, woollen or ſtraw ſacks, dung, or what can be had, whereof ſtore ſhould be provided before hand. If there be ground enough for it between the Rampart and the Town it is well; if not, as many Houſes, owe them who will, muſt be pull'd down, as may ſerve the turn. The Ancients uſed theſe Retrenchments frequently, and call'd them *Countermures*: The *Germans* call them *Abſueid*, that is, a cutting off; becauſe by it they cut off the reſt of the Fort from that part the Enemy hath taken. Many times they are made in a very ſhort time, and ſo they may in a Town where no ſerviceable Creature is exempted from work, young nor old, man nor woman, except whom childhood or old age, or ſickneſs excuſeth. Yet, I think, that which *Monluc* writes concerning a Retrenchment is very ſtrange: He ſays, he was in *Henry* the Second of *France* his time, with the Count of *Briſac*, at the Siege of a Caſtle in *Piedmont*, called *Courteville*, where by a continued Battery of twelve hundred ſhot of Cannon in the ſpace of twenty four hours, the Wall was ſo beat down that the *French* went to ſtorm, which when they did, they ſaw oppoſite to them a Countermure as ſtrong as the Wall, made up in the time of the Battery. Yet *Monluc* by his own relation, took longer time himſelf to make a Retrenchment at *Sienna*, where he had a great deal of more hands to work than can be imagin'd could be got in any Caſtle of *Piedmont*.

A Retrenchment,

What it is.

Called a Countermure.

Great celerity.

What to be done at a ſtorm.

But if after all this care, diligence, and noble behaviour of the Governour and his Garriſon, the Beſiegers ſhall give a general ſtorm to the Fort, the Governour and all his Souldiery having made preparation before-hand for a gallant reſiſtance, he and they are to carry themſelves ſo manfully in the Aſſault that the Enemy may be beat off; but if that cannot be, he and his Garriſon may either dye like men, or if they be taken Priſoners, they may out-live their misfortune with honour and reputation.

Private capitulation between a Prince and a Governour of a Fort.

Next to that of a Captain General, there is not a more tickliſh charge in the whole Military employment, or that requires more caution in accepting, than this of a Governour; for on his good and happy, or bad or misfortunate deportment depends the Prince his ſervice, his own reputation, the welfare or ruine of the place, or perhaps the whole Countrey where the Fortreſs is ſituated: and therefore a perſon of honour ſhould be ſhy to engage in it; or if the obedience he owes to the abſolute command of his Prince, or his General, force him to accept

accept it, he should do it on conditions secretly agreed on, to which few or none but the Prince or his General should be privy. The conditions may be suppos'd to be such as these which follow.

The supposed conditions of it.

If the place be well fortified, after either the ancient or later way of Fortification, and well provided with men, and all those other necessary things formerly mention'd, the Governour may oblige himself, so long as his Ammunition and Victuals hold out, to maintain it to the last drop of his blood, without any other conditions. But if there be any defect in these or any of these, then the private conditions should be; First, How long he shall be bound to hold out. First. Secondly, If he shall reject all summons and all proffers, till the Enemy hath fully form'd his Siege, and invested the Fort. Second. Thirdly, If he shall hearken to no agreement, till the Enemy make his Approaches, and begin to make Batteries; for you are to observe, the Governour is to expect worse conditions after the Cannon hath play'd than before. Third. Fourthly, If he shall endure the Battery, Zap and Mine, and all this to give time for the Prince or his General to gather forces for the relief of the Fort. Fourth. Fifthly, If the Governour shall be obliged to hold out one storm, and then capitulate, or more than one; for you are still to imagine, that the nearer the Enemy draws to him, the worse conditions will be offer'd him. Fifth. Sixthly, How soon he may expect a succourse after the Siege is form'd, that accordingly he may take his measures, and to save Men and Munition, may protract and gain time by counterfeited Parleys (a thing excellently well practis'd by Sir *James Ramsay* at the Siege of *Hanaw*, 1636 and -37.) in seeming to accept some offer'd conditions, but to require others which he knows will not be granted; but he must still be sure not to treat in earnest, till some days after the expiration of the time of the promised relief agreed on in the private capitulation between the Prince or his General, and the Governour. Sixth. Counterfeit parleys. Seventhly, If the promised succourse come not at the appointed time, as being hinder'd by those insurmountable difficulties which could not be foreseen; whether then the Governour may not accept of Articles, and by giving over the Fort, save his Masters Artillery, Arms, Ammunitions and Victuals? and if this cannot be granted him, whether he may not by the loss of some of these, or all of these, save the lives of his Garrison, by the best accord he can make? Seventh. And lastly, The Prince or his General should exactly condescend and agree with the Governour what Dumb Intelligence shall be given by signs by either party, that both may understand how all these foregoing transactions will be, or will not be performed, and what tokens shall be given in the day time and what in the night; as suppose so many shot of great Guns either in the day time or the night, shall signifie such a thing; a great smoke made at such a place in the day time shall intimate such and such a matter; three, four or five shot of Cannon made at such an hour of the night, or a Lanthorn with many lights let down so many times in the night time from a high Steeple shall denote the wants within the Fort, or perhaps the number of weeks and days the Governour is able to hold out; one, two, or three Fires made at such a distance without, shall let the Governour know such and such things. Eighth. They should likewise agree concerning Intelligence to be sent in or out by word of mouth or Letters: The last should be writ in Cyphers, a Copy whereof both General and Governour should have: The first should be such language as the Messenger himself should not understand the meaning or sense of it. In the punctual observation of all these the General and Governour should be very wary and attentive.

Dumb Intelligence.

But in my Discourse of Intelligence, I told you how dangerous it is to trust to any Intelligence, that by word of mouth may be reveal'd to an Enemy either by the Treachery, or the confession (press'd out by torture) of him who carries it. That by Letters may be reveal'd by the carriers fear or falshood, and the Cyphers opened with a Key, or they may be betray'd by the Secretaries who wrote them. Next, a great persons subscription may be counterfeited, in which art some are very expert; neither is there any hurt in it, so they make not a bad use of their skill, and a Prince or a Generals Seal may be taken from some old Pass, and clapp'd to a new Paper. This was practis'd in the time of *Francis* the First, King of *France*, at the Siege of *Sainct Disier* on the *Marne*, where the Emperour *Charles* the Fifth was in person: Here the Count of *San-*

Letters dangerous.

Counterfeitd Letters.

cerre was cheated to a ſurrender of the place (which he had defended a long time with much honour and valour) by a Letter feign'd to be ſent from *Claud* Duke of *Guiſe*, the *French* Kings Lieutenant General, whoſe ſubſcription was handſomely counterfeited, and his Seal taken from an old Paper, and put on the Letter; all contriv'd by *Granuell*, Preſident of the Emperours Council, who gain'd, with much Gold, a *French-man* to carry this Letter in the ſoal of his ſhooe, into the Town. This *French* fellow was as much Fool as Knave, who did not reveal the whole matter to *Sancerre*, from whom he might likewiſe have receiv'd Gold enough. But a truſty and faithful Meſſenger may be ſent into, or out of a beſieged place, and go ſtraight to an Enemy, and ſeem to reveal all he knows, and give up the Letters he carries, (which ſhould contain no truth) and by that means carry his Letter of importance ſafely as he is directed, ſeeming to do the Enemy ſervice; but here cunning ſhould be added to fidelity; and men of that Caliber are rare; yet the *Rochellers* met with one of them who adventur'd to cheat a no leſs perſon than Cardinal *Richelieu*, and did it. A Gentleman of *Anjou* offer'd to the Duke of *Soubiſe*, to enter into *Rochel* (then beſieg'd and reduc'd to the laſt extremity) and bring him certain news of the Towns condition. He went ſtraight to the Cardinal (with whom he had gain'd ſome truſt) and told him what he had undertaken: this great States-man permitted him to ſlip into the Town, provided he ſhould ſhow him his Letters at his return, which he promis'd; having done his buſineſs in the City, he came back to the Cardinal, and deliver'd him the Towns Letters, written purpoſely that this Great Miniſter might read them, who took ſome pains to open and ſeal them again handſomely, and bid the Gentleman carry them to *Soubiſe*; who went and deliver'd to the Duke a hidden Letter, which told him the true condition of the City, and that was, That it could not hold out above two days without ſuccourſe, or all muſt dye for hunger.

A faithful and cunning Meſſenger may do much good in a Siege.

Inſtance.

If ſigns by fire, ſmoke, or ſhot of Cannon be not agreed on before the place be inveſted, it will be very dangerous to do it afterwards by Letters for theſe may be intercepted, or betrayed. The laſt whereof befel two illuſtrious Brothers, both of them great Captains, thoſe were *Maurice* and *Henry*, Princes of *Orange*, both of them egregiouſly cheated by a Countrey Clown. *Maurice* entruſts him with Letters to *Juſtin* of *Naſſaw*, Governour of *Breda*, when it was beſieged round by Marquels *Spinola*; the fellow undertook to deliver the Letter, and bring the Governours anſwer, and ſo he did, but not till *Spinola* had read both, the firſt before he enter'd, and the ſecond after he came out of the Town, who thereby came to the knowledge of all their ſecrets; the Rogue was well rewarded by both parties. But after *Maurice* his death, this Bore reſolves to ſerve his Brother, Prince *Henry*, in the ſame faſhion, and to that end ſeem'd to be gain'd with much difficulty, and by much Gold, to carry the Prince his laſt Letters to the Governour: *Henry* wrote to him, that it was then purely impoſſible to raiſe the Siege, and deſir'd him at midnight to diſcharge three pieces of Ordnance, and that thereafter by ſeveral fires on the great Steeple, he ſhould let him know how many days his Victuals would hold out. The Intelligencer went ſtraight to *Spinola*, who having read the Letter, and handſomely ſeal'd it up, diſpatch'd the faithful meſſenger to the Governour, who at the prefixed time made his three ſhots, and by eleven ſigns made by fire, let the Prince know he was able to ſubſiſt no longer than eleven days; which *Spinola* did as punctually obſerve as the Prince of *Orange* did. In the time of that ſame Siege, at a Sally, a *German* Souldier was taken by the Count of *Iſemberg*, who treated his Countrey-man ſo well, that the fellow undertook to return to the Town, and come back to the *Spaniſh* Camp when the Victuals of the beſieged City grew ſcarce, which he did; and thereby *Spinola* had likewiſe a fair help given him how to take his meaſures.

Letters reveal'd to an Enemy.

If all endeavours, and all hopes fail, and that inexorable neceſſity force the Governour to yield, let him do it on the moſt honourable and advantageous terms he can; and let him be ſure to have his Articles ſign'd by him who commands in chief; and if he can obtain it, let him get Hoſtages of quality ſent to ſome neighbour Garriſon, to lye there till all conditions agreed on be performed. Of Articles I ſhall ſpeak in the next Chapter.

To yield on Articles.

But

But if there be ſmall, or no hopes of ſuccours, it will not be fit for a Governour to bring things to the laſt extremity, or ſtand out, where he cannot probably hope to reſiſt; for that expoſeth his men to Butchery, a thing very unacceptable to God, and prejudicial to his Maſters ſervice. It is needleſs to illuſtrate this with examples, ſtory is full of them, and we have ſeen the practice of it in our own days. The *Imperial* Lieutenant General, Count *Tili*, finding *New Brandenburg* (an inconſiderable Town) obſtinately defended by Major General *Kniphauſen*, and his *Swediſh* Garriſon, did at the ſtorm forbid all quarter (though he was known to be merciful enough) and after he had carried the Town by Aſſault, he told the Governour who was then Priſoner, That he could not uſe him worſe than ſend him to his Maſter, the King of *Sweden*, who, he thought, was oblig'd in Juſtice to hang him, for loſing him ſo many gallant men, by his vanity and arrogant reſiſtance. And truly, I think, to put a few men in an obſcure place, or a Caſtle of a mean Fortification, and command them to ſtand out againſt a well appointed Army, or that which ordinarily paſſeth under the name of an Army Royal, is to ſend them directly to the Shambles; for what General will ſuffer himſelf to be ſo affronted, and not revenge it? When the *French* King, *Francis* the Firſt, march'd into *Italy* with a mighty Army, the Governour of a little ill fortified Caſtle in *Piedmont*, called *Volane*, made a Sally, and kill'd and plunder'd ſome *French* Baggagemen: The Caſtle is ſummon'd, and refuſing to yield on honeſt conditions, it is inveſted, and forc'd to render on mercy, whereof they found but little in that ſevere Conſtable *Anne de Montmorancy*, who cauſed the poor Governour, and his Garriſon, to be hang'd every mothers ſon. Another Caſtle held out againſt *Charles* the Fifth, when he retir'd to *Italy*, out of *Provence*, but being forc'd to yield, the Garriſon receiv'd the like uſage, every man of it being forc'd to end his life on a Gallows.

Obſtinacy in defending Forts hurtful,

Eſpecially thoſe of ſmall importance.

Inſtances.

Yet ſometimes the condition of the War, and the circumſtances of it require, that a Governour and his Garriſon ſhould rather fight to death, than accept of any agreement, and this is when time muſt be given for gathering or joyning of forces; or in a Retreat, to give a ſtop to an Enemies furious purſuit; and this *Ratio Belli* in ſuch caſes, hath *Ratio Phyſica* in the belly of it, for it is nothing elſe but Amputation, by cutting one member off to ſave the whole Body.

Yet ſometimes *Ratio Belli* requires it.

On the other hand, to give over a fortified place without a Noble, and Souldier-like reſiſtance, is a crime which comes near to that of *Treaſon*; for it is indeed *Tradere urbem in poteſtatem Hoſtis*, To betray the Town into the power of the Enemy. And as it was with the Ancients, ſo it is yet puniſhable with ſhameful death. *Monluc* tells us in his Commentaries, that *Don Arbre*, a *Spaniſh* Colonel, caus'd a Captain to be hang'd at the Bridge of *Aſturia*, a Town in *Piedmont*, without Proceſs or hearing him, for giving over a Caſtle without an Aſſault; and he ſays, he knew the like ſeverity uſed to others for crimes of that nature. In the year 1632. *Guſtavus Adolphus* took a Town in *Bavaria* called *Reene*, in two days time, and left a Colonel to be Governour there, who was beſieg'd ſhortly after, and kept out the Town eight days: But becauſe the King his Maſter thought he had given it over too ſoon, he caus'd his head to be ſtruck from his Shoulders. In the year 1636. *Jane Deverth*, and ſome other *Imperial* and *Spaniſh* Generals, deſtroyed a great deal of *Picardy*, and burnt many Villages; at that time the Governour of *Chaſtelet* having abundance of all things requiſite to hold out a Siege, baſely gave it over, and though he ſav'd himſelf by flight, yet was he by the *French* Kings command, hang'd *in effigie*. *Corvey*, a very ſtrong place, was alſo cowardly given over to the *Spaniards*, who put a Garriſon into it, the Governour whereof deliver'd it back to the *French* ſooner than he needed; for which, ſo ſoon as he came to the firſt Town of *Artois*, where there was a Garriſon, he was commanded to alight from his Horſe, kneel at the Port, and without other Proceſs, had his Head ſtruck off by the hand of a Hangman. I remember that in the year 1637. the *Swediſh* Felt-Marſhal *Banier* garriſon'd the ſtrong Caſtle of *Luneburg*, which Caſtle they called *Kalkberg*, and appointed one Colonel *Stammer* to be Governour of it, who not long

To give over with ſmall, or no reſiſtance, puniſhable with death.

Inſtances.

long after yielded it to the Duke of *Luneburg* without reſiſtance; pretending for his vindication to a Court of War, that his Conſcience would not permit him to occaſion ſo much blood to be ſhed, as he knew would be ſpilt, if he offer'd to defend the Caſtle: But the Court made no ſcruple of Conſcience to paſs a ſentence of Death upon him; which by *Banier*'s command, was executed at *Stetin*, by cutting off his Head, as finding the Colonels Conſcience dangerouſly and ridiculouſly miſled by an erroneous Judgement.

A Queſtion ſtarted.

Having diſcours'd thus far of the Defence of Towns and Forts, I ſhall tell my Reader, that ſome are pleas'd upon this ſubject to ſtart a queſtion, which is this, Whether all places which Princes and States intend to maintain with Garriſons, ſhould be fortified *a-la-Modern*, that is, according to the Modern Art of Fortification, with Curtains, Gorges, Faces, and Flanks of Bulwarks, Fauſſe brays, Ditches, Counterſcarps, and Out-works? Or if a place fortified *a l'antique*, or the ancient manner, may without prejudice be kept and defended, as it is? There be reaſons *pro* and *con*. But ſome judicious perſons, who have obſerv'd the practice of our Modern Wars in *Europe* theſe ſixty years by-paſt; eſpecially in the long *German* War, where many Forts were taken and re-taken, where many places only fortified in the ancient way, remain'd inexpugnable, notwithſtanding obſtinate Sieges form'd againſt them, having in them but ſmall Garriſons of Souldiers, aſſiſted by ſtout and reſolute Inhabitants; whereas other places of great importance, fortified with all the new inventions of Art, have either ſuddenly been taken by force, or ſoon brought to ſurrender on Articles. I ſay, they doubt not to averr, That a Town which hath a ſtrong Stone Wall, (obſerve here, that the hardeſt Stone is ſooneſt breach'd) with Towers at a convenient diſtance one from another, with dry and deep Ditches; a good and firm Counterſcarp, without any Out-works (wherein men are irrecoverably loſt, to the great prejudice of the Fort) this Town, defended by a reſolute and indifferently well experienced Governour, ſeconded by ſtout and valiant Souldiers and Burgeſſes, though not very numerous, may make as good and as long, if not a ſtouter and longer reſiſtance, than a Town fortified *a-la-modern*, *cæteris paribus*, that is, the one being provided as well as the other, with Meat, Money, Munition, Arms and Artillery. It is true, thoſe Round Towers built on the Wall, in the ancient manner, cannot be well Flanked; but to that it is anſwer'd, that they do much hurt in Approaches, and are not batter'd down, but with a vaſt expence of Powder and Bullet; as alſo, that the Faces of the Modern Bulwarks, which take up much more than the third part of the whole Fortification, have no other Defences but from the ſecond Flanks, and thoſe are not very conſiderable.

Anſwered.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Priſoners, Parleys, Treaties, and of Articles, in our Modern Wars.

IN thoſe Battels, Retreats, Sieges and Defence of Towns, whereof we have ſpoken in the four preceding Chapters; there have been, no doubt, many Priſoners, many Parleys and Treaties made, and many Articles ſign'd, and therefore it is fit to ſpeak ſomething of them. In the twenty third Chapter of my Diſcourſes of the *Roman* Art of War, I have ſhewn you the manner of them among the Ancients; between which, and that uſed in the Modern War, we ſhall not find very eſſential differences. And firſt we ſhall ſpeak of Priſoners.

Impriſonment. Impriſonment is one of thoſe ſeven external afflictions, which learned men ſay follow the humane nature, and may befal every particular man, how great ſoever he be. Emperours and Kings, yea, our Bleſſed Saviour, as he was Man, was not exempted from it. Men are made Priſoners, for crimes, for debts, and by chance of War; and it is of theſe I nam'd laſt, whereof I now diſcourſe. How thoſe ſhould demean or comfort themſelves, I leave to the directions of the Divine or Moral Philoſopher; only I ſhall ſay this, and perhaps may averr it to be true, That if Souldiers would accuſtome themſelves to be ſometimes alone, and learn to enjoy themſelves without other company, and have thoſe meditations they ought to have of their own mortal and uncertain condition, they would endure Impriſonment with greater patience, than thoſe can, who when they are at liberty, cannot live without ſociety and company; for he who can live pleaſantly and contentedly alone, will find a Priſon eaſie enough, if no other affliction be added to it.

Priſoners of War, Divided into two Claſſes. We may divide all Priſoners of War into two Claſſes, of thoſe who are taken without any previous Treaty, and thoſe who have Articles. The firſt Claſs we may ſub-divide into thoſe who have quarter verbally promis'd them, and thoſe who ſubmit to the mercy of the Victor. Of all theſe, and each of theſe, I ſhall ſay one word in general, that though quarter be promis'd by inferiour Officers or Souldiers, or that the vanquiſh'd hoping for mercy, yield without any ſuch promiſe, he who commands in chief (provided he be on the place) may put all thoſe Priſoners to the Sword; for quarter given by the Inferiour ſignifies nothing till it be confirm'd by him who commands on the place, and then the Priſoners have quarter. That chief Commander may order them all to be kill'd, without any imputation of breach of Faith or Juſtice, as not being tyed by any promiſe his inferiour hath made; and this he may do by the Law of War, and that is grounded on the law and cuſtome of Nations; and if you will believe *Cyrus*, and the *Athenians*, it is grounded on the Law of Nature, by which Priſoners of War may be uſed as the Victor pleaſeth. And *Grotius* ſays, *In Captivos quicquam impune fieri*, and *Captivi Jure Belli occidi poſſunt*. Suppoſe ſtill, that no quarter hath been promis'd by him who commands in chief on the place. But though, I ſay, a General may do this by the Law of War, yet he cannot do it without the imputation of horrible cruelty and inhumanity, except in ſome caſes. And though *Jure Belli* they may be kill'd, yet without invincible reaſons, to kill men in cold blood is not the part of a man; for they caſt up their account, that the bitterneſs of death is paſt, and therefore they ſhould not be put to death, unleſs he who inflicts it, can produce as good a warrant for it, as he could who hewed the King of the *Amalekites* in pieces, after *Saul* had given him quarter. The Heathen *Tacitus* could ſay, *Trucidare deditos ſævum*; It is cruelty to kill thoſe who ſubmit. Yet you will ſee anon that Chriſtian Priſoners of War have been put to death in cold blood by Chriſtian

What a General may do with Priſoners of War.

Cruelty to kill Priſoners in cold blood.

Christian Princes and Generals, without any other Authority for their so doing, than what the Law of War gave them.

But after Quarter is confirmed or granted by the General, the question is, Whether upon the emergency of three several accidents, they may not be put to the Sword? The first is, if an Enemy rally after a Battle is won, and make, or offer to make a fierce onset, the victorious Army not being so strong to oppose the charge and guard the Prisoners, from whom also danger is to be expected; This was *Henry* the fifth of *Englands* case at *Agencourt*, where, for the same reasons, 6000 *French* Prisoners by his order were in an instant put to the Sword.

Whether Prisoners may not be killed after Quarter given them by the General, In three cases.

Froissard passionately relates to us the sad fate of about one thousand *French* men, who were taken Prisoners, and had fair quarter given them by *John* King of *Portugal*, in a battle that he fought with one of his own name, King of *Castile*: the story was briefly this, The King of *Castile* having a just pretence to the Crown of *Portugal*, (to which in hatred of the *Castillans*, the *Portugueses* had advanced a Bastard) invades *Portugal* with a great Army, in which were many *French* Auxiliaries: The *Portugueſe* King being reinforced with a considerable number of *English* Archers, resolves to fight. The *French* would needs have the point, which was given them with much indignation by the *Castillans*, who lag'd behind them at a very great distance. These *French* valiantly fighting, are routed, and most of the thousand I spoke of, are taken; thereafter the *Castillans* advanced with a resolution to fight; the *Portugueſe* seeing he was to fight a new Battle, commanded under pain of Death, every man to kill his Prisoner, which was instantly performed with much pity and compassion, and not without the sad tears of those who massacred them.

The second case is, when an Army is retiring, and a powerful Enemy fiercely pursuing, it will be dangerous to leave your Prisoners behind you, and forward you can hardly bring them. And the third is, When you are reduced to great penury and want of meat, whether you had not better kill your Prisoners than let them starve, for if you maintain them, they insensibly cut your throat by eating your bread. All these three cases *Grotius* comprehends in these words, *Si Captivorum multitudo oneri aut periculo sit*; If, sayes he, the multitude of your Prisoners be dangerous or burthensome, in these cases he adviseth rather to dismiss them, than kill them. I think he speaks like a good Christian; but I am afraid, that they who lead Armies will think by such mercies they will prove cruel to themselves, and treacherous to their Prince; and when in any of these cases they are put to death, often their numbers occasion their destruction, which in other cases the same *Grotius* would have to be the cause of their safety.

To whom Quarter ought not to be given.

But the Prince or Generals promise of fair quarter admits *la salvo*, for notorious Thieves, Robbers, Murtherers, such as have deserted their service and run over to the Enemy, or have broke their Oath of fidelity, ought not to be comprehended in this promise, nor can it save them from the stroke of Justice: Indeed if they get Articles signed for their lives, these Articles should be religiously observed, for faith should be kept to the worst of men. Neither can the promise of Quarter secure Rebels from that death Rebellion deserves; for nothing can save them but the mercy of the Sovereign Prince or State, against whom the crime is committed: Yet my humble opinion should be, That when Rebellion is come to that growth, that she is not ashamed to take her mask off, and that the success of Rebels hath clothed them with usurped Authority, Princes and States should rather suffer Quarter (though without Articles) to be kept to those of them who are taken Prisoners, than provoke them to shed the blood of loyal persons on Scaffolds, as hath been done too oft; for it is not to be doubted, but Rebels will both by their Paper and leaden Bullets, vindicate themselves, and maintain their Authority to be lawful, and roar out these distinctions, which yet make our Ears tingle, of the Prince his virtual and personal power, of his legal and personal capacity.

What to be done with Rebels.

Prisoners who yield on discretion.

Having told you, who hath power to give Quarter, and having spoken of Prisoners who yield upon promise of Quarter, let us speak next of those who submit to the Victors discretion, and have no promise of Quarter, who certainly may be put to the edge of the Sword, without any imputation of breach of

of Faith or promiſe, yet not without the imputation of cruel inhumanity. They do not indeed tranſgreſs againſt the Laws of War nor Nations, who ſhed their blood; but they ſin againſt humane nature, which commiſerates frailty, and againſt the Laws of Chriſt. The Duke of *Alva*, and his Son *Don Frederick*, broke no faith nor promiſe to the Garriſon and Inhabitants of *Harlem* and *Narden* in *Holland*, who had ſubmitted to their mercy, when they beheaded, hanged and butchered to death many thouſands of them: but that horrible action of theirs hath left an eternal ſtain of inhumane cruelty on their names, as it will do on all thoſe who imitate their bloody example. The Duke of *Burgundy*, *Charles* the Warlike, Beſieged and Battered *Granſon*, a Town belonging to the *Switſers*, the Garriſon conſiſting of 800 men, yielded to his mercy, which was ſuch, as that he put them all to the Sword. But here vengeance purſued him cloſe, for within a very few dayes, he was ſhamefully beaten by the *Switzers*, who were but a handful of men in compariſon of his numerous Army. Commonly three reaſons are given for putting thoſe to death who yield on diſcretion; Firſt, Obſtinacy in holding out: Secondly, To terrify others: Thirdly, To uſe *Legem Talionis*, when the Prince or General of the other party hath formerly uſed the like ſeverity. To the firſt, to hold out gallantly, and reſolutely, ſo long as there are any hopes of a Relief, is not a crime in it ſelf, but if accidentally a Garriſon have provoked the Beſieger to revenge, it will be more gallantly done to refuſe all Parley, diſcharge all Quarter, and in the fury put all to the Sword, than to kill them in cold blood; yet it is frequently done. But *Torſtenſon* the *Sweediſh* Felt-Marſhal did generouſly, when he reſolved to put a *Daniſh* Garriſon of 600 men to the Sword, who were in a Sconce of the Dutchy of *Holſtein*, he refuſed all Parley and Treaty, and in the Storm killed them every man. Yet this action of his ſmelled too rank of revenge, for it was thought, all this blood was ſhed, becauſe a *Sweediſh* Admiral called *Flemyng* was killed with a Cannon Bullet out of that Sconce. The ſecond reaſon to kill men *ad terrorem*, to terrifie others, hath no ſhew of reaſon in it; for why ſhould men be terrified from doing their duty? Shall a Governour yield his Fort for fear, the Beſiegers may kill him, if he yield it not? when he deſerves to be hanged by his own Prince, if he ſhould yield it for any ſuch reaſon. To the third reaſon, it is anſwered, That by the Law of Nature in juſtice and equity, *Talio* can only be uſed againſt the perſon or perſons who committed the crime, and therefore it is a trangreſſion againſt the Law of Nature, and a high injuſtice to put a Garriſon to the Sword, which either doth yield, or would yield to mercy, only becauſe the Prince or General of the other party did ſo; for none of this Garriſon now to be butchered were partakers of that crime. But this *lex talionis* is pretended too often for killing men after they have got Articles, and that is worſt of all, whereof I ſhall ſpeak hereafter: But other reaſons may be given for this killing of thoſe who ſubmit to diſcretion, which the *Germans* call *genad* and *ungenad*, that is, mercy or no mercy, as when the Priſoners are too numerous, a powerful Enemy expected, or the Souldiers are apt to mutiny, if they get not the ſpoil. To the laſt I ſay, lives and the blood of men are no ſpoil nor booty; to the other two, better have refuſed (as I ſaid before) all Treaty and Parley: Yet this was the caſe of *San Joſeph* and 700 *Italian* Souldiers at *Smerwick* in *Ireland*, who yielded themſelves to the mercy of the Lord *Grey*, Deputy of that Kingdom; the Officers had their lives ſpared, all the *Iriſh* were hanged, and the *Italians* put to the edge of the Sword; and when this was told to Queen *Elizabeth*, that heroick Princeſs, who deteſted the killing of thoſe who yielded, ſhe was exceedingly diſpleaſed, nor would ſhe accept of any excuſes or allegations.

Inhumanity to kill them.

Duke of *Alva*, and his ſon.

Charles Duke of *Burgundy*.

Reaſons given for it.

Anſwer to the firſt reaſon.

To the ſecond.

To the third.

Other reaſons alledged and anſwered.

I have told you in another place, how Priſoners of War were uſed by the Antients, let us take a view, what uſage many of them have met with in our Modern Wars: The *Mexicans* or *Tenuſtitans* uſed to ſacrifice their Priſoners to their Idols, or to the Sun. The *Cannibals*, to fat them, kill them and eat them. A *Parthian* King took *Valerian* a Roman Emperour, on whoſe neck that barbarous Prince ordinarily ſet his foot when he mounted his Horſe, and at length did fley him quick. *Tamberlan* uſed *Bajazet* the great Turk ill enough, yet did he ſuffer him to be his own Bourreau. *Mahomet* the Great, took ſome of *Scanderbegs* Captains, and fley'd them quick, and in that torment

Horrible cruelties.

he kept them fifteen dayes alive; the like cruelty he uſed to a poor King of *Caramannia*: He put alſo to death all who had any relation to the Imperial families of *Conſtantinople* and *Trapeſund*. But it were well, if theſe cruelties had been only exerciſed by Heathens and Infidels, but it is pity ſo many Chriſtians have taken licence to themſelves to deal mercileſly with their Priſoners, even thoſe who profeſs the ſame faith in Chriſt, who gave no warrant to his followers to mask cruelty with that Law or Cuſtome of Nations, whereof *Cyrus* ſpoke to his Captains, and the *Althenian* Embaſſadours to the *Melitans*. Heathens killed ſometimes thoſe who had got quarter, ſo have Chriſtians done too often. In the Civil Wars of *France*, it was practiſed many times by the parties of both perſwaſions to put Man, Woman and Child to the Sword, or lead them out to ſome River and drown them. We read of a Proteſtant Colonel, who for his ſport forced all his Priſoners (except one) to leap from the top of a high Steeple; certainly this mirth of his was mixed with much miſchief. In theſe Wars, though Commanders in chief might (though not without cruelty) put Priſoners to death, to whom their inferiors had promiſed Quarter; yet I wonder, how others below them, and of a mean condition, uſurped that ſame power, and were never either puniſhed, reproved or reprehended for it. At the Battle of *Dreux*, Saint *Andrew* Marſhal of *France*, had Quarter given him by a Gentleman, who mounted him on the croup of his Horſe, having no other to give him; but one *Banbigni* pretending the Marſhal had once wronged him at Court, ſhot him through the head, for which barbarous act he was never puniſhed by the Admiral of *France*, who commanded the Proteſtant Army, the Prince of *Conde* being made Priſoner at the ſame Battle. More generous was Prince *Portian*, who though he had received many real injuries from *Monmorancy* Conſtable of *France*, yet when he ſaw him Priſoner at that ſame Battle of *Dreux*, he gave him his hand, and offered him all the ſervice he could do him. The Prince of *Conde* had fair Quarter given him at the Battle of *Jarnac*, but was thereafter inhumanly ſhot through the head by a private Gentleman, nor was ever the Murtherer called in queſtion for it. But theſe may ſeem but peccadilloes to the cruelties which are related by Hiſtorians, of ſome of which I ſhall give you a touch.

A deviliſh act.

Quarter baſely broke.

In a Sea Battle fought about the year 1253. between the *Venetians* and *Genueſes*, (with the laſt whereof ſome of the Emperour of *Greece* his Ships were joyned) the *Venetian* fleet was routed, all the Priſoners who fell to the *Genoways* ſhare were put to death, every Mothers Son; but the *Greeks* pretended they would deal more mercifully with their Captives, and I will tell you how they exerciſed it: They put out both their eyes, ſet them a ſhore, and ſo ſent them to look for their fortunes; ſo true is it what Truth it ſelf hath told us, That the mercies of the wicked are cruel. As *Charles* of *Burgundy* Beſieged *Nancy* the *Lorreiners* endeavoured to enter the Town, which ſome performed, but one *Cifron* a prime Gentleman was taken, and had quarter given him, but the Duke againſt all Law and Equity would have him hanged: the Gentleman deſired to ſpeak privately with the Duke before his death, intending to reveal to him the horrid Treaſon plotted againſt him by his Favourite the Count *Campobacchio*; but that obſtinate Prince would not hear him, and ſo the poor Gentleman was hanged; upon which followed the loſs of the Dukes Army, honour and life: The pretended reaſon he gave for hanging *Cifron* was, It was (as he ſaid) a capital crime to offer to enter into a Town that was Inveſted and Beſieged by a Prince, and againſt which he had made uſe of Ordnance, a thing in thoſe dayes ſometimes practiſed by the *Italians* and *Spaniards*, but now deſervedly out of faſhion. *Charles* of *Anjou*, Brother to the *French* King *Lonis* the Saint, did worſe than all this; for having taken the title of King of *Naples* and *Sicily*, by the donation of Pope *Martin*, it happened that he took *Conradin*, the true proprietary of theſe Kingdoms, priſoner, and with him *Frederick* Arch-Duke of *Auſtria*, and beheaded them both publickly on a Scaffold, and with them a conſiderable number of the Nobility of thoſe Kingdoms, who were all Priſoners of War; an action ſo much the more execrable, that it was committed by a Chriſtian King, and by the inſtigation of a Pope, who aſſumed to himſelf the title of Head of the Church. This cruel King had a Son, who was called *Charles* the Halting, a Prince of a ſweet diſpoſition, who had like to have paid

Mercileſs inhumanities.

A King and an Arch-duke Priſoners of War, beheaded.

paid dear for his Fathers sin, he was taken at a Sea-fight by *Roger de Lorra*, that famous Admiral of *Arragon*, and in *Sicily* condemned to dye in that same manner as the other two Princes had done; but the sentence of death being brought to him on a *Friday* morning, his answer was, He was well contented to dy on that day on which his Saviour suffered the death of the Cross: which being reported to the Religious Queen *Constance* (who was then Regent in *Sicily* for her Husband *Peter* King of *Arragon*) she said, That for his sake who dyed that day for all Believers, *Charles* should live, and so saved him: But it was not in her power to hinder the revengeful *Sicilians* to sacrifice on a Scaffold the heads of two hundred *French* Gentlemen (all taken with Prince *Charles*) to appease the Ghosts of the murdered *Conradin* and *Frederick*. This they thought was *Lex Talionis*, though indeed it was nothing like it. Take one of a later date, When Count *Lodowick* of *Nassaw*, (otherwise a brave and a worthy Gentleman) had defeated and killed the Count of *Arembergh*, at *Wirschot* in the Province of *Groninghen*, he took many *Spaniards* Prisoners, whom he hanged every Mothers Son; a most disavowable act. The Duke of *Alva* (that severe Governour of the *Netherlands*) did not at all challenge him for his cruelty, much less that he had done any thing against the Law of War or Nations; but looking on it as an indignity done to the *Spanish* Nation, since *Lodowick* had used the men of no other Country with so much severity, he revenged it (as most wise men of those times thought) by putting to death shortly after (under the pretext of justice) great numbers of the *Dutch*; in one day he beheaded on the *Sandhil* of *Bruxels* eighteen Lords and Gentlemen of quality, the next day he caused six or seven prime men to be tortured to death, and a few days after that, caused the Earls of *Egmond* and *Horne* to be beheaded publickly on a Scaffold at *Bruxels*: This had nothing of *Lex Talionis* in it, none of these Lords or Gentlemen having been accessary to that Action of Count *Lodowick*.

How revenged.

A detestable act of a Count of *Nassaw*.

But was there ever *Turk* more mercileſs to men, who had Quarter promised them, than an *Italian*, of whom I am now to tell you? When the *Imperialists* Besieged *Florence*, *Volterri* revolted from the *Florentines*, who sent one *Ferrucci* to reduce it to obedience, he entred the Castle (which held out for *Florence*) and by it the City, where he committed extream cruelties, killed many Souldiers, and took fourteen *Spaniards* to whom Quarter was promised: but when they thought themselves secure, the mercileſs *Ferrucci* (alledging, that some of their Country men had once taken him, and given him a very spare Dyet) threw them all into a dark Dungeon, where he famished the poor wretches to death, and then hanged their Carcasses about the Walls. What do you think of this *Lex Talionis*? May not a man say (without wrong to charity) that this *Italian*, if it had been in his power, would have tortured these poor mens Souls as well as their Bodies; nor did he keep any agreement made to the poor Citizens, but hanged some, and plundered all, and spared neither Church nor Cloyster. The same *Ferrucci* being summoned shortly after to deliver up the Town to *Maramaldo* one of the *Imperial* Generals, against the Law of Arms, he hanged the Trumpeter; this action sounded loud for revenge, which quickly overtook him, for being thereafter beaten by the *Imperialists*, he is taken Prisoner, and brought to that same *Maramaldo*, who, after outragious Language, caused him to be disarmed, and then killed him with his own hand; an ignoble act of *Maramaldo*, but too good a death for *Ferrucci*. But before I go out of *Italy*, hear another barbarous usage of a Prisoner in that same Rencounter, a *Florentine* Gentleman, one *Amico d' Arsoli*, was taken Prisoner, fair Quarter was given him, and he had his ransome paid, but by the wrong hand; for one *Martio Colonna* bought him from him who had taken him, purposely to kill him, and poor *Amico* was killed, and by *Martio*'s own hand: a very unmartial act, and all because *Amico* had fairly killed a Cousin of *Martio*, one *Stephano Colonna*; nor had *Lex Talionis* place here neither. The *Italians* then need not to expostulate with the *Turks* either for cruelty, or inobservance of Quarter given to Prisoners. But let us in the next place see how a *Spaniard* behaved himself (and he was a person of no mean quality) in keeping the Quarter that was given to Prisoners of War.

Unspeakable cruelty of an Italian to his Prisoners.

Revenged by the like.

A barbarous usage of a Prisoner.

When *Philip* the Second, King of *Spain*, had taken Possession of the Kingdom of *Portugal*, his Admiral the Marquess of *Santa Cruz*, at a Sea Battle near

Santa Crux his inhumanity to *French* Prisoners.

the *Terceras*, defeated a *French* Fleet: Here was taken *Philip Strozzi*, a *Florentine*, who was sent as General of the forces ordain'd by *Catherine de Medici*, Queen Mother of *France*, to assist the Prior of *Crato*; with *Strozzi* were three hundred more taken, and had fair quarter promis'd them: *Strozzi* was pitifully wounded, and laid down before *Santa Crux*; but neither the quarter promis'd him, nor the sad condition of a brave Gentleman, nor the consideration of the instability of humane affairs, could move *Santa Crux* to pity him, but gave a barbarous order to throw him immediately over-board. Nor did his cruelty stop there, for by a formal Sentence he beheaded fourscore Gentlemen of the Prisoners; all the rest of three hundred, that were above seventeen years of age, he hang'd; those that were under that age he condemn'd to the Galleys. An unparallel'd act of Justice.

A question.

I have said before, that quarter, unless promis'd by Articles, should not be given to Fugitives. But here a question ariseth, If an Officer or a common Souldier be taken, and be not able to maintain himself in Prison, and no care is had by his Superiours either to exchange, ransome, or maintain him, if he be forc'd to take service under the Enemy, and be re-taken, whether he

Answered.

should be used as a Fugitive or not? Here, I suppose, a distinction will be necessary. If he be the natural subject of the Prince or State that makes the War, he may not serve their Enemy on any pretence; and if he do it, he is liable to punishment as a Traytor; but if he serve him only as a mercenary, it seems disputable: for the *Grecians* and *Romans* punish'd such of their own as serv'd the Enemy, with death; but not their Auxiliaries, unless they had run over from them to the Enemy: but that is not the question, for all Runaways deserve death; but these I speak of are not such. Yet there was a valiant Knight *Capuz Muden*, who had done *Charles* the Fifth great services, but was none of his Subjects; he was taken by the *French* in *Piedmont*, and having often, and in vain sollicited for his exchange or ransome, he took service under the *French* King, and after that was taken by the *Imperialists* in *Artois*; and notwithstanding all his defences, had his Head cut off by the Emperours command. When that Major General *Kniphausen*, whom I mention'd in the last Chapter, was Prisoner with Count *Tili*, he wrote to the King of *Sueden*, (whose subject he was not) and desir'd to know, (since he could neither maintain nor ransome himself) if he might take imployment under the Emperour; the King told all those who were with him, That the Major General ask'd him the question, Whether he might lawfully be a Knave or not? Intimating thereby, that he might not for all his Imprisonment, break his Military Oath. But for all that, I have known thousands take service in that manner, and never challeng'd for it when they have been re-taken: Inexorable necessity dispensing oft with transgressions of that kind.

Severity.

Injustice in making some Prisoners.

To make those Prisoners who have not taken Arms, but live in amity with both parties, only because they are suspected to favour one party more than the other, hath little of the Law of Arms in it, and less of that of Conscience. Herein the famous Count of *Mansfeld* is inexcusable, for putting Guards on the Earl of *East-Friezeland*, when he had quarter'd his Army in his County. So was the *Swedish* Felt-Marshal *Banier* for sending one of the Dukes of *Saxon-Lauenburg* and the Lord *Arnheim* Prisoners to *Sueden*: Neither can the late King of *Sueden* be well excused for seizing on the persons of the Duke and Dutchess of *Courland*.

Whether Women should be Prisoners of War, if taken.

The securing of the Dutchess as well as her Husband the Duke, minds me of a question, Whether Women should be made Prisoners of War? it is certain, in ancient and later times too, they were taken, and ransom'd, or exchang'd, or made slaves; yet it would seem, since Nature hath generally exempted that Sex from making War, they cannot properly be made Prisoners of War. The *Mahometans* notwithstanding make Slaves of them. And, I suppose, in our late Wars, they were not ordinarily made Prisoners, rather because the custome of it is worn out, than that it is abrogated by any Law. It is not yet 130 years since some *French* Captains under *Francis* the First took some *Spanish* Ladies Prisoners at *Perpignan*, and would have put them to ransome; but that generous King gave a summ of money to those who had taken them, and sent them home to their Husbands, without ransome; Now it is not like he would

have

have bought them from his own Officers, if he had not thought they had some right to them by the Law of War. The great *Cyrus* did well in preserving the honour and chastity of the fair *Panthea*, taken Prisoner in the War, but he had done better to have sent her home to her Husband *Abradates*. *Alexander* did well to use *Darius* his Mother, Wife and Daughters honourably; but he had done better to have sent them home to the *Persian* King, either for, or without ransome. *Selimus*, the First, as barbarous and cruel a Tyrant as he was known to be, shew'd more generosity in this point than both of them; for the noise of the *Turks* Cannon having rather frighted the *Persian* Horses, than chac'd the Sophi *Ismael* out of the *Calderan* Plains, his Horse-men took a number of noble *Persian* Ladies Prisoners, whom the Great Turk sent home to their Husbands without ransome, and without any violence done to their persons or honours. Some instances of it.

But Prisoners of War having got fair quarter promis'd them, and honestly kept, What shall be done with them? Assuredly, they must be either enslaved, exchang'd or ransom'd. As to the first, we are to know, that after the great *Constantine* suffer'd the Christian Faith to be preach'd without interruption, over most of the then known World, men remitted much of the severity of the Law of War and Nations to Prisoners: And Slavery (which makes men differ but little from beasts) wore piece and piece out of fashion; yet long after Christianity shone over the World, Prisoners of War were made Slaves: for there be some Canons of the Church extant, that forbid men to counsel Slaves to desert their Masters. But by tract of time all Nations, as it had been by an universal consent, left off to make their Prisoners Slaves, or to sell them as such, because they were then better instructed in the Laws of Charity than to abstain from killing miserable Captives, only out of respect of gain to themselves, or at least to seem to be less cruel. But three hundred years after the Great *Constantine*'s death, when *Mahometanism* had spread its darkness over the East, slavery was brought back to the World; and yet if you will consider right, you will find this slavery and bondage of Christians is not confin'd to those Countreys only, where *Mahomet* is adored; for there are thousands of Christian Slaves to be found in the Galleys belonging to the most Christian and Catholick Kings, the Great Duke of *Tuscany*, the *Venetians*, the *Genoways*, the Pope, and the Great Master of *Malta*. And may we not say, That many thousands of his Majesties Subjects, after quarter given, were made perfect Slaves, and upon that account sold and sent to remote Plantations? The Great *Gustavus Adolphus* did, I think, something very like this, when he sent three thousand *Croatians*, commonly called *Carabats*, (who had quarter given them for life at several places in *Germany*) by Sea to *Sueden*, there to work at his Iron and Copper Mines. Slavery remitted by Christians, Brought back by *Mahomet*. Retain'd yet by some Christians.

Among Christians then, Prisoners of War being exempted from Slavery, they are to be kept till they be either exchang'd or ransom'd, or set at liberty by the Victor *gratis*; this sometimes falls out, but seldome. Sometimes they are set at liberty conditionally, as, If you do such a thing, enjoy your liberty; if not, return to Prison: and the Prisoner is oblig'd to do either the one or the other. It was the case of some *Scottish* Lords, whom *Henry* the Eighth, of *England*, detain'd Prisoners. He permitted them to return to *Scotland*, and if they could procure the Marriage of his Son, Prince *Edward*, with the Infant Queen of *Scots*, then they were to have their liberty; if not, they were to return: they failing in the first, some of them honestly perform'd the second. He that takes a Prisoner may search him, and all he lays hold on is his own; but if the Prisoner hath reserv'd something hidden, that his Taker knows not of, he may make use of it to maintain himself, or to help to pay his ransome; for he who took him hath no right to it: for Lawyers say, *Qui nescit, nequit possidere*. The exchange of Prisoners of equal quality is ordinary over all the World; if there be some, but no considerable disparity, some Money ballanceth the matter. The Ransome of a Prisoner belongs to him who took him, unless he be a person of very eminent quality, and then the Prince, the State, or their General seizeth on him, giving some gratuity to those who took him. The price of the Ransome useth to be estimated according to his pleasure who keeps the Prisoner; but because many times they are extravagant in their demands, an agreement is frequently made between the two parties who make the War, of a certain Liberty granted to Prisoners conditionally. By Exchange. By Ransome.

A general agreement for Ranſomes ordinary.

certain price to be paid by Officers, and Common Souldiers for their Ranſomes according to their quality, and this ſeldom exceeds one Months pay, for any under the degree of a Colonel: and this is exceeding comfortable to Priſoners, when they know how much themſelves or their Friends have to pay for their liberty.

A Queſtion concerning ranſome.

But here is a queſtion, When a Priſoner agrees for his ranſome, and dyes before it be paid, whether the Heir be obliged to pay it? If he dye out of Priſon, there is no doubt but the Heir is bound to pay it; but if he dye in Priſon, *Grotius* ſays, his Heir is not obliged to pay it, becauſe the Priſoner had not that for which he contracted; and that was his liberty. But if the bargain be made, that the Priſoner ows the ranſome, immediately after the contract is made, the ſame *Grotius* ſayes, His Heir ought to pay it, becauſe the Captive was not to be looked on after the finiſhing of the agreement, as a Priſoner but as a Pledge for his Ranſome. But I can tell *Grotius*, that the Corps of many dead Priſoners are Ranſomed. There is another queſtion, If a Priſoner Parol, and ingage to get ſuch a perſon of the adverſe party ſet at liberty, and on that condition is ſet free himſelf; if the Priſoner agreed on, dye before the other can procure his liberty, whether in that caſe the Priſoner contracting be obliged to return to Priſon? *Grotius* ſayes no, unleſs it have been particularly ſo agreed on: yet he ſaith, he is bound to do ſomething like the equivalent, and that is to pay his own Ranſome.

Anſwered.

Another.

Anſwered.

I ſhould now ſpeak of thoſe Priſoners, who have Articles for life, it may be Cloths and Monys, or any thing elſe they carry about with them, and ſometimes as much of their goods as they can carry on their backs: but before I enter on it, it will be fit to know what poor inferior Officers and Commanders have to Parley, Treat, and to Grant, Sign and Seal Articles.

Of the power, inferior Commanders have to grant Articles.

Firſt, it will be granted, that none have power to Treat or Sign Articles but thoſe who command in chief on the place, whether it be in Town or Field. Princes or their Generals cannot be every where, and therefore muſt recommend the leading of Wings or Parts of their Armies to ſubordinate Commanders, what ever title they may have, be it Lieutenant or Major General, Colonel or Brigadeer Generals, they Treat and Grant Conditions and Articles to Enemies in the Field, or to Enemies within Towns, becauſe the emergency or neceſſity of diſpatch will not ſuffer them to adviſe with the Prince or State whom they ſerve; and therefore Articles granted by them, are to be as inviolably obſerved as if they had been Signed by the Prince himſelf. But if either a General or any under him make a tranſaction with an Enemy againſt the known Conſtitutions and publick Laws of the Prince or State whom they ſerve, then they deſerve Puniſhment, and the Prince and State are not obliged to performance; and if ſo, they ought not, nor can they in juſtice retain what they have gained by that Capitulation, whether it be Towns, Forts, Lands, Mony or Priſoners, but are obliged if they diſapprove the Agreement, to put all in *ſtatu quo prius*. *Grotius* maintains that a General hath not power to diſpoſe of Lands, Territories, Inheritances, and Offices and dignities (except they be military) without the Prince his expreſs Warrant: and there is no doubt but this aſſertion is grounded on juſt reaſon, and yet that Prince of *Orange*, General for the Emperour, who totally routed the *French* in the Kingdom of *Naples*, diſpoſed of the inheritances of moſt of thoſe who were of the *French* Faction, to his Captains; and not only ſo, but diſtributed the chief Offices of the Crown among them: and though his Maſter *Charles* the Fifth, did much diſlike of the Prince his encroaching on his Prerogative; yet that wiſe Prince ratified all that *Orange* had done, as knowing how dangerous it is for Soveraigns not to approve of what their Generals tranſact in their names. For if that be not done, who either dare, can, or will make any Capitulation with a General, whoſe agreement, be it never ſo authentick and ſolemn may be called in queſtion and revoked by the Prince he ſerves.

What a General may do.

What ſubaltern officers do

What a Captain General of an Army may do in things of this nature, the like power have thoſe who are ſubordinate to him, when they command apart, and are upon the head of ſome Wing or Brigades of the Army at a diſtance from

from the General, and at such a distance, that his assent and approbation cannot be got so soon as the present necessity or conveniency of the affair requires; as suppose a Major General or Colonel is sent three or four miles before the Army (this is no great distance) to force a Pass, which those within it offer to give over, provided they be secur'd by Articles to march away in safety, it is not time to send to the General, (suppose he have an Enemy in his Rear) for his assent, the Major General or Colonel may do it, which the General is bound to ratifie, and so it is in a hundred cases more. Nay further, If that Subordinate or Inferiour Officer grant an agreement to an Enemy, contrary to the private instructions he hath from his Prince or General; yet if he have done nothing which did exceed the limits of his office and function, the Prince and General are obliged to ratifie it: Indeed they may punish him for his transgression, to which the party with whom he capitulated, did contribute nothing, and therefore must not suffer for his Trespass. As suppose a Major General hath a little Town yielded to him by accord, whereby he permits the Garrison to march to a place of greater importance, which the Prince and his General intend to besiege, and have privately forbid the Major General to make any such agreement, they may punish him for his presumption, but are bound either to suffer the Garrison to enjoy their Articles, or at worst to go back to the place where they were. Let us summ up all that hath been said in this particular, in one instance of *Hannibal* and *Maharbal*, and it will quadrate very fitly with the subject we now speak of; the story is this:

Should be ratified by a General.

After the *Romans* were beat at the lake *Thrasimenus*, *Hannibal* sent *Maharbal* to pursue the Victory, seven or eight miles from the place of Battel, (at or near which *Hannibal* stay'd;) *Maharbal* finds six thousand *Romans* in a Body, ready to accept of liberty, if granted them to return to *Rome*, otherwise to sell their lives at a dear rate. The *Carthaginian* thought it not fit to hazzard the loss of numbers of his own men on so strong and so desperate a party, and therefore agrees with them, that they should deliver their Arms, and then have liberty to go home. *Hannibal* will not ratifie the agreement, but makes all the six thousand *Romans* Prisoners, and loads them with Irons; telling them, *Maharbal* had no power, without his consent, who commanded in chief, to grant them any immunity. The worst act ever *Hannibal* did. If *Maharbal* had no power to grant those *Romans* their liberty, he had no power to grant them their lives; and so *Hannibal* with that same Justice might have put them all to the Sword. But first, *Maharbal* commanded in chief in that place where he capitulated; next, he did nothing that exceeded the bounds of his Office, being a great Commander in the *Carthaginian* Army; thirdly, he was at such a distance from *Hannibal*, that he had no time to send for his assent, and do his errand, which was to pursue the flying *Romans*. And therefore the Historian wrongs not *Hannibal*, when he says, *Punica religione servata fides est ab Annibale*: *Hannibal* kept promise with a *Punical* Faith. Indeed, if *Hannibal* had been on the place he had said right; and this demonstrates what I said before, that any quarter given in the field where a General is, signifies nothing till it be confirm'd by him; and observe, that Articles and Agreements made by word of mouth (as this of *Maharbal*'s was) bind as strongly as those made in writing; for Promises and Parolls of Princes and Captains should be sacredly kept.

Maharbal's agreement with 6000 *Romans*,

Unworthily broke by *Hannibal*.

Grotius acknowledgeth, that *Maharbal*'s agreement should not have been infringed by *Hannibal*; and yet in that same Chapter affirms, That *Masaniſſa*, King of *Numidia*, a Friend and Ally of the *Romans* had not power to grant the fair *Sophonisbe* her life. I am not at all of *Grotius* his judgement: For first, *Masaniſſa* acted by *Scipio*'s Commission; secondly, he was far from *Scipio*; thirdly, he commanded in chief where he then was; fourthly, *Sophonisbe* was not by any former publick Law exempted from pardon; fifthly, if *Masaniſſa* had private instructions to take her life, *Scipio* might have punish'd him, but *Sophonisbe* should not have suffer'd for his transgression, but should either have enjoy'd her life, or been sent back with all her people, to the Castle where she was taken. And assuredly, *Masaniſſa* had power to grant her life, and marry her too, as he did; but he preferr'd the *Roman* friendship to the love of his Beautiful Wife, and so sent her a Cup of Poyson, as the last token of his affection.

So was that of *Masaniſſa* to *Sophonisbe*, by *Scipio*.

This

Duke *Hamilton*'s death, a Murther.

This that I have ſaid, may be accommodated and applied to *James* Duke of *Hamilton*'s caſe, who had Articles granted to him, and all that were with him for life; which, becauſe *Lambert* avouched he had given, the pretended Parliament of *England* did not deny it, but ſaid, with *Hannibal*, that *Lambert* being ſubalterne had not power to give ſuch conditions; but he had power, for he exceeded not the limits of his Office, and function of a Major General; he commanded in chief on the place where he capitulated; and we never heard that *Cromwel* did charge him with the tranſgreſſion of any of his private inſtructions at that time; and *Cromwel* was ſo far from *Lambert* then, that he could not poſſibly ſend to him for his aſſent; and if *Lambert*'s ſuperiours thought it not fit to approve of what he had done, then in Juſtice (which was a great Stranger in their Courts) they ſhould have ſet the Duke, and all that were with him at liberty, and then have taken their hazzard of all the miſchief could befal them: All which concludes that the death of that unfortunate Lord was plain Murther.

Count *de Montgomery*'s little better.

Of this ſtamp was that agreement made by thoſe who took Count *Montgomery*, who had kill'd *Henry* the Second, of *France*, at Tilting, ſore againſt his will: He had done very ſignal ſervices to the Proteſtants, in the time of the Civil Wars, and at length was beſieged in the Caſtle of *Domfron*, which he maintain'd gallantly, reſolving to dye with his Sword in his hand; but being at length deſerted by moſt of thoſe that were with him, he accepted of conditions, which were, That his Life ſhould be ſafe, and he ſhould only be Priſoner a few days, and then have his liberty. But the Queen Mother, *Catherine de Medici*, pretending that thoſe Lords who had beſieg'd the Caſtle, had no power to grant any ſuch conditions, caus'd him to be brought to *Paris*, where his Head was publickly cut off in the *Greve*, not without a previous torture. At that ſame time, his Son *Lorges* yielded *Carentan* upon Articles, but had been likewiſe ſent to *Paris*, there to partake of his Fathers fate, if he had not been dextrouſly ſhifted out of the way, and ſuffer'd to eſcape, by a near Kinſman of his own.

Ceſſations of Arms, and Parleys.

Many Parleys and Treaties are without any Ceſſation of Arms. That at *Munſter*, which produc'd the Peace in the year 1648. laſted ſix years, and yet the War in *Germany* was as hot and fierce as ever. And ſo it was in *England* in the time of the Treaty of *Uxbridge*. But if there be a ceſſation of Arms, which you may call a Truce, during the time of it, acts of hoſtility ceaſe, yet Armies may retire, Souldiers may be levied, Fortifications may be helped, unleſs by Articles all or any of theſe be forbid. If this Truce, or Ceſſation be broke by one party, the other may lawfully run to Arms, without any new denunciation of the War; or he may not do it, as he pleaſeth, or thinks convenient for the preſent poſture of his affairs. Commonly at Sieges, in time of Parley and Ceſſation, all works above or under ground are forbidden.

Towns and Forts ſurpriz'd in time of Treaty.

But when Beſieged Towns, Caſtles and Camps are neceſſitated to come to a Parley, though there be a ceſſation of Arms, let neither the Beſieger nor the Beſieged truſt to it, but ſtand on their guard, for many times the Beſieged, contrary to agreement, Sally, to deſtroy the Approaches, to ſhift away their Horſe-men, or ſome of them for Intelligence; and oftner do the Beſiegers take the advantage of a Parley, and without his order or knowledge who commands in chief, fall on the Beſieged place, whoſe Garriſon then over-wearied with former fatigue, is ſecure, and ſo ſoon overmaſter'd: For the deſire of booty, whereof the Treaty robs the Souldiers, ſtirs them up to take their advantage of thoſe, who thinking themſelves ſafe by a Ceſſation, make little or no reſiſtance. And though the Beſieger who commands in chief, may pretend it was done without his knowledge, yet he keeps what he hath got as his lawful gain, without any thought of reſtitution.

Inſtances.

Thus was *Theroüen*, and *Monmorancy*, Marſhal of *France*, in it, taken by the *Imperialiſts* in time of Parley and Ceſſation. Thus *Coqueville* at *Sainct Valery* was ſurpriz'd in the time of Treaty, by the Marſhal *de Coſſe* his Forces. Thus the ſtrong Caſtle of *Fontenay* kept by the *French* Proteſtants in the year 1574. in the time of Treaty was ſtorm'd by the Duke of *Montpenſier*, at the breaches of the Wall, and though it was defended at that time, yet it was forc'd to ſurrender, for fear of a ſecond Aſſault, on mean conditions. And thus was *Maeſtricht* ſtorm'd in the year 1579. by the Duke of *Parma*'s Army, where moſt

moſt of the Souldiers and Inhabitants, in time of Parley, were put to the Sword, after they had defended themſelves bravely for the ſpace of four months. Nor can I fancy there can be better ways found out to prevent ſuch miſchiefs at ſuch occaſions, than to keep ſtrict Guards, to diſcharge all private Parleys, to ſuffer neither Officers nor Souldiers of the two parties to ſpeak together, be the pretence of the conference what it will, and to oblige the one party to ſtay within the Walls, and the other within the Approaches, not only till the Treaty be finiſhed, and the Articles ſign'd, but even till the evacuation of the place; for *Homo Homini Lupus*; One Man is a Wolf to another.

Ways to prevent it.

Much more generous would it be to give fair conditions to thoſe who are reduced to extremities, than to take ſuch unjuſtifiable advantages againſt them. So did *Serriou* to the hunger-ſtarved Inhabitants of *Sancerre* in *France*. And truly, I think, Marqueſs *Spinola* left a noble teſtimony to the World of his Heroick Spirit, when he gave very advantageous conditions to the Governour of *Breda* in the year 1628, when he knew well enough (as I obſerved in another place) that there was no relief to be expected from without, and not above three days Victuals within.

Articles oft-times ill obſerv'd.

When Articles are ſign'd, I ſuppoſe, there is not any man of what perſwaſion ſoever, but will ſay they ſhould be religiouſly obſerv'd, and inviolably kept, neither is it in the power of any, either Prince or State, to break them without perfidy and violation of Faith, the very Cut-throats of humane ſociety. The *Turks* who were accuſtom'd to keep no Treaties, but to kill all or moſt who yielded on Articles, have learn'd of late to keep their Promiſes, as finding the breach of them was prejudicial to themſelves, becauſe it forc'd the Defendants to ſtand out to the laſt drop of their blood. It were to be wiſh'd that many Chriſtians had not prov'd perfect *Turks* in this. *Caſar Borgia*, Duke of *Valentinois*, after Articles of an accord ſign'd, ſtrangled ſome principal Lords of the noble family of the *Urſines*, and put many others to death. Nor did *Leo* the tenth, Biſhop of *Rome* enſlave himſelf to his promiſe made ſolemnly to the Dukes of *Urbino* and *Ferrara*: The Bloody Tenet, No Faith to be kept to Hereticks, could not excuſe this fedifragy, being it was done to *Roman* Catholicks. In the year 1632. we ſhall hear of Faith broke by both Proteſtants and Papiſts: The *Imperialiſts* forced a *Suediſh* Garriſon in the Town of *Sultsbach* to yield the place on conditions ſign'd, ſome whereof were baſely broke: Not long after the *Suediſh* King beſiegeth it, and makes it render upon Articles; notwithſtanding which, when the Governour was march'd a good way out of it, he was ſhot dead, and with him ſome other officers; the Souldiers all plunder'd, and forc'd to take ſervice: You may be ſure *Lex Talionis* was pretended here, but in vain, for the fedifragy of the firſt could not excuſe the foul breach of the ſecond. The famous *Bernard*, Duke of *Weymar*, had almoſt done in paſſion ſuch a diſavowable act. The caſe was this: *Briſac* being reduc'd to the utmoſt extremity, the Noble Duke (though he knew all their wants) gave Major General *Reinach* honourable conditions: But after the Garriſon was march'd out, he came to know that of thirty of his Souldiers who were Priſoners within the City, eight dyed for hunger, which the other twenty two did eat, and then were ſtarv'd to death for want of meat. This ſo enraged the Duke, that he reſolv'd to put that Monſter of a Governour, and the four hundred Souldiers, or rather Skeletons, that came out with him, to the edge of the Sword; and here you may be ſure unjuſt Revenge put on the mask of *Lex Talionis*. This diſavowable action of the Governour of *Briſac* ſhould be a Caveat to all Governours not to bring many Priſoners into beſieged places, for thoſe reaſons I mention'd in my Diſcourſe of Sieges. But if the Duke had done as he intended, he had been as guilty of perfidy, as *Reinach* was of inhumanity. And therefore the Great Commanders of his Army repreſented to him the ugly face of fedifragy in its lively colours, which did fully divert him from an action unworthy of ſo brave and ſo renown'd a Prince.

Inſtances.

Treaties ſhould be made, Promiſes given, and Capitulations ſign'd, without equivocation or mental reſervation, they ſhould be clear, ſincere, and candid, without ambiguity; for if any of that be made uſe of, it will be ſo far from excuſing breach of Faith, that it will make it look with the uglier face; as

Articles ſhould not be ambiguous.

when ſomething is foyſted into an Article, which may carry a double meaning, the Victor makes himſelf Interpreter of the genuine ſenſe; and if he be wicked, under pretence of the breach of one branch of an Article, he aſſumes to himſelf power to break all. I have given ſome Inſtances of the practice of this among the Heathen, nor hath the light of the Goſpel deterr'd men of later times from actions of ſo baſe an alloy. In the year 1633. *Great Gloggaw* in *Sileſia*, yields to *Wallenſtein*, who ſign'd Articles for them to march to the next *Swediſh* Army; but without the Town, a quarrel is pick'd for the breach of an Article, the Garriſon ſurrounded, and forc'd to declare for the Emperour. And if you will peruſe *Ireton*'s Treaty with the Town of *Limerick* in *Ireland*, 1651. you will find it of the ſame ſtamp, or worſe; after he was maſter of the place, under pretext of ſome breach of the Garriſon, he broke all agreements, and hang'd the Mayor, and ſeveral others to bear him company.

Two unworthy actions.

But after ſuch ſad ſtories of the bad obſervation of Capitulations, let me refreſh you with the relation of a merry, but a true Treaty, which was very punctually obſerv'd. When *Spinola* had retir'd himſelf from the *Lower Palatinate* to *Brabant*, he left Don *Corduba* to finiſh the War in that diſtreſſed Countrey: This *Spaniſh* General march'd to a little Town called *Ogerheim*, out of which all the Inhabitants had fled for fear, except twenty four; theſe diſcharged ſome Falconets upon the *Spaniſh* Fore-Troops, and thereafter unr over the Walls, where they were loweſt; only the Town-Shepherd, who was called *Hans Warſch*, (for he deſerves to have his name recorded) ſtay'd. A Trumpeter is ſent to ſummon the place, (the *Spaniards* not knowing its ſolitary condition) with whom *Hans* capitulated, That himſelf and his Family ſhould enjoy their Lives, Goods, and free liberty of their Religion; to which the Trumpeter readily condeſcended, and then *Hans* opened one of the Ports: This Agreement was ratified, and faithfully kept by Don *Corduba*.

A pretty ſtory, and yet a true one.

A Souldier no Spy.

A Priſoner of War may be examined, and both hired and threaten'd to tell all he knows; but if he will not, he ſhould rather be cheriſh'd than puniſh'd: for a Souldier is not to be uſed as a Spy; the laſt you may put to the Rack, but not the firſt, with any Juſtice; yet the contrary hath been practiſed. In the Civil Wars of *France*, I find, that a Souldier, after he had got quarter, was tortur'd, by pouring in Water at his mouth, till his belly grew as great as an Ox head, and yet dyed without revealing any thing he knew. A Captain who had eſcap'd out of *Sancerre*, and was looking for aſſiſtance to that hunger-ſtarved Town, was taken, and tormented with the blows of Cudgels on the Belly, till he told all he knew, or all they would have him to tell, and then they hang'd him for his pains.

Inhumanity.

Fear of bad quarter.

The fear of bad quarter, of hard and cruel uſage, of the breach of Treaties and Articles, hath made many reſolve to take no quarter at all, and to chuſe to dye fighting: Whether theſe be acceſſory to their own death, whether this be not ſelf deſertion, or whether it be diffidence of the Almighties power, ſhall not be the ſubject of this Diſcourſe. But I ſhall ſay that Self-preſervation is a Law imprinted in the hearts of all men by Nature, and when with Honour and Reputation, a Souldier, either of high or low degree, may have fair quarter, he both may, and ſhould accept of it, both to preſerve himſelf for his maſters ſervice, and his own future fortune, and that without the leaſt aſperſion of Cowardiſe. That which is commonly reported of the Emperours Crabats, and the King of *Sweden*'s *Finlanders*, that none of them would either give or take quarter, is a meer ſpeculation; for I have known them both give and take it very contentedly.

Philopæmon.

Philopæmon may ſtand as a Beacon to all Souldiers, whether they be Pagans, Infidels, or Chriſtians, not to preſume, or yet be confident never to be Priſoners: Of a mean Gentleman, he came by his valour and conduct to be Prætor and General of the *Achæans* ſeven or eight times: Dining one day with ſome of his Friends, he heard them much commend one of his acquaintance for an excellent good Souldier: *How can he* (ſaid *Philopæmon*) *be a good Souldier, who deliver'd once himſelf Priſoner.* But this great Captain (who had now arriv'd with much Honour to the age of ſeventy years) did not foreſee his fate, which the very next day (while he made good the Retreat of ſome *Achæan* Gentlemen from the *Meſſenians*) deliver'd him Priſoner to his mortal

mortal Enemies, who having brought him to *Meſſene*, caſt him into a deep Priſon, and not long after preſented him with a Cup of deadly Poyſon, which (after he was aſſur'd of the ſafety of his Friend *Licortas*) he cheerfully drank off, and immediately gave up the Ghoſt.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of our Modern Military Puniſhments, and of Rewards.

THe Law is a Dumb Judge, and a Judge is a Speaking Law. In vain it is to make Laws, unleſs Judges look to their execution, for that is the life of the Law. I have ſpoke in another place of the Military Puniſhments and Rewards of the Ancients, I have likewiſe ſpoke of our Modern Military Laws; where obſerve, that moſt of them threaten Puniſhment, few or none promiſe Reward; the firſt is due to Tranſgreſſors, the ſecond is *ex beneplacito*, becauſe all men are bound to do their duty; yet Princes and States have rewarded Vertue of late times, as well as the Ancients did. I ſhall ſpeak of Puniſhments, and then of Rewards.

Though Princes and States have their ſeveral Laws of War, yet all agree that Treaſon againſt the Prince, in betraying either his Forts, Forces, or Munitions, ſhould be puniſh'd with an ignominious Death, but the crime ſhould be throughly examin'd by the Judge Marſhal, and Court of War, whereof I have formerly ſpoke. Mutiny againſt Command, or Superiour Officers is puniſhable by Death: If it cannot be compeſc'd without force, either all, or moſt of the Army are to be call'd together, to cut the Mutineers in pieces. But if a Mutiny be quieted without blood (in doing whereof both Courage and Prudence are requiſite) then ordinarily the ring-leaders are to dye, and the reſt are eitheir all pardon'd, or all to run the *Gatloupe*, or the tenth man of them is to ſuffer death; which cuſtome is borrow'd from the Ancient *Romans*. If Officers run away from the Mutineers, and leave them mutinying, the Law of War orders them to dye, unleſs they can make it appear, that either they had kill'd ſome of the Mutineers, or had been wounded themſelves by them: But it is not to be denied, that too many of them are more ready to give a riſe and beginning to a Mutiny, than to put an end to it. The Death of a Mutineer ſhould be ignominious, and therefore it ſhould be hanging, or breaking on a Wheel. All crimes that are Capital by the Civil Law, are ſo alſo by Martial Law, as Wilful Murther, Robbery, Theft, Inceſt, Sodomy, and others, needleſs to be rehears'd. But Martial Law makes many crimes Capital, which the Civil and Municipal Law doth not; Such are, to deſert the Colours, to Sleep on Sentinel, to be drunk on a Watch, to draw a Sword or ſtrike at a Superiour; many times theſe are pardon'd, and very oft they are puniſh'd with Death, when a General thinks Juſtice more convenient than Mercy. To be abſent from a Watch, by ſome Military Laws is Capital, but ſeldome put in execution: Yet I find in the Reign of *Henry* the Second, of *France*, that one *Granvillon*, a *German* Colonel, in a Court of War condemn'd an Enſign bearer to be hang'd for playing at Dice in his Lodging, when the Company was on Watch; and he put the Sentence in execution. The crime of Cowardize is by the Law of War, Capital; but ſhould be well examin'd by the Auditor, and the matter made clear in a Court of War, before Sentence be paſt, becauſe it, and Treaſon, taints the Blood of the parties. To run away in time of ſervice, either in the Field, or from the Aſſaults of Towns, Forts and Out-works, brings Death upon

Puniſhment of Capital crimes, Treaſon,

Mutiny,

Many more.

Severe Juſtice.

Cowardiſe.

upon the guilty; or that which to generous Spirits is worſe than death, that is, to have their Swords broke over their Heads by the hand of the Hangman, and ſo turn'd out of the Army; and this I have known more frequently practis'd, than death inflicted; but the Inſtances I could give are too freſh, and therefore I ſhall tell you only of one about a hundred years ago. At the Siege of *Dinan*, *Gaſpar Coligni*, that famous Admiral of *France*, commanded ſome Enſign-bearers to run with their Colours to the Aſſault of the breach; they did not go, pretending the place was too dangerous for the Kings Colours, for they might chance to be taken by the Enemy; for which the Admiral caus'd all their Swords to be broke over their Heads by a Hang-man, in view of his whole Army. It will be about two or three and thirty years ſince *Leopold* Arch-Duke of *Auſtria*, and his Lieutenant General *Piccolomini*, cauſed a Regiment of Horſe to be cut in pieces, and all the Officers to be hanged in the place, where-ever they could be apprehended, without any Proceſs or Sentence of a Court of War, becauſe it was well known, that the whole Regiment had run away in a full body, without fighting, at the ſecond Battel of *Leipſick*, where the *Suediſh* Felt-marſhal *Torſtenſon* gain'd the Victory over the *Imperialiſts*. I have ſpoke in the laſt Chapter of the puniſhment due to thoſe Governours who give over Forts ſooner than they need, and gave you ſome inſtances; but now I ſhall tell you, that by ſome Articles of War, the whole Garriſon is lyable to puniſhment, which is, to be Pioneers to the reſt of the Army. I dare ſay nothing againſt the Juſtice of this Law, but, I think, if the Garriſon diſobey the Governour, and do not march out at his command, (he pretending the Prince or Generals order for what he does) all of it may undergo the cenſure and puniſhment of Mutiny: But many Laws are made *ad terrorem*, which do but little good.

An ignominious puniſhment.

An exemplary and deſerved puniſhment.

A ſevere Law.

Inhumane puniſhments.

I think, the *Turkiſh* Puniſhments not imitable by thoſe who profeſs the name of Chriſt; ſuch as are, roaſting at ſlow fires, flaying quick, and gaunching; the manner of this laſt is, to throw the condemned perſon from the top of a Tower or a high Wall, the place where he is to fall, being all beſet with Iron pricks; and the wretch is happy if his Head, Breaſt, or Belly fall on one of them, for thereby he may be ſoon diſpatched; but if a Leg, Arm or Thigh catch hold, he muſt hang till extremity of pain, hunger, thirſt, and the fowls of the air, put an end to his miſerable life. The *Muſcovites* for a Military Puniſhment can whip to death, and that is cruel enough. They and other Chriſtians can impale condemned perſons on wooden Stakes and Spits, which in ſome extraordinary caſes is alſo practiſed in *Germany*; and I have heard, that Hang-men can ſo artificially do it, that the woful Delinquent will ſometimes live three days in unſpeakable torture. When *Mahomet* the Great, ſaw a Valley in *Valachia* beſet with theſe Stakes and Wheels, on which ſome thouſands of Men and Women lay executed, it is ſaid that he much commended the Vayvod or Prince of that Countrey for a good Juſtitiary; ſo near did the one of their tempers, both barbarous and cruel, reſemble the other.

The faireſt and juſteſt way of Puniſhment is by Courts of War, if the caſe do not require a preſent animadverſion: And that Court is to judge, and give Sentence according to the Military Laws of the Prince or State, in whoſe ſervice the Army is. When the Sentence is pronounced, the General may either pardon the offender, or delay the execution, or alter the manner of his death. The moſt honourable death for a Delinquent Souldier is accounted Beheading; the next to that is Shooting, (which commonly is called Harquebuſiering) if he be a Horſe-man, with Piſtols; if a Foot Souldier, with Muskets. But the Puniſhments of ſeveral Crimes are left by Martial Law, to the arbitrement of a Court of War; and ſome of theſe, aggravated by circumſtances, are made Capital, though in themſelves they be not ſuch; of which, demurring to give preſent obedience, if an Enemy be conceiv'd to be near, is one; and this falls frequently out.

Generals may pardon.

Military Puniſhments, which reach not to Death, are the Strappado, hanging up by the Thumbs, ſo that only the Delinquents Toes can touch the ground; laying Muskets on their Shoulders, more or fewer, for a longer or ſhorter time, according to the quality of the fault; to be kept in Priſon ſo many days or weeks with Irons on them; and ſometimes to be fed only with Bread

Ordinary puniſhments.

Bread and Water in Priſon. Obſerve here, that without a Sentence of a Court of War, no Superiour Commander, be who he will, can keep an Inferiour Officer or Common Souldier longer in Priſon than the impriſoned party calls for a hearing. There is alſo riding the Wooden Horſe, on which ſometimes the Offender hath his hands tyed behind his back, and ſometimes Muskets, or other weights tyed to his feet: As likewiſe to be turned out of the Army by the Hang-man, to have their Ears cut off by the Hang-man, to be whipp'd by the Hang-man, to have their Swords broke by the Hang-man. I have known ſome who thought, that Souldiers who are whipp'd at *Gatloupe*, ſhould be turned out of the Army; which is a groſs miſtake, for they are appointed to be whipped by their Comerades, that they may be kept in the Army, for after an Officer or Souldier is put in a Hang-mans hand, he ſhould ſerve no longer in any Army. *Guſtavus Adolphus*, King of *Sweden*, firſt began it, in imitation belike of the cuſtome the *Roman* Centurions had to whip their Souldiers. It is a *German* word, *Gaſlauf*, and comes from *Gas*, or *Gat*, which ſignifieth a Street; and *Lauffen*, or *Louppen*, which is, to run; becauſe he who is to be whipp'd, is to run through a Street, between two rows of Souldiers. The Provoſt Marſhal is to furniſh Rods, and to give the Delinquent the firſt laſh; but if there be neither Provoſt nor Lieutenant, nor Servant of his (who is called *Stokknecht*) then the Drummers give the Rods.

A neceſſary obſervation.

The original and derivation of *Gatloup*.

But there are ſeveral caſes which require preſent Puniſhments to be inflicted by Officers and Commanders, without committing the Delinquents to Priſon, or calling them before a Court of War; as in point of obſtinacy, either in not doing the thing that is commanded, or not doing it in that manner that the Officer would have it done; the giving undutiful language in preſence of a Superiour; ſpeaking after ſilence is commanded; ſtanding ſtill after one is commanded to march or go: In any of theſe, and many other caſes, a Sergeant may make uſe of his Halbert, and a Commiſſionated Officer of his Battoon, if the party offending be either an Inferiour Officer, or a Common Souldier. Nay, there be ſome caſes wherein Officers may cut, wound, yea, kill, as in a Mutiny; whereof I have ſpoke already: In caſe Souldiers be Plundering, and will not forbear, when commanded; in caſe two be brawling and fighting together, and will not leave off: But killing ſhould be uſed by no Officer, but where the ſervice of the Prince, or the Vindication of Juſt Authority make it neceſſary. And therefore to kill Souldiers when they ſtraggle on a march, unleſs they refuſe to obey, and return to their Companies, I think is a crime in any Commander or Officer, except in a Marſhal or Rumour-maſter. And here I muſt acquaint my Reader with ſome nice diſtinctions that ſome make of Superiours beating their Inferiours.

In what caſes Officers may ſtrike, wound, or kill.

As firſt, that none under a Colonel may kill, nay, nor thruſt with the point, or ſtrike with the edge of a Sword, only they may ſtrike with the broad ſide of it; but in ſome of theſe caſes, which I have mention'd, eſpecially Mutiny, both Commiſſion'd and Uncommiſſion'd Officers may ſtrike with the edge, thruſt with the point, yea, kill with their Swords; and if they do it not, they may be queſtion'd upon their lives. Secondly, ſay ſome, A Sergeant ſhould beat with nothing but his Halbert; and ſo ſay I too, if he have it by him (which he is not always bound to have;) but if not, he both may and ought to do it with his Sword, when emergencies require it. Thirdly, they will tell you, a Corporal muſt only beat with a Musket-reſt, if he ſerve to foot, (for Corporals of Horſe, they grant, may beat with their Swords,) but Musket-reſts are now out of faſhion, and when they were uſed, if a Corporal broke one of them in beating a Souldier, who ſhould pay for it, the Corporal or the Souldier, is a hard queſtion: He may therefore beat with his Sword, for none under an Enſign-bearer ſhould be permitted to carry a Battoon; an abuſe too much ſuffer'd. But fourthly, many Intelligent Commanders have averr'd, that none but a Major may ſtrike with a Battoon, as alſo that he may beat with it any Officer under a Captain, that is, both Lieutenants and Enſigns, which they ſay is no affront to them, provided the Major immediately throw away his Battoon, and draw his Sword. Truly, there is no new cuſtome but appears ſtrange and bizarre at firſt, till it become common, and then it doth not ſeem ſtrange at all. I find by my Lord *Carbouſier*'s teſtimony that this was the ordinary

Some nice Queſtions. Firſt.

Second.

Third.

Fourth.

nary Military cuſtome in *France*, in the latter end of the Reign of *Henry* the Great, not much more than threeſcore years ago. But that whereat I wonder is, that a Battoon at that time, and yet, was not more odious to any people under the Sun than to the *French* Nation. But mark the reaſon that is given for this cuſtome, Becauſe a Major (ſays *Louis de Montgomery*) carried always a Staff three foot and a half, or four foot long, to meaſure the length of the Souldiers huts, and with that he might ſtrike, and with no other. A ſtrange reaſon, I know no precedent for this cuſtome, except that perhaps Drapers and Taylors may beat their Journey-men and Apprentices with thoſe Ells or Yards, wherewith they meaſure their Cloath. But now thoſe whom the *French* call Marſhals of Quarters, and we Quarter-maſters, meaſure out to the Souldiers their proportion of ground for their huts, and ought to have a meaſure for it, may they therefore beat with it? I trow not. And why a Major ſhould be permitted to ſtrike with a Battoon more than a Lieutenant-Colonel, or a Colonel; or in *France*, more than a Captain (who often commands the Major) is more than I can divine. The Cuſtome is a great deal better to ſtrike at Lieutenants and Enſigns, with Swords, if neceſſity force their Superiours, (as ſometimes it may) to ſtrike at them at all.

Fifth.

Fifthly, I have heard ſome very Philoſophically diſcourſe, and argue, That if a Superiour Commander draws his Sword againſt his Inferiour, the Inferiour is obliged to retire ſeven ſteps back; but if the Superiour purſue beyond that limit, the Inferiour may draw in his Defence. But this Argument is near in kin to ſome of thoſe that are uſed for reſiſtance of the Lawful and Civil Authority, and is an Uſher of Rebellion: It caſts all Order, Diſcipline and Command in a Chaos of Confuſion: At beſt, it is but the contemplation of ſome Speculative brain; for who can tell whether the Inferiour hath gone back thoſe ſeven ſteps, or not? Who reckon'd them? Witneſſes will not agree in the meaſure. It is true, it is neither fit nor handſome, that the Superiour ſhould purſue his Inferiour, if he pay him that reſpect as to retire from him; but if that Superiour will purſue, it is permitted (and if I miſtake not, commanded,) that the Inferiour fly, but not at all reſiſt. But this is too tickliſh a theme for Military Diſcourſes. Though there may be other puniſhments, yet, I ſuppoſe, I have ſpoke of moſt. And now I ſhall deſire all of my profeſſion; of what quality ſoever they be, to proportionate their puniſhments to the crime; and to take good heed (as they will anſwer it one day to the great Judge) they do not revenge their private quarrels and grudges under the cloak of publick Juſtice. It is true, Military perſons may ſay, That this warning of mine concerns them no more than it doth thoſe who officiate both in Church and State, and neither indeed doth it.

Several kinds of Rewards.

I come now to our Military Rewards, which I may rank in three Claſſes, thoſe are, Advancement in Military charges, Titles of Honour, and recompences or gratuities of Lands, or Money. The firſt and the third are, in my opinion, common to both Commanders and common Souldiers; for a Musketeer advanc'd to a Corporals place, and getting ten or twenty Shillings of Benevolence, hath his preferment and his gratuity, as well as that Commander who is advanc'd to be a Lieutenant General, and gets a Donative of 20000 *l.* Sterling. But Titles of Honour are only given to deſerving Commiſſion'd Officers, and to none below them. Among thoſe Titles I reckon that to be one, to be made a Gentleman, and this is in oppoſition of what is commonly ſaid, That all Souldiers are Gentlemen. I knew when the late Emperour, *Ferdinand* the Third, made Major General *Sperreuter* (who had done great ſervices in the Wars) a Gentleman by Patent, becauſe he was none by birth, and gave him a Coat of Arms. Moſt of all Titles of Honour, as Dukes, Marqueſſes, Earls, Barons, and Knights, have been given for ſervices in the Wars; notwithſtanding which, Princes neither can, nor will be reſtricted to confer Honours on others of their Subjects, who both have deſerv'd or may deſerve Honour as well as Sword-men: But herein I will not offer to play the Herauld.

Princes cannot reward all who have ſerved them.

The time was never, is not, nor can in reaſon be ever expected to be, that Kings can gratifie all who have ſerv'd them Loyally. The late Emperour, in our own time, conferr'd both Riches and Honour on many; yet where one who had ſerv'd him, was rewarded, two hundred were not.

not. Queen *Christina* of *Sweden*, was so profuse in bestowing both Honours and Lands on those who had done her service in the *German* War, that she was thought to have made a prostitution of the first, and to have disposed of the second, even to the sensible diminution of the Revenues of the Crown; and yet not one Officer of a hundred that had serv'd her, tasted of her liberality. His Majesty now reigning, hath honour'd and enrich'd many, but it is not possible for him to reward all; yet those who have not got, should not envy those on whom he hath conferr'd his Princely Favours and Rewards.

The ancient custome of praising and commending those who have done any particular kind of Military service, continues yet; for every General doth something like it, but they have not that power over the Treasury, that the *Roman* Consuls had in the Fields. Our late Politicians can tell us, That their Fore-fathers were so wise, as not to entrust both the Sword and the Purse to one person, and yet Souldiers were never better paid, nor the Prince his service better done, than when he who commanded the Arms, commanded the Purse likewise. But when a General cannot reward of himself, he should not fail to acquaint his Master with the names of the persons who have done him services, with a specification what those were. Marshal *Monluc* had done great things to *Henry* the Second, when he was but Colonel, under the Count of *Brisac*, Marshal of *France*: The Noble Earl did represent those services so handsomely to the *French* King, that *Monluc* was made Gentleman of the Bed-chamber, and Governour of *Saint Abbe* in *Savoy*. Upon this subject, he hath these expressions in the Second Book of the first Tome of his Commentaries: 'It is an unspeakable grief to a 'Gentleman, who hath liberally expos'd his life in several actions, when both 'himself and his services are conceal'd from the Prince, upon whom all the 'Lives, Honours, and Fortunes of his Servants do depend; there is no 'theft, says he, nor robbery comparable to that which is made of a mans 'Honour: And yet many Generals make no Conscience to commit that theft, 'and that Robbery. Thus far *Monluc*. And since he dyed, Experience hath hath confirm'd the truth of his Observation, Generals loving too well to take both the praise and benefit of all that is done well to themselves, and with a great deal of dexterity, they lay the miscarriage of all their own actions at other mens doors. The *Swedish* Felt-Marshals, *Banier* and *Torstenson*, in our own time, were none of those Generals, for they rewarded Officers and Souldiers themselves, as well as they could; and when they could not help them, they generously recommended them to the Administrators of *Sweden*, in the Queens minority, with a grateful remembrance of their services.

Generals should make Gentlemens services known.

Monluc his sense of it.

Knighthood, in former times, was a peculiar and honourable reward of Military men, and that which is conferr'd in the Field, in time of action, is assuredly the most honourable. But Soveraign Princes have thought it fit, either when they were infested with War, or other grievous calamities, or after some glorious Victory, to unite and tye some of their Great Captains and Chieftains in a fraternity, and to confer on them, with splendid and magnificent Ceremonies, a peculiar Order of Knighthood, thereby to enflame both them and others, to Vertuous and Valorous actions: The oldest, and most Honourable, is that of the Garter, instituted by *Edward* the Third, of *England*, under the Patrociny of Saint *George*; as that of the Thistle of *Scotland* was under Saint *Andrew*. *John* of *Valois*, King of *France*, instituted the order of the Star, under the protection of Saint *Owen*, say the *French*; as one of his Successors, *Louis* the Eleventh, instituted that of Saint *Michael*. In the minority of *Henry* the Sixth, of *England*, when the War was hot between that Kingdom and *France*, *Philip le Bon*, Duke of *Burgundy*, instituted the Noble Order of the Golden Fleece, under the protection of Saint *Andrew*. The King of *Denmark* makes Knights of the Elephant, and the Duke of *Savoy* those of the Annunciation. *Christina*, Queen of *Sweden*, instituted a new Order of Knighthood, which she would have called the Order of the *Amaranth*; which, they say, never withers, and accordingly she appointed the Device to be *semper idem*. The Knights of the *Teutonick*, or *Dutch* Order, those of St. *John* of *Jerusalem*, called afterwards Hospitallers, Knights of the *Rhodes*, and now of *Malta*; as also those of the Sepulchre, or Knights Templars, were, and some

Knighthood.

Several orders of it.

Religious Orders of Knighthood.

ſome yet are very Martial Knights, whoſe renowned Actions are, and ever will be on the Records of Fame. But there were likewiſe Religious Orders, for they vowed Chaſtity, Poverty, and Obedience: And from Religion have come moſt of the *Spaniſh* Orders of Knighthood. *Sanctius*, the third of that name, King of *Caſtile*, for the more vigorous proſecution of the War againſt the Infidels, inſtituted the Order of *Calatrava*, in the Kingdom of *Toledo*: The Maſter of which Order is a perſon of great Riches and Power. His Son *Alphonſe* the Ninth (in the time of his dangerous War with the *Moors*) inſtituted the Order of Saint *James*, which hath ſince come to that heighth of power, that the Maſter of it is one of the greateſt Subjects of *Spain*: But *Ferdinand*, the firſt Catholick King, made himſelf and his Succeſſors (with the help of the Pope) Maſters of theſe Orders. One of the Kings of *Portugal*, when he had Wars with both the *Saracens* of *Africk* and *Spain*, inſtituted the Order of the Knights of *Jeſus Chriſt*. About the year 1570. the Queen of *Navarre* cauſed 12 great Medals of Gold to be coined, which ſhe diſtributed among 12 of the moſt eminent Chieftains of the Reformed Religion, as tokens of their fraternity, to incite them to Conſtancy, Valour, and Perſeverance, in the Cauſe againſt the *Roman* Catholicks. Upon one ſide of the Medal were theſe words: *Aſſured Peace, Entire Victory, or Honeſt Death.* On the Reverſe was the Queens own name, with that of her Son, the Prince of *Bearne*, who was afterwards *Henry* the Fourth, the Great, King of *France* and *Navarre*.

Jane d' Albret.

War drains the Treaſures of Princes and States ſo dry, that for moſt part they are not able to pay the Wages and Arrears of thoſe who ſerve them, much leſs reward them. The *Roman* Oak, Olive, and Laurel Crowns, are out of faſhion long ago, nor would they ſignifie any thing, but rather be ridiculous, unleſs they were given with all the Wages due to the party, who is to be honour'd with one of thoſe Crowns, as the *Romans* were accuſtomed to do. I have obſerv'd in another place, how in many parts of Chriſtendome, Officers, above the quality of private Captains, many times are reduced to beggary; to obviate which, ſince Princes and States cannot forbear War, or will not live in Peace, it would be a great work of Charity in them, and would much redound to their Honour and Fame, to build ſome Hoſpitals, and endue them with ſome ſmall Revenue, in which thoſe Commanders who are lame, old, and poor, might get a morſel of Bread; which would be an exceeding great relief to thoſe diſtreſſed Gentlemen, and much encourage younger people to engage in a freſh War; for alaſs, though written Teſtimonies, ſign'd and ſeal'd by the Prince or his General, may be of good uſe to young and luſty Gallants, who have their Health, and ſome Money in their Purſes, to look for new Fortunes; yet Paſſes (though never ſo favourable) to poor old men, are, upon the matter, nothing elſe but fair Commiſſions to beg.

Works of Charity.

Paſſes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The Comparison made by Justus Lipsius *of the Ancient and Modern Militia, examined.*

IT is one of the Curses that follow'd *Adam*'s fall, and I think was inherent in him before his fall, that as he was not, so none of his Posterity can be content with his present condition. The longing desire we have to enjoy that we want, robs us of the content we may have of what we possess. Hence it is, that old men cry up those customes that were used when they were Boys, vilifying the present, and magnifying the by-past times. Neither is this *fastidium*, or loathing of present things, the concomitant of age only, for young men, who are in their strength, are tainted with it. Some are displeased with the Government of the State, others hugely dissatisfied with that of the Church, because none of them are cast in those moulds, which they fancy to be better than the present ones; and though perhaps they cannot pretend to have seen better in their own times, yet they have heard or read of those which they conceive were so absolutely good, that nothing can be added to their perfection. Others like only of those Governments which have their birth, rise, growth, and perfection in their own giddy brains. Discontent follows humane nature.

But to come nearer our purpose, few Souldiers are satisfied with their own Countrey Militia; for if they have been abroad in the World, at their return home, they cry up the Arms, the Art, and the Discipline of Foreigners; nor can they find any thing at home can please them. And though their occasions have never invited them to take a view of strange places, yet their Books afford them matter enough, to prefer those Arms, those Exercises, those Guards, those Figures of Battels, that Discipline of War they never saw, to all those they may daily see. Of this disease of Discontent, I think, *Justus Lipsius* hath been irrecoverably sick, and though he did not compile a Military Systeme of his own, as *Machiavelli* did; yet I may compare these two in this, that both of them were Speculative Souldiers. *Lipsius* is so far disgusted with the Milice of his own time, (which truly, being about eighty or ninety years ago, was an excellent one) which he might have seen and observ'd, better than his Writings shows he did; and is so much in love with the old *Roman* Militia, (which he never saw but by contemplation) that in the comparison he makes of the two, in the last Chapter of his Commentary on *Polybius*, he is not asham'd to prefer the Ancient Art of War to the Modern one, in all its dimensions. *Justus Lipsius* an admirer of the *Roman* Militia.

As I conceive, he was so Rational as to think no man would deny the Modern Milice to want its imperfections; so, I suppose, none will be so void of Reason, as to grant to him, that the *Roman* one was absolutely perfect. He hath read it sure in the best of Authors, That nothing below the Sun is perfect. And I would have it observed, that though the Title of the Comparison be, Of the Ancient and Modern Militia, yet all along in the Comparison it self he mentions only the *Roman*, as if that had been the only Ancient one, whereas he knew the *Grecian* was more Ancient than it, the *Judaick* older than the *Grecian*, and the *Ægyptian* older than all the three. My purpose then being neither to derogate from the excellent worth of the *Roman*, nor to vilipend the Modern Art of War, I hope, without any offence to the ashes of the Learned *Lipsius*, I may take a view of his Comparison, wherein he speaks of all the five essential points of War, and in them all gives the preheminence to the *Roman*; let us hear his Reasons. He compares it with the Modern Art of War, In five points.

The first point is Election or Levy, of which he avers very magisterially that the *Roman* was the best, and which now, saith he, cannot be imitated, except First, in Election or Levy.

except perhaps in ſome Republicks, and among thoſe, he ſays, the Commonwealth of *Venice* is ſo far from imitating the *Romans*, that ſhe reſtrains her Citizens from the Exerciſe of Arms at Land, permitting them only to ſerve in her Naval Militia. In anſwer to this, I think *Lipſius* deals very rudely with Monarchs (himſelf being a ſubject of one of them) who, by his aſſertion, neither have the beſt way of Levy, nor can imitate the beſt way; for he plainly ſays, the *Roman* Levy is the beſt, and cannot be imitated but by ſome Republicks, and not by all of them neither. In the next place I ſay, that though Princes do not bring all their Subjects together in Arms every year, and out of them enrol ſome to be Souldiers, as the *Romans* did, yet it may ſatisfie *Lipſius*, if they do the equivalent; and that is, to order the matter ſo, that their Subjects on a Frontier be ready in an inſtant to withſtand an invaſion, till the Prince with a greater force comes to repel it: Or if Princes intend to invade others, then by their ſeveral Municipal Laws, they make in a ſhort time ſuch a Levy as ſerves their turn; witneſs the Commiſſion of Array in *England*, the raiſing of all between ſixteen and ſixty in *Scotland*; out of which an Election is quickly made. But *Lipſius* might have remember'd the ſeven Legions which were appointed by *Francis* the Firſt to be perpetually maintain'd, and in readineſs, in *France*, in imitation of the *Romans*: Of which, notwithſtanding Marſhal *Monluc* writes, that *France* in its Wars found no advantage. So little did that great Captain care for imitating the *Roman* Levy; and if it be true, that *Credendum Artifici in ſuâ arte*, we ſhould in a matter that belongs to War, ſooner truſt *Monluc*, perpetually vers'd in Arms, than *Lipſius*, mew'd up moſt part of his life in a Cell. And if *Lipſius* be offended with the beat of Drum and ſound of Trumpet for our Modern Levies, he ſhould have remember'd, that *Rome* had likewiſe her ſudden and tumultuary Levies. And if he miſlike that Princes and States ſhould give ſuch truſt to ſo great numbers of Strangers as ordinarily they Levy, and keep in Pay, he ſhould remember that the *Romans* truſted their Allies as much, if not more; and after the name of Allies was obliterated, Auxiliaries of ſtrange Nations had the ſame truſt. In the days of our Fathers, and our own too, the Eſtates of *Venice*, and the *United Provinces*, the Emperour, the Kings of *France* and *Spain*, of *Denmark* and *Sweden*, have done great feats by the Levies and maintenance of Strangers.

Secondly, in Order.

The ſecond part of the Compariſon conſiſts in the Order kept in their Armies: Here he crys out, *O, ille bonus in re Romanâ*! O, how good it was in the *Roman* Milice! But that is not enough, he adds, See the Centurions, the Enſign-bearers, and the Options; here, ſays he, nothing is wanting, nothing redounding. Yes, by your favour, *Lipſius*, I have ſhewn in my Diſcourſes of the *Roman* Milice, there was much wanting. But here our Author ſpeaks not one word of, or againſt the Order of the Modern Militia, and therefore I need not ſpeak one word for it, yet he ſeems to detract from it, by crying up the other ſo much. When he ſpeaks of Officers, he ſeems to ſay the *Romans* had enough of them, and we too many: But if this laſt be true, as perhaps it is, I affirm the *Romans* had too few; for to ſpeak of their Foot, I know not what to make of their Centurions, Sub-Centurions, or Options; but Caporals, Lanceſpeſates, and Bringers-up, as I told you in another place. Nor do I find their Cavalry commanded by any Officers in chief under a Conſul or a Legate, for the Decurions were not ſubordinate one to another, nor had any of them a greater command than our Corporals or Brigadeers of Horſe. All theſe I look on as Defects, nor hath *Lipſius* prov'd the contrary. In our Modern Militia there is an order that our Colonels ſhall be with their Regiments and Brigades, and not ſtand in an heap together, as *Lipſius* makes his *Roman* Tribunes to be in time of Battel, all at the Eagle of the firſt Legion, waiting on the Conſul, as his Lackies, or at beſt, as his Adjutants: And this, I conceive, was another defect in the *Roman* Militia, whereof our Modern one cannot be accuſed.

Thirdly, in Arms.

Thirdly, He compares the Ancient and Modern Arms, and truly I ſhall eaſily grant that Defenſive Arms were more uſed in *Lipſius* his time, than they are now, & that they were better in more ancient times, than in either his time, or ours. But that will not ſatisfie him, for he will have the *Roman* Weapons, or Defenſive Arms,

to

to be preferr'd to ours. He acknowledgeth the Pike to be an uſeful Weapon, but not ſo good as thoſe Arms the *Romans* had, and for this he cites the authority of *Polybius*; of which I can ſay no more than I have done in my view of that Authors compariſon of the *Grecian* Phalange and the *Roman* Legion, whereof I ſhall repeat nothing in this place. *Lipſius* ſays, A Bow is a more uſeful Engine of War than an Harquebuſs: I ſhall not add any thing here to what I have ſpoke of the neglect of the Bow; but though I think well of it, I dare not for all that, attribute ſo much to the ſtrength of an Arrow, ſhot by the ſtrongeſt Arm, and moſt experienc'd Archer that ever liv'd, as to a Bullet ſhot out of a Harquebuſs; and yet *Lipſius* attributes full as much, and offers to prove it by ſeveral inſtances taken out of Authors: I pray have the patience to hear them. *Plutarch* in the life of *Craſſus* ſays, That the *Parthian* Arrows pierc'd and kill'd through the ſtrongeſt Armour that was ever forg'd on an Anvil; and *Agathias* tells our Author, That Arrows ſhot by a certain *Goth*, kill'd men through both a Target and a Corſlet. I think this was much, but if you think it not ſo, then hear what follows, If the Arrows ſhot by that dreadful *Goth* fell on Stones or on Rocks, they ſplit and broke them in pieces. If this be true, I wonder why the *Goths* did not rather batter the Walls of Beſieged Towns with Bow and Arrow than with the Ram. But take another ſtory along with you, *Procopius* ſpeaks univerſally of the Archers of his time, that their Arrows could not be reſiſted by either Target or Corſlet, nor by both. To all this I anſwer, firſt, If what theſe Authors ſay be true, then the Ancients made all their Defenſive Arms in vain; for joyn the reports of ſeveral Authors together, you may make this concluſion, That no Head-piece, no Target, no Back nor Breaſt, could reſiſt Arrows, Stones, nay, nor Swords. Secondly I ſay, If Arrows could not be reſiſted with well temper'd Iron or Steel, then it is purely impoſſible to make Armour Musket-proof; and yet that this may be done, and was done in his own time, *Lipſius* knew very well, and this, I conceive is *argumentum ad hominem*. Thirdly, I ſay, our Author ſhould have been aſham'd to be ſo credulous as to believe all he read in Hiſtorians, who, no doubt, had theſe tales told them in their own days at the corner of a Chimney, by ſome *Thraſonical* Souldiers, who either ſaid, they did theſe feats themſelves, or avouch'd they ſaw them done by others.

The Pike.

The Bow.

Pretty ſtories of Arrows and Archers.

Lipſius too credulous.

Lipſius prefers the Sling (particularly that which is tyed to a Battoon) to our Hand-guns, or Bombards, as he calls them. The Stones or Lead caſt by thoſe Battoon-ſlings, did likewiſe (as our Author avers) break through Corſlets, Targets, and all manner of Armour: And here he crys loud, *Nego, Nego, Bombardis his noſtris majorem vim eſſe poſſe, fortaſſe nec tantum*: I deny, I deny, ſays he, that Hand-guns can have a greater force, perhaps not ſo great; he adds, *excipio Muſquetta quæ vocant*: I except, ſays he, thoſe Guns which they call Muskets. This is all like the reſt of the ſtuff before. But yet he goes a greater length, and tells us gravely, That the Leaden Bullets thrown out of theſe Battoon-ſlings, were caſt with ſuch violent force that they melted by the way; and to let us ſee he is in good earneſt, he offers to prove it by the Authority of both Philoſophers and Poets, as well as Hiſtorians. To the firſt, I ſay, if *Seneca* (for he is the Philoſopher cited) had liv'd in *Lipſius* his time he would have alter'd his opinion, when he ſaw (which *Lipſius* might have ſeen ten thouſand times if he had pleaſed) Bullets ſhot with an incomparable greater force than can be attributed to the Arm of Man, that is, by force of Fire (the violenteſt Agent that nature hath, which melts any Lead; when he ſaw, I ſay, thoſe Bullets batter, break, wound and kill, without being melted. The reaſon given by *Seneca* and *Lipſius* for the melting, is that the ſwift motion extenuates the air, that extenuated air becomes fire, and that fire melts the Lead. What foppery is this? Is there any motion ſwifter than that of a Bullet, ſhot from a Gun, and yet that motion (whoſe efficient cauſe is fire) melts not the Lead. It is ſtrange, that *Lipſius* ſhould have believed that which he read more than that which he ſaw. His next Authority is from Poets, and he cites four of them, that ſo he might convince us who are unbelievers, with the teſtimony of many Witneſſes. But our Author knows what is permitted to Poets, and what faith we owe them. Hear one of them.

The Battoon-ſling.

An uncouth tale.

Reaſons for it confuted.

Ovid.

Non ſecus exarſit, quam cum balearica plumbum
Funda jacit, volat illud, & incandeſcit eundo;
Et quos non habuit, ſub nubibus invenit ignes.

This is ſo pretty a ſtory, that I think my ſelf oblig'd to give you it in *Engliſh*,

It burns, as doth a piece of Lead that's caſt
Out of a Sling, it melts, it flyes ſo faſt;
For when it doth below the Welkine ſoar,
It finds thoſe Fires which it had not before.

Lipſius laughs and ſcoffs at an *Italian* Writer, whom he names not, for ſaying, That he believ'd the ſtrongeſt Arm that ever was, could not throw a ſtone above forty paces, that could do any hurt. I am not of that *Italian*'s opinion, and yet I do not believe with *Lipſius*, that a Slinger could hit a mark with a Stone ſix hundred real foot. He cites for this the Authority of *Vegetius*, in the twenty third Chapter of his Second Book, where he ſays, That Sheaves of Corn or Graſs were ſet up for the Bow-men and Slingers at ſix hundred foot diſtance, as marks, which they hit often. I believe an Arrow may do it, but that a Battoon-ſlinger can do ſo much, I ſay in our Authors own words, *Nego, Nego.* But I muſt tell you, in this citation of *Vegetius*, *Lipſius* plays faſt and looſe; he knows the firſt part of *Vegetius* his aſſertion is very queſtionable, and that is concerning Bow-men, who, he ſays, were exercis'd by the Ancient *Romans*; for we find (as in another place I have obſerv'd) in other Authors, that till the time of the Emperours, none of the *Romans* handled a Bow, or any of their Allies either; nor can I find they were uſed by any who ſerv'd for them or with them, till after the *Hannibalick* War: And if *Vegetius* hath err'd in the firſt part of his aſſertion, (as I believe *Lipſius* knew he did) why would the ſame *Lipſius* offer to impoſe on our Faith, as to make us believe that Battoon-ſlingers threw lumps of Lead, and did miſchief with them at the diſtance of ſix hundred foot, eſpecially when the Lead they caſt, was of one pound weight, as the ſame *Vegetius* ſays they were? But let us ſuppoſe all to be true that *Lipſius* reports of the ſix hundred foot, yet it is moſt certain that Muſketeers are able to wound, break, bruiſe, and kill, before theſe Battoon-ſlingers come within diſtance to caſt either Stones or pieces of Lead.

Vegetius his authority

Very queſtionable in this point.

Lipſius's ſmall eſteem of Artillery.

After this, *Lipſius* tells us very ſtoutly, That the noiſe of the Modern Cannon and Muskets terrifies none but Birds. He ſpeaks this like a Philoſopher, and one that ſate conſtantly in a Cell, and never either ſmelt Powder, or heard a Bullet fly. He avers, the *Romans* would not at all have troubled themſelves with Guns; but who will take *Lipſius* his word for that, when he reads in ſeveral Hiſtories that they were appall'd, frighten'd, and chac'd out of the Field with Arms and Weapons not ſo terrible by half. And laſtly, he ſhows himſelf ſo much an Admirer of a Sling, that he doth not at all wonder that *David* kill'd *Goliah* with one of them. Nor ſhall I wonder either, if *Lipſius* can aſſure me that the Gyants Helmet did not cover his fore-head; but if it did, (as probably it did) and that his Head-piece was proportionable to the Coat of Mail he had on his Body, (as probably it was) then I ſhall ſay, *David* could not kill him with Pebble-ſtones caſt out of a Sling, without a Miracle; for the Stone that could pierce ſuch a Head-piece, requir'd a greater force than *David*, and twenty of the ſtrongeſt *Iſraelites* were Maſters of; and, no doubt, it was aſſiſted from above.

David a good Slinger.

Upon this whole buſineſs of Arms, I think it was well for *Lipſius*, that he was taken up with more grave Studies, that could allow him no time to read Romances; for if the Authors of thoſe had but declared all the acts of Knight-errantry to have been done by the Ancient *Romans*, *Lipſius* had undoubtedly believ'd them all to be true ſtories. Let us hear what he ſays more, He finds our Modern Artillery good for nothing but for battering the Walls of Towns and Forts; for in Battel, ſays he, any riſing ground, little Bank, or Breaſt-work, being quickly caſt up, eludes all the hurt Artillery can do. He is ſo far

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in the right, that theſe helps (whereof he ſpeaks) are very good, if the General who uſeth them ſtand ſtill, and only endeavours to keep his ground; but in day of Battel unleſs he advances, he ſhall not win the Field; and if he advances, he muſt quit thoſe ſhelters; and the ſuddener and quicker his march is, the leſs hurt he ſhall receive from the Enemies Ordnance. But I think it is very fair, that *Lipſius* is ſo modeſt, that he doth not prefer the Ancient Catapults and Baliſts to the Modern Artillery, and I wonder much he did it not. *Lipſius* his miſtake.

In the fourth place he brings Embattelling or Marſhalling Armies on the Stage, and according to his cuſtome, preſers the *Roman*, yet doth not tell us wherein the Modern is deficient; and this is not ſo fair dealing as might have been expected from ſuch a man as *Lipſius*. But I am only to trace him in his own ſteps, and that which he ſaith on this ſubject amounts to this: He firſt ſays, he will let us ſee the *Velites* fight, and retire; in whoſe room he marſhals the *Haſtati*, they being weary, go back; to them ſucceed the *Principes*, who not prevailing, retire; then the *Triarii*, who are, ſaith he, the *Veterans* and the Chieftains, take the work in hand, and they cannot but proſper: yet he who wrote this, cannot but know for all this, that both the *Roman Velites*, their *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, have been beat out of the Field oftner than once. All theſe things have been already ſufficiently ſpoke of. But I wonder who could tell *Lipſius* that Modern Generals have not their Reſerves, as well as the *Romans* had; ſure in his own time, if he had but enquir'd after it, he might have learn'd that the Duke of *Alva*, and Prince of *Parma*, divided their Armies into Van, Battel, and Rear; and what were the *Roman* three fold Batallions but the ſame; and ſince *Lipſius* his time, if great Captains, for good reaſons, have thought they could do their buſineſs better with one Reſerve than with two; I ſuppoſe, *Lipſius*, if he were alive, might acquieſce to it, and not examine their reaſons why they do not tye themſelves to the *Roman* method. But the Jeſt is, *Lipſius* will have a Retreat from one Body to the ſecond, and from that to the third, to be a great ſecret; *Magnum arcanum*, he calls it. This might be a ſecret to him, and thoſe of his profeſſion, but to no Souldiers; and yet he hath the vanity to deſire all Generals (*Duces* he calls them) to conſider well of his ſecret; but, I ſuppoſe, few of them need thank him for revealing ſuch ſecrets. In the next place, he crys up the *Roman* manner of Embattelling, for placing, ſays he, their Cavalry on the Wings or Horns, that their Foot ſhould not be ſurrounded, nor their Battel out-wing'd. What folly was this in him, to appropriate that to the *Romans*, which was an ordinary cuſtome with other Ancients, it may be, before *Rome* was a City. And it is ſtrange he did not know that it was the cuſtome of all Armies, ſince the downfal of the *Roman* Empire. But I muſt come nearer him, and ſay, That this was a defect very oft in the *Roman* Militia, to marſhal their Armies ſo that it could not ſave them from being ſurrounded by a numerous Enemy, in regard they drew up ſo many Bodies one behind another; and thoſe Bodies were marſhall'd ſo deep in File, that their Armies could not (eſpecially Conſular Armies) have a large Front; the beſt means in a Champaign, (where there are no advantages of Hills, Rivers, Ditches, or Marſhes to be expected) to ſave an Army from being out-wing'd. When *Lipſius* wrote this, it ſeems he forgot that at *Cannæ*, the *Roman* Horſe did ſo little hinder the Foot to be ſurrounded, that the not adverting to it, loſt them the day; for *Aſdrubal* having beaten *Æmilius* on the Right Wing, fell on the Rear of the Legions, while they fought in Front with *Hannibal* his Foot; and routed them. And if *Lipſius* diſtruſt *Livy* in this relation, let him look on the firſt Book of his own *Polybius*, and there he will find, That *Xantippus* the *Lacedæmonian*, with an Army of *Carthaginians*, (who had been often beaten and baffled before) and a few Mercenary *Laconians*, routed the *Roman* Army (where the Conſul *Regulus* was taken) only by outwinging it, and falling on the Rear of their Infantry, by which (ſays the Author) *cogebatur facta converſione, cum iis dimicare*; He was forced by facing to the Rear to fight with them, that is, with the *Carthaginians*. A ridiculous myſtery. *Lipſius* his inadvertency. Defects in the *Roman* manner of Embattelling.

Fifthly, and laſtly, he compares the Ancient (ſuppoſe ſtill *Roman*) and Modern Militia in their Diſcipline. And this he divides into three parts, Duties, Exerciſes, and Laws. I ſhall trace him in all the three. And firſt, he ſubdivides Duties Fifthly, in Diſcipline, which he divides into three. Fourthly, Embattelling.

First, Duties, subdivided, Private services,

Duties into three; these are, Private Services to Officers, Watches, and Publick Works. As to the first, he says, Private Services to Superiours a ither ceas'd, or are voluntary. He is right, they are voluntary; yet no Souldier now will refuse to do any honest service to his Captain, or any Officer either above or under him; and *Lipsius* knows the *Roman* Souldiers were no Slaves, and why should Christian Souldiers be Slaves? As to the second part

Watches,

of Duties, which is Watch and Guard, he confesseth, there is some show of them in the Modern Militia not to be contemned; for so I interpret his words, which are, *aliqua, nec improba, apud nos species*. But he adds, *Credo tamen aliqua meliora ac tutiora olim fuisse*: But I believe, says he, that of old some things in Watches were better and surer: yet I am not obliged to make his belief the ground of my faith, to believe any such thing. And though he tells us not wherein our Modern Guards are defective, yet he seems to hint at the *Tessera*, or Word, at the stations before Ports, at the Rounds, and at the division of the Vigils. To all which I answer thus: The Modern Words or Signs (when it is needful) are given and received with as much secrecy and caution, and with

Rounds.

a great deal of less trouble than the Ancient *Tessera* was. Our Rounds in the night, and visiting the Guards in the day time, are as frequent and as orderly; and the neglect of either them or the Guards, as severely punish'd as among either the *Romans* or the *Grecians*. But he says, one man standing now at a Port is thought a sufficient Guard for it; truly, I say, he who thinks so is a very insufficient Souldier; nor can I imagine that ever our Author saw in his own Countrey (which in his time was the Stage of *Mars*) a Port guarded only with

A gross mistake of *Lipsius*.

a Sentinel. It hath been his gross mistake, for that Sentinel which he took to be the Guard, stood there to challenge Strangers, and upon occasion to call out the Corporal or whole Watch, who were within a House builded and appointed for them, commonly called a Court of Guard. As to the Vigils, we have sometimes Double Sentinels, none whereof sleeps, none whereof sits; and if there is but one Sentinel, yet he being visited not only by the Rounds, but frequently by the Corporal or other Officers, will keep as good, if not better Watch, than four *Romans* on one Post, whereof only one stood and watch'd, the other three lay and slept; and were visited only by the *Circitors*, and not at all by their own Commanders. I know not what he means by the Division of the Vigils, for certainly a Clock, a Passelunt, or a Sand-glass can divide the hours, and measure the night, as well as a *Roman* Water-glass.

Publick works.

The third kind of Duties, which Souldiers are bound to pay, are Publick Works; and here you may be sure he will prefer the *Roman* Souldiers for their wonderful fatigue, to all our Modern Souldiery. And so he may, but I will not suffer him to calumniate us, and charge us with more idleness and sloth than we are guilty of: For first, he avers, That all publick works are altogether omitted; he says, Souldiers will not lay their hands to a Spade or to a Mattock: They cry out, says he, It is a shame for a Souldier to meddle with these, let others be imployed for such services. It is true, such words have been heard, but very soon compesced. And I verily believe, *Lipsius* had such an animosity against the Modern Militia, that he never either convers'd with Modern Armies, or endeavour'd to learn their customes; otherwise he might have seen the contrary of those things he wrote, even at that time when he wrote them. It is a generally receiv'd Maxime, for any thing I know, in all our

A Souldier is oblig'd to work for his own safety.

Modern Armies, That a Souldier is bound to work any thing that can make for his own Defence; and under that notion, he must not refuse to work in Approaches before Towns, to make up Breaches, Retrenchments, and Counter-mures within Towns, and to make Sconces, Redouts, and Bastions, for the Fortification of Camps and Leaguers. If our Author had gone to *Holland* with the Duke of *Alva*, he had seen his Souldiers work all these at the Sieges of *Harlem* and *Leyden*; or nearer to his own Town of *Louvaine*, he might have seen the Prince of *Parma*'s men work laboriously at the Sieges of *Gant*, *Antwerp*, and many other places; or if he had made a step with that Prince over to *France*, in his two marches thither, he would have seen his Souldiers refuse none of those works I have spoke of. Nay, I will tell him that, which will make him inexcusable, either for Ignorance or Malice, when he wrote this. The *Spanish* Souldiers (and *Lipsius* was the King of *Spain*'s Subject) thought it a

disgrace

disgrace for them to suffer Pioneers to work in the Approaches, they would do it themselves, nor would they take Money for their work, for they said they receiv'd the Kings pay for that, as well as for fighting; their custome was to dig in the Approaches with a Helmet and Back-piece, but nothing on their Breasts and Bellies, because when they bow'd their Bodies to work, only their Heads and Backs were in danger. But if a Prince or a General can ease his Souldiers, by the assistance of Countrey people and Pioneers, will it not be well done? Will they not be the more fit, and the more ready to fight? I suppose they will. Did not *Cæsar*'s Legate, at the Siege of *Marseilles*, make the Country Clowns cut down Trees, bring them to his Camp, and help him in many other Drudgeries; let him read *Cæsar*'s Commentaries, and he will find he did so. Custome of *Spanish* Souldiers 80 year ago.

Among those Publick Works he reckons Encamping, and so he may justly do. And here he fiercely chargeth the men of the Modern Militia with the neglect of both the parts of Encamping, those are, Castrametation and Fortification; and he doth it in a very few words, *Aperte considemus, & sine certo ordine*; we sit down, says he, in our Camps open, and without any regular order. I should think that he who wrote this, either was never in a Modern Camp, or did not at all take heed to it. The several quarters are as orderly divided as ever they were with his *Romans*; for proving which I refer you to my Discourse of Modern Castrametation; neither will you find so many defects in it, as I have observed to be in the *Roman*, even as it is describ'd by *Polybius*, *Terduzzi*, *Preissac*, *Steuechius*, and by *Lipsius* himself. As to the Fortification of the Camp, he says, we use none, except it be a *Waggonburg*, or Sconce of Waggons, whereof I spoke formerly, and which he in barbarous *Latin* calls *Carrago*. I shall here repeat something (for clearing this matter) of what I spoke in another place. Our Modern Generals hold it to be exceeding troublesome, and not at all necessary, to fortifie their Camps every night, when no Enemy is near them: And when one is near, if they resolve to fight, they stand all night in a fighting posture; if they do not resolve to fight, they either retire, or they fortifie. If an Army be to stay for one night or two, Generals chuse some high or close piece of ground for Encamping, after the *Grecian* custome; and where it is deficient, they help it by some artificial works, or with such a *Carrago* as *Lipsius* speaks of. And I pray you, what necessity for fortifying a Leaguer every night, where there is no danger? what good doth it, nay, how much hurt doth it? To make Souldiers work the half of the night to fortifie that Camp (when you are in no danger) which you are to leave the next day betimes. Is this any thing else but to give your Souldiers a needless fatigue? Hath *Lipsius* never read it, That the just man is merciful even to his Beast? But in this Discourse our Author is very injurious to those great Captains who were coetaneous with him, who were very expert in that point of War, and used it more than hath been practised since. Let any peruse the Histories of his time, they will find, that at all their Sieges (which were many and frequent) all their Camps were excellently well fortified with a double Circumvallation, one against the Besieged place, and another against those without who would attempt to relieve it. If *Lipsius* had liv'd some years longer than I suppose he did, he would have recanted, when he saw *Spinola*'s Siege of *Breda* in the year 1625. for there he might have seen stranger works than ever any he read of; and with which *Cæsar*'s Circumvallations either when he besieg'd *Alesia*, or when he offer'd to besiege *Pompey*'s Army at *Dirrachium*, could not compare. For here at *Breda*, the *Spanish* outward or exteriour Entrenchment against the Prince of *Orange* and all his Abettors, was of fifty two miles circumference, and the inner or interiour against the Town, of sixteen. In both which were reckon'd (beside the Fortification of some Villages, for securing Convoys) above three hundred and sixty Forts, Batteries, Sconces and Redouts; so that he who writes the particular History of that famous Siege, hath reason to say, That there was such a Labyrinth of Fortifications there, that none but those who saw them will have faith enough to believe it.

Encamping.

Castrametation,

Of the Fortification of the Camp,

Both of them ordinary in *Lipsius* his time.

Spinola his wonderful Circumvallations at *Breda*.

Our Author tells us here, what a great benefit it was to the *Romans*, to have a Camp to which they might retire after a Battel. But he might have learned, that the great Captains of the Modern Militia propose to themselves no advantage by these Retreats, justly fearing their Souldiers may retire before it be half

A Retreat to a Camp dangerous.

half time, or before they get order for it. And if *Lipsius* had been pleas'd he might have remember'd that his own *Romans* made sometimes very bad use of retiring to their Camp: As when they run to it from their Enemy in their Mutiny against *Appius Claudius*, and at other times too; as I have observed in my first Chapter of the *Roman* Art of War. Nay, some of their Consuls, apprehending the danger of it, took away all possibility of retiring to the Camp. Take a few Instances. One of the *Fabii*, a Dictator being to fight with the *Samnites*, cast down his Entrenchment, burnt his Tents, fought, and gain'd the Victory; as you may see it in *Livy*'s Ninth Book. At *Ciminia*, another *Fabius* caused his Drudges in the night-time to cast down his Ramparts and fill up the Ditch, while he marshall'd his Army, wherewith he march'd out, and fought next morning with Success. *Cato* the elder being to fight with the *Spaniards*, led his Army in the night-time a great circuit, even behind the Enemies Camp, and next morning did shew his Souldiers where they were; remonstrated to them what they had to do, and that there was an impossibility to get back to their own Camp, but over the Bellies of their Enemies; they fought and got the Victory. These great *Roman* Captains, you see, were not of *Lipsius* his Judgement. But further, the *Roman* Senate imputed the loss of *Cannæ* to the Retreat of their Army to the Camp, and accordingly punish'd all that were taken in the Camp, for that Retreat. And besides that, take two other Instances of the hurt their Retreats to their Camps were like to do: The Consul *Attilius*, fighting against the *Samnites*, saw his Foot fly shamefully, he instantly order'd some of his Cavalry to get between them and the Camp, and by meer force drive them back; this was done by the Horse, and the *Roman* Foot desperately turning head, gain'd the day; see *Livy*'s Ninth Book. At that great Battel which *Lucius Scipio* fought with *Antiochus*, the Left Wing of the *Roman* Foot being indifferently well secur'd by a River, the Consul made his Left Wing of Horse the weaker; which *Antiochus* perceiving, caused a brisk charge to be given on the Horse, and routed them; and immediately fell on the left Flank of the Foot, who not enduring it, fled toward the Camp; but the Tribune who was left for the defence of it, issued with his Cohorts, and forced the flying Legions to face about; which they doing, fought well, and gain'd the day. If this Tribune had let them enter the Camp, as he might, by *Lipsius*'s consent, have done; in all probability, the rest of the Legions had left the Field, which, no doubt, had given *Antiochus* the Soveraignty of the greatest part of *Asia*.

Instances.

Exercises.

Lipsius hath kept us long in the comparison of the first part of Discipline, which consists of Duties; now he comes to the second part, which is compos'd (as he will have it) of Trainings and Exercisings; these, he says, in the Modern Discipline are wholly omitted and neglected. In answer to which, I say, I have spoke of great and very great neglects in this point of the Military Art in the later times: But I cannot, I dare not, I will not believe our Author, that they were either neglected or omitted in his days, unless I give the lye to all the Histories of those times, which witness, That *Flanders* and *Holland*, the first for the King of *Spain*, the second for the Estates of the *United Provinces*, were the Military Schools where most of the Youth of *Europe* did learn all their Military Exercises.

Military Laws.

Lastly, he makes the third part of the Discipline of War to consist in Military Laws. And truly, if all be true he says, he needs make no comparison in this point between the Ancient and Modern Militia; for he avers we have no Laws at all, or very few; or if any at all, they are made in vain, as being never put in execution. Here he assumes to himself to speak what he pleaseth to the disgrace of Christian Souldiers, and very little to his own reputation. Listen a little to his words: "*Adeste mei Duces, date vestras Leges: Quid mussatis? An nullæ? An paucæ? Illæ ipsæ* "*quæ sunt, irritæ & pro nullis: Profecto ita vivitur, libido pro lege est, Jurisque lo-* "*cum sibi vindicat ensis. Furta quis hodie punit? Imo, quis Raptus, & Cædes? Stu-* "*pra & Adulteria inter facinora Militaria censentur, & quæ poscant aliquam Coro-* "*nam.* Take it in *English*: "Come hither, says he, you Captains, and give me "your Military Laws, that I may examine them, and compare them with those "of the *Romans*: Why do you whisper? Have you none? Or have you but a "few? Yea, these few are made in vain, and signifie nothing: you live so as "if

Pedantick Insolence.

"if your Luſt were your Law, and that your Sword uſurps the place of Juſtice. "Who is it this day that puniſheth Thefts? who is it that puniſheth "Robberies, Rapes, and Murthers? Whoredomes and Adulteries are "accounted Military gallantries, and ſuch as deſerve the reward of "ſome Crown. Aſſuredly, if all this be true, it muſt be granted, *Lipſius* hath reaſon enough to cry down the Modern Diſcipline. But before you believe, that Armies either were in his time, or have been ſince ſo Lawleſs and void of Diſcipline, I ſhall deſire you to examine Hiſtory, and daily practice; and then I doubt not but you will find this Author of ours was not always guided by exact truth in his aſſertions. Too many crimes have been, and are committed daily in our Armies, and ſo it was among the *Romans* too. Too many of them paſs unpuniſh'd by the miſunderſtanding of great Commanders, and the careleſneſs and neglect of Inferiour Officers; and ſo it was among the *Romans* too. Nor dare *Lipſius* ſay that all crimes were puniſh'd among them, no, even in their ſevereſt times. Theſe faults mention'd by him, as Thefts, Robberies, Murthers, Whoredomes and Adulteries, are puniſh'd as ſeverely now, as when *Rome* was in her growing condition, and then ſhe was in her pureſt times. Nor can *Lipſius*, or any for him, produce more ſevere Laws of War among his Ancient *Romans*, than Military conſtitutions were in his time, and yet are under moſt *European* Princes and States, as you may ſee in my Diſcourſe of the Modern Laws of War; nor were puniſhments more frequent in their Armies, or more ſevere than in ours at this day, as you may likewiſe ſee in my diſcourſe of Puniſhments and Rewards. And indeed, thoſe Mutinies which fell out in the *Spaniſh* Armies, after the Duke of *Parma*'s Death, and ſome before it, were infamous and inexcuſable; yet no worſe, nor ſo bad by half, as many were among the *Romans*; ſome whereof you may remember I have obſerved in another place.

Too many crimes unpuniſh'd both now and of old.

Our Author, in the cloſe of his Compariſon joyns with *Vegetius*, and crys up the *Roman* cuſtome, in cauſing the *Roman* Souldiers to depoſite at their Colours the half of their Pay, to be a ſtock to them after they had obtain'd their Dimiſſions. I think indeed, the cuſtome and inſtitution was good and commendable enough; but it is ridiculous to propoſe the imitation of it now, when for moſt part, Princes and States detain (without the conſent of the Souldiers) in their own hand, ſome the half, ſome the third part, and ſome two parts of three of both Officers and Souldiers Wages; ſome Proviant-bread, and now and then a bit of Cheeſe being deduced.

To depoſite half pay is now ridiculous.

The reaſons.

To conclude, upon the whole matter of this Compariſon, *Juſtus Lipſius* hath ſhown himſelf a good Antiquary, well travell'd abroad, but to be *Peregrinus domi*, a great ſtranger at home. And ſo I take my leave of him.

CHAP. XXIX.

Whether the profeſſion of a Souldier be lawful.

WAR being the ſubject of my Military Diſcourſes, and therein I being neceſſitated to ſpeak frequently of Souldiers; becauſe without thoſe, who either truly have, or profeſs to have skill in Military affairs, War cannot be managed, it will be fit to enquire, Whether the profeſſion of a Souldier be lawful; that is, Whether it have any warrant in either Divine or Humane Law, or (which is the ſame) if it be againſt any of them. I do not here intend to queſtion the lawfulneſs of War; for having ſpoke ſomething of that, I ſhall take it for granted, that War grounded on juſtifiable cauſes, is lawful. Nor do I make it a queſtion, Whether Subjects that are able to bear Arms, are bound to ſerve their Princes in the Wars, as Souldiers. But the Quære ſhall be, Whether it be lawful to make a trade of Souldiery; that is, to learn no other Art, either Liberal or Mechanical, except to ſerve in the Wars for Pay, and thereby to gain a livelihood. The affirmative whereof I maintain, my opinion being grounded on the reaſons mention'd in this following diſcourſe. But firſt to ſhun cavilling, I ſhall eaſily grant, that it were much more commendable to learn ſome other Art, that when a lawful War is at an end, thoſe who have ſerv'd in it, may work with their hands (as the Apoſtle ſays) and ſo get their livelihood, than to rove from Country to Country to look for imployment in foreign Wars. And without all doubt, many of thoſe who do ſo, cannot but be ſubject to very uncharitable thoughts, and unlawful deſires; for whereas not only Chriſtians, but all men, even as men, ſhould deſire and pray for Peace, as the greateſt Earthly bleſſing mortals can enjoy; thoſe who know not how to get a livelihood in time of Peace, long for War, and wiſh and pray for it; which cannot be done without great ſin both againſt God and Humane Society. But I anſwer, all this is by accident, it is but the wickedneſs of the Souldier, not the profeſſion of Souldiery, that makes him pray for War; for pious and morally honeſt Souldiers in time of Peace may put themſelves in Domeſtick ſervice, of either Gentlemen or Country Farmers, and ſo earn their bread, till they have a fair call to follow the Wars: But truly their condition for moſt part is very deplorable, for when they become lame or ſo old that they can ſerve no longer in the Wars, they are good for nothing but Hoſpitals; and becauſe few of them can get into any of theſe, the reſt muſt be contented to beg, as Troops of them do over all Chriſtendome. In ſeveral great Towns of *Germany* I have ſeen Captains begging alms, and at *Bruxels* and *Antwerp* I have known thoſe who could teſtifie by their Paſſes, they had been Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors; much more others of a lower degree begging Charity in the Streets.

But I find nothing that occurs to my memory, either in the Old or New Teſtament, that diſchargeth the profeſſion of Souldiery, that is, to ſerve for Pay in the Wars, whether theſe Souldiers have learn'd any other trade or not; yea, on the contrary, there be ſeveral paſſages that confirm me in my opinion. I ſhall not inſtance *Abner*, *Joab*, *Amaſa*, *Benajah*, and others, who were meer Souldiers, and manag'd the Wars of *Saul*, *Iſhboſheth*, *David* and *Solomon*; for it may be told me, theſe were Gentlemen, who had Eſtates, and needed learn no other Trade: but I ſhall ſay, That *Jephte* had no Eſtate, having been baniſh'd from his patrimony by his Brethren, becauſe he was a Baſtard: He, I ſay, knew no other trade but Souldiery, and thereby maintain'd himſelf and his followers, and in the Land of *Tob* he learn'd and practis'd his Art of Souldiery, ſo happily againſt the Enemies of Gods people (for ſo *Deodati* interprets it) that his Countrey-men by a ſolemn Embaſſie, invited him to be their Captain General againſt the *Ammonites*, which he accepted, and wrought their deliverance.

Prov'd to be lawful.

rance. Here have you a Souldier, who knew no other Art or profession but that of Souldiery, approved of by the Lord, and elected by him and the people at *Mispa*, to fight the Lords Battels against the Enemies of his people; and this very Souldier is reckon'd among the elect and faithful, by the Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, Chap. 2. v. 32. In the Gospel we read that the Souldiers ask'd the *Baptist* what they should do to he sav'd: *Be contented with your wages*, said he, *and do violence to no man.* Here he bids them not learn other trades, and I am bound to believe, that most of those who ask'd him the question, if not all of them, were *Romans*, who knew no other livelihood but to be Souldiers, and were then quarter'd in *Judea*, to keep the *Jews* under the subjection of the *Roman* Emperours; and whether this was a lawful employment or not, shall be spoke to hereafter. The Apostle *Paul* moves the question, Who goes to War on his own charges? meaning none is bound to do it. Hence it will follow, that a Souldier may serve for wages; or if any will serve without wages, as some Volunteers do, it is not forbidden them; however in these two places, nothing being spoke against the profession of Souldiery, I may safely conclude, that the profession of a Souldier, without any other trade, is allow'd and authoriz'd by those two great Saints. Our blessed Lord bore witness, That the Centurion who said he was not worthy that our Saviour should come under his roof, had more Faith than he had found in *Israel*; and I make no doubt, but if the profession of Souldiery had been unlawful, he would have bid him learn some other Art wherewith to gain his livelihood. The like may be said of that Centurion, who sent to *Joppa* for St. *Peter* to come to *Cæsarea*; for we find not that the Apostle, when he instructed that Captain and his Friends of the means of their Salvation, gave him either advice or command to learn any other trade than that of Souldiery; and it may not only be probably conjectured, but asserted, that these two Centurions had learn'd no other trade but that of Souldiery; as much may be said of a third Centurion, who confess'd our Saviour to be the Son of God, even when he saw him suffer on the Cross as a Man, who, as Church Histories mention, dyed a Martyr for the Christian Faith.

These of whom I speak, who know no Art or way of livelihood but by the trade of Souldiery, are ordinarily called, *Souldiers of Fortune*; though most of them might rather be call'd the *Sons of Misfortune*. From what I have said, this argument may be fram'd, that That Profession, Art, or Trade, that is neither directly, indirectly, or consequentially condemned by any Divine Law or Ordidinance, mention'd in Holy Scripture, is in it self lawful; but the Profession or Art of Souldiery, without any relation to any other Art, is neither directly, indirectly, nor consequentially discharged in Scripture: *Ergo*, the profession of meer Souldiery is lawful. If it be objected here, That the Apostle writing to the *Corinthians*, orders every man that would eat, to work with his hands: I answer first, That the *Corinthians* being a people conquer'd by the *Romans*, were not permitted to be Souldiers; and next, if the command be general for all Nations, and in all Ages, then Souldiers are included, for they work with their hands, and very oft a bloody work. And if no Divine Law be against this profession, as little can it be alledged, That any positive Law of man hath forbid it; and daily experience teaches us, That all Princes and States make use of men who know no other trade but that of Souldiery; which they could not do without sin, if that profession were unlawful in it self. Nay, I have known the time, thirty years ago, when I serv'd in *Germany*, That Princes and States, though they bestow'd Levy-money very plentifully, could not get half so many of that profession as they desired; and at this very time when I write this, those *European* Princes who are hot in War with others, cannot get men enough of that trade; and yet I shall easily grant, they get more than they pay well.

But *Hugh de Grot*, commonly call'd *Grotius*, a very learned and grave Author, towards the end of the Twenty fifth Chapter of his Second Book *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, is a heavy Enemy to the trade of Souldiery; for there he says, *Nullum vitæ genus est improbius, quam eorum, qui sine causæ respectu, mercede conducti, militant*: No kind of life (says he) is so godless as of those, who without regard to the cause, fight for wages; and he subjoyns, *Et quibus ibi fas, ubi plurima merces*: And with whom it is a Rule, That War is most lawful, where

Grotius's opinion examined.

greateſt Pay is to be got. For anſwer, What if I grant all this, it will make juſt nothing againſt my aſſertion: The abuſe of a thing cannot make the thing unlawful; I ſhall confeſs it is ſo as he ſays, with very many Souldiers, who have another falſe Maxime (which *De Grot* mentions not) and that is, It is all one with them whom they ſerve, ſo they ſerve faithfully. Theſe are great faults in too many Souldiers, but all Souldiers not being guilty of them, all ſhould not be charged with them; nor ſhould the profeſſion ſuffer for the fault of ſome of its profeſſors. *De Grot* would have taken it unkindly, if I ſhould have argued thus with him, No ſuch a Godleſs kind of life, as of thoſe, who without any regard to the juſtice of the cauſe, embrace the quarrels, though never ſo unjuſt, of ſuch Clients who are beſt able to reward them; for though this be true enough in *theſi*, yet *Grotius* would have thought, that by ſuch an expreſſion, I reflected on all Lawyers and Advocates, and their profeſſion too; for it is certain, that too many Lawyers do ſo, which *Grotius* (who profeſs'd Law) knew but too well, and perhaps practis'd it too much. And as *Grotius* muſt confeſs, that it is a ſin in an Advocate to plead for a Fee in a Clients cauſe, which he knows to be unjuſt; ſo I ſhall acknowledge all Souldiers to be ſinners who fight in a cauſe which they know to be unjuſt. But I muſt tell you, there is a great difference between Souldiers and Lawyers in this caſe, for there be but few Advocates who cannot diſcern between the juſtice and unjuſtice of the cauſe they undertake to defend; whereas on the other hand, there be but few, and very few Souldiers, who can diſcern between a juſt and an unjuſt cauſe, for which they are to fight. I knew a perſon abroad, who left an Honourable employment, in which he had gain'd much reputation, and went to his own Countrey to commence a War againſt his Prince; for being illiterate, he was not able to diſcern that he was fighting againſt Gods Ordinances, when he ſuffer'd himſelf to be perſwaded by ſome skilful and learned men, that he was to fight for the cauſe of God.

That Souldier who ſerves or fights for any Prince or State, for wages, in a cauſe he knows to be unjuſt, ſins damnably, and ſtands in need of both a ſudden and ſerious repentance. But alas, how few of them can diſcern; and again, alas, how few of them ſtudy to diſcern, and inform themſelves of the Juſtice or Unjuſtice of a cauſe! Beſides, it is the ſad fate of many of them, that being engaged in a foreign Prince's ſervice, even in a juſt cauſe; when that War is at an end, the Prince begins a new War, and an unjuſt one, but will not permit his Souldiers to leave his ſervice, as being tyed to him by their Military Sacrament; yet I think, if foreign Souldiers knew the War to be unjuſt, in ſuch a caſe they ſhould deſert their employments, and ſuffer any thing that can be done to them, before they draw their Swords, againſt their own Conſciences and Judgements, in an unjuſt quarrel.

St. *Auſtine* defended.

Grotius tells us, that St. *Auſtin* ſays, *Militare non eſt delictum, propter prædam militare eſt peccatum*: To be a Souldier (ſays the Father) is no crime, but to ſerve in the Wars for booty is a ſin; and I ſhall ſay ſo too: Yet neither St. *Auſtin* nor *Grotius* dare aver, but a Souldier, after the Victory, may take a ſhare of the booty: It was a common practice of Gods people, the *Iſraelites*; and it is no where forbidden in Gods word: *Auſtine*'s meaning then muſt be, to fight meerly for Booty, without any other motive, is a ſin; and ſo I ſay too: But obſerve that the Father ſays not, *Militare propter mercedem eſt peccatum*: To fight for wages is a ſin; for indeed it is no ſin for a meer Souldier to ſerve for wages, unleſs his Conſcience tells him, he fights in an unjuſt cauſe; but *Grotius* adds, *Imo & propter ſtipendium militare peccatum eſt, ſi id unice & præcipue ſpectetur*: Yea, to fight for wages (ſays he) is a ſin, if wages be chiefly and only look'd to. What if I grant him all this, it will not follow that the profeſſion of pure and only Souldiery, without any other trade, is unlawful. If ſome Souldiers ſerve only for wages, without any conſideration of the cauſe, all do not ſo: But what if the Souldier cannot know whether the cauſe for which he fights, be juſt or unjuſt; nay, what if he conceive the cauſe to be moſt juſt, when it is truly in it ſelf moſt unjuſt, ſhall we not preſume, that in ſuch a caſe, invincible Ignorance may plead an excuſe with a merciful God; aſſuredly it ſhould prevail much with the charity Chriſt hath commanded men to bear one to another. I am of the opinion, if *De Grot* had writ thus when his Maſters, the Eſtates of the *Seven United Provinces*, commenc'd their War againſt the King of *Spain*, they

they would have given him but very sorry thanks for such doctrine; for they stood then in great need of men, (as perhaps they do this very day) and whether their quarrel with *Philip* the Second (who undoubtedly was their Soveraign one way or other) was just or unjust, was strongly debated among the wisest States-men, Politicians, Divines, and Lawyers in all *Europe*, and therefore could not be discerned by every dull and block-headed Souldier; it was enough for them to believe what their Masters said, That the cause was just; and therefore very lawful for them to serve for wages: And if those Estates had not begun the War, till all those who serv'd them, whose only trade was Souldiery, had been satisfied in their Judgements and Consciences concerning the justice of the War, I dare affirm they had never been either Free or Soveraign Estates.

What Judgement shall we make of all the Civil Wars of *Germany*, *France*, and *Great Britain*? certainly the cause of both parties could not be just; and yet, no doubt, all or most of each party thought their own cause the most just, and the only just cause; shall we therefore cast all, whose quarrel was most unjust, into the ever-burning flames of Hell? God forbid: Ignorance was the greatest sin of most of them; though it may be feared, many of the Leaders of the faction sinn'd against Conscience and Judgement. The late King of *Sueden*, *Charles Gustavus*, invaded *Poland* in the year 1655. examine the matter rightly, it was a most perfect breach of the twenty six years Truce, concluded and sworn in the year 1635. there being yet six years to run; but the poverty of the *Suedish* Court, of the Grandees, and General persons, concurring with the unlimited Ambition of that Martial King, trod upon all bonds of Equity, Law, and Justice, and carried on that Invasion; and that Kings Manifesto (though the poorest that ever was published) was so gilded over with seeming reasons for the justification of his Arms, that thousands not piercing further than the external pretences, were fool'd into a belief that the cause was just, and were content to serve him for pay. What Court of Justice can condemn those Innocents for sin; yet if *De Grot* presided in it, they would be condemn'd to the Gallows, and perhaps worse, as sedifragous and perjur'd, Breakers of the Laws of Nations, Robbers and Thieves.

It is a question, Whether those Souldiers who made their address to *John the Baptist* serv'd in a just and lawful War or not? For my part, I think they did not; yet they serv'd their Master, the *Roman* Emperour, for pay, and thought the cause just, which I am confident, justified their service in an ill cause; otherwise the *Baptist* was oblig'd to tell them their quarrel was unjust, and if they continued in that service, they sinn'd damnably; but he rather encourag'd them to serve still, and be content with their pay, and wrong no man. *Grotius* would have handled them more roughly. That the cause wherein they serv'd was unjust and unlawful, I demonstrate thus: Whether *Pompey* and *Crassus* made War in the name of the *Roman* Senate, against the *Jews*, justly and lawfully, shall not be the debate, though I think they did not; but whether that War was just or not, *Julius Cæsar* usurping the State, alter'd the case: for as he had no just right to the Soveraignty of *Rome*; so he had as little to *Judea*: After his death, the Senate and People of *Rome* resumes the Soveraignty; but kept it not long, for it was soon taken from them by *Octavius*, *Antony* and *Lepidus*, and so reduc'd to a Triumvirate: *Antony* and *Octavius* quickly robb'd *Lepidus* of his third, and so divided the Empire into two parts, each of them usurping the Soveraignty of his own share, to which neither of them had either just title or claim. While these two Brothers-in-law remained Friends, *Antony* gave the Kingdom of *Judea* to *Herod* the *Idumean*, in whose Reign our Blessed Lord was born. *Herod*'s Title was very weak, for *Antony* himself had no just title to *Judea*: and *Qui non habet, non potest dare*: He who hath not cannot give. But *Antony* is beaten, and kills himself, and *Augustus* remains the sole Usurper of the whole *Roman* Empire: He by his usurped power confirms *Herod* in a Kingdome, to which neither the one nor the other had a just title. *Herod* the Great dyes, and his Son *Archelaus*, by *Augustus* his permission, succeeds, who could have no better title than his graceless Father had; upon his misdemeanours, *Augustus* banishes him, and reduces the Kingdom of *Judea* to a Province, giving

John the Baptist.

ving a Tetrarchy to *Herod Antipas*, who beheaded the *Baptist*. All this power did *Augustus* usurp, the true Soveraignty of all these Countreys belonging not to him, but to the Senate of *Rome*, if it belong'd to the *Romans* at all. *Augustus* dyes, and leaves *Tiberius* his adopted Son, to be Successor to his ill-got Empire: *Tiberius* proves a Tyrant, *utroque modo, sine titulo, & exercitio*; He wanted a just claim, because he who gave it him, wanted one himself: But *Tiberius* was wise enough to know, that *Quomodo aliquid acquiritur, eodem modo tenetur*; By what means a thing is acquir'd, by those same means it is kept: And therefore what his Predecessor had gain'd with his Sword, he resolves to maintain with the same, and therefore kept *Judea* Garrison'd with Souldiers. In the fifteenth year of his Cruel and Tyrannical Reign, about the time that Jesus Christ began to Preach, and manifested himself to be the *Messiah*, did the *Roman* Souldiers ask the Baptist, What they should do to be saved? But he neither bid them forsake their trade of Souldiery, or keeping it, to learn another; nor did he say to them, That though their profession of Souldiery was lawful, yet it was not lawful for them to serve in an unjust cause, or under an Usurper and a Tyrant, as *Tiberius* was: And truly this passage is very observable for my purpose, for if it had been told those Souldiers, That they incurr'd the hazzard of eternal damnation by serving in an unjust War, they should presently have laid down their Arms, though the Tyrant should have put them all to death for it: So it seems to me, the *Baptist* thought invincible Ignorance excused them, not knowing the cause to be unjust, But assuredly, if *Tiberius* had ask'd him the question, What he should do? *John* would have bid him resign the Government over to the Senate, and be contented with his own proper goods, and to do no more violence to any man. I believe none will offer to justifie the Invasions and bloody Ambition of the Emperour *Maximianus*, and yet the *Theban* Legion, which was compos'd of Christians, serv'd him faithfully in his Wars, and refus'd none of his Commands, except to Sacrifice to Idols, and for that all of them receiv'd the Crown of Martyrdome; either they thought it did not concern them to examine the cause, or they thought it was just; which was enough to save them from the injustice of it; we may observe here, That neither our Saviour, the *Baptist*, or any of their Apostles or Disciples ever seem'd to take notice of the Usurpation or Tyranny of either *Augustus*, *Tiberius*, *Caligula*, *Claudius*, *Nero*, or *Domitian*; in whose reign (if I mistake not) the longest liv'd Apostle dyed: Our Saviour, as Man not meddling with Secular Powers, his Kingdome not being of this World, both himself and his Apostles ever inculcating on all his followers and Disciples passive obedience to all Superiour Powers, even without exception of Tyrants.

Tiberius his title to the *Roman* Empire was no better than that of his Predecessor, who gave him both the Empire and Title; but *Augustus* had no just title to that Soveraignty which he had usurped, which is clear enough by the History, and much more clear by a resolution he once took to restore the Supreme power to the Senate and the People; but wavering in his thoughts, being loth to wrong his Natural Conscience, by keeping that which did not belong to him; and as loth to make himself a Subject, since he had been a Soveraign: He call'd his two great Friends and Favourites, *Agrippa* and *Mecœnas* to his Council, protesting he would do in that business as they would advise him: *Agrippa* in a long Speech counsell'd him to do Justice, and resign his power; but *Mecœnas* in as long an harangue advis'd him to retain the Soveraignty for the good of the people, preferring Monarchy to both Aristocracy and Democracy; the last Speech fitting the ambition of *Augustus*, prevail'd with him, and made him adhere to his usurpation, by which only he had power to devolve the Succession of the Empire to *Tiberius*. Nor could this *Tiberius* pretend prescription; for That, as Lawyers say, orders possession to be one hundred years old, and all *Augustus* his Reign, even from the first time of his Trimvirate, consisted but of fifty six years. But I believe, Lawyers say also, That in Soveraignties there is no prescription of time, but whenever the just owner can, he may resume his power, which the *Roman* Senate knew very well; when *Nero* fled out of the City, and deserted the Government, they made a Decree, That the Monstrous Tyrant should be put to death *more majorum*; that was, to be well whipp'd, and then

then have his Head cut off. Now we must be very wary to aver, That the Souldiers who were in *Tiberius* his pay, serv'd in a just War, because their Master was left Successor by *Augustus* his Testament, and had the Empire confirm'd to him, by the Votes of the Senate and People of *Rome*; for if that made him a lawful Prince, and his Wars just, then the Armies which serv'd in *Scotland*, *England* and *Ireland*, under *Richard Cromwel*, the pretended Protector of the three Nations, serv'd in a just and lawful War, and under a just and lawful Prince; for *Richard* had the Protectorship and Soveraignty left him by his Father *Oliver* the Usurper, and had the supreme power confirm'd to him by the greater, the more visible and governing party of the three Kingdomes: But as no honest person will aver this, so the other of *Tiberius* can be granted by no judicious man. The Corollary of this discourse will be, first, That the profession of pure Souldiery, though joyn'd with no other trade, is lawful; as also that a Souldier may serve in an unjust and unlawful War, and under an unjust Master, provided he think the Cause and the War just and lawful, because his Ignorance may excuse him. On the other hand, I think, if a Souldier know the cause to be unjust, and the War not to be lawful; nay, if he doubt whether it be just and lawful or not, if he continue to serve in it, he sins heinously, for *qui dubitat damnabitur*, may hold true in this case.

Grotius impertinent.

But *De Grot* in the same place formerly cited, takes a liberty to himself to render the Profession, the Trade, or the Art of a Souldier not only impious, but most contemptible, detestable and despicable: Let us hear him in his own language. "*Parum, quod suam vendunt necem* (says *Grotius*) *nisi & aliorum sæpe* "*Innocentium venderent*; *tanto, Carnifice detestabiliores, quanto pejus est, sine causâ,* "*quàm ex causa occidere. Sicut Antisthenes dicebat, Carnifices Tyrannis esse Sanctio-* "*ores, quod illi Nocentes, hi Innocentes interficerent*: It were no matter, said he, if Souldiers sold only their own lives (or rather their own deaths) but they sell also the lives of others, and often of Innocents; as much are they more detestable than a Hangman, as it is worse to kill without a cause, than with a cause. *Antisthenes* said, Hangmen were more religious than Tyrants, because the first puts to death those who are guilty, the last those who are innocent. This language, Monsieur *de Grot*, is indeed severe enough, but *multa dicis, pauca probas:* Indeed, I think few men would have fancied, that such impertinencies could have dropp'd from the Pen of so learn'd and so wise a man as *Grotius* was esteem'd to be. For first, I shall answer, That it belongs not to the profession of a Souldier, either to sell his own life, or the life of another; much less to sell the life of an Innocent. It is a Souldiers profession, to hazzard his life (not sell it) in the Prince or States service, with whom he has stipulated for wages; and when he is commanded by his Superiours to fight, he is oblig'd to do it, as well as he can, against all that are in Arms against him; and if he kill any of them, it is so far from being his fault, that it is his duty; it is their own fault that are kill'd, who would by fighting, defend an unjust cause: for it must be observed, that both parties think they have Justice on their side, and yet but one of the parties hath it; nor does a Souldier in heat of fight, kill any innocent man, because all his Enemies, and all in Arms against him, are represented to him as guilty, and as such are seeking to take his life; and Nature teacheth all men, That it is better to kill than to be kill'd, because of two evils the least evil is to be chosen. It were to be wish'd, that War might be ended, and an Enemy overcome without killing; for a bloodless Victory is the most honourable: But if that cannot be done, it is folly, nay, madness, to say that Souldiers should not kill their Enemies. I confess, too many Souldiers are cruel in putting to death those whom they might spare, as such who yield themselves Prisoners, (and yet this many times in the heat and ardour of Battel cannot be done without danger) or old people, Women, Children, in assaults and storms; this is the Souldiers excess, this is their fault, this is their crime, (unless they be commanded to do it, which seldome falls out;) but this should not reflect on the profession of Souldiery, as *Grotius* makes it to do, since by the Law of Arms, such peoples lives should be spared; the faults of some should not

not be imputed to all, as *Grotius* does here, and therein he is moſt unjuſt. I ask, If ſome Lawyers, by colluſion with the contrary party, betray the cauſe of their Clients; If ſome Phyſicians poyſon their Patients; and ſome Paſtors of Churches, by preaching Hereſie and Schiſm, kill their Flocks? Muſt all Lawyers be called Knaves and Cheats? all Phyſicians Poyſoners? and all Miniſters of the Goſpel Soul-Murderers? God forbid. I confeſs, when Souldiers kill without cauſe, they are more deteſtable than Hangmen, and deſerve to be puniſh'd by the hands of Hangmen; but *Grotius* was bound in reaſon to have limited his expreſſion, and not have extended it to all Souldiers, as his words bear; and herein he is not only malicious, but ridiculous, in ſuppoſing that Souldiers always kill without cauſe, and never with cauſe; for if this be true, all War is unlawful, which *Grotius* durſt never mutter, far leſs ſpeak out; for in a lawful War, Souldiers kill with cauſe, and when they do it without cauſe, they are liable to puniſhment and cenſure. This unlimited and general expreſſion of *Grotius*, renders *Moſes*, *Joſhuah*, and all thoſe famous *Iſraelites*, who deſtroy'd the *Canaanites*; *Saul*, *Samuel*, and others who put the *Amalekites* to the Sword; *David* and his Worthies, who killed thouſands and ten thouſands of the uncircumciſed, and *Joab* who killed ſo many *Iſrrelites* in *Abſalom*'s Rebellion, and all thoſe of the eleven Tribes who had well near extinguiſh'd the Tribe of *Benjamin*: *Grotius*, I ſay, makes them all more deteſtable than Hangmen. And what is it to the purpoſe to tell us, *Antiſthenes* ſaid, That Tyrants are not ſo pious as Hangmen, becauſe the laſt puts only the guilty, the firſt the innocent to death. What hath that to do with the profeſſion of a Souldier, of which *De Grot* was ſpeaking: As ſure as all Tyrants are not Souldiers, as certain it is that all Souldiers are not Tyrants. Beſides, this great man ſuppoſeth in his compariſon, that which is a manifeſt untruth, That Hangmen put none to death but thoſe who are guilty; certainly *Grotius* did know that moſt, if not all thoſe Innocents, againſt whom Tyrants have pronounced the Sentence of Death, eſpecially in the ten firſt Perſecutions, were executed by the hands of bloody and cruel Hang-men, whom *De Grot* with a ſtrange and odd kind of Charity, prefers before Souldiers. I doubt *Grotius* did not believe, that the Hang-man that beheaded *Oldenbernevelt*, at the *Hague*, with whom *Grotius* was *Socius Criminis*, ſtruck off the Head of a guilty man, for aſſuredly he thought him an Innocent.

I am afraid *De Grot* wrote this (though it came not to light till ſix years after) when he was Priſoner at *Lovenſtein*, beſide *Gorcum*; where he had conceiv'd a mortal hatred againſt Souldiers, perhaps becauſe they guarded him too ſeverely. His comparing Souldiers to Hangmen may have proceeded from the reſtleſs agitations of his troubled thoughts, which may have continually repreſented to his fancy the Idæa or Image of one of thoſe Officers of Juſtice, who had cut off the Head of his Complice *John Oldenbernevelt*, Advocate of *Holland*, and would have done as much to another of his Complices, *Giles Leidenberg*, if he had not uſurp'd the Hangmans Office, and cut his own Throat; it being moſt certain, that *Grotius* himſelf might have run ſuch a hazzard, if his kind Wife had not got him carried away in a Coffer, pretending it was full of Books, and at that time ſure he was oblig'd to Souldiers for neglecting to ſearch the Coffer.

Grotius uncharitable.

The ſame great man *Grotius*, in the before-cited place goes further, and ſays, "*Non eſt inter Artificia, bellum, imo res eſt tam horrenda, ut eam, niſi ſumma "neceſſitas, aut vera charitas honeſtam efficere nequeat*: War, ſays he, is not to be reckon'd among Artifices; nay, it is ſo horrible a thing that nothing can make it honeſt but extreme neceſſity, or true Charity. Well, I ſhall be content to take what he grants, and that is, That War ſometimes is honeſt; and if ſo, I think he muſt grant, that thoſe who manage that honeſt War, and thoſe are Souldiers, may be ſometimes honeſt, and therefore not more deteſtable than Hangmen. Nor do I think any ſober man, endued with any reaſonable proportion of ſolid Judgement, though he had never heard of the name of Jeſus Chriſt, but will readily grant, That War being the greateſt ſcourge of mankind, ſhould not be begun till either our own extreme neceſſity, or the Love and Charity we owe to our Neighbours force us to it;

it; and herein do all the Moral Philoſophers, and the wiſe Rulers of the Ancient Heathens, fully agree with Chriſtian Doctors. But how ſhall that War, which either extreme neceſſity on our own part, or Charity on our Neighbours, makes lawful, be managed but by Souldiers? And how can Souldiers obtain the Victory, but by killing ſometimes their Enemies? And with what Credit, nay, with what Conſcience, or with what comfort can Souldiers kill their Enemies, if the very killing them, render Souldiers more deteſtable than Hangmen? If *Grotius* had ſaid, That thoſe Souldiers who kill'd impotent old Men, Women and Children, or Priſoners in cold blood (as too many do) are more deteſtable than Hangmen, I ſhould never have debated the matter with him, no more than with reaſon he can contradict me, if I ſay, That thoſe Advocates (and *Grotius* was an Advocate) who betray the cauſes of their Clients, who take money and wages from both parties; I add alſo, Thoſe who undertake the patrociny of a cauſe, which themſelves know to be unjuſt and illegal, are more deteſtable than the worſt of thoſe who hang men on a Gallows.

Grotius unintelligible.

But what this great and learned man means, when he writes, *Non eſt inter artificia Bellum*, I do not very well know; if he means there are no artifices in War, he makes a fool of himſelf, for what ſhall then become of all thoſe laudable and lawful Stratagems that are uſed in War, which he himſelf in his Book *De Jure Belli ac pacis*, both mentions and commends: If he means War is not an Art, he ſpeaks palpably againſt Senſe, Reaſon, and Experience; for the management of War is an Art, and as a moſt noble, ſo a moſt neceſſary Art: *Machiavelli*, Recorder of *Florence*, writes ſeven Books of the Art of War, and yet in one of them denies War to be an Art. All Tacticks write of the Art of War, the way to handle Arms, Sword, Dagger, Cannon, Musket, Piſtol, Pike, Partizan, or Halberd; or in more ancient times (before the Monk found out Gun-powder) the way to handle the *Roman Pila*, Javelines, Darts, Arrows, Bows, Slings, Stones, and other Miſſiles; do all prove there is Art in War. The ordering Souldiers in Files, Ranks, Troops, Companies, Squadrons, Batallions, Regiments, and Brigades; the marſhalling and conduct of Armies, fighting of Battels, beſieging and attacking Towns, Caſtles, and defending them, do all bear witneſs, that War is an Art, and more than an ordinary one: It cannot therefore be, that ſo wiſe a man as *Grotius* could think that War is not an Art, but poſitively to tell what he means by thoſe words, is not in my power; and if others can tell no better than I, we muſt be content to want the true ſenſe of them, till *Grotius* riſe from the dead in the day of Judgement; and then, I ſuppoſe, it will not be time to inquire after ſuch follies.

Machiavelli anſwered.

Nicholas Machiavel in the Fourth Book of his Art of War (if I remember right) is yet more ſevere to profeſs'd Souldiers than *Hugo Grotius*; for he ſays, That no Prince or State ſhould ſuffer thoſe who profeſs to live by the Art of War, to dwell under their Jurisdictions, or in their Dominions. This is bad enough, but worſe follows, for he adds, that no virtuous nor good man will profeſs Souldiery to be their livelihood, or uſe War as an Art or Trade; and thoſe who do it, ſays he, muſt of neceſſity be falſe, fraudulent, treacherous and violent. I have anſwered his Raveries in the firſt Chapter of my Military Eſſays of the Modern Art of War: Here I ſhall only ſay, That it were a diſgrace for the Art of Souldiery to be commended by one, whoſe Political Rules introduce Atheiſm, Tyranny, and Cruelty; and who ſets up *Ceſar Borgia*, the Baſtard of Pope *Alexander* the Sixth, to be a Pattern for Princes; than whom the Sun never look'd on a perſon more abandon'd to the contempt of a Deity, guilty of Inhumanity, Treachery, Lechery, and barbarous Cruelty. Let either Chriſtian or all Morally honeſt men judge, whether this Author, this Atheiſt, this *Machiavel*, ſhould have been permitted to have liv'd within the Territories of either Chriſtian Prince or State.

Thoſe who condemn the Profeſſion or Art of Souldiery, ſmell rank of Anabaptiſm and Quakery, both which Sects condemn all War as unlawful; for I conceive, thoſe who grant War to be ſometimes both lawful and neceſſary, muſt of neceſſity grant, that it is lawful for ſome to ſtudy the Art, how to manage

manage that War with the greateſt advantage. Thoſe who are fitteſt to ſtudy it are thoſe who have no other trade or livelihood, for that is the mean to make them ſtudy it the more accurately; and when they have attain'd to ſome perfection in it, why they may not make a Profeſſion of it, and teach it to others for wages, I know not: Do not all profeſſors of Divinity, Medicine, Philoſophy, teach others their Arts and Sciences for wages? Yes aſſuredly; and why ſhould it be denied to a profeſſed Souldier to teach his Art to others for wages, *Muſa mihi cauſas memora*: What I ſpeak of teaching others, I mean of all Military Officers, who by their command and charges are oblig'd to teach their Art to thoſe under their command; and ſince Souldiery is a practical Art, Souldiers of all kinds may ſerve in the Wars (provided the cauſe ſeem juſt to them) as well as Chirurgions may cure men for wages, that are hurt or wounded in the Wars. Hiſtories tell us, and our experience and ſence teach us, That Peace and War are alternative, and there be but few Kingdoms in the World that have not felt the ſmart of War, as long as they have enjoyed the fruits of Peace. May not I then conclude, That the Art of Souldiery and the Profeſſion of it for wages, is as lawful, and as neceſſary too, as the profeſſion of any of thoſe Arts or Sciences, which can neither be conveniently taught, or learn'd, but in the time of Peace.

St. *Paul*'s authority.

But to conclude, I avouch that St. *Paul*'s opinion concerning this queſtion was the ſame with mine; and I have reaſon to think, That great Apoſtle's authority will weigh more with men who profeſs the name of Chriſt, than either *Grotius* or *Machiavel*: If I miſtake not, that great Doctor of the *Gentiles* thought the Art of Souldiery, conſider'd a part, and diſtinguiſh'd from all other Arts, either Liberal or Mechanical, very lawful, and therefore compar'd not the profeſſors of it to infamous people, ſuch as *Grotius* knew Hangmen to be. On the contrary, the Apoſtle propoſes a pure Souldier, who waited only on his own Art of War, as a fit example for his Son *Timothy* to follow: Read the third and fourth verſes of the ſecond Chapter of his Second Epiſtle to *Timothy*, you will find theſe words, *Thou therefore endure hardneſs, as a good Souldier of Jeſus Chriſt. No man that Warreth, entangleth himſelf with the things of this life, that he might pleaſe him who hath hired him to be a Souldier.* The *French* Tranſlation hath it, *the affairs of this life*; the *Italian*, *the doings of this life*; the *German* hath it, *no Warriour ſeeks another livelihood.* This is much, and more than I deſire; for, I think, it were good for Souldiers to have learned ſome othe Art, or Trade, than that of Souldiery only. *Deodati* expounds theſe words [*in the doings of this life*;] that is, ſays he, in ſuch affairs, ſuch Art, or ſuch Trades, as may hinder a Souldier in his duty of Souldiery. Be that as it will, I avouch, That the Apoſtle in theſe words, pronounceth the pure Art of a meer Souldier, without any other Art or Trade, to be moſt lawful, elſe he had made no appoſite compariſon between *Timothy* and a Souldier; which, I preſume, none who hath read *Paul*'s Epiſtles, and believes them to be endited by the Holy Ghoſt, will be ſo impious as to fancy. By this Text, a Chriſtian man may very lawfully apply himſelf to the profeſſion of pure Souldiery, without learning any other Art or Trade. And I think alſo, that *Timothy* was exhorted, if not commanded to apply himſelf only to the Miniſtry of the Goſpel, and to no other Art; yet if he had learn'd any other way of livelihood, before *Paul* circumcis'd him, it would not have been forbid him: *Paul* himſelf, before his converſion, had learn'd to be a Tent-maker, which he exercis'd for his livelihood, when he preach'd the Goſpel: *Luke* the Evangeliſt, before his Baptiſm, was a Phyſician, which, no doubt, he practis'd all the time he accompanied St. *Paul* in his Voyages. But, I think, by this Text, men are forbid to learn any other Art, after they are actual Miniſters of the Goſpel. And therefore, I conceive, Church-men are forbid to have plurality of Profeſſions; which perhaps they will be contented to hear with better will, than to have it told them, That plurality of Benefices is forbidden the Clergy.

St. *Auſtin*'s authority.

But becauſe *Grotius* hath made uſe of St. *Auſtine*'s authority againſt me, in this queſtion which I have cleared, I ſhall preſume to cite that ſame Father in defence of my cauſe: It is true, I have read but few of his learned Books, but

but the passage I mind to speak of, I have read, cited by a very worthy and credible Author; and though he cites it for another purpose, yet finding it makes very much for mine, I could not chuse but make use of it: The words are in one of his Books against the *Manichees*, and are these, "*Non est potestas* "*nisi à Deo, sive jubente, sive sinente; Ergo vir justus, si fortè sub Rege etiam Sacri-* "*lego militat, rectè potest, illo jubente, Bellare; quemadmodum enim Regem facit* "*reum Iniquitas imperandi, ita Innocentem Militem facit ordo serviendi. English* me this, Monsieur *de Grot*; but because you either cannot or will not, I both can and will: There is no power, says he, but from God, either commanding or permitting it, therefore if sometimes a Righteous man serves as a Souldier under a Sacrilegious King, he may lawfully fight when he is commanded; for as the sin of commanding makes that King Guilty, so the obedience of serving makes that Souldier Innocent. This is more than I have yet said, this great and pious Divine seems to me to assert, That a Souldiers Art is not only lawful, but that he is bound to fight when commanded, even in a cause, the Justice whereof does not appear to him; yea, though the Injustice of it be made apparent to him. But assuredly St. *Austin* meant to except those things which are diametrically against the word and Will of God; for the rule holds firm and perpetual, Better obey God than Man: In other matters, the Souldier is not so strictly to examine the quarrel, the sin of commanding to fight in an unjust cause, rendering the Souldiers obedience in fighting, blameless and innocent. Hence it will follow, That a profess'd Souldier, who knows no other Art or Trade, may lawfully make profession of his skill, and practise it in any part of the World for wages, so he fight not for those who are profess'd Enemies of the name of Christ, against those who profess it; for I do not at all doubt, but Christian Souldiers, who make a profession of Souldiery, and have no other way of livelihood but to fight for wages, may very lawfully serve either the Sophi of *Persia*, or the great Mogul of *India*, against the Great *Turk*, because though they be all three equally blasphemous adorers of the *Alcoran*; yet the Wars of the first two may divert the Grand Signior from the Invasion of Christendome.

Tertullian's authority.

Give me leave to take the help of another Doctor, and Father of the Christian Church, and that is *Tertullian*, whom I find cited by many others, to prove taking Arms against Soveraign power unlawful. The passage is in that Apologetick which he wrote in vindication of the Primitive Christians, persecuted by Heathen Emperours: I shall only cite the words that I conceive make for my purpose; "*Cui Bello non prompti fuimus? cui Bello non idonei,* "*etiam impares Copiis, qui nunc tam libenter trucidamur?* To what War, says he, were we not fit? to what War were we not ready, though fewer in number of forces, who now are content willingly to be slain? In these words observe that profess'd Christians were Souldiers, and fought willingly, and without constraint, (and for pay too you may be sure) under the Banners of Heathen, yea, Persecuting Emperours, without examining the Justice of the War, which ordinarily was very oft wanting with those Princes, who measured the equity of their cause by the length of their Sword. I doubt not, but the War which the Tyrant *Maximianus* made, was neither just nor lawful, yet the *Theban* Legion, consisting of six thousand Christians, serv'd faithfully in that War, and found no opposition in their Consciences to that Military employment: But when that Pagan Emperour commanded them to Sacrifice to his false Deities and Idols, then they flatly refus'd obedience, knowing surely they were not oblig'd to disobey God, by giving obedience to Man; and offer'd their Throats to be cut, and gave their Bodies to be butcher'd to death by the rest of his Heathen Army. *Julian* the Apostate, who with both force and fraud, endeavour'd to root out the Christian Name and Religion, had thousands of Christians who served under him in his Wars, who, I suppose, never examin'd the Justice of them; for if they had, they would have found that even that very War he made against the *Persians*, (wherein he dyed, as is said, blaspheming the name of the Son of God) was grounded only on Ambition to enlarge the limits of the *Roman* Empire; and such a reason even the moral Heathen, much less the Christians, did never acknow-

acknowledge to be a juſt or lawful cauſe of War. By vertue then of theſe paſſages and precedents, Souldiers may make a profeſſion of the Art of War, and may practiſe it, and ſerve for Wages, though they neither know nor examine, whether the cauſe be juſt or not. But I ſhall conclude this diſcourſe, as they ſay *Bellarmine* did one of his, but in another caſe, and ſay, It is moſt ſafe to truſt to the Juſtice and Equity of the cauſe, and to examine it well, before men engage in it.

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